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ASPECTS OF

MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

AND ITS RELATION TO

HĪNAYĀNA

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD

BY

PROF. LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN
of the University of Ghent, Belgium

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1930

TO

DR NARENDRA NATH LAW

THIS HUMBLE TRIBUTE

OF

ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP

FOREWORD

MY DEAR FRIEND,

You have done me an honour by requesting me to write a few words by way of Preface for your work on the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and this request reminds me indeed of the many happy hours passed by us in the study of some Buddhist texts and in the discussion of the innumerable questions, of which your well-meaning curiosity expected to have from me the solutions Often our learned palabra did not of course yield satisfactory solutions, it drifted on, one śāstra leading us to another, commencing from Hīnayāna, we landed in *Vijñaptimātratā* where quite naturally we lost ourselves While making our way, however, each of us profited by the discussions

Your aim, rather modest, is to present a clear view of the relations historical and doctrinal, between the two Vehicles, and your book responds very well to your purpose In your treatment of the numerous questions interesting in themselves and more interesting by reason of their general significance, you have not omitted to direct your attention to the exposition of the process of ideas, the action of foreign influences, the stages covering some centuries and an extensive region, by which the early form of Buddhism developed into the wonderful efflorescence of beliefs, myths and metaphysics of the Great Vehicle It will be clear to your readers that the systems of the Great Vehicle are an adaptation of the theories of the Small Vehicle *prāptis* and *bījas*, *asaṃskṛtas*, *kāyas*, the *tathatā* itself, the *Sukhāvatīs* and the heaven of Maitreya, etc It is necessary to understand that there was never anything like Protestantism in the history of Buddhism It is this that you show very well in the course of an examination of an important point

You have not denied yourself the trouble of giving expositions of the topics on which you have some new observations to make I wish you had expanded the portion dealing with the history of Buddhism into three or more independent chapters One can well see from your volume

that the Buddhism of the most ancient sūtras differs from that of the philosophical sūtras, the Buddhism of the Mahāsāṅghikas is not the Buddhism of the Sarvāstivādins, which again is not identical with that of the Sthaviras, the Mahāyānic tendencies, both doctrinal and religious, are of great antiquity and the Mahāyānic writings refer to aspects of Buddhism very different from one another, e g., the *Lalita*, the *Puṇḍarīka*, the *Prajñās*, and the treatises of Asanga, not to speak of the *Sraddhotpāda* and such other works, in which the archaic Śākyamuni disappears giving place to the five Jinas The researches which will give a little of chronology and geography have hardly been begun Accordingly you do not pretend to write the history of Hīnayāna-Mahāyāna, that is to say, the history of Buddhism

One of your best chapters, the newest by virtue of both the subject and the method, is that devoted to the *Vinaya* of the Great Vehicle While reading it I have taken many of your notes and references You have rectified some errors that have been current for a long time We know that the Chinese pilgrims noticed long ago that the members of the two Vehicles resided together in a number of convents The monks,—some adhering to the Great Vehicle and some to the Small, but belonging to the same sect, as also members of different sects within the convent of a particular sect,—lived in excellent harmony performing in unison the ecclesiastical acts, and evidently complying quite closely with the same disciplinary rules Many European critics, not the less, or the least prudent, have denied it in the name of logic "The sects have for their basis", says one of them, "not only traditional formalities but also some canonical writings, and precise doctrines, a sect divided into two *yānas* is therefore almost inconceivable The statements of this nature found in the accounts of the Chinese pilgrims are due probably to confusion, or point to variations purely local and do not permit one to draw from them a general principle." All this is not clear, but we know, from the account given by I-tsing, the story of a Buddhist of the Great Vehicle, who had a horror for meat food his master, of the Small Vehicle, refused him ordination as long as he did not eat the "three

pure (kinds of meat)" This anecdote, so touching, shows where the difficulty lies The master of Cittavarman saw nothing wrong in the fact that his disciple read books of the Great Vehicle, his sect had undoubtedly definite views about *sarvam asti*, about the inutility of the cult of the Bodhisattvas and so forth, but these were problems that did not affect the life of the monks within a convent The important point is the respect shown to the traditional *Vinaya* Cittavarman's master cannot tolerate the scruples about eating which Cittavarman had foolishly learnt from the *Laṅkāvatāra* In the same way, the king of Koutcha received respectfully Hiouen Tsang despite his Mahāyānism, but he had in mind to persuade him to take pure meat Nevertheless, Cittavarman was received amongst the convinced and irreconcilable Hīnayānists, but all Hīnayānists were not of this sort and finally the diversities of diet were allowed in the same convent

In fact, Mahāyāna is sometimes allied to Tāntrism, it has sometimes sanctioned the marriage of monks and the overthrow of the ancient Buddhist institution It cannot be denied that from the beginning it had a tendency to place the lay-supporters on the side of, if not above, the monks But you show well that the Mahāyānic disciplinary initiatives at the earliest stage were very modest, the purpose was satisfied by adding a certain number of new rules to the ancient Vinaya (the avoidance of meat and so forth) and by increasing the rigour of some precepts The scale of values is modified, it is believed that the preaching of the Law and service to others are more precious than the exercises which are of personal utility and certain ancient rules, though favourable to Arhatism—"no possession, no anxiety" —were no longer regarded as obligatory The progress was generally slow but it was pursued without any harm "The upholders of the more rigorous discipline should not be blamed, the upholders of the less rigorous are also blameless" Devadatta, the Abbe Tempête of the history of Buddhism, did not play an important rôle in this history As concerns the doctrines, it cannot be conceived that Vasubandhu on adopting the doctrine of Tathatā had to quit his sect for

entering into a sect of the Mahāyānists. Where are the sects of the Mahāyānists, and by which names should they be known? There are only eighteen sects, all of which were represented in the assemblage of scholars of Nālandā. Can it be doubted that the communities of the Sthaviras practised the cult of relics? However, according to the definite views found in the *Dīgha*, the cult of relics concerns the laity and not the monks, whose endeavour should be exclusively confined to the supermundane.

Your critical *exposé* of the views formerly and lately offered concerning Nirvāna is very lucid. It is a problem full of difficulties because it is not easy for unmystical minds to understand a thing which can only be "realised" in trance. Clearly, the Hīnayāna denied the existence of any psychological principle outside the Skandhas. Evidently the Skandhas (which are also named Upādhi) disappear at the death of a saint. Nevertheless if the (Sautrāntika) author of the *Sūtra* says "Five things are mere name *viz.*, things of the past, things of the future, space, Pudgala and Nirvāna" the Buddhists, as a rule, admit that Nirvāna is bliss but the saint, when dead, does not touch, seize, possess, realize Nirvāna as he used to do when living. Such is the doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā*. For early Buddhists, the Nirvāna was, of course, an immortal state beyond existence and non-existence. The thirst for non-existence is very bad; the aspiration to Nirvāna is the very root of salvation and happiness.

In conclusion, I do not wish to omit to point out the diligence with which you have collected the information and discussed the few points with which we are acquainted about the geographical origin of Mahāyāna, and also the interesting results that you have furnished by your study of the *Prajñāpāramitās*.

It now remains for me to thank you for your desire that my name should be associated with your work.

Yours very sincerely,
LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

BRUXELLES
5th November, 1929

PREFACE

The object of this work is to present an exposition of the principal doctrines of Mahāyāna as found in the early Mahāyānic treatises and to show points of agreement and difference between the doctrines of Hīnayana and Mahāyāna. For the convenience of comparison and for comprehending clearly the gradual changes undergone by the Buddhistic doctrines, I have sometimes placed in a detached way the views as found in the authoritative texts of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna without attempting to mix them up into a composite whole. The reason for following this method of presentation is that the Buddhist texts are the products of different periods and regions separated sometimes by long distances of time and space and, therefore, they cannot always be expected to fit into one homogeneous whole. It would be obliterating the signposts of development of philosophical or religious thought or its distinctions due to its development in different schools or regions if we treat the views embodied in the different treatises as a composite entity. The views found in every volume of the Buddhist scriptures should be subjected to an examination from this standpoint before they could be mixed up into an amalgam. In these circumstances, it will be helpful to Buddhistic studies if the facts collected from the various texts be stated accurately but in separate groups so as not to blur in any way the peculiar significance of each group.

The FIRST chapter is meant to help the readers to have a bird's-eye view of Buddhism for about seven centuries. The doctrines dealt with in the second and subsequent chapters belong to this period, though the sources from which the information has been drawn may be later.

The SECOND chapter shows that the Mahāyānists regarded themselves as the true followers of Buddha, and asserted that Buddha had only one form of teaching, the Mahāyāna, but the Hīnayānists being, according to the Mahāyānists, intellectually weak, could not comprehend it thoroughly

They considered themselves far superior to the Hinayānists and adduced reasons for this superiority

The THIRD chapter is divided into four sections It will be found from the *first* section that according to the *Saddharmapundarīka* and other Mahāyāna texts, the Hinayāna teaching was only an expedient adopted by Buddha to suit the mental calibre of his early disciples, and that the Hinayānists were taught only Pudgalaśūnyatā and not Dharmaśūnyatā It has been shown in the *second* section that the Buddha of the Hinayānists was really, according to the Mahāyāna view one of his Nirmānakāyas, his two other kāyas being Sambhoga and Dharma A review of the speculations of Trikāya in the various texts has been given in the section The *third* section treats of the interpretations of Nirvāna In it the conclusions drawn by scholars from the Pitaka passages have been reviewed and the expositions of Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna and others have been summarised and compared The *fourth* section deals with the four Truths and the Causal Law, the Paramārthasatyas of the Hinayānists They are, however, Samvrtisatyas to the Mahāyānists, whose Paramārtha or Parinispanna-satya is Dharmaśūnyatā or Tathatā

The FOURTH chapter contains an exposition of the Bodhisattva-bhūmis, showing that the first six bhūmis correspond to the four stages of spiritual progress of the Hinayānists and that the last four bhūmis are meant exclusively for bodhisattvas for the comprehension of Dharmaśūnyatā or Dharmasamatā and the acquisition of the extra ordinary powers of a Buddha

It has been shown in the FIFTH chapter that the Mahāyānists depended upon the Hinayānists for their disciplinary code, adding to it some rules and practices in conformity with their own ideals

In the APPENDIX an attempt has been made to ascertain the probable time of composition of the *Prajñāpāramitās*

The difficulty of finding suitable English equivalents of the technical terms of Buddhist philosophy has compelled me at times to use the original Pāli and Sanskrit words without their English renderings To make these words

easily intelligible, an alphabetical list of same with the English renderings has been given at the end of the book

A tendency is noticeable in scholars making a special study of a particular branch of Buddhistic literature to develop a love for same, leading him to look upon the other branches of the literature with disfavour This accounts for the lack of sympathy sometimes evinced by a scholar in the field of Hīnayāna towards the subjects pertaining to Mahāyāna This state of things ought to be removed by a widening of outlook through an extension of the field of study by each scholar so as to embrace the one towards which he is unsympathetic without any good grounds

In sectarian disputes it is not unusual that one sect should misrepresent the views of the rival sect As the result of my study of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, however, I can state without hesitation that the Buddhist writers are not open to this charge Uniformly, the Mahāyāna works have represented accurately the position of the Hīnayānists This can be well corroborated by actual references to the Hīnayāna works in regard to the expositions of particular Hīnayānic views I have attempted to demonstrate that the Mahāyānists had no personal grudge against the Hīnayānists though, of course, the doctrines of the former differed essentially from those of the latter The Mahāyānic criticisms of the Hīnayānic doctrines throw a flood of light on points which would have remained obscure if we had to depend on the Hīnayāna works alone In order to clear up their own position, the Mahāyānists carefully analysed the Hīnayāna doctrines Hence, instead of obscuring or misrepresenting the position of the Hīnayānists, the Mahāyāna works made substantial contributions towards the elucidation of Hīnayānic doctrines Hence, to my mind, it is essential that we should utilise both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna works in order to arrive at the right conclusions with regard to the Buddhist doctrines

In conclusion, I want to acknowledge my debts of gratitude to the scholars who have rendered me help in various ways in the preparation of this work I am thankful to Prof R L Turner, Dr L D Barnett and Dr N N Law, under

whose directions the plan of the book was matured and who did not spare themselves the trouble of going through it to remove its blemishes The sympathy with which Dr Barnett used to come to us, the Indian students, in the Oriental Room of the British Museum to furnish us with the pieces of useful information come across by him in the course of his studies and to help us otherwise in our subjects of research will always be a pleasant memory to me The help derived by me from Prof Louis de la Vallée Poussin of the University of Ghent proved very fruitful Little did he realize the services he was rendering to me through the answers to my "queries" which by their nature and number often taxed to the utmost his delicate health But his genial temper was never ruffled, and the best efforts were made by him to lead me through the maze of technicalities of the Mahāyāna scriptures It was indeed a pleasure to meet him at Brussels in his cosy study with the master-minds of the Buddhistic age preserved in the numerous volumes nicely arranged all around He has increased my obligation to him by contributing a Foreword to this volume My thanks are also due to Prof Max Walleser of Heidelberg and Dr E J Thomas of Cambridge for giving me facilities for research, the former by placing his whole library at my disposal during my stay at Heidelberg and guiding me to consult the Tibetan and Chinese works, and the latter by enabling me to have access to the rare Buddhist manuscripts deposited in the Cambridge University Library I also take this opportunity to express my thanks to the Principal of the London School of Oriental Studies, Dr E D Ross, who is always ready to extend his helping hand to the Indian students, and who took much interest in my Tibetan and Chinese studies

Though this work was written in Europe, I had in India a few sincere friends who helped me in diverse ways in spite of the distance, particularly mentionable among them is Prof Durgamohan Bhattacharya, M A, of the Scottish Church College

Mr N C Barua, M A, has helped me much by preparing the Index to this work The way in which a young friend of

mine, Mr Abani Mohan Chakravarti, has assisted me in making my manuscript ready for the Press merits special mention As a mere expression of gratitude to Dr. N N. Law would be inadequate for the help received from him, I take this opportunity to dedicate to him this humble volume

The acknowledgments of my indebtedness will not be complete unless I express my gratitude to the authorities of the Post-graduate Arts Department of the Calcutta University for the study-leave granted to me for enabling me to prosecute my researches in Europe.

NALINAKSHA DUTT

Calcutta University

30th July, 1930

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

A Historical Survey of the Period of Transition from Hinayāna to Mahāyāna

The history of Buddhism for the first six or seven centuries may be looked upon as covering the following three periods

A EARLY OR PURE HINAYĀNA BUDDHISM, preserved mainly in the Pāli Nikāyas and Vinaya, or in the fragments of their Sanskrit versions hitherto discovered

B MIXED HINAYĀNA BUDDHISM, represented by the various schools which came into existence about a century after Buddha's death The sources for this period are scanty, being limited to a few books, either expressly attributed to a particular school or having sufficient evidence to indicate the school to which the works belong, and also the treatises dealing exclusively with the history of the schools and their doctrines

C THE BEGINNING OF MAHĀYĀNA, or as Rosenberg puts it, the period of conflict between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna [1] The sources for this period are mainly the *Prajñāpāramitās*, the *Saddharma Pundarika*, the *Daśabhūmikasutra*, the *Gandavyūha*, the *Lankāvatāra* as also the works of Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghosa, Asanga and others so far as they throw light on the relative position of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

FIRST PERIOD

(i e , circa 450 to 350 B C)

A EARLY OR PURE HĪNAYĀNA BUDDHISM

There has already arisen a fairly large amount of literature upon the first period (i e , the first century after the inception

[1] A similar division was also suggested by Wassiljew in his *Buddhismus*, pp 38 ff Die erste Periode = ein Jahrhundret nach dem Tode des Buddha, die zweite Periode = die Zeit des Streits, und die dritte Periode = Mahāyāna

Rosenberg divides the period a little differently in *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, p 35 Die Periode des sogenannten "reinen

of Buddhism), offering us solutions of many problems—a result which has been made possible by the strenuous labours of the Pāli Text Society in regard to the publication of the Pāli canonical texts By the early or pure Hīnayāna Buddhism, we mean only that form of Buddhism which is presented to us by a considerable portion of the Vinaya and the four Nikāyas[1] For the present purpose of drawing a rough sketch of the period of transition from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna we shall state some of the conclusions reached by scholars about the Buddhism of this period in order to ascertain how it changed in course of time and gave rise to the different schools These conclusions are as follows —

Hinayana" und seiner verschiedenen Richtungen d h der älteste Buddhismus, die Periode des Entstehens des Mahayana und seines Kampfes mit dem Hinayana die Periode des Sieges und des Aufbluhens des Mahayana The first two periods of Rosenberg's division cover our three

[1] Not all the suttas of all the Nikāyas, because there are many that were incorporated in a later period The *Khuddaka Nikāya* contains a few early works, but many are of much later date The *Divyāvadāna* always speaks of four Āgamas, implying that the four Nikāyas or Āgamas were the only recognised canonical texts even at the time of the compilation of the *Divyāvadāna* See *Divyā*, pp 17, 253, 333 Prof Bapat contends in his article, "The different strata in the literary material of the Dīgha Nikāya" in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute* (vol VIII, pt i) that the Pāli canon like all other sacred literatures is 'a mosaic of earlier and later material' His view is that the suttas, containing among other things, accounts of miracles, mythological, and metaphysical or Buddhological speculations are later than those which contain simple teachings of sīla, samādhi and paññā It is difficult to agree with some of his conclusions, specially his remarks that the suttas of the first volume of the *Digha Nikāya* are earlier than those of the second, and that the suttas of the second are earlier than those of the third, for in the first volume there are suttas like Kevaddha, Ambattha, containing materials, which, according to his own statement, should be of a later date

As early as 1911, Prof Winternitz in his learned review of the translations of the *Digha Nikāya* in the *J R A S* raised this point of the Nikāyas being a mosaic of materials, early and late He analysed the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta and the Mahāpadāna sutta, and showed the various strata contained in them. Prof Bapat does not seem to have noticed this review as otherwise he could have seen many other means of testing the different strata These matters, however, are still far from a complete solution.

1. The spread of Buddhism was confined to a few towns or villages situated in the central belt of India from the east to the west Of these the more noteworthy are (commencing from the east) · Kajangala, Campā, Rājagaha, Gayā, Kāsi, Nālandā, Pātaliputta, Vesāli, Sāvatthi, the dominion of the Licchavis, Vajjis, Videhas, Mallas, Bhaggas, and Koliyas, Kosambi, Sankassa, Ujjeni, Avanti, Madhurā, and Verañja There were a few adherents who came from the northern country of Maddarattha, and two brāhmana villages of Kuru, and also from the southern places like Patitthāna Gandhā a and Takkhasilā were as yet unknown to them [1]

2 The kings and clans mentioned in them are all pre-Asokan, *e g*, Bimbisāra, Ajātasattu, Pasenadi Kosala, and Canda Pajjota, and the clans like the Bulis, Kolivas, and Vajjis [2]

3 The place of the laity was not yet well defined Laymen appeared more as supporters of the Sangha than as its actual members They only revered Buddha and his disciples, heard their teachings, and observed some of the precepts and, on occasions, uttered the formulae of *triśarana*—the only mark that distinguished a devotee of Buddha from others This however, did not affect their social status, which in India has always been associated with religion, as they continued to be the members of the society to which they belonged [3]

4 The religion in its full form was meant exclusively for those who would retire from the household life, enter the order of monks, and observe the *Pātimokkha* rules, the observance of which was not possible for a householder Householders could not observe completely even the ten *sīlas*

5 The *Pāramitās* were yet unknown. The *Life of Buddha* usually commenced from the time of retirement to the attainment of Bodhi with occasional references to his previous existences, as in the *Mahāgovinda sutta* or the *Mahāsudassana*

[1] See my *Early History etc*, pp 82 ff, E J. Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, Map

[2] *Ibid*

[3] N Law, *Studies in Indian History and Culture*, ch. v, "Early Buddhism and the Laity."

sutta The conception of the life of a Bodhisattva performing *pāramis* was hazy, if not unknown [1]

6 The *Jātakas*, as one of the nine Angas, referred to only some of the stories relating to the previous births of Buddha as found in the *Mahāgovinda*, *Mahāsudassana*, *Makhādeva* and other *Jātakas* traced by Dr Rhys Davids in the *Nikāyas* and *Vinaya* but they did not appear as yet as a separate collection depicting the Bodhisattva's practice of the *pāramitās* [2]

7 Buddha was a human being but possessed of omniscience, supernatural powers, and other attainments unattainable by other beings [3] The appearance of a Buddha is exceedingly rare in the world, only one occurring in several kalpas

8 The doctrines were confined to the three essentials, *Anicca*, *Dukkha*, and *Anatta* and the four *Ariyasaccas*, the *Paticcasamuppāda*, and the *Atthangika-magga*, practices were limited to the thirty-seven *Bodhipakkhika dhammas* The practices were usually divided under three heads *sīla* (moral precept) *samādhi* (mental training), and *paññā* (development of insight and knowledge enabling one to realise the Truth)

9 The goal of life was Arhathood and rarely Paccekabuddhahood, but never Buddhahood The stages of progress to Arhathood were four, *viz*, *sotāpanno*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*

10 Nibbāna was a state of absolute rest and marked the end of all *kilesas* (afflictions) and hence of all *dukkha* It was an extremely happy and peaceful (*sānta*, *panīta*, *accantasukha*) condition

SECOND PERIOD

(i.e , circa 150 to 100 B C.)

B MIXED HĪNAYĀNA BUDDHISM

The history of the events and doctrines of Buddhism of this period—one of the most important periods in its history—is still not fully known , first, because the sources from which the

[1] See *E R E*, II, sv Bodhisattva [2] See *infra*, pp 6 f

[3] See Saunders, *Epochs in Buddhist History*, pp xviii xix for a scheme of Buddhology.

reconstruction can be made are scanty,[1] and secondly, because the dates of composition of those that are available have not yet been definitely ascertained This period witnessed the breaking up of the Buddhist Sangha into many sections and the scattering of these sections over the various parts of India, each growing in its own way Though dissensions in the Church may be undesirable from the orthodox point of view, they were indicative of the great interest taken by the disciples in ascertaining the real teachings of Buddha as also of the attempts to interpret the old teachings in a new way, and to adapt them to the changed circumstances brought about by the advancement of thought for over a century

THE GROWTH OF THE *Abhidhamma* LITERATURE

To keep pace with this movement of thought the older schools had to gird up their loins in order to make their position strong and unassailable As the result of this effort, we have the Abhidhamma literature of the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda schools The great agreement between the Nikāyas (=Āgamas)[2] and the Vinaya[3] of the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda schools, and the great disagreement between their Abhidhamma[4] literatures show clearly that while compil-

[1] *E g* Sanskrit *Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara*, *Divyāvadāna*, *Avadāna sataka*, *Aśokāvadāna*, Vasumitra's treatise on the Schools, fragments of the Sanskrit Canon discovered in Eastern Turkestan and the neighbouring regions,

Pali *Kathāvatthu*, *Milinda pañha*, Ceylonese chronicles, *Nikāya sangraha*

[2] Theravāda Suttapitaka *Dīghanikāya*, *Majjhimanikāya*, *Anguttaranikāya*, *Saṃyuttanikāya* and *Khuddakanikāya*

Sarvāstivāda *Dirghāgama*, *Madhyamāgama*, *Ekottarāgama* and *Saṃyuktāgama*

[3] Theravāda Vinayapitaka *Pātimokkha*, *Mahāvagga*, *Cullavagga*, *Suttavibhanga* and *Parivāra*

Sarvāstivada Vinayapitaka *Vinayavastu*, *Prātimoksasūtra*, *Vinayavibhāga*, *Vinayaksudrakavastu* and *Vinaya-uttaragrantha*

[4] Theravada Abhidhamma *Dhammasangani*, *Vibhanga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna*

Sarvastivāda Abhidhamma *Sangitiparyāya*, *Dhātukāya*, *Prajñaptisāra*, *Dharmaskandha*, *Vijñānakāya* and *Prakaranapāda*.

For details see *Early History etc* , pp 277 ff.

ing their Nikāyas and the essential parts of the Vinayas, the two schools lived close to each other in Magadha or thereabouts,[1] and utilised a common source,[2] but while compiling their Abhidhammas, they were far from each other and developed the Abhidhamma literatures independently[3] From the nature of the contents of the *Kathāvatthu* of the Theravādins, it is also evident that the Abhidhammas were developed not only to add strength to their respective views but also to criticise the views of their opponents and establish their own against them Hence, we can say that this period witnessed not only the appearance of the new schools but also a new development of the older ones[4]

THE APPEARANCE OF THE *Jātakas* AND *Avadānas*

Besides the efforts of the old and the new schools to vie with one another in the field of literature, one notices also a keen competition among them for propagating among the masses the tenets of their respective schools, which, as a matter of fact, resulted in a great measure in the wide propagation of Buddhism[5] It is a well-known fact that the *Jātakas* and the

[1] *i e* in the first period

[2] For a comparison of the fragments of Sarvāstivada Āgamas with the corresponding portions of the Pali Nikāyas, see Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains etc*, pp 30 ff

For the correspondence, verbal and otherwise, between the *Prātimokṣa sūtra* of the Sarvāstivādins and the *Pātimokkha* of the Theravādins see *J A*, 1913 see also Lévi, *J.A*, 1912, Oldenberg, *Z D M G*, vol lii, Watanabe, *Tables of Problems in the Saṃyukta Āgama and Saṃyutta Nikāya* (Tokio, 1926)

[3] See *J P T S*, 1904-5, pp 60 ff

[4] An evidence for the later growth of the *Abhidamma* literature is the orthodox tradition (*Attha*, pp 28-32) that Buddha did not preach the *Abhidhamma in extenso* but gave only the *mātikā*, which was later on developed by Sāriputta and handed down by him through his disciples to Revata This evidence is important in view of the fact that this is a statement made by persons who believe that every thing of the scriptures is Buddhavacana The rejection of the *Abhidhamma* by the Mahāsāṅghikas as non canonical is also an evidence in support of our contention See *Early History etc*, p 235 In the *Kośa-vyākhyā* (p 12) it is stated that the *Abhidharma* was preached in fragments by Buddha

[5] The inscriptions, which speak of the gifts made to a particular

Avadānas were meant for inspiring in the minds of the people a faith in Buddhism and thus popularising the religion [1] The Jātakas were only an afterthought of the Theravādins They originally did not form part of their scriptures (*Buddhavacana*) The *Jātaka Book* [2] or the floating mass of Jātakas, some of which found their way into the famous stone-monuments of India, belongs certainly to an ancient date as is proved by scholars like Rhys Davids, Cunningham, Oldenberg, and Winternitz, but still all of them are not considered to be of the same age as the *Nikāyas* Rhys Davids' suggestion that the stories found both in the *Nikāyas* (*i e*, Suttanta-Jātakas of the *Cullaniddesa*) and in the *Jātaka* collection form the oldest type of Jātaka stories and may be called pre-*Jātaka* is of great value [3]

The mention of Jātakas among the *Navāngas*, a very ancient division of the Buddhist scripture, may lead one to think that the most ancient Buddhists were not without a Jātaka literature of their own This seems plausible at first sight, but it should be remembered that the division of Buddhist scriptures into nine Aṅgas does not refer to nine different groups of literature but to nine types of composition to be found in the collections of the ancient Buddhists In

school, add sometimes that the gifts were meant also for the *cāturdiśa saṅghas*, *i e*, members of the Buddhist Sangha in general

Compare the *Ava Ś*, p xxxix (*Kalpadrumāvadāna*)

Gacchata bhikṣavo yūyam sattvānam vinayārthataḥ,
Deśān pratyabhigacchantaḥ prakāśayata *samvṛtim*

(The word *saṃvṛti* in this verse is noteworthy The Mahāyānists will not admit that the *dharmas* which were mostly propagated by the Hinayānists at first were anything but the truth in disguise There is, of course, also the hint that *paramārtha* truth is a matter for realisation and cannot be the subject of preaching)

[1] See Speyer, Preface to the *Ava Ś*, pp v, vi

[2] In the *I H Q*, vol iv, p 6, Prof Winternitz draws our attention to the fact that the Mandalay and Phayre Mss of the Jātaka-Book (*i.e.*, Verse-Jātaka) have been examined by Dr Weller and found to be extracts made from the Jātaka commentary He, however, still cherishes the view that there was a canonical Jātaka-Book and that it was in verses

[3] *Buddhist India*, pp 190 f, Mr G D De (*Cal Rev* 1929-30) however shows that versions of some of the Suttanta-Jātakas are posterior to the versions of those of the Jātaka-Atthakathā, hence all Nikāya-Jātakas are not of the oldest type and cannot be called pre-Jātaka

one Sutta or Suttanta there may be portions which can be called a *sutta*, a *geyya*[1], a *gāthā*, an *udāna*, a *veyyākarana*, an *abbhutadhamma*, or a *jātaka*. It was long after the navāṅga division was known that the compilations *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, and *Jātaka* came into existence. The explanation of navāngas as attempted by Buddhaghosa[2] also shows that he did not know any particular sections of literature corresponding to the navāngas. It is very interesting to notice in his exposition that for two of the nine angas, viz., *Vedalla* and *Abbhutadhamma*,[3] he could not find any work or group of works which could be classified under these headings and so he named some suttas which came under them. Taking these two as our clue, we may suggest that the other seven of the navāngas should also be explained in the same way. Instead of putting the whole Abhidhamma collection under Veyyākarana,[4] the Suttas in which Sāriputta, Mahākaccāyana or Buddha[5] gave detailed expositions of the four truths or the eightfold path, or of any tenet of Buddhism or of any of the pithy sayings of Buddha, should have been included. So also the Jātaka-Anga does not refer to the 550 Jātakas as Buddhaghosa says, but to the few stories found in the Nikāyas, in which Buddha refers to incidents in one of his

[1] *Attha.*, p. 26. Sabbam pi sagāthakam suttam Geyyan ti veditabbam.

[2] *Sum. Vil.*, pp. 23, 24, *Attha.*, p. 26, *Petavatthu* 4., p. 2.

[3] *Attha.*, p. 26. Sabbe pi acchariyabbhutadhammapatisamyuttā suttantā Abbhutadhamman ti veditabbam. The 'Acchariyabbhutadhamma Sutta' (*Majjhima*, III, pp. 118 f.) may be treated as one of the Abbhutadhamma class. For Abbhutadhamma, see also *Mtu.*, III, p. 200.

[4] As done in the *Attha.*, pp. 27–28.

[5] The Mahākaccānabhaddekaratta sutta (*Majjhima*, III, No. 133) offers an excellent example of a sutta containing gāthā and veyyakarana. The Mahākammavibhaṅga sutta (*Majjhima*, III, No. 136) is a type of veyyākarana sutta.

Buddhaghosa makes himself quite clear in his attempt to establish that the *Kathāvatthu* is as much Buddha-bhāsita as were the Madhupiṇḍika and such other Suttas expounded by Mahākaccāna, Ānanda and others. His argument is that Buddha at some places gave only the mātikā (substance), which was sometimes explained by Mahākaccana, and the whole of it was regarded as Buddhavacana. Suttas of this type, in my opinion, were meant to be included under Veyyākarana-division. See *Attha.*, p. 5.

previous births. *Pūrvānusmṛti* is one of the *abhijñās* (superior knowledge) acquired by the Arhats, so it is quite in keeping with the tenets of early Buddhism to speak of one's previous existences But the idea of utilising these stories of Pūrvānusmṛti as a means of propagation of the religion came later, at least, subsequent by a century and a half to the inception of Buddhism So it is in the second period of our division that we must place the compilation or composition of the Abhidhamma and the Jātaka literatures [1]

Like Buddhaghosa, the Mahāyanic expositors attempted to classify their literature according to the twelve angas—a division current among the Sarvāstivādins, the Mahāsāṅghikas and others placing the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā* under *Sūtra*, the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, *Samādhirāja* and *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* under *Vyākaraṇa*, and so forth [2] But this division of scriptures into twelve Angas was not the work of the Mahāyānists It had been made by the Sarvāstivādins [3] and the Mahāsāṅghikas and followed by some of the other Hīnayānic schools The three additional Angas are *Nidāna*, *Avadāna* and *Upadeśa* [4] Burnouf explains *Nidāna* as those treatises which show the causes antecedent to events, *e g*, how Śākyamuni became a Buddha The cause

[1] In addition to what has been said in connection with the Abhidhamma (see fn ante, p 6) it may be pointed out that the Mahāsāṅghikas also rejected the claim of the Theravādins that the Abhidhamma and the Jātakas were canonical Compare the Yogācāra tradition that in the first part of his life, Buddha preached the four Āgamas, Dharmānusmṛtyupasthāna, *Lalitavistara*, *Karmaśataka* and *Avadānaśataka* Wassiljew, *Buddhismus*, p 352 According to the Sarvāstivādins, each of the Abhidharma books had a compiler Cf *Kośa vyākhyā*, p 12 Śruyante hi abhidharmaśāstrāṇām kartāraḥ

[2] Burnouf, *Intro*, pp 51-67, Hodgson, Notices etc, in the *Asiatic Researches*, XVI, Wassiljew, *Buddhismus* pp 118 f

[3] *Kośa*, VI, 29b Professor La Vallée Poussin drew my attention to the fact that the 12 angas are mentioned in Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* and not in the *Kośa* itself

[4] Taking *Vaipulya*=*Vedalla*, see Kern *Manual of Buddhism*, p 7 For a discussion about Vaipulya=Vaitulya, see *J R A S*, 1907, pp 432ff and 1927, pp 265ff, but cf Buddhaghosa's interpretation in the *Attha*, p. 26

was the completion of the Pāramitās by Buddha and so the treatises, or the portions of treatises, describing the completion of pāramitās are called Nidānas He also points out that there is no literature which is classified under Nidāna [1] The explanation of Burnouf is supported by the Nidānakathā of the *Jātakatthavannanā* But in the Mahāyāna literature as well as in the *Mahāvastu*, Nidāna signifies the introductory description which sometimes contains, as in the case of the *Mahāvastu*,[2] hints of the topics to be dealt with in the treatise The description of the preparations made by Buddha, viz, entering into samādhi and putting forth rays of light from the body, the appearance of Buddhas on lotus, and so forth before the preaching of the Prajñāpāramitā, is called Nidāna [3] In the Tibetan versions of the *Ratnakūta-sūtras* the place where a particular Sūtra was delivered is referred to as Nidāna [4] Considering the uses of this expression, we may take it as that aṅga (portion) of a treatise, which contains the introductory matters The sense of the term *Avadāna* is clear and needs no comment It includes all stories of previous births whether of Buddha or of any of his disciples or of any prominent figure professing the Buddhist faith, and a huge literature has grown under this heading [5] In the explanation of the term *Upadeśa* however, there is some obscurity There is hardly any justification for considering the Buddhist Tantras as coming under the heading Upadesa, for they had not come into existence when the term Upadesa came into vogue [6] It certainly means ' instruction" and this is supported by the Tibetan rendering of the term by *bab-par-bstan pahi-sde* In one [7] of the Chinese texts it has been explained

[1] Burnouf also points out the technical signification of the term Nidāna as=12 links of the Pratītyasamutpāda Cf Nidānasutta in the *Digha*

[2] *Mtu* I, pp 2, 4

[3] *Pañca* p 17

[4] M Lalou's paper in the *J* 4, 1928

[5] See Speyer's Intro to the *Ava* S The Pāli collection has also an *Apadāna* It contains accounts of the previous lives of Arhats.

[6] Burnouf, *op cit*, pp 55-6 *As Res*, XVI, p 427, Wassiljew, *op cit*, p 119 die Upadesas eine analytische Untersuchung der Lehre "

[7] On 12 Angas, see Nanjio's *Catalogue*, No 1199 (Taisho ed. of the Tripitaka, vol 31, p 586)

as those discourses which contain expositions of the profound and mysterious dharmas That the term later on bore this sense is also apparent from the fact that the *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* is sometimes called *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstra* [1]

INCORPORATION OF *Pāramis* IN THE DOCTRINES OF THE THERAVĀDINS

One can easily observe the type of literature that was intended for inclusion under at least two of these headings It consisted more of anecdotes, stories, parables and so forth than of the actual doctrines of Buddhism They were incorporated into the Buddhist literature in the garb of Pūrvānusmrtis, and the chief object was to popularise Buddhism and to show that they were meant as much for the benefit of the masses as for the selected few who could retire from the world This is an innovation which the earliest orthodox school, the Theravādins, had to make reluctantly under the pressure of circumstances Their early literature was ignorant of the pāramitās, [2] and much later, when they spoke of pāramis it was only to inspire faith in the minds of the people and not to set an example to incite them to fulfil the pāramis The attitude of the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas, however, was different They did not diminish in the least the extreme difficulty of the task of fulfilling the pāramitās, but they did not discourage people from the endeavour Not only to inspire faith, but also to encourage people in the performance of *dāna*, *śila*, *ksānti*, *virya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*, they invented story after story and associated them not only with the life of Buddha but also with the lives of persons who attained prominence in the history of the Buddhist faith

The Theravādins, it will be observed, speak of ten pāramis,

[1] See my Intro to the *Pañca*

[2] The omission of the Pāramis in the Dasuttara and Sangiti suttantas of the *Digha* is significant The word 'pāramippatto' (*Majjhima*, III, p 28) is sometimes found in the sense of perfection but not in the technical sense of six or ten pāramis.

viz, *dāna sila*, *nekkhamma*, *paññā*, *viriya*, *khanti*, *sacca*, *adhitthāna*, *mettā*, and *upekkhā* Throughout the Sanskrit literature, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, earlier or later, the pāramitās are mentioned as six [1] It is in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* [2] that we first find mention of ten pāramitās, adding the following four to the usual six,—*Upāyakauśalya*, *Pranidhāna*, *Bala*, and *Jñāna* If we compare the three lists, it is evident that the conception of six pāramitās was the oldest The Theravādins added to it *Nekkhamma*, *Sacca*, *Adhitthāna*, *Mettā*, and *Upekkhā*, and dropped *Dhyāna* Apparently this list lacks a system, [3] for the last two Mettā and Upekkhā are the two of the four brahmavihāras and have to be practised by all Arhats to perfection, while Sacca may easily be included in Sila Of the other two, Adhitthāna is to form a resolution (which in the case of Sumedha only was to become a Buddha) and to carry it out at any cost It corresponds to Pranidhāna of the Mahāyānists [4] The Nekkhamma pārami, *i e*, retirement from the household life, was emphasised by the Theravādins, and, in fact, formed one of the chief features of the doctrines of this school, while it was let alone by the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sarvāstivādins The Mahāyānists also gave to Nekkhamma a superior place, but they did not make it imperative upon every being to retire in order to derive the benefits of the religion

One of the main reasons for the differential treatment of the Pāramitas by the three schools is that the Theravadins rejected the idea of any being aspiring to Buddhahood, while the other two regarded the probability of a being becoming Buddha as a very rare event In the *Divyāvadāna*, [5] we find passages in which it is said that after the delivery of a discourse, some beings were established in the Truth,

[1] *Divyā*, pp 95, 127, 490, *Lal Vis*, pp 345 474, *Sata*, p 242.

[2] *Dasa*, pp 63, 72, 81 94 Cf *Mvyut* 34

[3] Cf Prof La Vallée Poussin's remark in the *E R E*, sv Bodhisattva.

[4] See *Infra* ch IV for four kinds of Adhitthana, see *Mvyut*, 80 and *P T S Dict*, Adhitthāna in the *Mahāvamsa* ch XVII, *sl* 46

[5] *Divyā*, pp 226 271, 368, 469, 470, 478, 495, 569

some in one of the four stages of sanctification, some developed aspiration for the attainment of Śrāvakabodhi or Pratyekabodhi, and some for Anuttarasamyaksambodhi Remarks like these are significant and show that the Sarvāstivādins, to which school the *Divyāvadāna* belongs,[1] were not as conservative as the Theravādins The Mahāsānghikas, as is well-known, were the first to bring about this change in the angle of vision They were the precursors of Mahāyāna, and hence, it is hardly necessary to adduce reasons why the practice of Pāramitās should form an integral part of their doctrines So the introduction and formulation of the Pāramitas were due originally either to the Mahāsānghikas or the Sarvāstivādins and were adopted later on in a modified form by the Theravādins

Closely connected with the Pāramitās are the Jātakas and the Avadānas, and consequently the Bharaut and Sanchi sculptures All the three schools put forth their best efforts in propaganda, but it is still an open question as to which of the three schools inspired the origin of the famous stone monuments Attempts have been made by many scholars[2] to identify the sculptural representations of Jātakas, and many have been traced in the *Jātakatthavannanā* but still the identifications are not all beyond doubt, and it is not improbable that a better elucidation of these sculptures will be found in the huge literature of Avadānas which are still in manuscript

PROPAGATION

The efforts of the various schools to propagate their particular faith met with success, as is evidenced by the early stone monuments of India Every school no doubt increased the number of its adherents and we have evidence of this in some of the inscriptions, belonging to a period little later than that with which we are here concerned These inscriptions are records of gifts made specially to a particular school[3] But along with these we find some inscriptions in

[1] Csoma Korosi, *As Res* XX, Speyer, Intro to the *Ava S*

[2] Of whom Cunningham, Oldenberg, Barua, Charpentier may be mentioned

[3] *E g* Luder's *List*, Nos 1105, 1107.

which no particular sect is mentioned, but gifts are made for the benefit of the sangha of the four regions (cāturdiśa saṅgha)[1] This shows clearly that the devotees might have had faith in the tenets of one of the schools but they supported all the schools, i e, Buddhism in general As the dates of these inscriptions do not help us much with regard to the period under review, we have to confine ourselves to the scanty evidence yielded by the few works whose dates of composition might be a little later, but which may be regarded as yielding materials for this period

We have seen from the Nikāyas that early Buddhism was confined to the central belt of India from Aṅga to Avanti, claiming also a few adherents from the distant countries of the north and the south[2] The account of the distribution of relics as given in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta in its Pāli and Tibetan versions[3] gives a fairly correct idea of the spread of Buddhism towards the beginning of the first period The people who shared the relics were the Licchavis of Vesāli, Sākyas of Kapilavatthu, Bulis of Allakappa, Koliyas of Rāmagāma, Brāhmanas of Vethadīpa, Mallas of Pāvā and Kusinārā, Moriyas of Pipphalivana, and the people of Magadha The places mentioned are all in eastern India The only place mentioned outside the eastern territory is Gandhārapura where a tooth of Buddha is said to have been enshrined[4] This is, as the commentator points out, a later addition, in any case, the people of Gandhārapura did not share in the relics A further hint about the spread of Buddhism in the first period is furnished by the boundaries of the Majjhima-janapada as given in the *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya*[5] The boundaries are as follows Kajangala nigama in the east, next to the Mahāsālā forest, the river Sallavatī on the south-east, Setakannika nigama on the south, Thūna brāhmanagāma on the west and Usīra pabbata on the north According to this account, Avanti-

[1] *E g* Luder's *List*, Nos 1099, 1107

[2] See for details, *Early History, etc*, pp 92, 137ff, 155, 169ff, Dr E J Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, Map

[3] *Digha*, II, p 167 *As Res*, XX, p 316

[4] *Digha*, II, p 167

[5] *Mv*, I, p 197, *Jāt*, I, 49, *Divyā*, p 21

dakkhiṇāpatha is a paccantima-janapada (border country)[1] and so also the country in the east beyond Kajangala, which is identified with Bhagalpur[2] The *Divyāvadāna*[3] preserves this tradition replacing only the eastern boundary Kajaṅgala by Puṇḍravardhana. If Puṇḍravardhana be identified with a place in North Bengal, the *Divyāvadāna* shows a slight extension of the eastern boundary The only other name in this account that deserves attention is the Usīraddhaja of the *Mahāvagga* and Usīragiri of the *Divyāvadāna* We know of an Usira mountain situated near Mathura,[4] and Tāranātha also tells us that Upagupta, the famous monk of Mathura and preceptor, according to the Sarvāstivāda tradition, of Aśoka, lived there for three years before going to Kashmir after leaving Vārāṇasī[5] So it is apparent that Mathura, a stronghold of the Sarvāstivādins, was included in the Majjhima-janapada

From the accounts of the Vesālī Council also, as given in the *Cullavagga*[6] and in the *Vinayas* of the Sarvāstivāda and Dharmagupta schools, it seems that the horizon of Buddhism, even at the beginning of the second century after the rise of Buddhism, did not extend far The geographical information that can be derived from this account is as follows Yasa, the convener of the orthodox council of Vesālī came from Vesālī to Kosambī, and from Kosambī he sent messengers to the bhikkhus of Pātheyya and Avantidakkhiṇapatha. Sambhūta Sānavāsī was at that time living on the Ahoganga mountain where assembled the sixty bhikkhus of Pātheyya and eighty bhikkhus of Avantidakkhiṇāpatha, all observers of Dhutaṅga precepts Revata, who lived at Soreyya, pass-

[1] *Mv*, I, p 197

[2] For the identification of the boundaries of the Majjhima janapada see S N Majumdar's Intro to Cunningham's *Geography*, p xliii

[3] *Divyā*, p 21 Puṇḍravardhana on the east, Sarāvatī on the south, Sthūnopasthūnaka brāhmaṇagrāmas on the west and Usīragiri on the north

[4] Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, I, p 308 [5] *Tāra*, pp 10, 13.

[6] *Cv*, XII, i, 7f See *Ind Ant*, 1908, *Councils, etc*, *Pag Sam Jon Zang*, p viii, for the Mahīśāsaka tradition, see Wassiljew's notes in the App to *Tāra*, pp 289–290

ing through Saṅkassa, Kannakujja, Udumbara and Aggalapura, came to Sahajāti Salha of Sahajāti found after deliberation that the Pātheyyaka bhikkhus were right, while the Pācīnaka bhikkhus were wrong For the settlement of the disputed questions was formed a committee on which Sabbakāmi, Salha, Khujjasobhita and Vāsabhagāmika represented the Pācīnakas and Revata Sambhūta Sānavāsi, Yasa and Sumana represented the Pātheyyakas An important fact that should be noticed in this account is the division of monks into two sections, the Pācīnakas and the Pātheyyakas The Pacīnakas indicated the easterners, of whom the Vesālians were the foremost, to this section belonged Sabbakāmi,[1] a disciple of Ānanda, and Salha, a distinguished monk of Sahajati The Pātheyyakas were the monks dwelling in Kosambi, Pātheyya and Avantidakkhināpatha, to this section belonged Sambhūta Sānavāsi, an important figure in the traditions of both the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, also Revata, an old bhikkhu of Soreyya, and Yasa, famous in connection with the Second Council [2]

TRADITIONS OF *Ācariyaparamparā*

The traditions of the second council as preserved by the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins are the same,[3] and as far as the succession of monks is concerned, there is also no disagreement The Theravādins only refer to Sambhūta Sānavāsi as a member of the committee of the second council, while the Sarvastivādins speak of him as the patriarch who succeeded Ānanda The two traditions bifurcate after the second council one speaking of the Asokan Council under the leadership of Moggaliputta Tissa, while the other ignores it, speaking of Upagupta as the religious adviser of Asoka, and dwelling at length on the Kaniskan Council at Jalandhara instead of the Asokan Council This

[1] According to the *Cv* (xii, 21) he was then ordained 120 years, *i e*, he must have been more than 140 years old *Pag Sam Jon Zang* (p 81) refers to his taking part in the Second Council, which was held, according to it, under the auspices of Mahāpadma Nanda

[2] For details, see *I A*, 1908

[3] *I A*, 1908, pp 4 ff, 89 ff

divergence of tradition is significant, and henceforth the history of Buddhism is no longer the history of one form of Buddhism but of many, principally of the three schools, Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Mahāsāṅghika.[1] The Theravāda is pre-eminently a Vinaya school,[2] and though the Tibetan tradition ascribes to Kaccāyana its leadership,[3] we may notice that Upāli as the compiler of the Vinaya was highly venerated by the Theravādins, and his connection with the Asokan Council is established through his disciples It should be observed that though the Theravādins speak of the line of disciples (*ācariyaparamparā*) from Upāli or Sāriputta, there is no idea of patriarchal succession In the *Majjhima Nikāya*[4] it is expressly stated that in the Buddhist Saṅgha there is no recognised head The Tibetan and Chinese traditions have, in fact, given currency to the idea of patriarchal succession The *Atthasālinī* also gives us a list of ācariyas of the Abhidhammikas, tracing it from Sāriputta which, however, is not worth credence[5] The traditions of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins about the acariyaparamparā of the first two centuries may be combined thus —

[1] Tāranātha (p 44) refers also to Sthavira Vatsa who introduced the Ātmaka theory He adds that Dhitika, who succeeded Upagupta, convened a council in the Puskarinī vihāra (of Maru Land) to suppress the Ātmaka theory of Vatsa and succeeded to convince the followers of Vatsa and, ultimately, the teacher himself of the untenability of the theory This legend evidently refers to the Vātsīputrīyas or the Vajjiputtakas, from whom sprang the Sāmmitīyas who attained prominence during the rule of Harsavardhana See *Early History etc*, pp 297 ff

[2] *Early History etc*, p 211, Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, I, p 302 referring to the Vinayists, (i e the Theravadins) as worshipping Upāli

[3] Wassiljew, *op cit*, p 295, Eitel, *Handbook etc*

[4] *Majjhima*, Sutta 108, see also Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp 141 f

[5] *Attha* p 32 Ācariyaparamparā Sāriputtatthero Bhaddaji Sobhito Piyajāli Piyapālo Piyadassī Kosiyaputto Siggavo Sandeho Moggaliputto Visudatto Dhammiyo Dāsako Sonako Revato ti (Then in Ceylon) Mahindo Iddhiyo Uttiyo Bhaddanāmo ca Sambalo

Mahākassapa — Ānanda

Sāriputta — Bhaddaji — Sobhita

Upāli — Dāsaka (Vesāli) — Sonaka (Rājagaha) — Siggava (Pātaliputta) — Moggaliputta Tissa (Pātaliputta Religious adviser of Asoka according to the Theravāda tradition)

Sānavāsika (teacher of Śrāvasti and its neighbourhood) — Upagupta (Tirhut-Mathura Religious adviser of Aśoka according to the Sarvāstivāda tradition)

Madhyāntika (Benares-Usīra, and then teacher of Kasmir)

Sobhita — probably — Siggava

Dhitika (Converted at Mathura, visited or lived in Kasmir Tukhara, Kāmarūpa, and Mālava His contemporary and converts were Menander and Hermaios)

Nāgasena of *Milindapañha* (if Minara of Tāranātha = Milinda of the Pāli text)

As I have already remarked we must not take ācariya-paramparā as patriarchal succession, nor should we attempt to calculate the duration of abbotship on the basis of an average period, as is usually done in connection with kings, for the Buddhist saints were generally long lived, and there was no custom of a disciple succeeding his teacher Moreover the ordination of disciples could have happened in the earliest or the latest part of a teacher's life According to Tāranātha, Madhyāntika was ordained by Ānanda shortly before his death,[1] hence it is quite possible that he was a contemporary of both Sānavāsi and Upagupta, or of Dāsaka, Sonaka, Siggava, and Moggaliputta Reading the tradition in this way, and also observing the names of places which were the centres of activity of the various bhikkhus, we may say that after the Council of Vesāli, the Sarvāstivādins attained more and more popularity and spread towards the north, having two important centres, one at Mathura with Upagupta as the chief teacher, and the other in Kasmir

[1] *Tāra.*, p. 9

with Madhyāntika as the chief, the two centres having later on coalesced under the leadership of Dhitika, who, it seems, greatly extended the horizon of influence of the Sarvāstivāda school by pushing it eastward to Kāmarūpa, westward to Mālava, and north-westward to Tukhāra, the realm of Mināra and Imhasa. The Theravādins retained their seat in Magadha all along with a branch at Ujjeni, founded by Mahākaccāyana. Mahinda and Sanghamittā,[1] it seems, were closely connected with the Ujjeni branch of the Theravāda school and propagated the same in Ceylon.

ASOKA'S PART IN THE PROPAGATION OF BUDDHISM

We are yet in the dark about the part played by Asoka in the propagation of Buddhism. If he helped in the propagation of Buddhism at all, we are not aware whether he supported any particular school of Buddhism, or Buddhism in general. Throughout his exhortations, so far as they have been found in the Edicts, there is not the slightest hint of his actively helping the propagation of Buddhism. His edicts refer to the *dhammavijaya* as opposed to conquest by arms, but by dhamma he does not mean Buddhism. His *dhamma* consisted of maxims for leading an ideal life and performing meritorious acts which make a person happy in this world as well as the next. The edicts do not contain a single reference to Nirvana or Sūnyata, Anātma or Duhkha, while on the other hand, they speak of heaven and happiness in a heavenly life,[2] which was never an ideal of early Buddhism, for it considered existence in any one of the three dhātus, Kama, Rūpa and Arūpa to be misery (*duhkha*). But it must be admitted that when an emperor like Asoka shows a bias for a particular religion and even proclaims himself to be a Buddhist upāsaka and pays visits

[1] It is noteworthy that with the ordination of Mahinda are associated the names of Majjhantika (very probably of Kasmir fame) and Mahādeva, the propagator of Buddhism in Mahisamandala along with Moggaliputta. See also *Early History etc.*, pp. 260 ff.

[2] Hultzsch, *Corpus*, p. liii. The remark of Dr. Hultzsch that Asoka's *dhamma*, preaching for heavenly life, represents an earlier stage of Nirvāṇa is without any foundation.

to the monasteries or sacred places of the Buddhists, the religion automatically receives an impulse, and its propagation by the Buddhist monks then becomes easy. So we may regard Asoka as a passive propagator of Buddhism, and, during his rule, the religion probably made its way throughout his kingdom, also reaching places beyond his dominion, *viz*, the kingdoms of the Yavanas, Kambojas, Gāndhāras, Pitinikas on the west, and Codas, Pāndyas as far as the Tāmraparni on the south [1] As Asoka was an adherent of Buddhism only as a supporter, or as an upāsaka,[2] we cannot expect him to be interfering in the sectarial disputes that were going on in his time Hence it is difficult to attach importance to the tradition of the *Mahāvamsa* that he supported the Vibhajjavādins (=Theravādins) [3] or to that of the *Avadānas* that he was an ardent devotee of Upagupta It is also remarkable that he does not refer to the Bodhisattva conception, nor to the pāramitās, which could suitably have been incorporated into his code of moral maxims His admonition to his subjects to choose the middle path, avoiding the two extremes, *viz*, of retirement from the world on the one hand and of indulgence in envy, anger, laziness and so forth on the other,[4] shows that he was not so much in favour of retirement from household life, upon which the early Hinayāna Buddhists always laid emphasis Asoka's preference for the life of an ideal upasaka as against that of a monk may have stimulated the Buddhist monks to devise ways and means to popularise their religion, and as the result of the efforts of the monks in this direction we have the large number of the Jātakas and Avadānas

The tradition of the *Mahāvamsa* about the part played by Asoka in the Third Council with Moggaliputta Tissa as its

[1] For details, see Hultzsch, *Corpus* (1925), pp xxxviii, xxxix

[2] *Ibid.*, pp xliv–xlv

[3] *Mahāvaṃsa*, p 54.

[4] Hultzsch, *op cit*, p 114 The rendering of Prinsep Bhandarkar and Smith is adopted here in preference to that of Hultzsch whose rendering does not appear to be in consonance with the general tenor of the inscription See M N. Basu's remarks in this connection in the *I.H Q*, III, p 349

head, and about the despatch of missionaries to the various parts of India still awaits verification It is not improbable that a sectarian council of the Theravādins was held under the leadership of Moggaliputta Tissa during Asoka's rule, and that an active propaganda was set on foot to spread Buddhism in the various territories in and outside India,[1] which the *Mahāvamsa* recorded with a colouring of its own In the same way, we can account for the two religious advisers of Asoka, namely Upagupta and Moggaliputta Tissa Asoka as an impartial ruler offered equal treatment to the Buddhists and non-Buddhists In the circumstances, it may be inferred that he would not support one school of Buddhism against another The Theravādins as well as the Sarvāstivādins associated his name with the contemporaneous leading figures of their respective sects in order to add importance to themselves So it would be fruitless to attempt an identification of Moggaliputta Tissa with Upagupta—as is done by Smith and other scholars[2] We may with some amount of confidence accept the tradition of the *Mahāvamsa* that about the time of Asoka, Buddhism made its way to the countries of Kasmira-Gandhāra, Mahisamandala, Vanavāsī, Yona, Mahāratthа, Himavantapadesa, Suvannabhūmi and Lankādipa[3]

CAREER OF THE MAHĀSĀNGHIKAS

Further light might be thrown on the propagation of Buddhism during this period, if the tradition of the Mahāsānghikas had been to hand It may be that the Chinese versions of the Mahāsānghika Vinaya may contain some

[1] The coincidence of the tradition of the Sarvastivādins that Madhyantika was the propagator of Buddhism in the north with that of the *Mahāvamsa* that Majjhantika was despatched to convert Kāsmira-Gandhāra, and the corroboration of the tradition by the caskets containing the relics with the inscriptions (on the top of the lid) 'sapurisasa Kasapagotasa savahemavatācariyasa, and (inside the lid) 'sapurisa(sa) Majhimasa' deserve consideration See Cunningham, *Bhilsa Topes*, p 287

[2] Waddell in *J A S B*, 1897, pt. i, p 76, *Proc A S B*, 1899, p 70, Smith, *Early History of India*, 4th ed, p 199 fn

[3] *Mahāvamsa*, p. 94, *Sāsanavamsa*, p 10 For detailed treatment

information, but as yet we are in the dark about it In the absence of any Mahāsaṅghika tradition, we cannot have much definite information about the Mahāsāṅghikas, or the part of India to which they confined their activities From the account of the Vesālian Council, we can say that they retained their seat at Vesāli, and from the inscriptions on the Mathura Lion Capital (120 B C)[1] and on the Wardak vase in Afghanistan,[2] it may be inferred that they made attempts to proceed towards the north, but the caves of Karle and the location of the centre of activities of their offshoots the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, at Dhanakataka[3] indicate that they were later on successful in their propaganda more in the south than in the north

According to Dr Burgess the Amarāvatī stūpas at Dharanikot (Dhanykataka) were originally constructed as early as the 2nd century B C[4] and Nagārjuna was closely associated with the Buddhist establishment of this place At any rate there is no doubt about the fact that Dhanyakataka was the chief centre of the Caityakas the Pūrva- and Aparasaila branches of the Mahāsāṅghika school, and that the people living there and in its neighbourhood lavished gifts on this Buddhist establishment It was one of the places mentioned in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*[5] as suitable for carrying on Buddhistic practices The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* also mentions that it contained the relics of Buddha[6] This is corroborated by the recent find of an inscription, recording a gift of a pillar by the sister of Mahārāja Madhariputra Śrīvīrapurusadatta to the caitya enshrining the dhātu of Sammāsambuddha. Among the inscriptions of this place edited by Dr Burgess, there is one (No 121) which refers to the Caityakas, of which the Pūrva- and Aparasailas were branches Among the recent finds in the neigh-

[1] *Ep Ind*, IX, pp 139, 141, 146

[2] *Ibid* XI, p 211, for other places in India where the Mahāsāṅghikas made their way, see *Early History etc*, pp. 241 ff.

[3] See *infra*, *Pag Sam Jon Zang*, p 74 Dhana-sribhi gliṅ

[4] Burgess, *Amaravati and Jaggayapeta Stupas*, p 100.

[5] *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series), p. 88

bourhood of the place, two among other inscriptions have been found, referring to the Puvaseliya (Pūrvasaila) and Avaras (Aparaśaila)[1] The inscriptions are supposed to be of the 2nd century A D Another important place near Dhānykataka was Śrīparvata (Srisailam), where, according to the Tibetan tradition, Nāgārjuna passed his last days[2] The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* also takes notice of this mountain as a suitable place for Buddhistic practices and one of the inscriptions, recently found, records that some devotees constructed a number of caityas and vihāras, and dug wells for pilgrims visiting the sacred place from Gandhāra, Cina, Aparānta, Vanga, Vanavāsi, Tambapannidīpa, etc[3] From these facts, it may be concluded that about the beginning of the Christian era there was on the bank of the Krishna in the Guntur district a very important centre of the Mahāsanghikas The name Andhakas given to the offshoots of this school[4] also point to the fact of its popularity in the Andhra country and of its being supported, as the Amarāvati inscriptions show by the kings, nobles and people of the Andhra country

BUDDHISM AFTER ASOKA

The *Mahāvamsa* and the *Sāsanavamsa* present a connected history of Buddhism in India up to the period of Asoka, and then turn to the history of Buddhism in Ceylon, leaving us in the dark about the career of the Theravādins in India, till we come to the *Milindapañha* From it we learn that king Milinda of Sagala (Sialkot, Lahore) took great interest in Buddhism, and that Nāgasena, a native of Kajaṅgala, the easternmost boundary of the Majjhima-janapada came to him, passing through Vattaniya and Pātaliputta He stopped at the Sankheyya parivena at Sāgala

[1] *Annual Report of S. I Epigraphy*, 1924, p 97 1926, pp 70, 92–93 1927, p 42, see also *I H Q*, V, pp 794–6

[2] Burgess, *op cit*, p 6; *Tāra*, pp 73, 81

[3] *Annual Report of S I Epigraphy*, 1927, pp 43, 71 Dr L. D Barnett kindly drew my attention to the recent finds of the inscriptions

[4] *Kathāvatthuppakaranatthakathā*, p 52

This account of Nāgasena's route indicates that Buddhism had already made its way as far north as Sāgala [1]

Tāranātha however, continues the story and gives us an account of the spread of Buddhism after Asoka, but as his narrative is based mainly on the Sarvāstivāda tradition, we may regard this story as essentially that of the Sarvāstivādins He tells us that Upagupta ordained Dhitika, [2] a native of Ujjayinī, at Mathura, the usual place of residence of Upagupta The teachership was transferred from Upagupta to Dhitika, who spread the religion widely and converted Mināra, the king of Tukhāra Many monks of his time went thither from Kasmir and established firmly the religion at that place They were supported by both King Mināra and his son Imhasa [3] He then went to the east at Kāmarūpa where he converted the rich brahmin Siddha and established the religion there After this, he visited Malava and converted the rich brahmin Adarpa, laying thereby the foundation of the religion in that region He came at length to his native place at Ujjayinī and there spent his last days He was succeeded by Kala or Krsna [4] who was followed by Sudarsana of Bharukaccha The spheres of activity of both these monks were in the west (Sindhu) and the north (Kasmir) of India generally In connection with Krsna, it is stated that he spread the religion in the south of India, in many small islands including Ceylon, and subsequently in Mahācīna [5] Poshadha who came after him spread Buddhism in Orissa during the rule of Vigatasoka [6] Tāranātha's history is full of legends and as such all his statements cannot be taken as authentic But considering

[1] *Mil*, pp 8, 16

[2] *Tāra*, p 23 All Sarvāstivāda traditions both in Chinese and Tibetan mention Dhitika as the successor of Upagupta.

[3] Schiefner suggests that Mināra=Menander and Imhasa=Hermaios, see *Tāra*, pp 23, 24 fn

[4] There is a reference to the spread of Buddhism in Ceylon also Krsna is said to have visited the place *Tāra*, p 44.

[5] Kāla is called Krsnavarna in the Chinese tradition, see Samyuktavastu, II, p 95b, *Tāra*, p 47 Taranātha's statement that Sudarśana and Aśoka died at the same time cannot be accepted

[6] *Tāra*, p 50

the fact that he makes some statements which are not *prima facie* unreasonable, and are in many cases corroborated by the Chinese travellers, we can attach to them some importance, though, of course, great caution should be exercised

Doctrinal Developments

We shall now proceed to take a panoramic view of the doctrinal developments that took place during this period and heralded the advent of Mahayānism The Mahāsānghikas were evidently the earliest school of the Hīnayānists to show a tendency for conceiving Buddha docetically which was later on brought to completion by a branch of theirs, the Lokottaravādins.[1] But whether the conception of the Bodhisattva and the practice of the six pāramitās were introduced for the first time by the Mahāsanghikas or by the Sarvāstivādins is uncertain The mention of the ṣat-pāramitā, the fulfilment of which is compulsory for the Bodhisattvas, is frequently found in the works of both the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsaṅghikas, and both are responsible for the growth of the large mass of Avadāna literature,[2] the central theme of which is the fulfilment of the pāramitās

THE GOAL OF BUDDHAHOOD

Then there remains the other conception, *viz.*, the attainment of Buddhahood as a goal to be aspired to, and the consequent lowering of the position of the Arhats[3] The Theravādins do not definitely deny that Buddhahood is unattainable, for there is the instance of Sumedha brahmana be-

[1] *E R E*, sv Docetism, for details

[2] Hüber has traced 18 Avadānas of the *Divyāvadāna* in the Chinese version of the Sarvāstivada Vinaya (*B E F E O*, V pp 1–37) See also Lévi, *T'oung Pao*, Ser II (1907), no I So it is quite probable that the *Divyāvadāna* is a book of the Sarvāstivādins

[3] In Vasumitra's treatise as well as in the *Kathāvatthu* it is stated that the Sarvāstivādins believed that the Arhats were liable to fall from arhathood On this point the Theravādins hold a different opinion They believe that the Arhats are as pure as Buddhas, and cannot fall down from that position The Mahāsānghikas also do not support the Sarvāstivādins in regard to this point See Masuda, *Origin etc.*, p 27 *Kvu.* i 2

coming Śākyamuni and that of a certain being who will become Maitreya Buddha, but such instances are so few and far between that they do not think it reasonable to hold up the ideal for the generality of the human beings to follow. They assert that a Buddha is hardly expected to arise even in many kalpas,[1] and this is echoed in the *Lalitavistara*, *Mahāvastu*, and some of the Mahāyānic texts, but still one reads in the *Divyāvadāna* that after the delivery of a discourse some aspired to *Śrāvakabodhi*, some to *Pratyekabodhi*, and some to *Samyaksambodhi*.[2] The fact mentioned last that some aspire to Samyaksambodhi leads us to infer that by the time of the *Divyāvadāna* the Sarvāstivādins admitted the practicability of holding up Buddhahood as an ideal. So, clearly, the Sarvāstivādins encouraged the aspiration to Buddhahood and hence to the life of a Bodhisattva, and the goal of Buddhahood was not purely Mahāsāṅghika or Mahāyānic. The Sarvāstivādins like the Theravādins conceived Buddha as an actual human being, but they magnified his qualities and powers so much that one is led to regard their conception of Buddha as that of a supramundane being.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SARVĀSTIVĀDA TO MAHĀYĀNA

The Sarvāstivādins had two Kāya conceptions[3] viz., *rupakāya* and *dharmakāya*, but these did not bear any Mahāyānic sense, though their conception of dharmakāya helped the Yogācārins in the formation of their conception of the same (=*svasambhogakāya*). The Sarvāstivādins are also responsible for the addition of a fourth term *śunya*, to the usual trio *viz.* duhkha, anitya, and anatma though the

[1] Kadāci karahaci Tathāgatā loke uppajjanti. *Digha*, II, p. 139, *Vtu.*, I, p. 55.

[2] *Divyā.*, pp. 226, 271, etc. The treatise of Vasumitra also says that the Sarvāstivādins were aware of the three Yānas. The date of the compilation of the *Divyāvadāna* may be later, but it contains many avadānas which are old. The mention of three Bodhis in the *Divyāvadāna* and the reference of Vasumitra in connection with the Sarvāstivādins to the three Yānas show that, to the Sarvāstivādins the Samyaksambuddhahood was a goal as much as the other two Bodhis.

[3] See *infra* Chapter III (b) The Doctrine of Kāya.

word conveyed no Mahāyānic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anātma [1]

But the most important doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, which, I believe, led to the development of Mahāyāna, is their extreme *Astitvavāda* (the theory of the actual existence of elements composing a being) We may say that Mahāyāna is a continuation of the Buddhological speculations of the Mahāsāṅghikas and their offshoots, and a revolt against the Astitvavāda of the Sarvāstivādins—a dogma which appeared to the Mahāyānists as an utter distortion of Buddha's teachings [2] It was this revolt which resulted in the other extreme, the establishment of *Dharmaśūnyatā* (non-existence of everything whatsoever) as the real teaching of Buddha

The third contribution made by the Hīnayānists, specially by the Sarvāstivādins is the exposition or analysis of skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, arya-satyas angas of the pratītyasamutpāda, and so forth [3] The Mahāyānists incorporated them in their works *in toto* although they relegated them to the domain of Saṃvṛti or Parikalpita-Paratantra, admitting, however, their utility as being indispensable to Bodhisattvas in arriving at the Paramārtha or Parinispanna truth [4]

CONTACT OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDINS WITH THE MAHĀYĀNISTS

The Mahāsaṅghikas may have been the forerunners of Mahāyāna but it is clear that the Sarvāstivādins contributed

[1] *Lal Vis*, p 419 *Divyā*, pp 206, 367 anitya, duhkha śūnya, anātma See *Kośa*, VI, p 163 and VII, pp 31 f where śūnya is explained as being devoid of ātman, puruṣa and so forth

[2] It will be observed that the remarks of Nāgārjuna and other early Mahāyāna writers are mostly directed against the realism of the Sarvāstivādins The *Madhyamakāvatāra* cannot help admitting that the Hīnayānists also teach Śūnyatā as much as the Mahāyānists do (see *Le Muséon*, Vol VIII, p 271) but in the general attack of the Mahāyānists against the Hīnayānists, they hold the latter as *Aśūnyavādins* evidently keeping the Sarvāstivādins in mind

[3] That the Mahāyānists incorporated mostly the Sarvāstivāda expositions and analyses may be asserted in view of the fact that the *Prajñāpāramitās* mention many terms, which are not very common in Pāli suttas, *e g*, Paryavasthāna, Saṃgrahavastu, Dvādaśāṅga (instead of Navāṅga) [4] See *infra* Chapter III (d)

much to the growth of Mahāyāna in some way or other As a sign of close contact, it may further be pointed out that Subhūti,[1] a prominent figure in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, plays an important rôle in the *Prajñāpāramitā* It is anomalous to find a Hīnayāna monk explaining the śūnyata doctrine, which goes directly against his own, so the *Prajñāpāramitā* offers us an explanation of the anomaly by saying that whatever was preached by Subhūti was preached not according to his own lights but through the influence of Buddhas The adoption of the *Lalita Vistara* by the Mahāyānists as the recognised *Life of Buddha* also shows a point of contact between them and the Sarvāstivādins, for, as we know from the Chinese translators, the *Lalita Vistara* was a biography of Buddha of the Sarvāstivāda school Mahāyānism in all probability germinated in the south, where the offshoots of the Mahāsanghikas had their centres of activities but the place where it appeared more developed was somewhere in the eastern part of India where the Sarvāstivādins were predominant Tāranātha tells us that the *Prajñāpāramitā* was first preached by Mañjuśrī at Odivisa (Orissa) [2] which, if not the actual centre of the Sarvāstivādins, was in the neighbourhood of the Sarvāstivāda spheres of influence, for we have already seen that Dhitika propagated Sarvāstivāda Buddhism in Kamrūpa, and Pundravardhana was the extended eastern limit of the Sarvāstivāda Madhyadeśa But the most fruitful contact between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāyānists took place at Nalanda, which became the principal centre of Mahāyāna and the seat of Nagarjuna

THE MAHĀSĀNGHIKAS WERE ESSENTIALLY HĪNAYĀNISTS

Thus we see that the Sarvāstivādins were as much responsible for the growth of Mahāyāna as the Mahāsanghikas

[1] See, *e g*, the *Ava S*, pp 127–132 and p xl (*Kalpadrumāvadāna*), R L. Mitra, *Nep B Lit*, pp 295–6 In the *Apadāna*, and in the *Anguttara*, and its commentary, Subhūti is mentioned as the chief of the Araṇavihārins, but he is not given much prominence in Pāli works.

[2] *Tāra.*, p 58

Apart from the Buddhological speculations, the Mahāsāṅghikas cannot claim much as their contribution to the growth of Mahāyāna It may be that the *Prajñāpāramitā* which, as the Tibetan tradition tells us, was possessed by the Pūrvaśailas, contributed much to the philosophy of Mahāyāna but as yet we are completely in the dark about this *Prajñāpāramitā* From Vasumitra's account of the tenets of the Mahāsāṅghikas[1] or from the discussions found in the *Kathāvatthu* about the doctrines of the Mahāsāṅghikas, one hardly notices anything particularly Mahāyānic in them For instance the Mahāsāṅghikas speak

(i) of the pañca- (or sad-) viññānakāya differing from the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins as to the function of the physical organs of sense [2]

(ii) of the four or eight Hīnayānic stages of sanctification with the attainments appertaining thereto [3] the *Kathāvatthu* adding that the Mahāsāṅghikas assert that the Arhats have avijjā-vicikiccha as they cannot comprehend the things that come within the purview of Buddha (Buddhavisaya),[4]

(iii) of the indispensability of the application (prayoga) of prajñā for destroying duhkha and obtaining sukha (*i e*, final beatitude, Nirvāna), one of the most important tenets of the Hīnayānic schools.[5]

[1] Masuda, *op cit*

[2] Masuda, *op cit*, I, 22-4 *Kvu* xviii 9, x, 3 4 Pañcaviññānasa mangissa atthi maggabhāvanā (one may practise the path while he has fivefold consciousness) The conception of Viññāna of the Mahāsāṅghikas is a little different from that of the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, specially, in view of two other tenets held by them, *viz*, "At one and the same moment, two minds (citta) can arise side by side" and "the nature of mind is pure in its origin, etc" Masuda *op cit*, A 43, B 3

[3] Masuda, *op cit*, I, 26-30, 33-5, 39, 48 *Mtu*, I p 139

[4] *Kvu*, xxi, 3 i, 2 The Theravādins hold that sabbaññutañāṇa (omniscience) is a special acquisition of Buddhas and beyond the scope of Arhats, so it is wrong to hold that Arhats have avijjā-vicikicchā Cf Vasumitra (Masuda, *op cit*, I, 35) "That according to the Mahāsāṅghikas, Arhats are liable to sink while the *Kathāvatthu* (i, 2, *Cy*, p. 35) says that some of the Mahāsāṅghikas hold that Arhats are not thus liable"

[5] Masuda, *op cit.*, I, 31 For Prajñā and Prayoga, see also *Mtu.*,

(iv) of samyagdrsti, śraddhendriya as not laukika (worldly), the *Kathāvatthu*[1] adding that the Mahāsāṅghikas hold that old age and death could neither be lokiya (worldly) nor lokuttara (transcendental) because they are aparinipphanna, (unmade),[2] and because the "decay and death of supramundane thing is supramundane and cannot be mundane",[3]

(v) of samyaktva-niyāma[4] (destined for right knowledge) and the consequent destruction of samyojanas (fetters)

(vi) of Buddha's preaching the dharma in the nītārtha sense,[5]

(vii) of asamskrta dharmas as being nine in contrast to three of the Sarvāstivādins,[6]

(viii) of upakleśas (impurities), anuśayas (dormant passions) and paryavasthānas (pervading passions)[7]

(ix) of the non-existence of phenomena of the past and future, as against the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins[8] and

(x) of the non-existence of antarābhava (existence intermediate between death and re-birth) as against the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins[9] and the Sāmmitīyas

In these and on a few other points of difference noticed in the work of Vasumitra and the *Kathāvatthu*, there is very little to distinguish them as distinctly Mahāyānic In the *Mahāvastu*[10] also, the discourses on the Truths[11] or the Causal

I, p 270 Throughout *Mtu* one notices that Nirvāna was conceived as sukha (kṣeme sthale śame śive nirvāne *Mtu* I, p 34) The Mahāyānists will have nothing to do with duḥkha or sukha

1 *Kvu*, xv 6

2 Mrs Rhys Davids translates it by "not pre determined"

3 *Points of the Controversy*, xv, 6

4 i e, one who has entered into the Darśanamarga, see Masuda, *op cit*, p 27 fn, Cf *Pañca*, leaf 262b

5 Masuda, *op cit*, I, 5, 40 This goes directly against the Mahāyānic view that Buddha's discourses have two senses nītārtha and neyārtha, and also against the Sarvāstivāda view See Masuda, *op cit* p 52

6 Masuda, *op. cit*, I, 41

7 Ibid, I 44

8 Ibid, I, 45

9 Ibid, I, 47

10 It does not really belong to the Mahāsāṅghikas so its date must be later, and it may be relegated to the third period of our division Only those passages which corroborate the tenets of the Mahāsāṅghikas mentioned in the treatise of Vasumitra are referred to here

11 *Mtu.*, III, pp 334, 446

Law, or on anitya, duhkha, and anātma do not go beyond the limits of the Hīnayāna conceptions. The only Mahāyānic traces in the tenets of the Mahāsāṅghikas are:—

(i) the Buddhological speculations, *viz.*, that Buddhas are lokottara (supramundane), without any sāsrava dharma (defiled elements), possessed of limitless rūpakāya,[1] prabhāva (power), and āyu[2] (length of life), can remain without any sleep or dream, are always in Samādhi, and do not preach by name or designation, possess ksanikacitta (*i.e.*, understand all dharmas with a moment's thought), and so forth, and

(ii) the Bodhisattva conception, *viz.*, that the Bodhisattvas are not born and do not grow in the womb in the same way as an ordinary being, are not defiled by the impurities of the womb,[3] enter the womb in full consciousness,[4] never harbour any feeling of kāma (lust),[5] hatred or injury, and take birth in hīna-gatis (lower forms of existences) for the benefit of the various classes of sentient beings, and so forth.[6]

These Buddhological speculations are more or less corollaries to the Mahāsāṅghika conception of the life of Śākyamuni. The Mahāsāṅghikas do not show thereby any recognition that all beings can become Bodhisattvas and ultimately Buddhas. The conception of the four caryās and the ten

[1] Cf. *Mtu.*, I, p. 263. Buddha appears everywhere. In the *Nikāyas* one also reads "eko pi hutvā bahudhā hoti etc." *Dīgha*, I, p. 78. In the *Lalita Vistara* (p. 100) we read of the Bodhisattva appearing in all the houses presented to him by the Sakiyans.

[2] Masuda, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 18, 19. *Kvu.* xi, 5. The Mahāsāṅghikas cite the passage of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, in which Buddha said to Ānanda that he could live many kalpas if he had wished so. The Theravādins without refuting this statement cite another passage which goes against this view.

[3] *Mtu.*, I, p. 143, II, pp. 14–15. Garbhāvakrānti and sthiti are all miraculous; Bodhisattvas are not touched by any impurities, *Mtu.*, II, pp. 16, 20.

[4] *Mtu.*, II, p. 10.

[5] *Mtu.*, I, p. 153. Kāmā na sevanti. Rāhula was an aupapāduka. He descended from Tuṣita heaven and remained in mother's womb for six years (*Mtu.*, III, p. 159).

[6] Masuda, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

bhūmis of the Lokottaravādins indicates a slight leaning to Mahāyānism Thus there appears to be little of Mahāyāna in the tenets of the Mahāsāṅghikas[1] The Mahāsāṅghikas, therefore, were essentially Hīnayānists, only with the conception of Buddha slightly different

Now we can state briefly the history of Buddhism in the second period thus

1 Buddhism is no longer one It divides itself into three principal sections, *viz*, the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, and the Mahāsāṅghika The Theravādins remained in the central belt of India, making their position stronger in Avantī where Mahākaccāyana had laid the foundation of Buddhism and from which place Mahinda was sent out to Ceylon to propagate the Theravada Buddhism The Sarvāstivādins were also in the central belt of India with their centres of activity in Mathura and Kasmir, the former being founded by Upagupta and the latter by Madhyāntika Dhitika, the successor of both Upagupta and Madhyāntika, spread it widely all over Northern India including Tukhāra on the north-west, Malava, and Odivisa (Orissa), and Kāmarūpa on the east The Mahāsāṅghikas established themselves at Vesālī and had followers sprinkled all over Northern India, but they became popular in the south In short, Buddhism during this period spread all over Northern India and portions of Southern India

2 Emperor Asoka took a great interest in Buddhism but did not help any particular sect The *dhamma* preached in his edicts is mainly ethical and lacks the specific colourings of any school of Buddhism or of later Buddhism. He encouraged more the leading of a righteous household life than that of a monk or an ascetic He, however, respected and supported the monks and recluses The interest taken by rulers, like Mināra and Imhasa, helped greatly the propagation of Buddhism outside India.

[1] The tenet of the Mahāsāṅghikas that "the nature of mind is pure in its origin, it becomes impure when it is stained by passions (upaklesas), the adventitious dust (āgantukarajas)" has, according to Masuda, been developed by Aśvaghosa in his *Awakening of Faith*. See Masuda, *op. cit*, p 30

3 The relation of the laity to the Buddhist Saṅgha was not materially altered as compared with previous conditions but a greater interest was created for the laity by popularising Buddhism through the Jātakas and Avadānas, and by holding up the Pāramitā practices before their view

4 Much stress was laid on the composition of the *Jātakas* and *Avadānas*, and great religious merit was attached to reading, writing, painting, and carving them This caught the fancy of the laity as a means of earning religious merit, and resulted in many sculptures, only some of which are preserved to us at Sanchi and Bharaut The credit of popularising the religion through the Jātakas and Avadānas is due, in the first instance, to the Sarvāstivādins, and later, to the Theravādins

5 The old division of *Navānga* is increased to *Dvādaśānga* by the addition of Nidāna, Avadāna, and Upadesa Though the Jātakas formed one of the divisions of the Navānga, they did not exist as a separate literature, but were embodied in the discourses purporting to have been delivered by Buddha and his disciples

6 The *Life of Buddha* commenced not from the time of Siddhārtha's retirement but from the first resolution (pranidhāna) formed by Sumedha brāhmana, and the prophecy (veyyâkarana) made by Dipankara Buddha

7 The essential doctrines are still the same as in the first period with slight changes, *e g* the addition of *śūnya* to the usual anitya, duhkha, and anātma, and of the six pāramitas to the thirty-seven Bodhipaksika dharmas

8 Some radical changes were effected in the tenets of the schools which developed during this period, *e g*, the Sarvāstivādins started their doctrine of realism, of the existence of past, present, and future, and so forth, while the Mahāsānghikas conceived Buddha docetically and introduced the Bodhisattva conception

9 The goal of life remained Arhathood and Pratyekabuddhahood with the Theravādins, while the Sarvāstivādins added to them the Samyaksambuddhahood

10 The conception of *Nirvāna* as sukha, śānta, etc, did not change much, the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsānghikas

agreeing mainly with the Theravādins[1] But the doctrine of realism of the Sarvāstivādins has led Prof. Stcherbatsky to interpret their Nirvāna as an ultimate lifeless state.[2]

11 The growth of the *Abhidhamma* literature took place during this period. As the principal schools located their centres of activity in different places of India, the development of this literature of each school was independent of that of the rest. This accounts for the wide divergence between the Abhidhamma literature of the Theravādins and that of the Sarvāstivādins.

12 The conception of the Bodhisattva, the Pāramitā practices, and the goal of Buddhahood are the only Mahāyānic traces that appear in the doctrines of the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sarvāstivādins, and their offshoots

THIRD PERIOD

(*circa 100 B C to 300 A C*)

C THE BEGINNINGS OF MAHĀYĀNA

Before we proceed to ascertain the approximate time of the emergence of Mahāyāna, we must determine the special characteristics which distinguish Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna Generally speaking, Mahāyānism is associated with

(i) the conception of the Bodhisattva,
(ii) the practice of the Pāramitās,
(iii) the development of Bodhicitta,
(iv) the ten stages (*bhūmi*) of spiritual development,
(v) the goal of Buddhahood,
(vi) the conception of Trikāya, and
(vii) the conception of Dharmaśūnyatā or Dharmasamatā or Tathatā

[1] The Sarvāstivādins held that the *vimukti* of the Srāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Buddhas is the same Masuda, *op cit*, p 49 The Mahīśāsakas held the same view (Masuda, *op cit*, p 62), but not the Dharmaguptas The *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, however, holds that with regard to *vimukti*, the Buddhas and the Śrāvakas stand on the same footing This is also the opinion of the other Yogācāra texts. See *infra* Cf also *Mtu.*, II, pp 285, 345

[2] Stcherbatsky, *Con of N*, pp 25 ff, but see ch III (c)

The Mahāyānists distinguish themselves by saying that they seek the removal of both *kleśāvarana* and *jñeyāvarana* and this is possible by the realisation of both *pudgalaśūnyatā* and *dharmaśūnyatā*. The Hīnayānists realise only the former, and thereby remove kleśāvarana. They, therefore, attain vimukti (emancipation) from kleśas, and as far as this is concerned, they are on the same footing with the Mahāyānists, but they lack true knowledge as conceived by the Mahāyānists, *viz.*, dharmaśūnyatā, because they do not remove jñeyāvarana. The Hīnayānists, however, do not admit their inferiority with regard to jñāna, for they consider that the destruction of avidyā (ignorance of the truth) or, in other words, acquisition of true knowledge is the only means to emancipation and this is effected by Arhats in the same way as by Buddhas. The Arhats are very often mentioned in the Pāli works as attaining sambodhi. They, however, admit that Buddhas, on account of their superior merits (technically, *gotra*), due to their long practice of meritorious actions, attain some powers and privileges, and also omniscience, which are beyond the reach of the Arhats. This is, in short, the relative position of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists.

If the development of Hīnayāna in its various phases be examined, one cannot help observing that some of the distinguishing characteristics of Mahāyāna mentioned above are also found in the later phases of Hīnayāna, *e.g.*,

(i) the conception of the Bodhisattva,

(ii) the practice of the six pāramitās,

(iii) the development of Bodhicitta,

(iv) the goal of Buddhahood, and

(v) two of the Kāya conceptions, *viz.*, Rūpa- (or Nirmāṇa-) kāya and Dharmakāya, the conception of the latter being essentially different from that of the Mahāyānists.[1] So, to be exact about the time of emergence of Mahāyana, we should consider when the conceptions of Dharmaśūnyatā and Dharmakāya (=Tathatā) came to be introduced.

[1] In the *Mtu.*, the expression Sambhogakāya does not occur, yet the description of Buddha's body sometimes shows it to be tantamount to that conception.

Semi-Mahāyāna

From what we have seen above in regard to the lines of development in the preceding period, it is evident that the Hīnayānists either to popularise Buddhism or to interest the laity more in it, incorporated in their doctrines the conception of the Bodhisattva and the practice of the pāramitās[1] This was effected by the production of the new literature, the *Jātakas* and *Avadānas* As the Jātakas confine themselves to the previous lives of Buddha, we must look to the Avadānas specially for the introduction of the Bodhisattva conception, and for its presentation as an ideal for the laity The object of the Avadānas is to show how the devotees sacrifice every thing, even their lives, for the performance of the pāramitās, not for any earthly or heavenly pleasures, but for the attainment of bodhi and thus for the rescue of all beings from misery[2]

The *Divyāvadāna*, as we have seen refers to the aspiration for the attainment of Buddhahood So also, one reads in the *Mahāvastu*[3] about devotees developing Bodhicitta and aspiring to Buddhahood by the simple act of worshipping a stūpa or making some presents to it In connection with the Sarvāstivādins, the treatise of Vasumitra speaks (i) of the sameness of vimukti of Buddhas, Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas, (ii) of the three Yānas, and (iii) of Bodhisattvas continuing to be pṛthagjana till they step into the samyaktva-niyāma (the path leading to the right knowledge)[4]

[1] For an interesting discussion on this point see Speyer, *Avadāna Ś.*, pp v ff

[2] *Divyā*, p 473 Rūpavatī makes sacrifice for "na rājyārthaṃ na bhogārthaṃ na svargārthaṃ na śakrārthaṃ na rājñāṃ cakravartināṃ viṣayārthaṃ nānyatrāhaṃ anuttarāṃ samyaksambodhiṃ abhisambudhyādāntān damayeyam amuktān mocayeyam anāśvastān āśvāsayeyam aparinirvṛtān parinirvāpayeyam"

[3] *Mtu.*, pp 364, 365, 367 bodhāya cittaṃ nametvā pp 375, 377 bodhiṃ atulyaṃ spṛśati

[4] Masuda, *op cit.*, p 49 "The Buddha and the two vehicles have no differences as to emancipation (vimukti) the Aryan paths (mārga) of the three vehicles (however) differ from one another This is wanting in the Tibetan version" Masuda contradicts Wassiljew's opinion (p 275, n.4) that it is an interpolation of the later Mahāyānists

The *Mahāvastu* also speaks of the existence of the three Yānas[1] and of the paths and practices to be followed by a Bodhisattva It mentions the four caryās of a Bodhisattva and the ten bhūmis but the conception of the bhūmis, as will be shown hereafter,[2] has very little in common with that of the ten bhūmis of the Daśabhūmikasūtra except the first two Of course, it may be assumed that the Lokottaravāda conception of the bhūmis served as the seed for the later development of the Mahāyānic conception

Thus the Avadānas, which are primarily the production of the Sarvāstivādins, clearly show a new phase of development within Hīnayānic Bodhisattva-yāna. The Lokottaravādins of the Mahāsāṅghikas show a little more development than the Sarvāstivādins by defining the four *caryās*, viz , *prakṛti-caryā*, *praṇidhānacaryā*, *anulomacaryā*, and *anivartanacaryā*,[3] the first referring to the preliminary practices of a Bodhisattva while he is a pṛthagjana, the second to the development of Bodhicitta the third to the gradual progress made by a Bodhisattva up to the sixth bhūmi, and the fourth to the practice of the last four bhūmis[4] from which a Bodhisattva can never retrocede but must ultimately attain Bodhi The attainment of Bodhi, therefore, came to be regarded as one of the goals of Hīnayāna It is for this reason that we see the *Kośa* discussing the thirty four moments required for the attainment of Bodhi,[5] and other matters relating to

For the vimuktisāmānya of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabudhas, and Buddhas, see *infra*.

Masuda, *op cit*, p 50 The Haimavata school supports the Sarvāstivādins on this point, adding, however, that the Bodhisattvas are not subject to rāga and kāma See Masuda, *op cit*, p. 52 The *Mtu*. calls a Bodhisattva in the first bhūmi a pṛthagjana who becomes an Ārya from the second bhūmi, see *infra* ch IV.

[1] *Mtu*, II, p. 362.

[2] See *infra*, ch IV, also Rahder's Intro to *Daśa*., pp. iii f

[3] *Mtu*., I, p 46, *Lal Vis*, p 35

[4] The writer of the *Mtu*. had very vague ideas about the last four bhūmis, so he dismissed them with mere enumerations of some names of Buddhas and recounting some stories

[5] *Kosa*, II, 44, VI, 21a b, cf *Kvu*, i 5, xviii 5, *Paṭis M*, I, pp 121 ff discusses the ñāṇa of Buddhas

Buddhahood, and the Hīnayānic works[1] mentioning some of the Bodhisattva practices and philosophical expressions like sūnyatā, dharmadhātu, dharmakāya, tathātva, though they are devoid of their new Mahāyānic sense

In view of these facts, we may hold that before Mahāyāna came into existence with its new interpretation of Buddha's words, evolving a new sense of śūnyatā, there had already been a Hīnayānic Bodhisattvayāna, which can be called semi-Mahāyāna, or Mahāyāna in the making This semi-Mahāyāna concerned itself only with the six Pāramitā practices and the extraordinary powers and knowledge attained by Buddhas It was as yet unaware of 'Advaya Advaidhikāra', Dharmasūnyatā or Tathatā That the six pāramitās belong to the domain of Hīnayāna is also hinted at in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.[2] In this sūtra as well as in other treatises dealing with the bhūmis, the ten bhūmis are divided into two sections, the first six carrying a Bodhisattva to the realisation of the Pudgalasūnyatā, or in other words, the Truth as conceived by the Hīnayānists, and the last four leading to the realisation of Dharmaśūnyatā, the Truth as conceived by the Mahāyānists So the actual Mahāyānic stages of progress commence from the seventh, but we learn from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* that the six pāramitās are completed by a Bodhisattva in the first six bhūmis Thus, it follows that the practice of Pāramitās alone does not make a person a follower of the Mahāyāna, though we must admit that the Māhayāna takes its stand upon the pāramitās as far as the practices are concerned, for it is said in the *Prajñāpāramitās* that Buddhas deliver discourses connected with the six pāramitās,[3] and in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that the Mahāyāna teaches not only sūnyatā but also the pāramitās, bhūmis, and so forth[4]

[1] *Mtu.*, II, p 357 Sūnyatām śāntaṃ bhāventi, see also *Saṃyutta* II, p 267, III, p. 167

[2] See *infra*, ch. IV.

[3] *Pañca.*, p 7 ṣaṭpāramitāpratisaṃyuktāṃ dharmadeśanāṃ karoti

[4] *M Ava*, (*Le Muséon*, VIII, p. 271) En effet, la doctrine du Grand Véhicule n'enseigne pas seulement le néant des éléments, mais encore les terres des Bodhisattvas, les vertus transcendantes (pāramitās),

Lastly, the fact, that the conceptions of *nirnimitta* and *nihsvabhāva* indicating the chief features of the attainments of a Bodhisattva in the last four bhūmis were yet unknown to the compiler of the *Mahābastu*, is evident from his inability to mention the qualities attained in the last four bhūmis [1] Hence it may be concluded that Buddhism entered into its semi-Mahāyānic stage very early, if not at the time of Asoka, at any rate, soon after him.

THE TIME OF COMPOSITION OF THE *Prajñāpāramitā*

The new Mahāyānic conception of Sūnyatā was for the first time propounded in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and therefore we should try to ascertain when the *Prajñāpāramitā* first came into existence There is the Tibetan tradition that the Pūrvaśailas and Aparasailas had a *Prajñāpāramitā* in the Prākrt dialect, [2] unfortunately no other information about it is forthcoming Tāranātha tells us that shortly after the time of King Mahāpadma Nanda, a king called Candragupta lived in Odivisa (Orissa) [3] Mañjusrī came to his house in the form of a bhiksu and delivered the Mahāyāna teaching The Sautrāntikas maintain that this teaching was the *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, while the Tantra school asserts that it was the *Tattvasangraha* [4] We may safely dismiss the Tantric tradition in view of the materials that are contained in the *Tattvasangraha*, [5] and attach importance to the Sautrāntika tradition that the *Astasāhasrikā* was the earliest text to contain the Mahāyāna teaching If the contents of the *Astasāhasrikā*, the *Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā*, and the *Satasāhasrikā* be compared, it will be seen that the *Astasāhasrikā* is

les resolutions (pranidhāna), la grande compassion, etc mais encore l'application du merite à illumination, les deux equipments de mérite et de savoir et la nature incompréhensible du dharma (acintya-dharmatā)

[1] See *ante* p 37, fn 4

[2] Wassiljew, *Buddhismus*, p 291 quoting the Tibetan *Siddhānta*

[3] *Tāra*, p 58, *Pag Sam Jon Zang.*, p 82 also says that Mahāyāna Buddhism had its beginning in Odivisa shortly after the reign of Mahāpadma Nanda.

[4] Recently published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series

[5] For a survey of its contents see my review in *I.H.Q.*, Dec, 1929

the earliest of the three and that it can be dated as early as the first century B C [1]

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DATA ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF MAHĀYĀNA

Without attaching much importance to the chronology of kings and such other materials presented to us by Tāranātha, we may with sufficient caution utilise some of his statements with regard to the developments in the history of the religion the geographical distribution of the schools, and the succession of teachers in the various centres He tells us that according to one tradition, 500 bodhisattvas [2] took part in the Jalandhara Council of Kaniṣka, that about this time the Mahāyāna texts appeared and were usually preached by monks who had attained the *Anutpattika-dharmakṣānti* ("Geduld in der Lehre des Nichtgeborenwerdens"),[3] a dogma characteristic of the Mahāyānists It may be a development of the Hīnayānic Anutpādajñāna (further non-origin of āśravas and hence re-birth) and Kṣayajñāna,[4] but it bore a completely different sense in the Mahāyāna scriptures. The reference to the existence of a class of monks called Bodhisattvas at the time of Kaniṣka's Council is also significant, for we read in the *Divyāvadāna* of the existence of a class of monks called *Bodhisattvayānika* along with a hint that they were not looked upon with favour by the Hīnayānists.[5] Tāranātha expresses his difficulty in accounting for the existence of monks called Bodhisattvas in the Kaniṣkan Council He tells us further that about the time

[1] For details see Intro to the *Pañca* (published in C.O S)

[2] Aśvaghoṣa is called a bodhisattva in the Chinese *Saṃyukta ratna piṭaka-sūtra* (No 1329 Vol VI) See Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p lix Cf De Groot, *Le Code du Mahayana en Chine*, p 8 Two or three days after the first ordination according to the Prātimokṣa rules, the monks pass through a special ordination according to the Brahmajāla sūtra and become bodhisattva. See *infra*, Ch V

[3] *Tāra.*, p 61 See *M. Vr*, p 363 n , *Lankā.*, p. 81 : *Aṣṭa.*, p 331 anutpādajñānakṣāntiko bodhisattva. See *infra*, Ch. III

[4] For Anutpādajñāna and Kṣayajñāna, see *Kośa*, VI, 17, 71 The Kṣayajñāna with the Anutpādajñāna makes the Bodhi, see also *Kośa*, vi, 50, vii, 1, 46, 7.

[5] *Divyā*, p 261.

of Kaniska, the brahmin Kulika of Saurāstra invited the Sthavira and Arahanta Nanda, a native of Aṅga, who had comprehended the Mahāyāna teaching in order to hear from him the new teaching.[1] The only point that deserves notice is the use of the appellations, Arahanta and Sthavira, indicating that Nanda was a Hīnayānist monk who had comprehended the Mahāyāna teaching The remark of Tāranātha that monks who had attained Anutpattikadharmaksānti preached also Mahāyāna shows that there was a class of Hīnayāna monks who had been propagating the Mahāyāna teaching[2] Then the association of Odivisa with the beginning of Mahāyāna teaching, and of the monk Nanda with Aṅga suggest that we should look for the origin of Mahāyāna somewhere in the east A passage occurring in all the *Prajñāpāramitās* partially lends support to the statement of Tāranātha. The passage says that Mahāyāna teaching will originate in the south (Daksināpatha), pass to the eastern countries (Vartanyām),[3] and prosper in the north Evidently, this statement of the *Prajñāpāramitās* was written while the work was compiled in the north after the Mahāyāna teaching had been effectively propagated there We may substantiate this statement by pointing to the Tibetan tradition about the existence of a *Prajñāpāramitā* in the Prākrt dialect belonging to the Saila schools, the centre of which was in the south (Guntur District) Very probably, this *Prajñāpāramitā* contained the germs of Mahāyāna teaching Then the shifting of the centre of Mahāyāna to the east is hinted at by Tāranātha, as referred to above In this connection it may also be pointed out that Nalanda was one of the earliest centres and storehouses of Mahāyāna teaching, becoming, later on, the seat of Nāgārjuna. So, it seems quite probable that Mahāyānism originated in the south some time before Kaniska and became a recognised form of Buddhism by the time of Kaniska, *i e*, about the beginning

1 *Tāra*, p 62

2 Can it be that Aśvaghosa, author of the *Buddhacarita*, belonged to this class of Hīnayāna monks?

3 *Asta.*, p. 225. For Vartanyām, see *Trikāṇḍaśesa*, 2. 1 12

of the Christian era when it established its chief centre in the east, gradually pushing its way towards the north to blossom forth in its full glory under the care of the great Nāgārjuna In the south too, it continued to thrive, for in the *Gandavyūha* we read that Mañjuśrī started from Jetavana to travel in Dakṣiṇāpatha [1] and came to Māladhvajavyūha caitya in the great city of Dhanyākara,[2] where many devotees lived Here he delivered a discourse and aroused aspiration for bodhi in the mind of Sudhanu, son of a rich banker of the place and directed him to go to Sugrīvaparvata in the country of Rāmavartta (also in Dakṣiṇāpatha) in order to learn the Samantabhadra-bodhisattva-caryā Sudhanu travelled over many places [3] of the Dakṣiṇāpatha in search of knowledge, arriving at last at Dvāravatī After learning all that he could in southern India, he went to Kapilavastu and travelled over some countries [4] of the north In the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* [5] also Dhānyakataka, Srīparvata, and a few other places of the Dakṣiṇāpatha are mentioned, showing the prevalence of Buddhism there. Nāgārjuna, whose birthplace was in Vidarbha (Berar),[6] also dwelt in the south, passing his last days at Śrīparvata (mod Śrīśailam) [7] Āryadeva likewise came from Southern India, as did also Nāga,[8] the other disciple

[1] *Gandavyūha* (A S B ms.) leaf 19b

[2] *Ibid.*, 21b Dakṣiṇāpath Dhanyākaran nāma mahānagaram Very likely it is the same as the famous Dhānyakataka (Dharaṇikota)

[3] The names of places in some cases seem to be fictitious, some of the names are —Sāgaramukha, Sāgaranāma, Laṅkāpatham, Vajrapuranāma Draviḍa-pattala, Vanavāsī, Milaspharanam nāma Jamudvīpaśirsam, Potalaka (the dwelling-place of Avalokiteśvara), and Dvāravatī

[4] The northern countries visited by him are —Bodhimanda and Kapilavastu

[5] *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series), p 88.

[6] Walleser, *Die Lebenszeit des Nagarjuna* in *Z für Buddhismus* (Munich), I, pp 95ff

[7] Nāgārjuna's name is closely associated with Dhānyakataka, near which are Śrīparvata and Nāgārjunikunda (west of Palnad Taluk), for details see Burgess, *Stūpas of Amarāvatī* pp 5, 6, 112, *Annual Report of South Indian Epigraphy*, 1926-7, p 71

[8] Nāgāhvaya in *Laṅkā*., p. 286. see Vaidya's *Catuḥśatikā*, *Intro*.

of Nāgārjuna. So, it appears that the south may claim credit for being not only the birthplace of Mahāyāna itself, but also of the noted figures, who were instrumental in making Mahāyāna what it was in the 2nd and 3rd century A C The dates of Āryadeva and Nāga are placed in the early part of the 3rd century (200–225) and Nāgārjuna precedes them by a few decades[1] The glory of Nāgārjuna and his school of philosophy threw into the shade the great figure of Maitreya, the traditional founder of the Yogācāra school, until the time of Asanga, who brought his works into prominence and placed this school of philosophy on a high pedestal

NATURE OF THE CONTENTS OF EARLY MAHĀYĀNA WORKS

The first two centuries of the Christian era witnessed the conflict between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna as well as the systematisation of the Mahāyāna doctrines The works which depict (in one-sided fashion, it must be admitted) this struggle, viz, the *Prajñāpāramitās*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, *Lankāvatara*, *Dasabhūmikasūtra* and *Gandayvūha*, were very probably the products of this period, but evidences are still lacking as to the exact dates of composition of these works The only clue is supplied by the dates of their Chinese translations but these are to be regarded as the latest limits of the time of their composition[2] In the absence of any definite data about the earliest limit, we can take into consideration

pp 22, 61, Wassiljew, *op cit*, p 130, Vidyābhūsana's *Logic* (1st ed) p 71

[1] Prof Walleser thinks it should be the beginning of the 2nd century See *Z fur Buddhismus* (6 Jahrgang, Schluss Heft), p 242, *I-tsing*, p lvii: Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa, and Āryadeva are regarded as contemporaries of Kaniṣka

[2] Dates of the Chinese translations

(i) Of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, the earliest translated is the *Daśasāhasrikā*, which, however, has no Sanskrit original It was translated between 25 and 220 A.C., the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* between 265 and 316 ? and the *Satasāhasrikā* about 659

(ii) The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* was translated between 265 and 316 by Dharmarakṣa, and between 384 and 417 by Kumārajīva For its various versions, see Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains, etc*, pp 139ff.

the nature of their contents, indicating a time when the Mahāyānists were trying to belittle the Hīnayānists. The *Prajñāpāramitā*· are full of Hīnayānic technical expressions and phraseology, meant to show how the position of the Hīnayānists is untenable, how they are deluded by the superficialities of the religion, and how insignificant their knowledge is in comparison with that of a bodhisattva practising the prajñāpāramitā. The *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* sets itself to the task of proving that the Hīnayānists are of poor intellect, but yet they can make progress in religious matters, ultimately turning to Mahāyāna and comprehending the truth. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* essays to depict the great struggles of a bodhisattva—struggles which are beyond the capacity of the Hīnayānists—in order to learn the Samantabhadra-bodhisattvacaryā, Sudhanu visits many bodhisattvas, bhikṣus, bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas, and upāsikās versed in certain portions of the Caryā and acquires the same from them. The *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, as the title indicates, relates the practices connected with the bhūmis, the gradual stages of a bodhisattva's sanctification. It also never misses an opportunity to attack the Hīnayānists and to show how the last four bhūmis of the bodhisattvas are wholly beyond the capacity of the śrāvakas. The *Lankāvatāra*, though one of the latest books of this group to be translated, contains an exposition of the early Yogācāra system and it harps throughout on the theme, *viz*, how the Hīnayānists are concerned only with svasāmānyalakṣana (particular and generic characteristics of things) and are ignorant of the non-existence of all things.

The Mahāyāna works that immediately follow are those of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Āryadeva, Vasubandhu, etc. Though

J R A S, 1927, pp 252ff , Feer, *Annales du Musée Guimet*, II, p. 242, *As Res*, XX, p 436, Wassiljew, *Buddhismus*, p 151

(iii) The *Lankāvatāra* was translated by Guṇabhadra (443 A C) and Bodhiruci (553). See *Eastern Buddhist*, IV, p 99

(iv) The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* was translated by Dharmarakṣa (297 A C) and by Kumārajīva (384–417) See Rahder's Intro to the *Daśa*

(v) The *Gaṇḍavyūha* was translated between 317 and 420 A C

the main object of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā* is to establish the idea that things are relatively existent, and that the truth is one and realisable only within one's own self, he takes up the chief dogma of the Hīnayānic schools and tries to prove its hollowness from the new standpoint set up by him Asanga, though of a much later date, does not allow the Hīnayānic doctrines to pass unnoticed. He shows in his *Sūtrālankāra* the inferiority of the Hīnayānists in mental calibre and their unfitness to comprehend the truth Vasubandhu likewise in his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* pointedly indicates how the Hīnayānists labour under misconceptions, the complete eradication of which is the aim of the Mahāyānists. Thus we see that though most of the works mentioned above belong to a time posterior to that with which we are here primarily concerned, they present us with materials illustrative of the conflict for ascendancy that was going on between the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists

One remarkable feature however, of the criticisms contained in these works against the Hīnayānists is that they do not attempt to distort the position of the Hīnayānists in order to win the laurel for the Mahāyānists The statements made in them with regard to the Hīnayānists are mostly borne out by the earlier and later Hīnayāna works Hence, instead of distorting their real position, they throw a flood of light on the Hīnayānic doctrines. The Mahāyānists found fault with the Hīnayānists, not because they misinterpreted the teachings of Buddha but because they looked upon as truth that which appeared to the Mahāyānists as only partial In the next chapter, we shall examine the estimate made of the Hīnayānists by the Mahāyānists, and the reasons underlying such an estimate

CHAPTER II

General Observations on the Relation between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna

Throughout the long history of Buddhism, unity amidst diversity is strikingly evident. Every student or adherent of Buddhism, at all times and places, admits that Buddha taught a middle path (*madhyamā pratipad*), comprising a doctrine which kept clear of the two extremes, existence and non-existence,[1] eternity and non-eternity of the world and its contents, and a discipline which advocated neither self-mortification nor a life of ease Without questioning the validity of the doctrines of the Teacher about the two extremes, the Buddhist philosophers found ample latitude for speculations about the middle path, but they failed to come to any agreement about the sort of life that Buddha actually wanted men to lead. Some understood it to consist in the leading of the life of a monk and realising the transitoriness of the things of this world including the self, while others understood it to be living in and through this world and realising that there is absolutely no difference between one's self and any other thing of the world, or, in the words of the Mahāyānic texts, between Samsāra (world) and Nirvāna (its cessation) Even the formulæ, Sarvam duhkham, Sarvam anityam, and Sarvam anātmam,[2] which came to be recognised as the characteristic marks of

[1] See *Vinaya*, *Mv*, i 6 17, *Mtu*, III, pp 331, 345, *Samyutta*, II pp 17, 20, 76, 23, 61, III, p 235 Also

M Vr, p 445

Na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvam vidhīyate,
* * sattvād asattvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā.

M Vr, p 504 Bhāvābhāvāntadvaya-rahitatvāt-sarvasvabhāvānutpattilaksanā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipan madhyamo mārga ity ucyate

Sūtrā, p 53 antadvayānuyogapratipaksena vinayah sāvadyaparibhoga pratisedhatah kāmasukhallikānuyogāntasyānāvadyaparibhogānujñānata ātmaklamathānuyogāntasya.

[2] All is full of misery, All is transitory, and All is egoless

Buddhism, lost their value in the eyes of the later Buddhists, the Mahāyānists. But *Nirvānam śāntam*,[1] however, never lost its charm for any of the Buddhist thinkers Almost all of them agree in holding that Nirvāna is śānta (peaceful i e, unruffled by origination and destruction) and that it is something inexpressible, and without decay and origin It has found expression in the well-known lines of the

Mādhyamikā Vṛtti [2] aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvānam ucyate (Nirvāna is....undecaying and unoriginating) and

Itivuttaka [3] Atthi, bhikkhave, abhūtam akatam asankhatam (there is, o bhikkhus, the unborn, uncreated, and unconstituted).

THE EXTENT OF AGREEMENT RE. THE CONCEPTION OF ŚŪNYATĀ

That all is transitory and all is egoless sometimes expressed by the words *sarvam śūnyam* (all is essenceless) formed the subject of keen controversies among the various sects The differences of opinion centred round the extent to which the transitory nature of the world should be carried The Hinayānists remained satisfied with a simple definition of Sūnya, declaring that as the world is void of individuality or anything belonging to an individuality, it is called sūnya (yasmā ca suññam attena va attaniyena va tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati ti) In other words, they say that as there is nothing permanent or personal in this world, the world is devoid of any substantiality The Mahāyānists, especially the Mādhyamikas, however, would not stop there They would carry the conception of Sūnya to its farthest limits, arriving at the Sūnyatā of not only the apparent existences but also of the so-called Tathāgata,[4] Nirvāna, or Ākāśa

[1] Sogen in his *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (pp 7 ff) takes Sarvam anityam and Sarvam anātmam and Nirvānam śāntam as the threefold cornerstone upon which rest both Hinayanism and Mahāyānism Strictly speaking, Anitya and Anātma do not find place in the Mahāyānic conception of Śūnyatā or Tathatā, the ultimate truth In fact, Sarvam tathātvam (all is such as it is) replaces the former two in Mahāyāna.

[2] *M Vr.*, p 521, Burnouf, *Intro*, p 519

[3] *Itiv*, p. 37, *Ud*, p 80

[4] *Suta.*, p. 120 Nāmamātram idam yaduta Buddha iti

They add that the Tathāgatas never trouble themselves about these terms, which to them are as meaningless as the self-contradictory expression like 'the son of a barren woman'[1] The usual way in which they speak of the non-existence of anything is

Na śūnyatayā rūpam śūnyam, nānyatra rūpāt śūnyatā, rūpam eva śūnyatā, śūnyataiva rūpam (form is not devoid of śūnyatā, sūnyatā is not outside form, form is śūnyatā, and sūnyatā is form)[2]

It is remarkable that this form of generalisation of the sūnyatā has been resorted to not only by the early Mahāyānists in the *Prajñāpāramitās* but also by the Mādhyamikas[3] and the Yogācāras[4] An attempt has been made to show with the help of this passage that though sūnyatā seems to be the ultimate abstraction of all dharmas (things), it is actually the name which is given to the real *svabhāva* (nature) of things (dharmas or dravyas) It is *dharmatā* in the sense that it is neither apart from the dharma nor identical with it If we say that it is apart from dharma, then the dharmas would be void, and if we say it is identical with dharma then the dharmas would be nitya (permanent) This conception of Śūnyatā is only foreshadowed, but does not appear in a developed form in Pāli literature in passages like—

Avyākatam mayā tam jīvam tam sarīram or aññam jīvam aññam sarīram Hoti tathāgato param maranā, na hoti tathāgato param maranā, hoti ca na hoti ca tathāgato param maranā, n' eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato param maranā"[5] (It has not been explained by me whether soul is the same

[1] *Laṅkā*, p 19 Alabdhātmaka dharmāh katame yaduta śaśakharoऽtra vājivisāna bandhyāputra prabhṛtayo dharmāh

[2] *Sata*, p 118 rūpam (lit form=material constituents of a body) has been taken here as X, i e, any term may be put for it In the *Pañcavimśati* (leaf 72b), 'Māya' has been used for 'Śūnyatā' in a formula exactly like this

[3] *M Vr*, p 248

[4] *Sūtrā*, p 76 In the *Vijñaptimātratā*, śūnyatā is the same as bhūta tathatā

[5] See, e g, *Dīgha*, I, p 188, Anesaki takes the word 'Tathāgato' instead of 'Buddha' as significant See *E R E*, vol iv, p 836.

as body or different from it, neither has it been explained by me whether Tathāgata exists or does not exist after death, or whether Tathāgata not-exists or not not-exists after death)

These expressions, which receive no more than bare mention in the Pāli literature under the belief that their true sense can only be comprehended by one who has risen to the highest state of sanctification, served, however, as a basis for many of the speculations of the later Buddhists The Yogācārins recognise that the truth is beyond the four limitations, viz, the same or different or both or non-both, i.e, it does not admit of the questions of existence or non-existence[1] But this recognition did not deter them from conceiving a Tathāgata-garbha, the "Womb of the Universe," or "the transcendental soul of man just coming under the bondage of karmaic causation"[2] The Mādhyamikas, who are too severe in their logical conclusions, consider that the four limitations are so many impossibilities and that any discussion about them is like the discussion about the 'colour of the son of a barren woman', and it is for this reason that they add that Buddha had no other alternative than to say that they are indeterminable (avyākrta)[3] The limitations, however, helped the Mādhyamikas in building their theory of Śūnyatā as an impersonal absolute principle, regarding which the above mentioned fourfold inquiry is inadmissible

AGREEMENT RE. THE FOUR TRUTHS AND THE CAUSAL LAW

Though the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists did not agree regarding the conception of Śūnyatā, there was no disagreement among them in regard to the fact that Buddha preached the four Truths (*Āryasatyas*) and the Causal Law (*Pratītyasamutpāda*)[4] The four truths, Duhkha, Samudaya,

[1] *Laṅkā*, p 96 Catustaya vinirmuktā tathāgatānām dharmadeśanā yadutaikatvānyatvobhayānubhaya-pakṣa-vivarjitā nāstyasti-samāropāpavāda vinirumktā.

[2] Sogen, *op cit*, p 25

[3] *M Vr*, pp 446–47 14 indeterminable problems are enumerated Cf *Con. of N*, pp 44–45

[4] See *Laṅkā*, p. 96.

Nirodha, Mārga (misery, cause of misery, cessation of misery, and the path leading to the cessation of misery) and the Pratītyasamutpāda form the watchword of the Hīnayānists and hardly need any explanation for the prominence received by them in the Hīnayāna literature But those who conceive this world as only an apparition, or as a mere delusion of the mind, must show reasons why the Truths and the Causal Law should find a place in their doctrines Nāgārjuna devotes two chapters[1] to these two topics, and, at the very commencement of his chapter on Āryasatyas, he anticipates this objection and says that there would have been no Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, had there not been the Truths and the Causal Law, for it is through them that the ultimate truth is attained and hence they could not but have a place in their doctrines According to him Sūnyatā is not nihilism but the absolute principle immanent in all, and hence, with it, no relation of the worldly things and usages can be established, the four Truths and the Causal Law relate to the world and are worldly The Yogācārins hold an identical view They have three forms of truth called Parikalpita (imaginary), Paratantra (dependent), and Parinispanna (perfect or ultimate)[2] Their view of Śūnyatā that the world is a delusion of the mind is a parinispanna truth, while the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda relate to the Paratantra and Parikalpita In short, the Mahāyānists hold that the four Truths and the Causal Law are the preparatory steps indispensable to the realisation of the absolute truth. Their doctrines exist to lead the ignorant beings from ignorance to knowledge, from darkness to light, and this is effected by and through the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda.

Though the Causal Law is relegated by the Mahāyānists to the domain of convention, it will be observed that it received their earnest attention Nāgārjuna opens his work with a long dissertation on the Causal Law in order to prove that the things and events, of which we are cognizant,

[1] *M Vr*, Ch. I & XXIV, see *infra*. Ch. III (d).

[2] For detailed treatment, see Ch. III (d)

are all relative, appearing and disappearing through some causes and conditions, and asserts that the moment a person realises this fact he is emancipated and knows the Truth, Śūnyatā [1] The Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists differ as regards the Truth but they agree that the Truth, as conceived by them, is attainable through the comprehension of the causal law, and so the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnayānic or Mahāyānic,[2] are unanimous in holding—

Yah pratītyasamutpādam paśyati sa dharmam paśyati, yo dharmam paśyati so buddham paśyati (He who realises the causal origination of things sees the Truth, one who sees the Truth sees the Buddha)

The formula of the Causal Law appealed so much to the Buddhists of all times and places that not only the scriptures of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists but also the inscriptions of different periods record

Ye dharmā hetuprabhavā hetum teṣām tathāgatah hyavadat,
Teṣām ca yo nirodha evamvādī mahāśramanah.

(The Tathāgata explained the origin of those things, which proceed from a cause He explained their cessation as well this is the doctrine of the great Sramana)

These show that there was complete unanimity amongst all the sects with regard to the fact that Buddha preached the Causal Law and the Āryasatyas But it has to be admitted that though the Āryasatyas, the Pratītyasamutpāda and the uncaused and uncreated Nirvāna find a place in the doctrines of all the schools, the standpoint from which each of them is being viewed is as apart as the poles In fact, around these three principles have developed various conflicting opinions, giving rise to a number of schools, each trying to show that its own view of the principles is right, while the views of the others are wrong.

[1] Nāgārjuna even identified Pratītyasamutpāda with Śūnyatā, see *M Vr*, pp 503, 542 yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatām tām praca kṣmahe

[2] *Majjhima*, I, p 191, *Samyutta*, III, p 120, *Itiv*, p. 92, *Sad Sah* (J P T S), 1890, p. 69 *Mil.*, p 71; *Dīgha*, II, p. 154, *Bodhic.*, p. 386, *M Vṛ.*, pp. 6, 160, *Śālistambasūtra*, p 70

EKAYĀNATĀ

As the Hīnayānists were confident of having preserved the original teachings of the Master, and of existing anterior to the Mahāyānists, they did not think it worth while to show the agreements and disagreements between their own doctrines and those of the Mahāyānists But the Mahāyānists, aware of their later origin and remoteness from the Founder of their religion in point of time, could not help devoting some thought to establishing their claim as the true representatives of the Founder They attempted to prove that the real point of view of the Founder had been missed by the Hīnayānists to whom they usually referred as Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas They did not deny the authenticity of the literature of the Hīnayānists and the doctrines propounded by them, but what they desired to prove was that Buddha knew the mediocre character of the intellect of most of his disciples and delivered some discourses in a modified form to suit their understanding while to the select few he gave out his real teachings which became known as the Mahāyāna sūtras They did not say that Buddha had different truths for people of different mental calibres According to them, Buddha preached one and only one Truth and Path, but the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas see and practise only a portion of same They are not debarred from seeing the whole truth and the real path, for many of them do so by becoming Mahāyānists after the attainment of Arhathood or Pratyekabuddhahood They do not state that there could be two kinds of knowledge (prajñā), one for the Hīnayānists and another for the Mahāyānists for the realisation of the Truth, so the *Prajñāpāramitās* say in their opening verses addressed to Prajñā.

Buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhais ca śrāvakais ca nisevitā,
Mārgas tvam ekā mokṣasya nāsty anya iti niścayaḥ

(You are the only path leading to emancipation, there is no other. It is the path followed by Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas alike)[1] The *Prajñāpāramitā* texts lay too much stress on the practice of *prajñāpāramitā*, identify-

[1] *Aṣṭa*, p 3, *Pañca.*, p. 1, *Bodhic*, p 430

ing it sometimes also with the absolute truth. The texts remark in many places that the three Yānas are embodied in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, and that the achievements of the Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas, or Pratyekabuddhas depend on the Prajñāpāramitā. So, according to these texts, the Prajñāpāramitā is the only Yāna for arriving at the Truth,[1] and it includes all other Yānas

The *Saddharma-Pundarīka*,[2] concerned as it is to prove that Hīnayāna is a stepping stone to Mahāyāna, supports this idea in these verses —

Ekam hi yānam dvitiyam na vidyate,
trtiyam hi naivāsti kadāci loke
Anyatrupāyā purusottamānām,
yad yāna-nānātyupadarśayanti
Bauddhasya jñānasya prakāsanārtham,
loke samutpadyati lokanāthah
Ekam hi kāryam dvitiyam na vidyate,
na hīnayānena nayanti Buddhāh

(There is only one path, no second, never does a third exist in the world The exhibition of the variety of Yānas is only a means adopted by the great sages The Teacher appears in the world to give out the Buddha knowledge He has only one object in view, and nothing else. Buddhas never lead men by an inferior path) It states again elsewhere[3]

Sa pasyati mahāprajño dharmakāyam asesatah,
Nāsti yānatrayam kiñcid ekayānam ihāsti tu

(For him, the highly wise, who has seen the Dharmakāya in its fullness, there is only one Yāna and not three) But as the avowed object of the *Saddharma-Pundarīka* is to show that the Śrāvakayāna was only a means (upāya) of uplift of the devotee as devised by the Teacher, it harps on the theme

Ekam eva yānam ārabhya sattvānām dharmam deśitavanto

[1] See, *e g*, *Pañca*, leaf 167a, *Bodhic*, p 431 It should be noted that the perfection in prajñāpāramitā means the realisation of the Absolute through the comprehension of the non-existence of things altogether

[2] *Sad P*, p 46 [3] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

yad idam Buddhayānam sarvajñatāparyavasānam, etc [1] (it is concerning only one Yāna that the dharma has been preached, it is the Buddhayāna leading to the attainment of all-knowledge, etc).

The object of these verses is to show that the real Truth and the real Path are one, and that which is followed by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is ultimately followed by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, hence there are not, in fact, three yānas called Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Buddhayāna but only one Yāna and that is Buddhayāna or Mahāyāna

Points of agreement between the two Yānas mentioned in the Mahāyānic texts

Some of the Mahāyānic texts have also attempted to prove the simultaneous origin and the essential unity of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by bringing out the points of agreement existing between the two Yānas The (Tibetan) *Madhyamakāvatāra* remarks on the basis of Nāgārjuna's statement in his *Mādhyamika-sūtras* about the conception of Śūnyatā of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists that "it is the same sūnyatā (vacuity) whether it be in the sense of destruction or of non-origin" and takes this fact as a proof of the simultaneous origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna [2] The *Sūtrālankāra* [3] also attempts to prove that there is only one yāna, not two or three, and that Hīnayāna is not altogether different from Mahāyāna. Its object is to show that the only Yāna (*Ekayāna*) is really Mahāyāna, the other two Yānas being subservient to it It points out that there

[1] *Sad. P*, p 41, see also *Sikṣā*, pp 95–6 "I have never preached the law in separate forms, one for Srāvakas, one for Pratyekabuddhas and one for Bodhisattvas"

[2] La Vallée Poussin's Fr transl in the *Le Muséon*, VIII, (N.S), p 271 "Ce point est enseigné par (Nāgārjuna) notre maitre, quand il dit Le Grand Véhicule enseigne la non naissance, l'autre Véhicule la destruction, c'est la même vacuité dans la sens de destruction et de non-naissance" Cf *Madhyamaka Sāstra*, XV, 7, *M Vr*, p 269, Kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam, pratisiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā. Cf. also *Samyutta*, II, p 17

[3] *Sūtrā.*, pp 68–70

are many things common to the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists, some of which are.

(i) Sameness of the *dharmadhātu* (totality of existence or things), i.e., the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas emanate from the identical dharmadhātu [1]

(ii) Sameness of *nairātmya* (absence of any substance) The Śrāvakas assert the absence of substance (ātmābhāva), the difference between the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas being that the former apply it to Pudgala (person) only, while the latter apply it to both Pudgala and Dharma (world)

(iii) Sameness of *vimukti* (liberation) It refers to the kleśa-vimukti (abandonment of passions) which is sought for by both the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas, the latter seeking something more, viz, the Jñeyāvarana-vimukti (abandonment of the screen obstructing knowledge)

(iv) In spite of the gotrabheda (difference in gotras), there are many who are of the Aniyata-gotras and become Mahāyānists The Aniyata-gotras include two classes of individuals, one class prone to become Śrāvakas and the other Bodhisattvas Many of the former class are attracted to Mahāyāna, while those of the latter are not allowed to slip (samdhāranāya) from Mahāyāna [2]

(v) Though Buddhas and Śrāvakas have two different *āśayas*, still there is a point of contact between the two On the one hand, Buddhas identify themselves with all beings, while on the other, those of the Śrāvaka-gotras, before they turn definitely to Śrāvaka-yāna, perform meritorious deeds which enable them to attain Bodhi, and also cherish a desire (āśaya) to become Buddha [3] There is no difference between Buddhas and Śrāvakas in the matter of getting release from the series of births Hence, after obtaining release, the Śrāvakas develop a desire (āśaya),

[1] Cf *Kāś P* p 116, §80, *Kārikā* (A S.B ms), leaf 2a.
Dharmadhātor asambhedāt gotrabhedo na yujyate;
Ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tad bhedah parigīyate 39

[2] See *Sūtrā*, p 69, v 54.

[3] Prof Lévi corrects the reading of the text from 'anātmani baddhāśaya to 'ātmani buddhāśaya' See his *Transl*, p 125, fn.

through the grace and influence of Buddhas, to become Buddhas, and ultimately the two āśayas become identical and so there is only one Yāna.

(vi) Buddha's exhibition of attainment of *parinirvāna* through Srāvakayāna It refers to the fact of Buddha's attaining Mahāparinirvāna as conceived by the Hīnayānists The Mahāyānists usually explain it away by saying that it was the parinirvāna of the Nirmānakāya of the real Buddha, but the text here takes it as a point of contact between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna

(vii) Ultimateness (*paryantāt*) of the Mahāyāna, i e, as there is nothing beyond Mahāyāna, so it is the only Yāna, Srāvakayāna making only some progress towards it

The above arguments of Asanga adduced by him to demonstrate the agreements between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna are more or less laboured His idea clearly is that there is only one Yāna properly so called, viz, the Mahāyāna and that the Śrāvakas pass through a course of Śrāvakahood only to take to Mahāyāna in order to become Buddhas in course of time The commentator explains it by a reference to the *Śrīmālāsūtra*, in which it has been stated that a Śrāvaka becomes a Pratyekabuddha, and ultimately a Buddha [1]

The *Lankāvatāra* [2] is more emphatic in its assertion that all Yānas are one and the same Its point of view, however, is quite different, for all its remarks are made mainly from the pure Yogācāra standpoint that everything is mental delusion It establishes the fact that all Yānas are essentially one and that they have been looked upon as different only because of their suitability to people according to the degree of progress made by them in mental and spiritual development It says—

> Triyānam ekayānam ca ayānam ca vadāmyaham,
> Bālānām mandabuddhīnām āryānām ca viviktatām

[1] *Sūtrā*, p 70 tam avasthātrayastham samdhāyoktam Bhagavatā Śrīmālāsūtre, śrāvako bhūtvā pratyekabuddho bhavati punaś ca Buddha iti

[2] *Lankā*, pp 65, 243.

Dvāram hi paramārthasya vijñaptidvayavarjitam,
Yānatrayavyavasthānaṃ nirābhāse sthite kutah.

[On account of the distinction existing among the ignorant, the dullards and the sages, I speak of Triyāna, Ekayāna, or Ayāna, (i.e., absence of any yāna) as the entrance leading to Paramārtha, (i e, the absolute truth), which is devoid of the two kinds of designations (vijñapti), in the absence of appearances (nirābhāse) how can this discrimination of three yānas stand] Still more philosophical is its definition of Ekayāna, when it says[1] that the realisation of Ekayāna means the cessation of all thought-creations (vikalpa) by thoroughly comprehending that the subject and the object are mere delusions This, according to the text, was discovered for the first time by Buddha, it was not known to the non-buddhists, Śrāvakas, or Pratyekabuddhas, hence it should be called Ekayāna

MAHĀYĀNA IS NOT THE ORIGINAL BUDDHISM BUT A LATER AND MORE DEVELOPED STAGE OF SAME

From the standpoint of Mahāyānic philosophy, the three yānas may be essentially one, but the philosophic expositors of *Ekayānatā* never saw eye to eye with the Hīnayānists, and expressed their feelings for the latter in disparaging terms The Hīnayānists, however literally obeyed the dictum of the Teacher, attānam na ukkamseti param na vambheti (neither praise yourself nor disparage others) and did not choose to embody in their literature condemnations of their opponents It cannot, however, be denied that Mahāyāna had in it some features and principles for which it can rightly claim superiority over Hīnayāna in some directions Its wider outlook with the great emphasis laid on *Maitrī* and *Karunā* and its attempt to put together in as perfect a manner as possible the philosophical truths can claim for it a superior position in regard to Hīnayāna, but it should be remembered that Mahāyāna is an advanced stage of Buddhism, in fact, it is

[1] *Laṅkā*, pp 133 Ekayānamārgādhigamāvabodhah katamo yaduta grāhyagrāhakavikalpa-yathābhūtāvāsthānād apravṛtter vikalpasyaikayānāvabodhah See also p 155.

a later phase of Buddhistic thought and religion, an outcome of the Buddhistic culture of two or three centuries. The relation of Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna has been happily expressed by Dr Maeda thus:—"The teachings of Śākyamuni are the seeds, those of Hīnayāna are the branches and leaves, those of Mahāyāna are the blossoms and fruits Long after the seeds were hidden away and when the time was ripe, the fruit appeared" According to Dr Murakami[1] "Buddha did not necessarily teach Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, as these are designations invented later What was really preached by Buddha himself was primitive Buddhism in which there was yet no differentiation" Even the Āgamas of Hīnayāna Buddhism, in his opinion, do not preserve all the features of early Buddhism, as they were compiled some centuries after Buddha, but yet they contain more primitive Buddhism than other scriptural texts. Drs Anesaki and Chuki Tominaga also agree that Mahāyāna cannot have historically a direct relation to Sākyamuni[2]

ATTEMPTS TO PROVE THAT MAHĀYĀNA WAS DERIVED DIRECTLY FROM ŚĀKYAMUNI

There are however scholars, both ancient and modern, who are not willing to accept the unpleasant truth that Mahāyāna is not derived from Śākyamuni directly The ancient scholars take shelter in scholastic arguments to oppose the inference, while the modern rely with the same object on a few traditions preserved in the literatures of Japan and India

I ASANGA

Asanga in the first chapter of his *Sūtrālankāra*[3] puts forward these arguments "If it be a fact that Mahāyāna

[1] Vide his article on Mahāyāna in the *Eastern Buddhist*, I, ii, pp 1, 2

[2] The opinions of the Japanese scholars have been taken from the paper of Mr R C Armstrong on "*The discussion of the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism*" in the *Eastern Buddhist*, IV, i.

[3] *Sūtrā*, pp 3, 4 This passage of the *Sūtrālankāra* is cited also in the Chinese commentary of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* for proving the authenticity of Mahāyāna See Prof. Poussin's French translation of the Chinese commentary, pp. 176–78.

was not preached by Buddha and that it was invented (utpāditam) by some body at a later time, then it would be a danger (antarāya) to the excellent religion (saddharma), and it should have been foretold by Buddha as one of the many dangers that might befall his religion in future (anāgata-bhayas),[1] but it was not It appears that Mahāyāna originated at the same time with Hīnayāna and not afterwards, then why should it not be regarded as based on Buddhavacana Mahāyāna is a sublime and profound religion and so it cannot be understood by tārkikas (sceptical dialecticians) It is also not correct to say that it was uttered by some body other than Buddha, for it does not appear in the Śāstras of the non-Buddhists (tīrthikas), and even if the tīrthikas are told of it, they do not believe it If we admit that it was said by some body other than Śākyamuni, then it must have been uttered by some one who had attained Bodhi In that case also it is Buddhavacana, for he who after realising Bodhi has uttered this is a Buddha If the existence of the Mahāyāna be denied, then there cannot exist a Śrāvakayāna, because Śrāvakayāna is Buddhavacana and it is not proper to say that there is no Mahāyāna (or Buddhayāna), for there cannot arise a Buddha without a Buddhayāna It is also Buddhavacana in view of the fact that the unconditioned knowledge (sarvanirvikalpajñāna) attainable through Mahāyāna operates as an antidote to all kleśas This scholastic reasoning of Asaṅga may have a value of its own but it does not establish the simultaneous origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna

II Śāntideva

Śāntideva, in his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, adduces reasons different from those of Asaṅga to establish the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures His attempt is more to challenge the authenticity of the Hīnayāna Āgamas than to establish the aforesaid point. He says that the statement found in the *Prajñāpāramitas* that all the three yānas have been

[1] For a note on the Anāgatabhayas, see Lévi's French Translation of *Sūtrā.*, pp 6, 7 fn.

preached in them (atra prajñāpāramitāyām sarvāṇi trīṇi yānāni vistareṇopadiṣṭāni) is not accepted by the Hīnayānists, for the latter deny the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures To establish the authenticity of their own Āgamas, the first argument advanced by the Hīnayānists is this, that with regard to the authenticity of the Hīnayāna scriptures, the Mahāyānists have nothing to say by way of objection, while the Hīnayānists do not accept the scriptures which the Mahāyānists accept as the authentic utterances of Buddha himself But the argument for establishing the authenticity of the scriptures on the acceptance of the same by persons (in this case the Hīnayānists or the Mahāyānists) is considered worthless by the Mahāyānists The second argument put forward by the Hīnayānists is that their *Āgamas* have been handed from teacher to pupil and that it satisfies the conditions laid down by Buddha as proofs of authenticity *viz*, that it agrees with the *Sūtra*, it can be traced (saṃdṛśyate) in the *Vinaya*, and that it is not in conflict with the causal origin of things (dharmatā[1], *i e*, pratītyasamutpāda) But this argument also falls through on account of the fact that the Mahāyānists also can quote a similar passage from the *Adhyāśaya-saṃcodanā-sūtra* of theirs The third argument of the Hīnayānists is that the authenticity of their scriptures is acknowledged not only by the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists but also by the non-Buddhists This again is met by the Mahāyānists, who argue that the *Vedas* and such other literature would also then be accepted as authentic The fourth and the last argument of the Hīnayānists is that as regards their scriptures, there are no differences of opinion, while there are many in regard to the Mahāyāna scriptures This is answered by the Mahāyānists by pointing out that, leaving out of account the non-Buddhists such as the Mīmāṃsakas, the Hīnayānists themselves are not unanimous in their opinion about their scriptures, as they are divided into

[1] *Bodhic*, p 431 Yac ca sūtre' vatarati, vinaye ca saṃdṛśyate, dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati, tad Buddhavacanaṃ nānyad, see also *Sūtrā*, p 5, cf *Digha*, II, p 124 Tāni padavyañjanāni sutte c'eva otaranti vinaye ca sandissanti, etc.

eighteen sects (bheda), the division does not stop there, the commentator adds, because in each sect (bheda) again, there are differences of opinion according as one is a Sautrāntika (one who studies the *Sūtras* only), an Ābhidharmika (one who studies the *Abhidharma* only), or a Vainayika (one who studies the *Vinaya* only)[1] The Hīnayānists, therefore, should give up their *Sūtras*, *Vinaya*, and *Abhidharma* This fact shows the unsoundness of the Hīnayānic argument that their scriptures have been handed down faithfully from teacher to pupil. Moreover, there should not be any disagreement regarding Buddha- or Sarvajña-vacana if they have been faithfully preserved Sāntideva's arguments may show the anomaly of the position of the Hīnayānists, but they do not establish his proposition that the Mahāyāna scriptures originated with Buddha

THE JAPANESE SCHOLARS ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF MAHĀYĀNA

Let us now see what the modern scholars have to say about the authenticity of Mahāyānism and Mahāyāna scriptures Mr Suzuki takes to a line of reasoning different from those of the ancient scholars He tries to draw an analogy between Buddhism and Christianity and says that if Protestantism be the genuine teaching of Jesus of Nazareth then Mahāyāna Buddhism is also the genuine teaching of Buddha Sākyamuni This sort of argument may well serve Mr Suzuki in a controversy with an orthodox advocate of Protestantism speaking on Mahāyāna, but in historical criticism, it has no weight However, he reveals the real state of things when he points out in another place that Mahāyānism is not a fossilised but a living religion like Christianity and though some "changes it has made during its historical evolution, its spirit and central ideas are all those of its founder" He states further that if we take the term "genuine" to mean a lifeless preservation of the

[1] For detailed discussion on the division of monks belonging to the same sect, see my *Early History etc*, p 207, *Lankā.*, (B T.S ed) pp 135, 137.

original, then Mahāyānism is not the genuine teaching of Buddha, but "the Mahāyānists would be proud of the fact, because being a living religious force, it would never condescend to be the corpse of a bygone faith". Ultimately he says "What does it matter, then, whether or not Mahāyānism is the genuine teaching of Buddha"[1].

Mr Suzuki admits, therefore, that Mahāyāna may not be the teaching of Buddha, but Mr Kimura, without denying the fact that the "Mahāyāna *sūtras* and the statements embodied therein undoubtedly came into being after Buddha's death", puts forward his theory about the possession of two kinds of "perception" by Buddha, Mahāyāna representing the "introspectional or esoteric" side of the "perception" and Hīnayāna the "phenomenological or exoteric" side[2] He believes that Buddha imparted his introspectional teachings to the select few among his disciples, preaching his 'phenomenological' teachings to all the rest This theory is based partly on the traditions to the same effect preserved in Japan and partly on an uncritical acceptance of some of the statements relating to Sāmvrta and Paramārtha truths found in the early Mahāyāna treatises, specially the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* There could be no objection to accept Mr Kimura's view if he could point out the "advanced and brilliant disciples" who "rightly grasped Buddha's introspectional ideas" and of which they made an exposition resulting in the development of "Mahāyānic ideas" If Sāriputra, Subhūti, Mahāmaudgalyāyana were not able to grasp Buddha's ontological teachings as the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* actually states, then who were the others able to do so? They certainly cannot be the Bodhisattvas, who have the appearance of fictitious figures even in the Mahāyāna literature In fact, the interlocutors in the early Mahāyāna treatises, such as the *Prajñāpāramitās*, are the Hīnayāna savants, Sāriputra, Subhūti, etc., and the names

[1] Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 16.

[2] Evidently Mr Kimura has in his mind the Paramārtha- and Samvṛti satyas. For Mr Kimura's statements, see *Journal of Letters* (Calcutta University), vol. xii, pp. 47, 59, 65. For the two Satyas see Chapter III (d).

that we most frequently come across in the Mahāyāna works are those of the prominent figures of the Hīnayāna literature No student of history will probably believe the statement of the *Prajñāpāramitās* that these disciples delivered the Mahāyāna teachings only by being inspired by Buddha[1] and without properly grasping them. Japanese traditions, which are relied upon in this connection to establish the authenticity of the Mahāyāna, reveal, I think, the actual state of things They accord priority of origin to Hīnayāna, as will be seen from the following.—

(*a*) The Hsien Shou school thus arranges chronologically the Japanese traditions on the various forms of the Buddhist teachings.—

(i) Siao Chiao or primitive teaching;
(ii) Shih Chiao or the beginning of the true religion (transitional state),
(iii) Chung Chiao or the final development of the true religion,
(iv) Tun Chiao or the school of meditation,[2] and
(v) Yuan Chiao or the complete religion of all the schools

(*b*) The Tien Tai school puts the order thus —

(i) Tsang Chiao or primitive teaching,
(ii) Tung Chiao or the teaching in a transitional state,
(iii) Pieh Chiao or the new teaching, and
(iv) Yuan Chiao or the complete religion of all the schools.[3]

The tradition of the Tien Tai school, however, adds that the *Avatamsaka sūtras* were preached first, but as they were not understood by the disciples, the *Āgamas* were preached

[1] *Aṣṭa*, p 33 Sthavirah Subhūtir āha. Tena hi Kauśika upadekṣyāmi te buddhānubhāvena buddhatejasā buddhādhiṣṭhānena.

[2] "This second school founded by the last Buddhist patriarch Ta Mo is not mentioned separately in the Tien Tai classification" T Richard, *New Testament of Higher Buddhism*, p 41

[3] See T Richard, *op. cit*, p. 4, here the word "teaching" has been preferred to "Buddhism", see also *Journal of Letters*, xii, p. 64, *Eastern Buddhist*, iv, i.

Then, after some time when Buddha had some disciples with more developed mental powers, the ontological doctrines found in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and such other works were preached Both the traditions support the view that both the forms of teaching were delivered by Buddha within the space of forty years The Tibetan traditions go further and state that Śākyamuni delivered his instructions on the *Prajñāpāramitā* sixteen years after the attainment of bodhi, *i e*, in the fifty-first year of his age while he was dwelling on the Gṛdhrakūṭa mountain, and add that they were compiled by Kāśyapa[1] Any one who examines the style of writing and the nature of the doctrinal and other matters discussed in the *Gandavyūha*, an old treatise of the *Avatamsaka* class, can have little doubt about the posteriority of this class of literature not only to the Hīnayāna *Āgamas* or the *Nikāyas*, but also to the *Prajñāpāramitās* Considering, for instance, the conception of the lokadhātus or the account of the existence of Buddhism in the south of India as found in the *Gandavyūha*, its composition cannot but be relegated to a time much later than the *Prajñāpāramitās*[2]

The *Prajñāpāramitās* like the *Astasāhasrikā* and the *Śatasāhasrikā* occupy a position between the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saddharmapundarīka* or the *Gandavyūha*. This fits in with the chronological arrangement of the Japanese traditions, if we leave out of account the statement mentioned in them that Buddha could not have any disciples able to understand the teachings embodied in the *Avatamsaka sūtras* Thus, we find, that the traditions do not deny the priority of origin of Hīnayāna referred to as Tsang Chiao (primitive teaching) Their mention of Tung Chiao (teaching in a transitional state) is also very interesting in view of the fact that it probably refers to the various schools like the Sarvāstivādins, the Mahāsānghikas, the Lokottaravādins, etc, which were half-way between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna But Yamakami Sogen[3] thinks that "Harivarman's doctrine

[1] *As Res*, xx, pp 399, 400

[2] For a discussion about the time of the earliest *Prajñāpāramitā*, see my Intro to the *Pañca*

[3] Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 173

(Satyasiddhi school) is to be regarded as the highest point of philosophical perception attained by Hīnayānism, and in a sense it constitutes the stage of transition between Hīnayānism and Mahāyānism" But the difficulty in the way of taking the Satyasiddhi school as indicative of the transitional state of Buddhism lies in the fact that the school came into existence as late as the 3rd century A C, when Mahāyāna had already developed It may be taken as an attempt made by Harivarman to reconcile Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The third name Pieh or Chung Chiao evidently refers to the early form of Mahāyānism as found in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the contemporaneous literature

The policy of reconciliation in the *Pundarīka*

The view shared by Dr Enryo Inouye and a few other scholars[1] on the strength of the Japanese traditions that Śākyamuni imparted two forms of teaching, esoteric and exoteric, is very probably derived from statements in Mahāyāna works, in which it is said that Buddha's teachings were based on two kinds of truth, conventional and transcendental, and from the *Pundarīka* which seeks to maintain that Hīnayāna was only an upāya-kausalya adopted by Śākyamuni to attract people of average intellect to his teachings and then ultimately to Mahāyāna It is well known how popular the *Pundarīka* is among the Mahāyānists, and what a great influence it still exercises over their opinion The statements are valuable from our standpoint, because their chief aim is the reconciliation of Hīnayāna with Mahāyāna It is stated that the Hīnayānists like Śāriputra acquired merits in previous births like the Bodhisattvas, but these they cannot remember now[2] It is to remind them of these merits, and also the resolutions formed by them in the previous births, that the *Pundarīka* is preached to the

[1] See *Eastern Buddhist*, IV

[2] Contrast Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 312 · Sāriputta enquired of Buddha if the Srāvakas like him could become Buddhas Buddha answered in the negative, saying that the Srāvakas must complete the Pāramis

Śrāvakas[1] Though the treatise maintains throughout the superiority of the doctrines and practices of the Mahāyānists to those of the Hīnayānists, yet it does not disparage the latter as quite worthless It tries to show that Hīnayāna is an expedient (*upāya-kauśalya*) that was adopted by Buddha to suit his disciples in a lower stage of intellectual and spiritual progress, and to serve as a step to Mahāyāna Those who had reached the highest stage to which the practice of Hīnayāna doctrines can lead can become Mahāyānists and ultimately Buddhas In fact, it devotes quite a large space to show how the bhiksus, Śāriputra, Kāśyapa, Subhūti, Mahākātyāyana, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, Pūrna Maitrāyanīputra, Ānanda, Rāhula, and others, and the bhiksunīs, Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī, Rāhulamātā, etc, who were held in high esteem by the Hīnayānists on account of their deep spiritual insight and high attainments, repented when they were old that they had to follow a lower course, as they did not possess the capacity to understand the covert teachings (*samdhābhāsā*) of Buddha, and could not have the full benefit from his teachings The statement is put into Śāriputra's mouth that he had been selected by the Teacher as the chief of Śrāvakas of his time He is the eldest son born of the mouth of the Teacher (jyesthaputra mukhajāta), but yet he mourns for his lot that he attains Nirvāna (arahathood) only, and cannot become a Bodhisattva or Buddha Then he curses himself that he has been found suitable by Buddha to be led through only a lower course of training (hīnena yānena niryātitah) The Teacher is represented as consoling him by saying that he can never have the intention of preaching different Yānas He has preached only one Yāna. Though he first taught Hīnayāna to some, it was to take them ultimately to Mahāyāna and make them realise Buddhahood in due course[2] The *Punda-*

[1] *Sad P*, pp 64–5 So'ham tvām Sāriputra pūrvacaryāpranidhānajñānānubodham anusmārayitukāma imam Saddharma-Pundarīkam dharmaparyāyam sūtrāntam mahāvaipulyam bodhisattāvavādam sarvabuddhaparigraham śrāvakāṇām samprakāśayāmi.

[2] *Sad P*, pp 36, 38, 60, 61; *Śata*, p 502, *Pañca* (A S B ms.), leaf 231b.

rika does not disappoint the Hīnayānists, for it holds out to them the hope that they will become Buddha provided they perform the duties enjoined upon a Bodhisattva As they have already attained the qualities pertaining to arhathood, it would not be difficult for them to perform the pāramitās, develop Bodhicitta, worship and serve the innumerable Tathāgatas, build stūpas, etc , and thus ultimately reach Buddhahood The treatise, proceeding further, predicts regarding each of the noted bhiksus the time when he will become a Buddha, what name he will bear, and over which lokadhātu he will preside[1] It also states that the bhiksus, who had become old and decrepit and had therefore no aspiration (sprhā) for Buddhahood or for powers pertaining to it, will not be left aside They are like a poor man who had long been separated from his father and was not aware of his vast wealth He would not believe that he would inherit this wealth. Similarly these Srāvakas, though devoid of desire or energy for attaining the glory of Buddhahood, will still obtain it as their birthright[2] There is also a reference to another class of bhiksus who will, in future, be Śrāvakas, be satisfied with their parinirvāna and not aspire to

[1] *Sad P*, pp 65, 144, 148, 150, 152, 201 Śāriputra after following the Saddharma of countless Tathāgatas, worshipping them in various ways, and fulfilling the Bodhisattvacaryās, will become Padmaprabhā Tathā gata, and preside over the Buddhaksetra called Viraja Similarly will Kāśyapa and others as stated below

Kāśyapa—Raśmiprabhā Tathāgata—Avabhāsaprāpta Buddhaksetra

Subhūti—Saśiketu Tathāgata—Ratnasambhava Buddhaksetra.

Mahākātyāyana—Jāmbunadaprabhāsa Tathāgata—Buddhaksetra not mentioned

Mahāmaudgalyāyana—Tamālapatracandanagandha Tathāgata—Mano bhirāma Buddhaksetra

Pūrna Maitrāyaṇīputra—Dharmaprasāda Tathagata—Buddhakṣetra not mentioned.

In pages 309-310, Buddha foretells regarding 300 bhikṣus that they have the āśaya for Buddhahood but they are not at present aware of same They will, however, develop Bodhicitta after ages and attain Buddhahood

Compare *Laṅkā*, p 240 Arhantah punar Bhagavatā vyākṛtā anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau, *Pañca* (A.S.B ms) leaf 231b.

[2] *Sad. P*, pp 100, 101.

Bodhisattvahood They will be reborn in the lokadhātus where Śākyamuni Buddha will appear under other names, and where they will develop under his influence a desire for Tathāgatajñāna and ultimately win it[1] The following beautiful simile used in the treatise shows in a concrete form the object which it has in view, viz, that every Hīnayānist is to become a Buddha, though he may not strive for it or may think it beyond his power to attain it A guide was leading a large number of men through an extensive forest to Mahāratnadvīpa After travelling some distance, they became tired and alarmed, and wanted to return The accomplished guide, quick in devising means (*upāya-kuśala*), brought into being a country by dint of his supernatural powers and asked them to take rest there When the people were refreshed after rest, the guide caused the country to disappear, told them that it was only a magical creation of his, and that they should now proceed to Mahāratnadvīpa The magical country is the Hīnayānic Nirvāna, while the Mahāratnadvīpa is the ultimate goal (i e, Buddhahood)[2] Such similes make the object of the treatise apparent. It does not deny the priority of Hīnayāna, but it wants to relegate it to a position subservient to Mahāyāna, implying that the real teaching of Buddha was not Hīnayāna but Mahāyāna

TWO HĪNAYĀNA STATEMENTS UTILISED TO PROVE THAT MAHĀYĀNA IS THE GENUINE TEACHING OF BUDDHA

The *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* utilises two statements found in the Hīnayāna literature for proving that Mahāyāna is genuine, and contains the most important teachings of Buddha

(i) The first is that Buddha, just after attaining bodhi, was hesitating as to whether he should preach the truth, or proceed to attain Nirvāna. In the *Ariyapariyesana-sutta*[3] it is stated that the Truth (dharma) is deep and abstruse, it is excellent and beyond the range of dialectics, it

[1] *Sad P* pp 186 ff. [2] *Ibid*, p 188.

[3] *Majjhima*, I, pp 160-175, *Dīgha*, II p 36, *Atthasālinī*, p 35, *Mtu.*, III, pp. 314 f, *Lal Vis*, pp 395-396, *Divyā*, p 492, *M Vr*, p 498

can be understood by the wise only People are addicted to desires and will hardly be able to understand the Paticcasamuppāda or Nirodha, so the preaching of the truth would be of no avail, as nobody would understand him, and his labours would be thrown away Cognizant of these thoughts passing through Buddha's mind, Brahmā appears and requests him to preach the truth, saying that though Magadha is full of impure religions, still there are beings with higher faculties and powers of vision, and the preaching of the Truth would save them from the miseries of the world, leading them to the haven of quietude Buddha realised the value of Brahmā's words and decided to preach the Truth

(ii) The second statement is that Buddha does not preach the Truth in a uniform manner [1] After observing the mental proclivities and capabilities of the persons to whom he desired to impart religious lessons he selected discourses appealing to their minds, and thus initiated them into the Truth To a householder, he would first preach the *dānakathā*, *sīlakathā*, *saggakathā*, *kāmānam ādīnavam okāram samkilesam, nekkhamme ānisamsam* (discourses on almsgiving, moral precepts, heavens, perils, corruptions, impurities of desires and the blessings of retirement) He would prepare the mind of a brahmin student by holding conversation with him on topics relating to sacrifice, caste-system and the like, and would deliver the Truth in a form suited to the mentality of the brahmin. To a husbandman he would preach the Truth through similes or topics relating to the tilling of lands, and so forth [2] It was only when he perceived that the minds of his hearers were sufficiently prepared that he would deliver the higher teachings, *viz*, *dukkha*, *samudaya*,

[1] See Ch. III (d), for the conventional and real teachings

[2] *Majjhima*, Āsayānusayam viditvā dhammam deseti, *Divyā*, p 97 Atha Bhagavā teṣām āśayānuśayam viditvā dhātum prakrtim ca jñātvā tādṛśī dharmadeśanā karoti, p. 463 Bhagavatā teṣām karsakāṇām āśayānuśayam dhātum prakrtim ca jñātvā dharmadeśanā kṛtā. See also pp 124, 550–1, 554.

Sutta Nipāta, Dhaniya Sutta, *Dīgha*, Ambattha Sutta, *Vinaya*, I,

nirodha, *magga* (misery of beings, how it originates, i e, the theory of causation, how it can be destroyed, and the various practices to which one must resort for achieving the goal), which, according to the Hīnayānists, were the highest and the most profound (sāmukkamsikā dhammadesanā) teachings of Buddha [1]

The first statement cited above that Buddha was wavering just after attaining Bodhi as to whether he should live in peace in a solitary place, or go out to preach the abstruse doctrines found out by him has been taken by the *Pundarīka* as an admission on the part of the Hīnayānists that their intellect is of a lower order The story woven around it is that Śākyamuni came into existence when one of the five kasāyas [2] (evils) or the sixty-two wrong views like 'nityam astīti nāstīti tathāsti nāsti' [3] prevailed, when men were overwhelmed by trsnā (desire), moha (delusion) and kāma (passion) and did not possess the merits usually acquired by Bodhisattvas in their previous lives (cīrnacaryā purimajātisu) When the evils were raging over the land, Buddha at Brahmā's request came out to preach the religion, but found the vision of his audience too dim to get an insight into his abstruse doctrines. There was even the likelihood of their incurring sin by scoffing at these doctrines Hence he thought it wiser to follow the previous Buddhas by devising some means to impart the Truth robed in different forms The people inspired as they were by lower aims (hīnādhimukta) would not strive heartily if they were asked to aspire to Buddhahood He therefore proceeded to Benares and preached to the five monks the dharma of quietude (dharmam praśāntabhūmim) [4] and of which, the Nir-

[1] *Dīgha*, I, p 148, *Vinaya*, I, pp 15 ff, VI, p 248, *Majjhima*, I, p 380

[2] Kalpakasāya, Sattvakasāya, Kleśakasāya, Drstikasāya, Āyukasāya —*Sad P*, pp 31, 43, 58, 162, 167, 192, *Lal Vis*, p 248, *Kośa*, III, 94, p 193, *Samādhirājasūtra* (B T S), p 9, *Mtu*, III, p 317

[3] *Sad P*, p 48, *Dīgha*, Brahmajāla Sutta.

[4] According to the Hīnayānists, dukkham, samudayam, nirodham, maggam were the sāmukkamsika dhammadesanā (see *Majjhima*, I p 380), while according to the *Sad P* (p 60), Buddhajñāna was the sāmutkarsikī dharmadeśanā

vāna, as conceived by the Hīnayānists, was the highest goal. Later on (paścime ca kāle), when he found some excellent men (putrān dvipadottamān), who had already been working through many rebirths to attain the highest Bodhi, he thought it fit to preach his excellent religion (sāmutkarsikī dharmadesanā) relating to the attainment of Buddhajñāna[1] This was, however, preached in such a language that it could not be understood by the untrained[2] The *Pundarīka* goes to the length of saying that it was beyond the comprehension of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas[3] The *Prajñāpāramitā* proceeds so far as to state that the collective prajñā of countless Maudgalyāyanas and Sāriputras would not be an infinite part of the prajñā of a Bodhisattva who has practised the prajñāpāramitā[4]

The second statement of the Hīnayānists, that Buddha preaches his dharma in a way suited to the tendencies and capabilities of the hearers, has given opportunity to the *Pundarīka*[5] to parade the intellectual superiority of the Mahāyānists over the Hīnayānists It says that Buddha preached to people his dharma by adopting hundreds of expedients (upāyakauśalyaśatair anekaih) after observing their mental tendencies (āsaya), their spiritual aspirations, their religious merits, and the variety of their actions (citrāni karmāni) To make his dharma universally attractive, he had recourse to various kinds of expressions, reasonings, and illustrations, and in fact, it was with this object that his teachings were imparted in nine

[1] *Sad P*, pp 55–57, 60.

[2] *Ibid*, p 59 Bahūni samdhāvacanehi coktam durbodhyam etam hi aśikṣitehi

[3] *Ibid*, p 19, 31, 70 Gambhīram durdarśam duranubodham Buddhajñānam . . . sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaih Cf Hīnayāna passages Ayam dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuno paṇḍitavedaniyo (*Dīgha*, II, p 36, *Majjhima*, I, p 160, *Mtu*, III, p 314, *Divyā*, p 492, *Lal Vis*, p 395–6)

It will be observed that the *Sad P* retains the Hīnayāna passage almost verbatim replacing 'duranubodham paṇḍitavedaniyam' by 'duranubodham Buddhajñānam sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaih'

[4] *Sata*, pp 121–2

[5] *Sad P*, pp 71, cf the corresponding Hīnayāna expressions, *ante*

forms, *viz.*, *sūtra*, *gāthā*, *itivṛttaka*, *jātaka*, *adbhuta*, *nidāna*, *aupamya*, *citra*, and *geyya*[1] It was for those who had lower aspirations, who had not performed the necessary duties under the previous Buddhas, and who were still attached to the world with its pleasures and sorrows that he had to preach how to attain Nirvāna only for their own selves. This was an expedient adopted by him to make them all ultimately realise the Buddhajñāna, but he never told them that they would become Buddhas, as the time was not ripe for it Now that the time had arrived, the truth that the navāṅgas were only upāyakauśalyas for leading all men to the highest perfection was given out As they were sons of Buddha, pure in conduct, wise and learned, and had performed duties under previous countless Buddhas, the Vaipulya Sūtras were preached to them[2] Aware of the noble aspirations of these disciples, Buddha tells them that they will, in future, become Buddhas and benefactors of the world If the Srāvakas can retain in their memory one verse of this great sāsana, (*i e*, the *Pundarīka*),[3] they will attain Bodhi To show that the Teacher had only one form of teaching, understood differently by different persons according to their capabilities, the treatise uses some interesting analogies, one of which is that the clouds water the trees, plants, and shrubs of the countless lokadhātus but the trees, plants, and shrubs absorb the water in different ways according to their capabilities and grow according to their sizes and species, similarly Buddha showers the dharma possessing the same qualities (rasa), *viz* vimuktirasa (emancipation), virāgarasa (absence of attachment) and nirodharasa (suppression of senses), etc,[4] and leading to omniscience (sarvajña-jñāna) but producing different results according to the capabilities of the disciples The

[1] *Sad P*, p 45 The enumeration is a little different from the usual The *Pañcaviṃśati* (A S B ms) leaf 165 remarks that only five Buddhas preached in the Navānga form See *ante*, pp 7 ff.

[2] Note here the contradictions appearing in the text The treatise, in fact, now attributes to the Śrāvakas all the qualities, lacking which they were in other places shown as inferior to the Bodhisattvas and unfit for hearing the Mahāyāna doctrines.

[3] *Sad P*, p 46.

[4] *Ibid*, p 124

simile of the sun shedding the same kind of light over all beings has also been used to show Buddha imparting the same teachings This could not convince some of the Śrāvakas who enquired as to why there existed distinctions as Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas The two analogies cannot be applied with all their implications to Buddha, for the sun or the clouds remain unconcerned about the subjects of their benefactions, while Buddha always discriminates between them according to their lower, medium, or higher aspirations,[1] and degrees of religious merit and capabilities. Not only this. He, in fact, did not think it desirable to teach everybody the dharma which leads to *sarvajña-jñāna* (omniscience possessed by a Buddha), for it may not conduce to the welfare of disciples not yet fit to utilize same The treatise, therefore, uses a parable to emphasize this point, *viz.*, that of a potter A potter turns out of the same clay earthen pots of various descriptions, such as, curd-jar, milk-jar, and so forth, just as the dharma of Buddha passing under three names has really the same substance This refers to one yāna explained in three ways, the Buddhabodhi delivered in three forms (Buddhabodhim tridhā vibhāsye' ha prakāśayeyam) [2] The parable concludes by saying that Buddha cannot be regarded as having said that he would lead some of his disciples by Hīnayāna, for that would attribute to the Teacher niggardliness (mātsarya), envy (īrsyā), whim (chandarāga) and ill-will (pāpacitta),—which is absurd. From all this it is apparent that according to the *Saddharma-Pundarīka*, Hīnayānism was really a lower form of teaching, but it was only an upāyakauśalya adopted by the Teacher on account of the poverty of intellect of his early disciples

The treatise then proceeds to remove a suspicion that might be entertained by the opponents regarding the straightforwardness of the Teacher in the adoption of the upāya-

[1] *Sad P*, p 140

Anuttarām Buddhabodhim deśayatyagrayānike
Prakāśayati madhyām tu madhyaprajñāya nāyakah,
samsārabhīrave bodhim anyām samvarnayatyapi

[2] *Ibid*, p 55

kauśalyas It uses a parable to explain away the suspicion A rich old man owns a very big house which can accommodate five hundred persons, but the house has only one door, and a roof of straw (trna) Suddenly, the house catches fire, the old man comes out, but his twenty sons remain within it unmindful of the fire He thinks that he is strong enough to bring them out safely The father apprises them of the fire and asks them to come out but they will not believe him As the father knows the playthings coveted by his sons, he thinks of using the expedient (upāya-kausalya) of tempting his sons out of the house by offering them the toys called Goratha, Ajaratha, and Mrgaratha He places them outside the house, and the boys run to reach them When the father sees them all out of danger, he feels happy, and gives them not the ordinary toys placed by him outside the gate but toys of immeasurable value, as he is immensely rich[1] Buddha is compared here to the rich father, and the three rathas to the three yānas The means of exit from the fire is only one and the Teacher attracts his disciples out of the fire through the exit and gives them the invaluable ratha, the Buddhayāna[2] This illustration is open to criticism, for the Hīnayānists might say that Buddha promised one thing and gave another, and therefore, he was open to the charge of having spoken a falsehood The treatise meets it by saying that though Buddha was speaking of three yānas, he had all along in his mind the excellent one By all these it is sought to establish that Buddha had only one religion and it was Mahāyāna, but his first disciples were not intelligent enough to grasp

[1] This parable is also cited in the *Lankā*, p 88

Rājā śreṣṭhī yathā putrān vicitrair mrnmayair mrgaih,
pralobhya krīdayitvā ca bhūtān dadyāt tato mrgān
tathāham lakṣaṇais citrair dharmāṇām pratibimbakaih,
pratyātmavedyām putrebhyo bhūtakotim vadāmy aham

(Just as kings or rich bankers first tempt their boys by various kinds of earthen deer and then give them the real deer, so also Buddha tempts his disciples first by various appearances of dharmas and their characteristics, ultimately enabling them to know the true existence, which is realisable within one's own self)

[2] *Sad P* pp 71–75

it and what they gave out as Buddhism was really a superficial view of the religion.

REASONS FOR REGARDING ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA AS HĪNAYĀNA

In spite of the conciliatory attitude of the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* trying to show that the Nirvānagāmins do ultimately become sarvajñas and that Hīnayāna was only an upāya-kauśalya, it is evident that this, as also other Mahāyāna treatises, assume an air of superiority and seek to establish that Mahāyānism is far superior to Hīnayānism There are seven features, the *Sūtrālankāra* says, for which Mahāyāna should be considered great First, its bases (ālambana) are great, for its sūtras are varied and innumerable. Secondly, its achievements (pratipatti) are great as it achieves two objects, viz, good for self and good for others Thirdly, the knowledge imparted by it is deep for it penetrates into the non-substantiality (nairātmyabhāva) of both the individuality and the things of the world (pudgala and dharma) Fourthly, it involves great austerities because it requires strenuous application of energy for incalculable kalpas Fifthly, it is great in its provision of expedients, for, its followers need not leave the worldly life provided they remain unattached to the world Sixthly, its fruitions (samudāgama) are great, for it secures bala (power), vaiśāradya (self-confidence born of the highest knowledge) and eighteen āveṇikadharmas[1] Seventhly, and lastly, its greatness lies in the performance of the duties of Buddha, namely the showing of the attainment of sambodhi and mahāparinirvāna[2]

The use of the appellation Hīnayāna itself shows at a glance the low place to which the Hīnayānism was relegated by the Mahāyānists The names, of course, that are mostly in use in the Mahāyāna scriptures are Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha These are colourless names, and the Hīnayānists themselves used the term sāvaka or srāvaka, *e g*, in the expressions, pakatisāvaka, aggasāvaka, sāvakasangha,

[1] For enumeration see *Mvyut* 7-9.

[2] *Sūtrā*, p 171, cf *Gaṇḍavyūha*, leaf 9b, Keith., *B Phil*, p 259

sāvikā, and so forth The Pratyeka-(Pacceka)-buddha is equally in frequent use among the Hīnayānists. The term, Hīnayāna, came into being to indicate that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas were hīnādhimukta (of lower aims)[1] They were also called Prādesikas because their mind (citta) takes only a partial (prādeśika) and not comprehensive view of the whole truth[2]

i ĀŚAYA.

The *Sūtrālankāra* shows analytically that the Śrāvakas were hīnādhimukta and in consequence thereof their exertion, instructions, merits, and fruitions were of a lower order in comparison with those of the Mahāyānists[3] It is according to one's aspiration that the teaching is imparted, and it is according to the teaching that one exerts himself He earns merit in proportion to his exertion, and bodhi in proportion to his merits, *i e*, either Srāvakabodhi, Pratyekabuddhabodhi, or Mahābodhi[4] From this, it is evident that the classification hinges on the āśaya of an individual The Srāvaka or Pratyekabuddhavānists are looked down upon by the Mahāyānists because they desire self-emancipation only (ātmaparinirvānāśaya) and do not aspire to lead others to Nirvāna, ignoring his own self As they seek to become only Arhats and not Buddhas for the salvation of all beings, and as they wish to possess only Dharma-caksu, they are of hīnādhimukti, (*i e*, of low aspiration) This ideal of self-emancipation of the Hīnayānists has been condemned in no

[1] In the *Pug P* (p 26) the term hīnādhimutta means a person who is immoral, does evil deeds and serves similar other persons. The opposite expression is Panītādhimutta, *i e*, one who is moral (sīlavā), performs meritorious deeds, and serves similar other persons

[2] See *Mvyut* 52, *Daśa*, p 25, *Lal. Vis*, p 433 Csoma Korosi on the basis of the Tibetan rendering translates Pradeśika as "a principle lasting but one day or a very short time" He adds in the footnote that it is "a vehicle or principle observed in a particular country or province" See *Mvyut* (A S B ed.), p 20 For Triyāna see *Sūtrā*, p 168, *Pañca*, leaf 6, *Lal Vis*, p 5, *Sad. P*, pp 45, 147

[3] *Sūtrā*, p 4

[4] Cf *Lal Vis*, p 34 āśayo dharmālokamukham Hīnayāna-sprhanatāyai samvartate Adhyāśayo dharmālokamukham udārabuddhadharmādyālambanatāyai samvartate.

uncertain terms as spiritual selfishness (ādhyātmika svārthaparatva) by all the schools of Mahāyāna The Mahāyānists, however unpractical they may be, cannot but be admired for their *Parārthatva*, i e., sacrificing one's own gains for the sake of others, or ranking the acquisition of one's[1] own spiritual gains as subsidiary to the spiritual gains of others The *Sutrālankāra*[2] uses the well-known simile in support of the greatness of the object of the Mahāyānists

Yathā punyam prasavate paresām bhojanam dadat,
Na tu svayam sa bhuñjānas tathā punyamahodayah

(As religious merit is produced by giving food to others and not by eating it, so the Mahāyānists earn more merit by helping others to attain nirvāna, and not by seeking it themselves like the Hīnayānists) This ideal of the Mahāyānists is echoed in the *Bhāgavata*,[3] where Prahlāda says —

Prāyena devamunayah svavimuktikāmā
Maunam caranti vijane na parārthanisthāh,
Naitān vihāya krpanān vimumuksa eko
Nānyam tvadasya saranam bhramato 'nupasye

(Very often, O Lord, the sages desirous of attaining their own salvation practise silence in the forests without devoting themselves to others' interests I do not wish to have salvation for myself forsaking the others I do not find for my bewildered self any refuge other than in you)

The ideal of the Mahāyānists is certainly very noble, and appeals strongly to the minds of men, but their process of attaining salvation through a period covering innumerable rebirths cannot appeal to all minds The Hīnayanists do not deny that the aspiration to become Buddha is very noble, but they think it useless and unpractical to advise persons, most of whom possess merits and capabilities far inferior to those of a bodhisattva, to strive for Buddhahood The charge laid against the Srāvakas that they do not work for others' benefit is not true The maxim of the *Dhamma*-

[1] *Sikṣā.*, p 17 Tatra Bodhisattvenaivam cittam utpādayitavyam sarvasattvānām ātyayikam parigrhyaitadapi me varjayan nisidāmiti

[2] *Sūtrā*, p 62

[3] *Bhāgavata*, VII, ix 44.

pada[1] "dhammadānm sabbadānam jināti" and the admonition of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Vinaya*[2]

> "caratha, bhikkhave, cārikam bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānam" (go, O ye preachers, to preach the religion for the benefit and happiness of men and gods)

clearly shows that they were not as selfish as they have been painted by the Mahāyāna writers What the Mahāyānists consider selfishness on the part of the Hīnayānists is that the latter before they think themselves capable of guiding others to salvation confine themselves in their own cells and strive for their own salvation It is after they attain true knowledge that they look upon themselves as fit to help others in the attainment of the same But when they are undergoing the course of training i e, before reaching the arhathood they visit the householders and preach to them the elementary principles of Buddhism, and the more advanced among them often take antevāsins (disciples) to train them up in the higher principles of the religion The lives of Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Kaccāyana, Mahākassapa, and others amply show their parārthatva, (i e, service for others) after their attainment of the arhathood In the *Lohicca sutta* it is stated that the truth must be preached, otherwise it would be like a king enjoying the whole revenue of the State himself[3] The *Sūtrālankāra* does not miss this point even in its effort to prove the selfishness of the Hīnayānists It says that the Śrāvakas do not teach their followers to serve others (parārtha), they teach only how to attain for oneself nirvid (disgust for worldly matters), virāga (non-attachment) and vimukti (emancipation) It concludes by saying that the doctrine which teaches selfishness cannot become parārtha by reason of being preached to others because it engages others to svārtha, their own parinirvāna Hence it is a yāna of selfishness[4]

[1] *Dh. P*, 354. [2] *Dīgha*, II, p 45, *Vinaya*, 1, pp. 20, 21

[3] *Dīgha*, I, p 229

[4] *Sūtrā*, p 4 na ca svārtha eva pareṣūpadiśyamanataḥ parārtho bhavitum arhati

ii. Upadeśa and iii. Prayoga

It follows as a matter of course that the *Upadeśa* (instruction) and *Prayoga* (exertion) should be in accordance with the Āśaya.[1] A Hīnayānist need not develop bodhicitta and try to perform the pāramitās. He need not like a bodhisattva take the vow that he would welcome the sufferings of numberless births in hell or in the Yamaloka as an animal, or as an insect, in order to lead every individual to nirupadhiśesanirvānadhātu (nirvāna without any corporal residue)[2] The regulation of life according to the rules of the *Prātimokṣa*, the performance of the duties of the eight fold path, and the realisation of the four truths and the law of causation are sufficient for them The comprehension of the world as void of individuality or anything belonging to an individual servss their purpose, and they need not go on to ascertain the nature of śūnyatā, the ultimate reality

iv Upastambha

It is essential that in order to be a bodhisattva one must earn sufficient merits in previous lives Unless and until these merits reach the high standard fixed by the Mahāyānists there is no possibility for a being to become a bodhisattva, or derive the real benefits from the Mahāyāna teachings The Hīnayānists hold quite a different view. According to the *Puggala Paññatti*, the perpetrators of the five deadly sins (ānantarikas) are excluded from the possibility of attaining emancipation,[3] while all the rest can attain it, some requiring a little longer time than the others Hence no *upastambha* is demanded in the code of Hīnayāna salvation: every one, other than the above men-

[1] *Śikṣā*, p 4 those who have pure adhyāśayas practise the pāramitās, those who practise the pāramitās are established in Mahāyāna.

[2] *Pañca.*, leaf 81b

[3] There are, however, stray instances of even the perpetrators of one of the five deadly sins attaining emancipation Contrast *Divyā*, p 261: a Hīnayānist refused ordination to a patricide, who was, however, ordained by a bodhisattvajātika bhikṣu *Śikṣā*, pp 17–8 none of the five sinners can develop a citta for śrāvakabodhi or pratyekabodhi

tioned five kinds of sinners, is eligible for the same The Hīnayānists achieve their end by detachment from worldly activities, while the Mahāyānists do the same through such activities, of course, keeping their minds completely unattached to things of the world

v KĀLA

As the Upastambha does not count much with the Hīnayanists, and as their asaya is simply the attainment of emancipation without the extraordinary powers of a Buddha, the time (*kāla*) required by a Hīnayānist to reach his goal is infinitely shorter than that of a bodhisattva [1] The *Sūtrālankāra* hints that a Hīnayānist can even attain the goal in three lives It refers to the Hīnayāna belief that through seven births one can reach the goal, five of them taking place in the Srotāpanna stage [2] The *Sūtrālankāra* in calculating the rebirths leaves out of consideration the first four births preparatory to the final srotāpanna stage This mode of calculation is also sometimes followed by the Hīnayānists themselves [3]

PRATYEKABUDDHAS DISTINGUISHED FROM ŚRĀVAKAS AND SAMYAKSAMBUDDHAS

Though the Pratyekabuddhas have always been classed with the Srāvakas as of lower aims (hīnādhimukta) they were distinguished from the latter as *Madhyas* [4] The Mahāyānists were the *Uttamas* or *Sresthas* The *Pundarīka* shows their relative position thus The Srāvakas are those who follow what is taught by others (paraghosāśravānugama), exert themselves to comprehend the four truths and attain parinirvāna for themselves The Pratyekabuddhas are those who desire to have self-control, quietude, and

[1] See *Kosa*, III, 93d-94a Buddhattva is attained in 3 Asankheyya, kalpas see also p 191

[2] See ch IV for details

[3] *Sūtrā*, p 4, *Comp of Phil*, Intro, p. 68

[4] *Sūtrā*, pp 4, 168, *Sad P*, p 140, see *supra*, p 76 fn

For notes on Prādeśika, see *Kośa*, IV, p 81 and IV, 36 a-b, p 93, III, p 155 fn, *Sikṣā*, p 183.

knowledge without the help of a teacher (anācāryakam) and seek their own parinirvāna after comprehending the hetu and pratyaya, i.e., the theory of causation. The Mahāyānists are those who strive to acquire the omniscience possessed by a Buddha without the help of a teacher and seek the powers of a Tathāgata in order to help all the beings of the world to attain salvation.[1] The *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* goes a little more into detail and distinguishes them as follows. The Śrāvakas are those who by their prajñā have acquired mastery (paribhāvyamāna) over the ten kuśala-karmapathas (ten good actions), possess a citta (mental capacity) to comprehend only an aspect of the Truth, are terrified by existence in the three dhātus (worlds) and depend on others for instructions, but in them mahākarunā (compassion) does not function. The Pratyekabuddhas are those who are still more purified, obtain insight into the Truth without others' help, and can comprehend thoroughly the theory of causation, but in them also mahākarunā (compassion) does not function. The Mahāyānists or Bodhisattvas are those who are further purified, have mastered the upāyakauśalyas (expedients), made the mahāpranidhāna (the sublime resolution), given up all their inborn passions, taken the Buddhajñāna as their ālambana (support), perfected themselves in the bhūmis and pāramitās and attained all the ten balas and other powers appertaining to Buddhahood, and in them mahākarunā (compassion) functions in the fullest degree.[2] The *Madhyamakāvatāra* and other Mahāyāna treatises draw the lines of distinction between the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas almost in the same way as above.[3] The difference between the Srāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas on account of the latter's comprehension of the theory of causation, as pointed out by Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin, is more scholastic than real, for it is nothing but a part of the second truth, viz., duhkhasamudaya. The *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* brings out the distinctions in a somewhat different way. Prof. Poussin has

[1] *Sad. P.*, p. 80. [2] *Daśa.*, pp. 25–6.

[3] *M. Ava.* (Fr. transl.) in *Le Muséon*, (N.S.) VIII, pp. 252 ff. For an exhaustive bibliography, see *E.R.E.*, X, p. 154.

summarised it thus "The Arhat, having expelled self-love from the series of samskāras that constitute their pseudo-individuality, develops an interest in the affairs of others, an interest born of compassion, and that destroys all pain The ordinary man (madhya), i e., the Pratyeka-buddha, desires mere deliverance, that is to say, an end of suffering, and not happiness during the existences of the samsāra, because this temporal happiness is an abode of suffering. The superior man (srestha), i e, the Bodhisattva, wishes to bring temporal happiness (ābhyudayika) to others and also the end of suffering, which is supreme happiness (nihśreyasa-svabhāva), or he desires for others' supreme and temporal happiness (sukham ābhyudayika-naihsreyasikam), and for himself the end of suffering, i e, Buddhahood as a means of realizing this service to others"[1] The *Abhi-dharmakośa* says in connection with the power of knowing the thoughts of others (paracittajñāna) that a Śrāvaka obtains ordinarily the power of knowing others' thoughts when they are in the first two moments of the darsanamārga only (i e, duhkhe dharmajñānaksānti and duhkhe dharma-jñāna), while the Pratyekabuddha knows in addition the eighth moment, viz, samudaye anvayajñāna[2] The Pratyeka-buddha may possess one or two powers of a like nature more than a Srāvaka, but the *summum bonum* of both is the same, and that is the reason why both are placed by the Mahāyānists in the same category, viz, Hīnayāna, the former being only distinguished as a Hīnayāna Madhya Prof Poussin in his article on the Pratyekabuddha[3] has accounted for the reason why the Pratyekabuddhas have come to figure in the Buddhist literature. He says that

[1] *E R.E*, II, p 740 sv Bodhisattva (summarised from *Kośa vyākhyā* (ASB ms), fol 263

[2] *Kośa*, vii, 6 and fn It also says something in connection with garbhāvakrānti about the comparative merits of a Paccekabuddha and Buddha, see *Kośa*, III, 17

[3] *E R.E*, X, pp 152-4 See *Divyā*, p. 399 Pindola Bharadvāja had seen Buddha He became a Pratyekabuddha and had been living at Gandhamādana, *Divyā*, p 416 Jinas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot get rid of karma effects, *Divyā*, pp 500, 503 Pratyekabuddhas lived in a forest.

Buddha himself did not like very much the solitary life of hermit-saints, of whom there were many during his time, but he recognised the fact that those hermit-saints possessed all the qualities of an arhat, if not more To assimilate these saints into the Buddhist community, to accord them a place in the Buddhist spiritual world, the conception of Pratyekabuddhas was introduced into the Buddhist literature They were believed to be converted Buddhists who could not attain arhatship when the religion was living, so they continued to progress in their holiness and wisdom and as a result they discovered the Truth by their own exertion as Śākyamuni did[1] On account of their lonely life, never having any teacher or spiritual guide (kalyāṇa-mitra), and disliking contact with the people of the world, they were unable to develop the power of preaching possessed to some extent even by the arhats

The conception of the Paccekabuddha has come to figure more in the later Pāli literature than in the *Nikāyas* The *Milindapañha*[2] compares the powers of a Paccekabuddha with those of a Buddha and an Arhat, and shows as above how a Paccekabuddha occupies a position midway between the two. The *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Lalitavistara* refer to them more as hermits outside the Buddhist order than as occupying a stage of perfection midway between an Arhat and a Buddha[3] The *Puggala-Paññatti*[4] points out that both the Paccekabuddhas and Sammāsambuddhas realise the truth without receiving instruction from any body but the former do not attain omniscience and mastery over phalas[5] The

[1] *E R E*, X, p 152
Cf *M Śāstra*, xviii, 12, *M Vr*, p. 378,
Sambuddhānām anutpāde śrāvakāṇām punah ksaye,
Jñānam pratyekabuddhānām asamsargāt pravartate.
see also *Madhyamakāvatāra* in *Le Muséon*, (N S) VIII, p 253

[2] *Mil*, p 106.

[3] *Majjhima*, III, p 86, *Lal. Vis* (R L. Mitra), p. 20, see also *Samyutta*, I, p 92, *Udāna*, 50

[4] *Pug P*, pp. 14, 73

[5] Contrast *Pug P*, p 70 where Sāriputta, Moggallāna and other Arhats are also said to have realised the truth not heard of before and put an end to their sufferings by realising the dhamma.

Hīnayānists do not dispute the fact that Buddha possessed powers much greater than those of an Arhat or a Pratyeka-buddha,[1] but as according to them it is only in many kalpas[2] that a being attains to Buddhahood, the consideration of Buddha's powers or the possibility of attainment of same does not interest them much The *Milindapañha*, however, has described in terms identical with those of the Mahāyāna scriptures the extraordinary powers possessed by a Buddha, but it has in view Buddha Śākyamuni and the few other Buddhas conceived by the Hīnayānists, and not the countless Buddhas of the Mahāyānists

GOTRABHEDA, THE MAIN REASON FOR PERSONS HAVING DIFFERENT ASPIRATIONS

The *Sūtrālankāra*[3] answers the query why among the disciples of Buddha there are persons with high, medium, or low aspirations This question reduces itself into a discussion of the subject of *gotrabheda*, difference in classes, and the examination of the statement found in the *Akṣarāśi-sūtra*[4] that on account of the various ingredients (dhātu) constituting beings they have endless distinctions of dhātus (qualities) It divides them into three classes, *viz*, *Niyata-gotras*, *Aniyata-gotras*, and *Agotras*. Under the first heading fall all those who by virtue of their previous merits or innate dispositions are destined to become either Srāvaka-yānābhisamayagotra, Pratyekabuddhayānābhisamayagotra or Tathāgatayānābhisamayagotra Under the second heading come all those who are still on the border-line and may become either Hīnayānists or Mahāyānists Under the third heading fall all other beings, who are again grouped into two sub-classes namely, (*i*) those who will not be able to

[1] See, *e g*, *Saṃyutta*, III, pp 65–6, *Niddesa*, I, pp 177–180, *Paṭi. S*, II, p 31

[2] *Dīgha*, II, p 139, but see also *Dīgha*, II, p 2. 91 kalpas ago Vipassi was Buddha, 31 kalpas ago Sikhi was Buddha, in the same kalpa Vessabhu was Buddha In this bhadrakalpa there have been four Buddhas, Kakusandha, Konāgamana, Kassapa, and Sākyamuni

[3] *Sūtrā*, ch III, cf. *Bodhic*, p 14, *Mvyut.*, 81.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 10 fn., see also *ante*.

attain parinirvāna at all (atyantam), and (ii) those who for the time being (tatkāla) will not attain parinirvāṇa Among the Niyatagotrasthas, it is the dhātus (qualities) which settle one's adhimukti (aspiration), while adhimukti determines the pratipatti (attainments) and it is according to one's bīja (seed) that the fruitions become hīna (low), madhya (medium), or viśista (excellent) The Śrāvakas are inferior to the Bodhisattvas because the former possess neither powerful merits nor merits of all kinds (or degrees) as they lack the five balas (powers), and the six vaiśāradyas (self-confidence born of the highest knowledge, etc)[1] Moreover, their merits are not everlasting, because they seek only anupādiśesa-nirvāna (i e, Nirvāna without any corporal residue), neither are the merits productive of great results, as the Śrāvakas do not dedicate themselves wholly to the service of others (aparārthatvāt)

The *Lankāvatāra*[2] also incidentally deals with the gotras, saying that there are five *abhisamaya-gotras* (*i e*, classification of persons with reference to the attainment of enlightenment), *viz*, Śrāvakayānābhisamayagotra, Pratyekabuddhayā° Tathāgatayā°,[3] Aniyatagotra, and Agotra The Srāvakayānābhisamayagotras are those who are enraptured by the teaching of the generic properties of the various constituents of the body (skandhadhātvāyatanasvasāmānyalaksana) and who acquire an insight into the properties of things associated with the causal law (pratītyasamutpādavinirbhāgalaksana-paricaye) Being in the fifth or sixth bhūmi (stage of progress), they are free from all forthcoming afflictions, but not vāsanā-kleśa (sufferings due to impressions[4]) They reach a stage from which there is no fall, and by virtue of same they proclaim that they have led the holy life of a saint, realised the egolessness of individuals, attained Nirvāna, and

[1] See Prof Lévi's notes on these words in his translation of the *Sūtrā*, pp 26, 27 fn

[2] *Laṅkā*, pp 63–65

[3] These three are called Niyata-gotras. See above.

[4] Vāsanā = "the impression unconsciously left on the mind by past good or bad actions, which therefore produce pleasure or pain" Apte's *Dict.*

are no longer subject to rebirths. The author of the *Laṅkāvatāra* makes a digression here and says that some of these Śrāvakas think that they have attained Nirvāna by realising the egolessness of individuals, and some think that they have attained it by comprehending the causal relation of things, but in fact, there is no real Nirvāna without the realisation of the essencelessness of all things (dharmanairātmya) They consider to be an exit (niryāna) that which is not really so and hence they hold only one of the many wrong views The Pratyekabuddhayānābhisamayagotras are those who are enraptured by the hearing of discourses relating to the enlightenment of particular individuals, do not like others' company, and are impressed much by miracles The Tathāgatayānābhisamayagotras, according to the *Lankāvatāra*, are of three kinds, (i) those who realise the essencelessness of all the so-called existent things, (ii) those who hold that the realisation of the truth can happen only within one's own self, and (iii) those who realise the greatness of all Buddha-kṣetras

The Aniyatagotras are those who take to one of the three gotras mentioned above when they are explained to them They are really in a preparatory stage When the Ālayavijñāna of theirs is purged of all klesas and vāsanās, they become either Śrāvakas or Bodhisattvas after enjoying the bliss of meditation as the result of the realisation of the essencelessness of things The Hinayānists recognize these classifications but in quite a different sense The *Puggala Paññatti* as well as the *Kośa* mentions Niyata- and Aniyatapuggalas, but according to them the Niyatas are either those who on account of the commission of five deadly sins are destined to have wrong views or are those who are ariyapuggalas, i e, are in one of the eight stages of sanctification and are destined to attain Nirvāna while all the rest are Aniyatas, i e, their careers are yet unsettled [1] The term Gotrabhū occupies an important place in the Hinayāna scheme of salvation It signifies a person who for the first time steps into the path of Nirvāna after separating himself

[1] *Pug Paññ*, p 13, *Kośa*, III, 44c, pp 137–8

from the average mass (puthujjana)[1] It is after a course of spiritual training that a person becomes a gotrabhū who after a "single moment of path-consciousness" discerns the first of the four truths, removes his doubts and errors, obtains an intuition into Nirvāna, and commences the performance of the duties of the eightfold path He becomes an ariya and is fit for passing to the highest state of ariya-puggalas. It is in this sense that the *Śatasāhasrikā*[2] also uses the term gotrabhūrastamaka while mentioning the various stages, in which the beings, destined to attain perfection, remain

HĪNAYĀNISM CRITICIZED BY THE MAHĀYĀNISTS

It is now evident that the Mahāyānists hold the same view of the Hīnayāna as the Hīnayānists did of the religious and philosophical beliefs of the preceding Brahmavādins or Sāśvatavādins In the *Brahmajāla sutta* it is stated that some people became Brahmavādins or Śāśvatavādins not on account of any particular views but on account of their incapacity to think of anything higher than the Brahmaloka or seeing beyond a few thousands of births It was Buddha who crossed this limit, and found out their shortcomings[3] It is apparent that there has been a continuous development of thought, and the neo-thinkers, the Mahāyānists, read all the statements attributed to Buddha in a new light Once a higher plane of thought is reached, every statement naturally comes to be interpreted from that higher plane The Mahāyānists pity the Hīnayānists for their misconceptions in the same way as the latter have pitied the Brahmavādins or Śāsvatavādins According to the Hīnayānists, Nirvāna marked a state superior to that of Brahma[4] while according to the Mahāyānists, Nirvāna is only a temporary test, and the real Nirvāna is much higher than the state conceived by the Hīnayānists. So the Hīnayānists

[1] *Comp of Phil.*, pp 68, 129 fn. *Majjhima*, III, p. 256; *Aṅguttara*, IV, p 373, V, p. 23, *Vis M.*, p 138.
[2] *Sata*, p 1263
[3] *Dīgha*, I, pp. 12 ff, II, p 251
[4] See *Dīgha*, I, p. 223.

have come now to be looked upon with commiseration by the Mahāyānists for their poor conceptions and ideals From the latter's standpoint they are like so many young boys playing with toys, not possessing the capacity to understand the reality The *Kāśyapa Parivarta*[1] says that just as the sons of the chief queen by a poor man are not recognised as princes, while the sons of the king whether by the chief queen or a maid are recognised as such, so the Hīnayānists may be an outcome of the same dharmadhātu[2] as the Mahāyānists, but cannot therefore be recognised as the sons of Buddha, just as the chief queen's sons by a poor man are not recognised as princes The *Prajñāpāramitās* harp on the theme that the prajñā (knowledge) of one who has perfected himself in the prajñāpāramitā cannot bear comparison with the prajñā of the best Srāvakas The *Lalitavistara*,[3] the *Kāśyapa Parivarta*,[4] and other works are emphatic in their declaration that the bodhisattva must develop asprhā (non-desire) for Hīnayāna The *Bodhicaryāvatāra*[5] thinks that all the merits of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas cannot equal the merits of a bodhisattva who has developed bodhicitta, while the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*[6] considers it a mūlāpatti (serious offence) for a bodhisattva either to associate with a Śrāvaka, for this would make him dull of intellect, or to preach Mahāyāna to one whose kuśalamūlas are not enough to make him take to Mahāyāna teaching,[7] and it would be a deadly sin for the bodhisattva to develop a citta for Srāvaka- or Pratyekabuddha-bhūmi[8] The *Gandavyūha*[9] gives a long list of their imperfections as compared with a bodhisattva, and shows the former's

[1] *Kāś. P*, p 116 (80)

[2] Cf *Sūtrā*, p 68 dharmadhāturabhinnatvāt, see *supra*

[3] *Lal Vis*, p 34.

[4] *Kāś P*, pp 50, 115

[5] *Bodhic*, pp 18, 48

[6] *Śikṣā*, pp 54, 59

[7] *Bodhic*, pp 146, 147 It cites the *Ratnakūṭasūtras*, *Sarvadharmavaipulyasaṅgrahasūtra*, and *Ākāśagarbhasūtra* in support of the contention that the higher teaching (Mahāyāna) should not be imparted to a man of lower capabilities, and the lower teaching (Hīnayāna) to a man of higher capabilities.

[8] *Śikṣā*, p 17, 50

[9] *Gandavyūha* (A S B ms), leaf 9b

inability to visualize actions (vikurvita) of Buddha at Jetavana. The reasons adduced are that the knowledge of Buddha is beyond the reach of Śrāvakas, their jñānacakṣu (eye of knowledge) is not so powerful as to see the actions of Buddha, and so forth. The *Prajñāpāramitās*[1] and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*[2] regard the Śrāvakas as pāpamitras (evil friends) as opposed to kalyānamitras (true friends) of the bodhisattvas, for the former persuade the latter to leave the Mahāyāna path of salvation as very arduous, impracticable, requiring too long a time, and to take to their path of salvation as practical, better, and requiring a much shorter period The *Puṇḍarīka*[3] calls the Hīnayānists abhimānikas (conceited) because they do not believe its statements

Though there is an attempt to decry Hīnayānism in almost all the Mahāyāna works, they cannot afford to deny the Hīnayānists credit for some advance in the path of sanctification, specially for moral progress According to the *Puṇḍarīka*[4] there are in each Buddha-kṣetra innumerable Śrāvakas, who are all endowed with energy (vīrya) and are like jewels without any flaw in the observance of the sīlas The disparagement of the dharma of the Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is considered one of the mūlāpattis for a bodhisattva[5] The *Śikṣāsamuccaya*[6] and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*[7] enjoin upon bodhisattvas that they should show equal respect to both Srāvakayāna and Mahāyāna The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[8] considers it an offence if a bodhisattva thinks that he should not listen to, learn, or practise the dharmas which are connected with Srāvakayāna It is not an unusual occurrence for bodhisattvas to approach Srāvakas[9] to hear religious

[1] *Śata*, pp 1185f, *Kaś P*, p 50 [2] *Śikṣā*, p 54

[3] *Sad P*, p 43

[4] *Ibid.*, p 24, see also pp 282, 285, 302

[5] *Śikṣā*, pp 54, 59, *Bodhic*, pp. 146, 147

[6] *Śikṣā*, p 92, *Bodhic*, p 146. See also Prof La Vallée Poussin's Notes sur le grand véhicule in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1909.

[7] *Bodhic*, p 146

[8] See *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1909, p 3

[9] In the *Gandavyūha* it is stated that Sudhanu approached many Śrāvakas for learning the duties of a bodhisattva

discourses, and it is striking that Subhūti undertakes the rôle of giving an exposition of the Śūnyatā philosophy in the *Prajñāpāramitās* Thus it is evident that in the early stages of Mahāyāna, Srāvakas were treated with reverence, this is also apparent from the formula of salutation which appears at the commencement of the early Mahāyāna works, in which among Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, Srāvakas are also mentioned In some of the later Mahāyāna treatises, the formula has been shortened, *e g*, the formula of the *Śatasāhasrikā*, the *Saddharmapundarīka*, and the *Lalitavistara*, which runs as "Namah sarvatathāgatapratyekabuddhāryaśrāvakebhyo, etc", is shortened in the *Śiksāsamuccaya*, *Sūtrālankāra*, and the *Mahāvyutpatti* into "Namah sarvabuddhabodhisattvebhyah" It is clearly seen in the Mahāyāna works that the progress of Srāvakas in the path of perfection is recognised by them their moral life is also admired It was their ideal and their less metaphysical conception of things that failed to win the approval of the Mahāyānists, and consequently their codes of ethics and philosophical views were regarded by the latter as inadequate and superficial

CHAPTER III

The Doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Compared :

(a). Preliminary

HĪNAYĀNA DOCTRINES EVALUATED IN THE EARLY MAHĀYĀNA SCRIPTURES

In the course of our examination of the attitude of the Mahāyānists towards the Hīnayānists we have found that the former have utilized the doctrines of the latter but have shown that these in their opinion are only an imperfect exposition of the Truth which Buddha had in his mind The *Prajñāpāramitās* mention the doctrines which loom large in the eyes of the Hīnayānists, *e g*, the Caturārya-satyas, the Pratītya-samutpāda the Bodhipakṣika-dharmas the four phalas, the minute divisions and sub-divisions of dhātus, citta and caittas, in order to show from the stand-point of śūnyatā, that the doctrines, which engaged the attention of the Hīnayānists so seriously and for the analysis of which they had taken so much pains, were of little consequence, as the view taken by them of the Truth was only a partial one (sāmvṛta) and would not carry them to the goal, or help them in realising the ultimate (paramārtha) truth The *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, which regarded Hīnayāna as a stepping stone to Mahāyāna, did not reject the Hīnayāna doctrines as altogether useless It showed that the Hīnayāna doctrines had a value of their own Though they might not have helped the realisation of the ultimate truth, yet they could carry their followers to a stage from which it would not be difficult for them to reach the state of perfection the Mahāyānists had in view It also claimed that the Hīnayāna doctrines were preached by Buddha as much as the Mahāyāna doctrines but that the former were only an upāya (expedient) adopted by him to meet the weak intelligence of his early disciples The *Puṇḍarīka*[1]

[1] *Sad. P.*, pp. 89–92

cites in this connection a remark attributed to Buddha: "I am the great ascetic (rsi) and father of all beings who are born in the three dhātus (i e, Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa) and cling to desires (kāma) The three dhātus are dreadful, full of hundreds of sufferings, there are burning in them incessantly the fires of birth, old age, and disease I have come out of these three dhātus and am living alone peacefully in open air, but as these fires are burning my ignorant sons, they are affecting me as well I know the dangers (ādīnava) and I know the way out, but these ignorant persons will not hear my excellent admonitions So I have to take recourse to the expedient of showing them only the path of escaping from the miseries of the three dhātus To those of them, who have taken refuge in me and have acquired the six abhijñās (higher knowledge) and the three vidyās,[1] or to those, who have become Pratyekabuddhas or never-to-turn-back (avaivartika) Bodhisattvas, I now say that they should take to the Buddhayāna and become Jinas I tell them of the excellent knowledge of the Buddhas, their powers (bala), trances (dhyāna), higher trances (vimoksa) and contemplations (samādhi) To the Srāvakas who have attained what they call Nirvāna, I say that they are all my sons and I am their father I have brought them out of their sufferings (duhkha) which were consuming them for innumerable kalpas I call this state of theirs also Nirvrti but they have not yet attained the Nirvrti in its fullness They have freed themselves from the sufferings of transmigration, now they should seek for the yāna leading to Buddhahood"

The Bodhisattvas are asked by the Teacher to observe the rules of conduct leading to Buddhahood while those who have low desires are asked by him to realise the four āryasatyas Those who are not conscious of the sufferings (duhkha) or their causes are apprised of the fact that trsnā

[1] The three Vidyās, in the enumeration, refer to three of the six Abhijñās, *viz*, Pubbenivāsānussati-ñānam, Sattānam cutūpapāte ñānam, and Āsavānam khaye ñānam See *Digha*, III, p 220 The remaining three Abhijñās are Dibbasota, Dibbacakkhu and Paracitta-vijānanam

(desire) is the cause of all sufferings (duhkha-samudaya). To get rid of trṣṇā, the third and fourth truths, nirodha-satya and mārga are explained to them. But in fact those who have reached the end of the mārga are not completely liberated (anirvrta), and so they cannot be considered to have attained emancipation (mokṣa), which one cannot reach unless and until he possesses agrabodhi

To show more clearly the relation between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna doctrines, the *Puṇḍarīka* introduces one of the frequently used similes of the Buddhist literature,[1] *viz*, that of the man born blind A man born blind does not believe in the existence of the sun and the moon, or of such other objects, even if he is told of their existence A physician, who can cure all kinds of diseases, finds out that the man's blindness is due to his past evil deeds He knows that all diseases are due to the abnormal state of any of the three humours, *viz*, wind (vāta), bile (pitta), phlegm (ślesman) or their complicated derangements (sāmnipātika) He thinks of the remedy and finds that the special medicines required for the malady are available only in the Himalayas Out of compassion for the blind man he procures the medicines and by their application cures him of his blindness The man now realises his foolishness for not having believed in the existence of the sun, moon, and stars, and is possessed by the idea that he can see all that is to be seen and all that others can see He is told by some rsis who are possessed of the five kinds of superior knowledge (abhijñā), that his pride is baseless, because he has no prajñā and is therefore not a wise man (pandita), for he is not able to see what is behind the wall, or know the minds of others, or hear what is being said at a distance of five yojanas, and so forth On enquiring how he is to attain them, he is advised to live in a forest or a cave, meditate on the dharma and get rid of passions (kleśas) He accordingly retires from the world, lives in a forest and attains those five abhijñās In the light of his new acquirements, he realises how small in comparison were his previous powers

[1] Cf. *Mil.*, pp. 134, 135.

The simile is then explained as follows the blind men represent the beings who are in one of the six forms of existence (sadgatyupapanna) and ignorant of the true doctrines They have been blinded by avidyā (ignorance of the Truth), from which have followed the samskāras (impressions), then nāmarūpa (name and form) and ultimately the duhkhaskandha (sufferings) The Tathāgata who has escaped from the three dhātus reappears there out of fatherly love (maitrī) and compassion (karunā) He sees the beings passing through the cycles of existence unaware of the means of escape Through his extraordinary power of perception he ascertains that there are beings, of whom some have little hatred but strong attachment (mandadvesa tīvrarāga), some little attachment but strong hatred (mandarāga tīvradvesa), while others are wise (pandita) or unwise (alpaprajña), pure (paripākaśuddha), or have wrong views (mithyādrsti) He accordingly imparts his teaching in various ways suited to the mentality of each The rsis possessed of the five abhijñās are the Bodhisattvas who have developed Bodhicitta and who after attaining anutpattikadharmaksānti (belief in the non-origination of things)[1] will become Buddhas The physician is the Tathāgata The humours wind (vāta), bile (pitta), and phlegm (ślesman) are attachment (rāga), hatred (dvesa), and delusion (moha), and the four medicines are the meditations of Śūnyatā (essencelessness), Animittatā (non-contamination by objects of perception), Apranihitatā (freedom from desire for perceived objects), and the attainment of nirvānadvāra As by the application of medicines the diseases disappear, so by the meditations of Śūnyatā, Animitta, and Apranihita, the Avidyā and the sufferings gradually disappear and the mind no longer clings to any idea of good or evil actions

The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are compared to the blind men after the recovery of their eyesight They have cut asunder the ties of samsāra (world), freed themselves from kleśas (passions, errors, etc) and passed out of the three dhātus They think that by reaching Nirvāna they

[1] See, for explanation, *Śiksā.*, p. 212, *Kośa*, I, 6, 39, II, 53, 250 266, *Dh. S*, p 63

have attained all there is to be attained The Tathāgata then teaches them that it is by the realisation of the sameness (samatā) of all dharmas that they can truly attain Nirvāna. They are made to develop Bodhicitta and realise that they are neither in Samsāra nor in Nirvāna They now comprehend that all the three dhātus of each of the ten directions are essenceless (śūnya) like images in dreams They see all dharmas as having neither origin (anutpannā) nor destruction (aniruddhā), they are neither unfettered (abaddhā) nor fettered (amuktā), neither dark (anandhakārā) nor luminous (atamā) They, who thus realise the dharma which pervades all the three dhātus, can see what is not ordinarily visible [1]

Fundamental points of difference

The *Saddharma-Pundarīka*, in this manner, clearly brings out the fundamental points of difference between the doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna It shows —

(1) That Buddha resides aloof from the three dhātus, though he appears in them out of compassion for the innumerable beings who suffer on account of their ignorance of the Truth,

(2) That the Nirvāna of Śrāvakas is only a place of rest where there is no misery, but it is not the real and final rest, and that Śrāvakas after attaining their Nirvāna have still to undergo a course of training to enable them to reach the only real and final state, Buddhahood; and

(3) That the mental capacities of beings vary, so for a certain class of beings (i e, Śrāvakas), the four Truths and the Law of Causation were preached in order to lead them out of the three dhātus, Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa

These three points require separate treatment, for the first refers to the Trikāya conception of the Mahāyānists, the second to the conception of Nirvāna as held by Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas, and the third to the conventional and transcendental truths in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

[1] *Sad. P.*, pp. 133–7.

(b). The Doctrine of Kāya

The first point of difference between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna schools noticed by the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, viz., that Buddha makes a show of his existence in the three dhātus leads us to an examination of the question of the Kāyas of Buddha as conceived by the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists Of the Hinayāna schools, the Sthaviravādins had very little to do with the kāya conceptions, as Buddha was to them an actual man living in this world like any other human being and subject to all the frailties of a mortal body. Metaphorically they sometimes spoke of Buddha as identical with Dhamma without any metaphysical implication but these remarks gave opportunity to the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāyānists to put forth their theories of Dharmakāya

The Sarvāstivādins commenced speculating on the kāya of Buddha, but it was the school of the Mahāsāṅghikas that took up the question of kāya in right earnest and paved the way for the speculations of the Mahāyānists.

The early Mahāyānists, whose doctrines are mostly to be found in the *Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, along with the school of Nāgārjuna conceived of two kāyas (i) Rūpa- (or Nirmāna-) kāya, which included bodies, gross and subtle, meant for beings in general, and (ii) Dharmakāya, which was used in two senses, one being the body of Dharma, (*i e*, collection of practices) which makes a being a Buddha, and the other the metaphysical principle underlying the universe—the Reality (Tathatā)

The Yogācāra school distinguished the gross rūpakāya from the subtle rūpakāya, calling the former Rūpa- or Nirmāna-kāya and the latter Sambhogakāya The *Lankāvatāra*, representing the earliest stage of the Yogācāra conception, calls the Sambhoga-kāya Nisyanda-buddha or Dharmatā-nisyanda-buddha (the Buddha produced by the Dharmas) The *Sūtrālankāra*[1] uses the term Sambhogakāya for Nisyanda-

[1] *Sūtrā*, pp 45, 188.

buddha and Svābhāvikakāya for Dharmakāya. In the *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* and the recast version of the *Pañcavimśati-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, Sambhogakāya denotes the subtle body which the Buddhas adopted for preaching their doctrines to Bodhisattvas, and Dharmakāya the body purified by the practice of the bodhipaksika and other dharmas which constitute a Buddha For the metaphysical Dharmakāya they use the term Svabhāva- or Svābhāvika-kāya. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* retains the conception of the *Kārikā* but adopts a new term, Svasambhoga-kāya, to denote the Dharmakāya of the *Kārikā* and distinguishes the Sambhogakāya by calling it Parasambhoga-kāya

REALISTIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHA IN THE NIKĀYAS

In a land where the tendency to deify saints is so strong, it is greatly to the credit of the early Hīnayānists that they were able to retain the human conception of Buddha even a century or two after his actual existence, when the scriptures may be regarded as having been put into a definite shape They gave expression to their conception of Buddha in the following words

Bhagavā araham sammāsambuddho vijjācaranasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānam buddho bhagavā So imam lokam sadevakam samārakam sabrahmakam sassamanabrāhmanim pajam sadevamanussam sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti So dhammam deseti ādikalyānam, etc

(The Blessed One is an arhat, a fully awakened one, endowed with knowledge and good conduct, happy, a knower of the world, unsurpassed, a leader able to control men, a teacher of men and gods, the awakened, the blessed He knows thoroughly the worlds of gods, māras, recluses, brahmins and men, and having known them he makes his knowledge known to others He preaches the dhamma (doctrines), which is excellent in the beginning, middle and end, etc)[1]

[1] This passage occurs in many places of the *Nikāyas*, see, *e g*, *Digha*, I, pp 87–88 *cf* *Lal Vis*, p 3, *Sad. P*, pp 144, 376

A description like this does not suggest that Buddha was originally more than a man, a mortal. In the cosmology of *the Buddhists, the gods of the various heavens, the highest* of which is Brahmaloka,[1] are only beings of superior merit and power, but they are inferior, in the matter of spiritual attainments, to the saints or arhats So in this description, the Hīnayānists do not attribute any transcendental or theistic element to Buddha All they say is that Śākyamuni, by pure and simple spiritual culture in this life and as a result of the accumulated merits of his previous lives, reached the highest stage of perfection and attained not only knowledge and power superior to any man or god but also the highest knowledge and power attainable In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, Ānanda explains why Buddha should be considered superior to the Arhats as well, although both arrived at the same goal He says that there is not a single bhikkhu who can be regarded as endowed with all the qualities in all their forms as possessed by Buddha. Moreover, a Buddha is the originator of the path not existing before, a knower and promulgator of the mārga, which is only followed by the sāvakas[2]

NIKĀYA PASSAGES ADMITTING A NON-REALISTIC CONCEPTION

In the face of such descriptions of Buddha, it would have been difficult for the later Hīnayāna schools to sublimate the human elements in him, had it not been for certain expressions in some of the earlier works of the Piṭaka, which lent themselves to other interpretations Some of these expressions are —

(1) Yo vo Ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto so vo mam' accayena satthā.

(Buddha said to Ānanda just before his parinibbāna 'the dhamma and vinaya that have been preached by me will be your teacher after my death')[3]

[1] In the Mahāyānic works also, as for instance in the *Daśa*, it is stated that a Bodhisattva can become a Mahābrahman in the ninth bhūmi if he so wishes.

[2] *Majjhima*, III, p. 8. [3] *Dīgha*, II, p 154, *Mil.*, p 99.

The dhamma and vinaya clearly refer to the collection of doctrines and disciplinary rules delivered by Buddha This is also evident from the conversation of Ānanda with Gopaka-Moggallāna, where the former explains why the monks after Buddha's death should not be regarded as without refuge (appatisarana) He says that they have now a refuge in Dhamma (dhammapatisarana), which, he points out, are the doctrines and disciplinary rules [1]

(2) Bhagavato' mhi putto oraso mukhato jāto dhammajo dhammanimmito dhammadāyādo iti [2] Tam kissa hetu? Tathāgatassa h' etam adhivacanam Dhammakāyo iti pi Brahmakāyo iti pi Dhammabhūto [3] iti pi ti

Just as a brāhmana would say that he is born of Brahmā, through his mouth—Brahmuno putto oraso mukhato jāto brahmajo brahmanimmito brahmadāyādo—so a Sākyaputtiya-samana may say that he is born of Bhagavā, through his mouth, born of his doctrine, made of his doctrine, etc Though in this passage Dhamma is equated with Brahmā, the context shows that there is no metaphysical sense in it, it is only to draw a parallel between a brāhmana and a Sākyaputtiya-samana that Dhammakāya is equated with Brahmakāya

(3) Vakkali on his death-bed became very eager to see Buddha in person, so Bhagavā came to him and said,

"Alam Vakkali kim te pūtikāyena ditthena Yo kho Vakkali dhammam passati so mam passati Yo mam passati so dhammam passati"

Just after saying this, Buddha referred to his dhamma of impermanence (anicca) There are in the Nikāyas many

[1] *Majjhima, Gopaka Moggallāna Sutta* (No 108) *Cf Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS*, 1890), ch x, p 65 Buddha says "84,000 dhammakkhandhas have been preached by me in 45 years I alone only pass away while there are 84,000 dhammakkhandhas which like 84,000 Buddhas (buddha sadisa) will admonish you"

[2] *Saṃyutta*, II, p 221, *Majjhima*, III, p 29 has the identical passage with the addition "no āmisadāyādo" after "dhammadāyādo" For the interpretation of "dhammadāyādo" see *Majjhima*, I, pp. 12f

[3] *Majjhima*, II, p 84, *Digha*, III, p 84, *Majjhima*, III, pp 195, 224 has "Bhagavā jānam jānāti passam passati cakkhubhūto ñāṇabhūto dhammabhūto."

passages of this import, which may well be taken as precursors of the later Mahāyānic conceptions and probably formed the basis of their speculations But the passages when read as they stand do not appear to bear any metaphysical sense In this passage Buddha refers to his body as *pūti-kāya* (body of impure matter), and to lay stress on his doctrines he says that his dhamma should be looked upon with the same awe and reverence by his disciples as they regard his person [1]

(4) The passage in the *Anguttara Nikāya*,[2] where Buddha says that he is neither a god, nor a gandhabba, nor a man, has been taken by Prof Masson-Oursel[3] as showing trace of the Mahāyānic kāya conceptions It is not impossible to read some metaphysical ideas into the passage, though probably the compiler of the Suttas did not mean to convey them Dona brahmana, noticing the sign of the wheel in the feet of Buddha, enquired of him whether he was a deva, a gandhabba a yakkha or a mortal Buddha replied that he was none of these beings as he had got rid of the āsavas (impurities) by the continuance of which one remains a deva, gandhabba, yakkha or mortal. Just as a lotus is born in water, grows in it but remains above and is apart from it, so also Buddha was born in the world, grew up in it but overcame it (abhibhuyya) and lived unaffected by the same Therefore, he asked the brāhmana not to regard him as anything but Buddha

1 *Saṃyutta*, III, p 120, *Majjhima*, I, pp 190, 191 Yo paticcasamuppādam passati so dhammam passati yo dhammam passati so paticcasamuppādam passati For other references, see Prof Vallée Poussin's article "Notes sur les Corps du Buddha" in *Le Muséon*, 1913, pp 259–290 Compare the remarks in the later Pāli works,—

Saddhamma Sangaha (*JPTS*, 1890), p 61

Yo me passati saddhammam so mam passati Vakkali,
Apassamāno saddhammam mam passe pi na passati

Milinda, p 71 yo dhammam passati so bhagavantam passati, dhammo hi mahārāja bhagavatā desito ti

Ibid, p 73 Dhammakāyena pana kho mahārāja sakkā bhagavā nidassetum, dhammo hi mahārāja bhagavatā desito ti

2 *Anguttara*, II, p 38

3 Prof Masson Oursel in his article "*Les trois Corps du Bouddha*", *J A*, 1913, pp 581ff

There are other passages referring to the miraculous powers of Buddha, *viz*, his ability to live a kalpa or to assume different forms and perform such other miracles, but it should be noted that these powers were attributed not to Buddha alone but also to his disciples in general, who had been able to attain the higher stages of sanctification [1]

KĀYA-CONCEPTION OF THE THERAVĀDINS REMAINED UNCHANGED

Even if it be assumed that the Mahāyānic ideas are latent in the above-mentioned expressions though not adequately expressed, the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu* [2] to establish the historical existence of Buddha as against those who denied it, and the manner in which references were made to the events of Buddha's life as depicted in the Nikāyas leaves no vestige of doubt about the opinion of the Theravādins regarding the kāya of Buddha.

Though the terms rūpakāya and dharmakāya found their way into the later Pāli works [3] from Mahāyāna or semi-Mahāyāna works, they did not bring with them any non-realistic sense Buddhaghosa even as late as the fifth century A C refers thus to the kāyas

Yo pi so Bhagavā asīti anuvyañjanapatimandita-dvattimsamahāpurisalakkhana-vicitra-rūpakāvo sabbākāraparisuddha-sīlakkhandhādi-gunaratanasamiddha-dhammakāyo yasamahatta-puññamahatta appatipuggalo araham sammāsambuddho

(That Bhagavā, who is possessed of a beautiful rūpakāya, adorned with eighty minor signs and thirty-two major signs of a great man, and possessed of a dhammakāya purified in

[1] See *Kośa*, II, 10 (also for references in the *Nikāyas*)

[2] *Kvu*, xvii, 1 The Vetulyakas held on the basis of the passage cited above (fn. 4) that "it is not right to say that the exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind" The Theravādins did not agree with them Buddhaghosa also pointed out how the passage should be interpreted.

[3] See, *e g*, *Sad San* (*JPTS*, 1890), p 69·

Sambuddhānam dve kāyā rūpakāyo sirīdharo,
Yo tehi desito dhammo dhammakāyo ti vuccati.

every way and glorified by sīla, samādhi, etc.,[1] full of splendour and virtue, incomparable and fully awakened)[2]

Though Buddhaghosa's conception was realistic, he was not immune from the religious bias of attributing superhuman powers to Buddha In the *Atthasālini*[3] he says that during the three months of his absence from the world while Buddha was engaged in preaching Abhidhamma to his mother in the Tusita heaven, he created some *Nimmitabuddhas* as exact replicas of himself These Nimmitabuddhas could not be distinguished from the real Buddha in voice, words and even the rays of light that issued forth from his body The created Buddhas could be detected only by the gods of the higher classes and not by the ordinary gods or men of the world

In short, the early Hīnayānists conceived Buddha's *rūpakāya* as that of a human being,[4] and his *dhammakāya* as the collection of his dhammas, *i e*, doctrines and disciplinary rules collectively

CONCEPTION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDINS

The other school, the Sarvāstivādins, who retained the realistic conception of Buddha, differed a little from the Theravādins Unfortunately their original Pitakas in Sanskrit are lost beyond recovery and we have to depend for our information about them on the few fragmentary pieces of their literature discovered in Central Asia, or on the Chinese translations of their Āgamas, in which again very little spade-work has yet been done[5] Our main source of information at present is the *Abhidharmakośa*, made accessible to us from Chinese by the monumental French transla-

[1] The five khandhas referred to here are, sīla samādhi, paññā, vimutti and vimuttiñāṇadassana See *Mil*, p 98

[2] *Vis M*, p 234, *Jātaka*, I, p 84. Rūpakāyasirī

[3] *Attha*, p 16

[4] See Prof Vallée Poussin's *Bouddhisme*, pp 232f

[5] Dr Chizen Akanuma (*Eastern Buddhist*, II, p 7) quotes some passages from the Chinese Anguttara and Samyukta Āgamas and shows that the *dharmakāya* of Buddha denoted the collection of dharmas (teachings)

tion of Professor La Vallée Poussin The *Kośa*, again, it should be noted, is the work of a systematiser and the production of a time much later than that of the Āgamas, to which it bears the same relation as the *Visuddhimagga* does to the Pāli Pitakas. As the present state of our knowledge indicates that the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Lalitavistara*[1] originally belonged to this school, though they were recast by the Mahāyānists, we must examine with caution some of the statements found in them regarding the kāya conception

i *Divyāvadāna*

There are a few passages in the *Divyāvadāna* throwing light on the rūpakāya and dharmakāya of Buddha and bearing the identical sense of the Pāli works On one occasion Śrona Kotikarna said that, through the grace of his teacher, he had seen the dharmakāya of Buddha, but as he was anxious to see the rūpakāya, he wanted to go to the place where Buddha was living at the time[2] Upagupta once said to Māra that he had seen the dharmakāya only and requested him to show him the rūpakāya Māra thereupon made an image (vigraha) of Buddha replete with all the major and minor signs of great men[3] In the answer that king Rudrāyana gave to Bimbisāra that "na rājan krpano loke dharmakāyena samsprset" [let not, O King, an irreligious person[4] attain (lit touch) the dharmakāya], the word "dharmakāya" may bear a metaphysical interpretation but the context does not warrant it[5] The remark made by Aśoka, after Upagupta had pointed out to him the stūpa of Ānanda, makes the sense of dharmakāya quite explicit It runs thus 'That body which you all call pure, excellent and made of dharma (dharmātmano dharmamayo) was borne (dhāritam) by him called Viśoka (=Ānanda) and therefore his stūpa deserves great honour The lamp of dharma, the

[1] Winternitz, *Geschichte etc*, II, p 194
[2] *Divyā*, p 19 [3] *Ibid.*, p 360
[4] *Ibid*, p 560 krpaṇa is defined thus·
yas tu dharmavirāgārtham adharme nirato nrpah,
sa rājan krpaṇo jñeyas tamastamahparāyaṇah.
[5] *Ibid*, p 560

dispeller of the darkness of afflictions that burnt still among men was due to the power of him, the son of Sugatendra, and therefore, should be worshipped with special reverence [1]

There are, however, Avadānas in the *Divyāvadāna*, which were not without some Mahāyānic tint, for, we read in the *Rudrāyanāvadāna*,[2] as we usually find in the Mahāyānic works, that rays of light issued forth from Buddha's mouth when he smiled, irradiating the beings of heaven and hell. It is noteworthy that the *Atthasālinī*[3] also speaks of raśmis (rays of light) of six colours issuing out of Buddha's body It seems that the Mahāyānic ideas were percolating gradually into the rocky soil of the conservative Theravādins

II *Lalitavistara*

The *Lalitavistara* gives us a picture of Buddha more superhuman than human and yet far from the Mahāyānic conceptions of the Sambhogakāya and Dharmakāya, though in the last two chapters it dwells on the doctrine of Tathatā In the *Lalitavistara* Buddha is deified but there are no traces of the Trikāya conception It says in many places that Buddha appears in the world of men for *lokānuvartana*[4] (*i e* to follow the ways of the world), which, if he so desired, he could avoid by remaining in one of the heavens and attaining emancipation there The running account of Buddha's life is interrupted at times—probably they are afterthoughts of the compiler—by dialogues between Buddha and Ānanda, in order to make the treatise appear Mahāyānic and not Hīnayānic At one place Buddha explains to Ānanda that, unlike human beings, he did not stay in the filth of mother's womb but in a jewel-casket (ratnavyūha)[5]

[1] *Divyā*, pp 396-7 Cf Przyluski, *Asoka*, p 408 In connection with the destruction of the law, Mahāmāyā exclaimed Ceux qui sont nés du Corps de la Loi (dharmakāya), ou sont-ils allés ?

[2] *Divyā*, xxxvii, p 568

[3] *Attha*, p 16

[4] E g, *Mtu.*, I, pp 168, 170

[5] *Lal Vis*, pp. 88, 105, 106 This formed one of the points of contention of the Mahāsāṅghikas See Masuda, *Early Origin etc*, in the *Asia Major*, Vol II.

placed in the womb, which was as hard as adamant but soft to the touch like the down of a Kācilindika bird, and that his birth and other events connected with it were all superhuman At the same time he prophesies that there will be, in the future, men unrestrained in act, thought and speech, ignorant, faithless, proud, believing without deliberation what is heard by them, who will not believe in the superhuman nature of his birth [1] One can perceive through the poetical exaggerations of the *Lalitavistara* that it has in view the historical Budddha endowed with the major and minor signs —a human being after all who requires to be reminded by the heavenly musicians of the acts of his past lives and his resolution to become a Buddha and rescue beings from misery, and who needs a stimulus to renounce the world in order to fulfil his resolution [2] In connection with the offer of houses which was made by the gods to the Bodhisattva when he was in the womb, it is said that in order to please all the gods who offered houses he caused the appearance of his pregnant mother Māyādevi in each of those houses by means of the Mahāvyūha samādhi This does not clearly reflect any idea of Nirmānakāya—it appears more like some of the miracles mentioned in the *Nikāyas* In the last chapter of the *Lalitavistara* where Buddha's attributes are mentioned, he is called the great tree (mahādruma), because he possesses a body of Dharmakāyajñāna (the knowledge of Dharmakāya) [3] As this chapter is very likely a Mahāyāna addition, we may reasonably say that the *Lalitavistara* in its original form as a treatise of the Sarvāstivādins viewed Buddha as a human being with superhuman attributes

iii *Abhidharmakośa*

We may now consider the writings of Vasubandhu, the great exponent of the Sarvāstivāda school In his *Abhidharmakośa* he imported a new meaning into the words Dharma-

[1] *Lal Vis*, pp 87ff This goes against the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda conceptions

[2] The descriptions gave opportunity to the Mahāyānists to invent Upāyakauśalya Pāramitā, the duties of Adhyeṣaṇā, Yācanā, etc.

[3] *Lal. Vis.*, p 428

kāya and Rūpakāya In examining the three Śaranas, he tried to bring out the real sense of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha in which a devotee takes refuge He said that those who take refuge in Buddha do, in fact, take refuge in the dharmas (qualities) which constitute a Buddha (buddha-kāraka), i e, the dharmas by the acquisition of which a certain person is called a Buddha, or in other words, the dharmas by the acquisition of which a person understands all things These dharmas are ksayajñāna (knowledge of the destruction of misery), anutpādajñāna[1] (knowledge of the further non-origination of misery), and samyagdrsti (right view) of the Aśaiksas together with the dharmas attendant on the jñāna, viz, the five pure skandhas A dharmakāya is formed of these dharmas In another place, while showing the sameness of the Dharmakāyas of all Buddhas, he explained the Dharmakāya as a series of pure dharmas, or rather a renewal of the psycho physical organism of the substratum (anāsravadharmasamtāna, āsrayaparāvrtti)[2] The Dharmakāya then signifies a new purified personality or substratum (āsraya), but it is pointed out that such a dharmakāya is possessed also by an arhat[3] In the *Sūtrālamkāra*[4] such a dharmakāya is attributed to the mother of

[1] *Kośa*, VI, 67 explains that Ksayajñāna with Anutpādajñāna makes Bodhi On account of difference among saints in the acquisition of these jñānas, Bodhi is said to be of three kinds Śrāvaka-bodhi, Pratyekabuddhabodhi and Anuttarasamyaksambodhi By the above two jñānas one completely abandons ignorance (aśesāvidyā prahānāt), by the first, one realises the truth that his task is accomplished (i e, the duhkha has been realised by him), by the second, one realises that his task is no more to be accomplished (i e., the duhkha has been realised by him and he will not have to exert any more)

The samyagdrsti of the Aśaiksas is to see things as they are really, to know truly the general character (sāmānyalaksana) of dharmas See *Kośa*, VI, 50 fn For a note on the Ksayajñāna, see Masuda, *Early Origin etc*, in *Asia Major*, Vol II, Fasc I

[2] *Kośa*, VII, 34, for the sense of āśraya see *Ibid*, VIII, 34 fn Cf āśraya pariśuddhi in *Sūtrā*, p 186

[3] *Kośa*, IV, 56

[4] Hüber, *Sūtrālamkāra*, pp 217, 390 quoted in the *Kośa*, VII, 32 p 81

Śākyamuni or to an advanced upāsaka Thus we see that the *Kośa* has two interpretations of the Dharmakāya, one being the qualities adhering to a Buddha and the other the purified personality (āśraya) possessed by him The *Kośa*, in fact, replaces the concrete conceptions of the Dharmakāya found in the *Nikāyas* and the *Divyāvadāna* by an abstract one In the last two works the Dharmakāya signified only the doctrines, *viz*, the Bodhipakkhiya dharmas or Anicca, Dukkha and Anatta, together with the *Vinaya* rules contained in the *Pātimokkha*, while to Vasubandhu it meant the qualities adhering to a Buddha as well as the purified personality (āsraya)

Referring to the formulæ of the Śaranas, Vasubandhu says that as the physical body (rūpakāya) of Buddha does not undergo any modification by the acquisition of the quality of Buddha, one should not take refuge in the rūpakāya of Buddha, which is, in fact, the rūpakāya of the Bodhisattva and hence sāsrava (impure) Just as a man would respect a monk for the qualities adhering to him and not for his person, so a devotee should take refuge in Buddhatva and not in Buddha the person In the same way Vasubandhu explains the two other saranas, *viz*, Dharma and Sangha, the former being explained as Nirvāna, or the three Truths—Duhkha, Samudaya and Mārga, or Sukha, Duhkha and Asukha-aduhkha—and the latter as the qualities that a saṅgha of monks is expected to possess [1]

The *Vibhāsā* informs us that there are some who believe that to take refuge in Buddha is to take refuge in the body constituted by the head, nape of the neck, belly, back, hands and feet of the Tathāgata Some say that as the body is born of parents, it is impure (sāsrava) and therefore it should not be a place of refuge The refuge should be the Aśaikṣa dharmas, which make a Buddha, *i e*, the Dharmakāya [2] Apparently the *Vibhāsā* refers in the first

[1] Compare the formula of Sarana in the Nikāyas, *e.g*, *Digha*, III, p 227

[2] *Kośa*, VI, p 32, IV, p 76n, VIII, p 34.

case to the earlier Hīnayāna schools and in the second to the Sarvāstivādins and their followers

SIMILAR DHARMAKĀYA CONCEPTION AMONG THE SATYASIDDHIS AND THE MAHĀYĀNISTS

The Satyasiddhi school takes almost the same view of the Dharmakāya as the Sarvāstivādins According to it the Dharmakāya is made of śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti and vimuktijñānadarśana dharmakāyas Buddhaghosa, Nāgārjuna and the writer of the *Milindapañha* also refer to such a dharmakāya [1] It means that the body of Buddha was purified by the practices of these five skandhas, and hence it can be called Dharmakāya But as these purifications are obtained by Arhats also, Harivarman, the founder of the Satyasiddhi school, distinguished the Dharmakāya of Buddha by saying that his Dharmakāya consisted not only of the above five purificatory practices but also of ten powers (daśa bala), four proficiencies (vaiśāradya) and the three recollections (smṛtyupasthāna), which the Arhats cannot obtain [2]

The *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* [3] and the *Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*,[4] important text-books of the Yogācāra school, define the Dharmakāya with a similar sense They say that the various dharmas, *viz* Bodhipakṣikas, Apramāṇas, Vimokṣas, Samāpattis and so forth, constitute Sarvajñatā (omniscience) and Sarvajñatā is the Dharmakāya It should be noted that the *Kārikā* and the *Prajñāpāramitā* use this expression in a sense different from that current in the Mahāyāna texts They really mean the Svasambhogakāya of the later Vijñānavādins

The *Prajñāpāramitās* also maintain the conception that the Dharmakāya is produced by dharmas, the highest of which is, according to them, the prajñāpāramitā, *i e*, the knowledge which helps a person to realise the dharma-śūnyatā The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* takes up the question whether the honour shown to the relics of the Tathāgatakāya is more meritorious

[1] *Vis M*, p 234, *M Vr* (as opinion of non-Mādhyamikas), p 433; *Mil*, p 98

[2] Sogen, *Systems etc*, pp 181, 182

[3] *Kārikā*, ch. viii

[4] *Pañca.*, (ASB ms) leaf 224a

than the honour shown to the *Prajñāpāramitā*, e.g., by making a copy of it. The answer given is that the relics depend on the body purified by the prajñāpāramitā, and therefore it is the source of Buddhas. The source deserves more honour than the remnants of the fruit (i.e., relics of Buddha) produced therefrom, and therefore it is more meritorious to honour the Prajñāpāramitā than the relics.[1] It adds that all teachings of Buddha issue from the Prajñāpāramitā, and the Dharmabhāṇakas preserve and propagate them, so the Dharmabhāṇakas should also be respected. They are protected by the Dharmakāya, the Prajñāpāramitā. *Sarvajñatā* (omniscience) is pervaded (paribhāvita) by the prajñāpāramitā, from *sarvajñatā* issues the body of Tathāgata, the relics of whom are worshipped, hence prajñāpāramitā deserves greater honour.[2]

HĪNAYĀNIC SPECULATIONS (a) WHETHER RŪPAKĀYA IS VIPĀKAJA ?

The *Kośa* maintains that the rūpakāya of Buddha endowed with the major and minor signs is the result of the excellent karmas of his previous lives. According to it, even the Buddhas cannot escape the effects of their karma. The schism created by Devadatta in the saṅgha is attributed to a deed in one of the previous lives of Śākyamuni. The *Vyākhyā* and the *Vibhāṣā* explain that it happened to Śākyamuni only, and not to the other Buddhas, because in one of his former lives he sowed dissension among the disciples of an ascetic, possessed of five abhijñās.[3] That the Buddhas enjoy or suffer the effects of karma is also maintained by the *Divyāvadāna*[4] and the *Majjhima Nikāya*.[5] The *Divyāvadāna* refers to a saying of Śākyamuni that even the Jinas themselves are not free from their karmas, while the *Majjhima Nikāya* says that a Tathāgata performs good deeds in his previous lives, and as a result of these he enjoys in the

[1] *Asta.*, ch. iv.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 99. It is from this conception that the Prajñāpāramitā is addressed as the mother of Buddhas.

[3] *Kośa*, VII, 34, p. 8 fn., 84, IV, 102, p. 212 fn. 2.

[4] *Divyā.*, p. 416. [5] *Majjhima*, III, p. 227.

present, pure and pleasant sensations (vedanā) only Tradition says that when Buddha was hurt by the splinter of stone thrown by Devadatta, he said that ninety-one kalpas ago he had hurt a person by a spear, as the result of which evil deed, he now received a wound

The *Milindapañha*, however, takes a different view of this matter Admitting that Devadatta created a schism in the sangha, it says that as the schism was not created by any act of Buddha's own and as it was caused by an external influence, it should not be said that Buddha as the result of his *karma* had a divided assembly (bhejjapariso) In a similar way it explains away the wound or the illnesses from which Buddha suffered First it asserts that Buddha attained omniscience after uprooting all roots of evil (akusalamūlas), so he could not have any more sufferings through *karma* It then says that apart from *karma* there are other causes like the three humours seasons, etc, which produce vedanā (feelings) According to it, the wound that Buddha received was due to an opakammika (accidental) cause and his illnesses to causes other than *karma*[1]

(b) WAS BUDDHA A JARĀYUJA OR UPAPĀDUKA ?

In order to remove doubt from the minds of the people as to the nature of the birth of so great and meritorious a being as the Bodhisattva in his last existence—a doubt expressed also in the *Lalitavistara*, where a ratnavyūha has been devised for the Bodhisattva's abode in his mother's womb—the *Kośa*[2] proceeds to show that the Bodhisattvas possess the power of choosing the manner of their birth (upapattivasitva), and that Śākyamuni chose birth in a womb (jarāyu) with two objects One was to benefit the Śākya clan and at the same time not to give opportunity to the people to consider him a magician or a god or a demon, and the other was to leave some relics of his body, by worshipping which men and other beings would go to heaven by thousands, or attain deliverance

The Mahāsāṅghikas and their followers[3] assert that

[1] *Mil.*, pp 134f [2] *Kośa*, III, 9 [3] *E g*, the Vetulyakas.

Śākyamuni was an upapāduka (self-born), and that even his son Rāhula was also an upapāduka, for Bodhisattvas cannot have kāma. They assert that Bodhisattvas are possessed of 'ādhisthāniki rddhi' (i e, the power of appearing anywhere and in any form), and that by that power Śākyamuni made a seeming show of his existence in the womb of Māyā They conceived Buddha as *lokottara* (transcendental), and Sākyamuni as only a phantom (Nirmānakāya) The transcendental Buddha has a rūpakāya which is limitless, everlasting, free from all sāsrava dharmas He is always in samādhi,[1] never sleeps or dreams, and can know everything in an instant of thought He knows neither fatigue nor rest, and is ever busy in enlightening sentient beings His power and his life are limitless For the benefit of sentient beings he appears at will in any one of the six gatis Whatever he utters relates to the truth, though people may understand him differently In short, the Mahāsānghikas conceived Buddha as a totally supermundane being with illimitable powers and knowledge, who never desired to attain Nirvāna[2]

KĀYA CONCEPTION AT THE BEGINNING OF MAHĀYĀNA

The Mahāyānists incorporated the Nirmānakāya conception of the Mahāsānghikas into their Trikāya theory, adding the two other, Sambhogakāya and Dharmakāya, the former approaching the Mahāsānghika conception of the transcendental Buddha, and the latter being a new philosophic conception of the Mahāyānists

These new Kāya conceptions, it seems, did not make much of an appeal at the beginning of Mahāyāna The *Saddharma-Pundarīka* and the *Suvarnaprabhāsa* tried to erase from the minds of the people the lingering impression about the historical existence of Śākyamuni In the *Pundarīka*[3] we find

[1] Cf *Lankā*, p 240 sadā samāhitāś ca tathāgatāh.

[2] For details see Masuda's *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, *Asia Major*, vol. II, fasc I, Anesaki's article in the *E R E*, sv *Docetism* (Buddhist), Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp 249–251 See also *Kośa*, III, 9 referring to *Mtu.*, I, pp. 145, 154

[3] *Sad. P*, pp 311ff.

Maitreya assuming the rôle of a sceptic and enquiring how Buddha could, within a short space of forty years after the attainment of Bodhi at Gayā, perform the innumerable duties of a Tathāgata and lead incalculable bodhisattvas to Buddhahood. It appears like the paradox of a man of twenty-five years claiming centenarians as his sons and the latter calling him their father Similarly Buddha's pointing to Bodhisattvas who had been performing the various duties conducive to Buddhahood for many millions of years as his disciples appears paradoxical Maitreya says further that in the minds of those Bodhisattvas who recently became Mahāyānists (navayānasamprasthitāh) there may be doubts of this nature, so the Tathāgata should explain the paradox for the welfare of the religion Buddha then asks his audience thrice to believe his words (avakalpayadhvam abhisraddaddhvam), and says, "It is not to be considered (naiva drastavyam) that Bhagavān Śākyamuni lately leaving his family attained Bodhi at Gayā I attained sambodhi incalculable ages ago, and since then I have been preaching the dharma All that I have said about the previous Tathāgatas, Dīpankara etc, and their parinirvāna were all my own creations They were only my expedients for imparting the dharma (upāyakauśalyadharmadesanābhinirhāranirmitāni) All that I have said to the effect that I was young, recently born, left home, and attained Bodhi, was to appeal to a class of people who otherwise would not have been convinced of the excellence of the religion and derived benefits therefrom But all that I said was not untrue, as the Tathāgatas know what the three dhātus really are they know that the dhātus neither are born nor die, neither produce nor non-produce, neither exist nor non-exist, neither are they the same nor different, and they are neither true nor false All that the Tathāgatas say is true, but people devoid of right knowledge construe different meanings out of it Though I have not attained parinirvāna, I say that I have attained it In order to rouse curiosity in the minds of the people and a desire to see Buddha, I say that the appearance of a Buddha is an exceedingly rare event I made a show of the Nirvāna, but did not enter into it,

but people with distorted views could not see my real self, and busied themselves with the worship of my relics. But this also produced a good effect, for they thereby became righteous and gave up their passions From among them I formed my śrāvakasangha, and showed myself at Gṛdhrakūṭa, and explained to them how to attain the agrabodhi"

In the *Suvarnaprabhāsa*[1] Ruciraketu and Kaundilya the brāhmana play the rôle of the sceptics The former enquires why Śākyamuni, who performed so many meritorious deeds, should have such a short span of life as eighty years The latter seeks a mustard-like relic of Buddha's body to worship and thus go to heaven Ruciraketu is told by the Buddhas of all lokadhātus that they did not know any man or god who could calculate the length of Śākyamuni's life They said that it might be possible to count the drops of water in a sea but it would be impossible to ascertain the length of his life Kaundilya brāhmana, who only feigned ignorance, was told by Litsavikumāra that, just as it is absurd to expect cocoanuts from a rose-apple tree, so it is absurd to expect a relic from the Buddhakāya The Tathāgatas have no origin, they are ever existing and inconceivable. It is only the Nirmitakāya that is shown by them How can a body, in which there is no bone or blood, leave a dhātu (relic)? Buddhas have only Dharmakāya and there is only the Dharmadhātu

NIRMĀNAKĀYA

The Mahāyānic texts tried to show, on the one hand, that the Hīnayānists were wrong in their belief that Sākyamuni was really a man of flesh and blood and that relics of his body existed, while on the other hand, they introduced the two conceptions of Nirmānakāya and Buddhakāya Whatever is said to have been done by Sākyamuni is accounted for by these texts as the apparent doings of a phantom of the Buddhakāya, a shadowy image created to follow the ways of the world (lokānuvartana),[2] in order to bring con-

[1] *Suvarnaprabhāsa* (B T S ed), pp. 4–8.

[2] Cf *Mtu.*, I, pp 168, 170

viction to the hearts of the people that the attainment of Buddhahood was not an impossibility As the Buddhas possess the knowledge of all that is to be done (krtyānusthānajñāna),[1] they can take any form they desire for the illumination of the various classes of beings The Mahāyānic conception of the Nirmānakāya is essentially the same as that of the Mahāsānghikas

The *Prajñāpāramitās* in their quaint way refer to the Nirmānakāya or Rūpakāya The *Pañcavimśati* says that a bodhisattva, after acquiring all the necessary dharmas and practising prajñāpāramitā, becomes Sambuddha He then renders service to beings of all lokadhātus (worlds) of the ten corners at all times by Nirmānamegha (Nirmāna clouds) This is called the Nairmānikā-kāya [2]

From the Chinese sources[3] we are informed that Nāgārjuna in his commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā, called the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā śāstra*, speaks of two kāyas, rūpakāya and dharmakāya The former is the body born of parents, possessing the qualities of sentient beings, and is subject to human frailties It was born in Kosala while his dharmakāya was born at Rājagrha The material body was necessary for "earthly truth" It was for the deliverance of beings that Buddha assumed different bodies, different names, birth places and ways of emancipation This interpretation of rūpa- and dharma-kāyas is also followed in the Chinese *Parinirvānasūtra* and *Sandhinirmocanasūtra* [4]

Some of the Yogācāra texts furnish us with the following information regarding the conception of Nirmānakāya as prevailing among the Yogācārins

(i) The *Sūtrālankāra*[5] explains the Nirmānakāya to be those forms which are assumed by Buddhas to render service to beings of the various worlds It generally refers to the human form that Buddha takes in order to make a show of

[1] One of the four jñānas peculiar to Buddha, see *Mvyut*, p 2

[2] *Pañca* (Cambr ms), leaf 343b

[3] C Akanuma, *E B*, II, pp 17ff , Masuda, *Die Individualistische etc*, p 60

[4] *E B*, II, pp 21f.

[5] *Sūtrā*, p 45

his acquiring the ordinary arts and crafts required by an average man, living a family life and then retiring from it, and ultimately attaining Nirvāna by a recourse to ascetic practices

(ii) The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* tells us that the Nirmāṇakāya is meant for Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Pṛthagjanas (common men) and Bodhisattvas who are not yet in one of the ten bhūmis It may appear in all lands whether pure or impure [1] The Chinese commentaries on the *Siddhi* mention the various ways in which Buddha can transform his body or another's body or voice, and his or others' mind, to suit his purpose Not only could he transform himself into Śākyamuni, or Śāriputra into a young girl, but also could create an altogether new apparitional body, not, of course, a living, thinking being [2] Often he assumed the voice of Brahmā or expressed himself through the mouth of Śāriputra or Subhūti, and it was for this reason that we find Śāriputra or Subhūti explaining some of the abstruse Mahāyāna teachings, which they themselves were not expected to understand [3] The third way in which he could transform his voice was to produce sounds from the sky His thoughts were supramundane (lokottara) and pure (anāsrava) He could produce in his mind any thought he liked, in fact, he appeared in his Nirmitakāya as Śākyamuni with a mind (citta) suited to the ways of the world. He could also impose his thoughts on the minds of others

(iii) The *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* states that there are four kāyas, of which the Svābhāvikakāya is real, and the three others, *viz*, Dharmakāya (=Svasambhogakāya), Sambhogakāya (=Parasambhogakāya) and Nirmāṇakāya are sāmvṛta (*i.e* unreal), these are meant for Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas respectively According to it, the Nirmāṇakāya was intended for Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas who are not yet in one of the ten bhūmis It describes the Nirmāṇakāya as a body unsevered from the real kāya, and

1 Masuda, *Die Individualistische etc*, p 60.
2 I have derived this information from Prof La Vallée Poussin
3 See *Aṣṭa*, pp 14, 33, 414.

as the actions performed by it are similarly unsevered from the kāya, they should be regarded as asamsāra (transcendental, i e, not worldly) Then it proceeds to show that the thirty-seven kinds of purificatory actions performed by the Nirmānakāya are really the actions of the Dharmakāya. The thirty-seven actions, as explained by it, are the thirty-seven steps through which a Nirmānakāya passes after its inception They are as follows [1] A Nirmānakāya (i) is unmindful of good or bad forms of existence, in other words, takes birth as an animal, human being or god as necessities require—this is called *gatipraśama*, (ii) practises the four *samgrahavastus* (elements of popularity), (iii) enlightens himself about matters opposite and similar, good and evil, by the *śrutamayi* and such other means of knowledge, and then applies himself to the service of others, keeping himself unconcerned (i e, having no *anunaya*, like a magician for the things made by him magically), (iv) practises the six pāramitās purified in three ways *trimandalaviśuddha*), (v) performs, and persuades others to perform the ten *kuśalakarmapathas* (moral duties) and thus establish all in the path leading to Buddhahood, (vi) exerts for realising the non-existence in reality of all things, (vii) comprehends the non-duality of things and the all-pervasiveness of the dharmadhātu, and so on, until he reaches the Tathāgatabhūmi after realising the absence of difference between things constituted and unconstituted [2] In short, the *Kārikā* wants to say that the whole course of life of a Bodhisattva, extending through incalculable births, is nothing but the Nirmānakāya, a thing not separate from the Dharmakāya, as, in fact, according to the Mahāyāna philosophy, all creations are neither the same as, nor different from, the dharmadhatu

(iv) The *Lankāvatāra* explains the relation of Nirmānakāya to Dharmakāya in the same way as the *Kārikā* It states that Nirmitabuddhas are not produced by actions, the Tathāgata is neither in them nor outside them (sarve hi nirmita-

[1] *J A*, 1913, p 604.

[2] *Kārikā*, ch viii, also *J A*, 1913, pp 599, 600

buddhā na karmaprabhavā na teṣu tathāgato na cānyatra tebhyas tathāgataḥ).[1] It is only when the sons of the Jina realise the visible world to have no existence apart from the citta that they obtain the Nirmāṇakāya free from *kriyā* and *saṃskāra*, and endowed with *bala*, *abhijñā* and *vaśitā*.[2] Like the *Siddhi*, it says that the Tathāgatas by creating Nirmāṇakāya perform the various duties of a Tathāgata (Tathāgatakṛtya).[3] It gives also the interesting information that Vajrapāṇi serves as an attendant on the Nirmitanirmāṇabuddhas, and not on the real Buddhas[4] and that the function of such a Buddha is to preach and explain the characteristics of dāna, śīla, dhyāna, samādhi, citta, prajñā, jñāna, skandha, dhātu, āyatana, vimokṣa, and vijñāna.[5]

SAMBHOGAKĀYA

We have seen that the Rūpakāya or Nirmāṇakāya was meant for the Srāvakas Pratyekabuddhas, Pṛthagjanas and Bodhisattvas who were not in one of the ten bhūmis, so another kāya had to be devised, a very subtle kāya, for the benefit of all Bodhisattvas. This is called Parasambhogakāya, as distinguished from Svasambhogakāya, a similar subtle body perceived by the Buddhas alone. It is this Parasambhogakāya which plays the rôle of a preacher of the various Mahāyāna sūtras, the scenes being mostly laid either at Gṛdhrakūṭa, the only place in the three dhātus considered pure and suitable for the appearance of a Sambhogakāya, or in the Sukhāvatī-vyūha, or in one of the heavens.

It will be observed from the description of the appearance of Buddha and his manner of preaching the Sūtras that the Mahāyānists were not yet able to forget or rise above the human conception of the Hīnayānists. They still gave Sākyamuni the rôle of the presiding Buddha of the universe, to whom flocked reverently with flowers, incense, etc., all the Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas and Gṛhapatis of the various lokadhātus of the ten directions, to hear from him the *Prajñā-*

[1] *Laṅkā*, p. 242 [2] *Ibid*, p. 73 [3] *Ibid*, p. 240
[4] *Ibid*, p. 242 [5] *Ibid*, p. 57

pāramitā, the *Saddharmapundarīka*, or the *Gandavyū*
These Bodhisattvas again had their own tutelary Buddh
who, according to the Mahāyāna metaphysics, possessed t
same Dharmakāya as Śākyamuni They also came or w
sometimes sent by their Buddhas, with messages of greetin
and flowers as tokens of their regard, to Śākyamuni Budd
whose Buddhaksetra was then the Sahā lokadhātu Son
times the descriptions go so far as to say that the Budd
themselves came to hear discourses from Śākyamuni Budd
and the concourse of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas became
great that the Sahā lokadhātu had to be cleared of
oceans, mountains, seas, rivers, and cities, as well as go
men and other beings As we read in the Hīnayāna te
that monks used to come to meet Buddha, bringing wi
them one or two sāmaneras, so also we read in the *Sa
dharma-Pundarīka* that on account of insufficiency of spa
the countless Buddhas could not bring with them more th
one or two Bodhisattvas as attendants (upasthāpakas)[1]

Now let us see what was their conception of the Kāya
this Buddha According to the *Śatasāhasrikā* and t
Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā,[2] it is an exceedingly refulgent bod
from every pore of which streamed forth countless brillia
rays of light, illuminating the lokadhātus as innumerable
the sands of the Ganges When this body stretched out i
tongue, innumerable rays of light issued forth from it, a
on each ray of light was found a lotus of thousand pet
on which was seated a Tathāgatavigraha (an image of t
Tathāgata, a sort of Nirmānakāya), preaching to Bod
sattvas, Grhasthas (householders), Pravrajitas (recluses) a
others the dharma consisting of the six pāramitās After
Simhavikrīdita samādhi his body illuminated the trisāhasr
mahāsahasra lokadhātu just as the bright clear sun or t
full moon illuminates the world Buddha then shows h
Prakrtyātmabhāva (real form) to all the worlds The seve
classes of gods as well as the men of the four continent

[1] *Sad P*, pp 244–245

[2] *Śata*, pp 8–29, *Pañca*, pp 6ff; for 'Āsecanaka' see *Samādh
rājasūtra* (B.T S ed), p 10

Jambudvīpa, Aparagodāna, etc, see this *Prakṛtyātmabhāva* and think that the Tathāgata is sitting before them and preaching the doctrine From this body again issue forth some rays of light by which all beings of all lokadhātus see Śākyamuni Buddha preaching the *Prajñāpāramitā* to his saṅgha of monks and congregation of Bodhisattvas

Though this conception of the refulgent body of Buddha found currency in the *Prajñāpāramitās*, the expression Sambhogakāya was still unknown to them It was usually called by them Prakṛtyātmabhāva (natural body) or Āsecanaka-ātmabhāva (all-diffusing body) As a matter of fact, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* is not even aware of the *Prakṛtyātmbhāva* or *Āsecanaka-ātmabhāva*, showing clearly its priority to the other *Prajñāpāramitās* It speaks only of Rūpakāya and Dharmakāya [1] and the long glorious description of Buddhakāya, which appears in the *Śata-* and *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā* as nidāna (introduction) to the text, is totally absent from it It is only in the recast version of the *Pañcaviṃśati* that the expression Sāmbhogika-kāya was introduced by way of giving a gist of the topic [2] In it the Sambhoga-kāya is described thus Bodhisattvas, after attaining bodhi by means of the prajñāpāramitā, take a body endowed with thirty-two major and eighty minor signs with a view to preach the doctrines of Mahāyāna to the bodhisattvas and at the same time to arouse in their minds joy, delight and love for the excellent dharma The original *Prajñāpāramitā* regarded this refulgent kāya as nirmita (created), and as such they included it in Rūpakāya and did not feel the necessity of introducing the conception of a third kāya, the Sāmbhogika

In keeping with this dvikāya theory of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, Nāgārjuna also did not refer to, or probably was not aware of, the third kāya, the Sāmbhogika Both Drs Akanuma and Masuda could not trace the conception of Sambhogakāya in Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* Dr Akanuma also mentions his disinclination to accept the "Hymns of the Triple Body (Trikāya)" ascribed by the

[1] *Aṣṭa*, pp 338, 497, 513

[2] *Pañca*, (A S B ms) leaf, 359a Iti Sāmbhogika-kāyaḥ

Tibetans to Nāgārjuna as a work of the famous Nāgārjuna [1] If the *Kārikās* of Nāgārjuna on the Tathāgatakāya [2] be examined, it also becomes apparent that Nāgārjuna was interested in giving an exposition of the real kāya (*i.e.*, Dharmakāya or Svabhāvakāya) only To him the distinction of Sambhogakāya and Rūpakāya was unimportant, as both of them were unreal

Thus, we see that up to the time of Nāgārjuna, the conception of Sambhogakāya was not distinguished from that of Rūpa- or Nirmānakāya The *Lankāvatāra* presents us first with this conception, calling it Nisyanda- or Dharmatā-nisyanda-Buddha, and it seems that the term Sambhogakāya was not yet current We have seen that in Hīnayāna works also it is pointed out that the super-excellent body of Buddha, endowed with the major and minor signs of great men, was due to the countless meritorious deeds performed by him in his previous lives [3] The Chinese rendering of Sambhogakāya by *pao sheng* [4] 報身 in which *pao* means fruit or reward, also indicates that Sambhoga had no other sense than vipāka or nisyanda' The later Yogācārins called it Parasambhogakāya in order to distinguish it from the other kāya called by them Svasambhoga Though the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* does not distinguish Sambhogakāya from the Nirmānakāya, it refers to the super-excellent body of Buddha as the result of his meritorious acts in previous lives [5] The *Lankāvatāra* by using the expression Vipākaja or Vipākastha, shows a stage of transition from the Hīnayānic conception of Vipākaja-kāya to that of Mahāyānic Parasambhogakāya

The *Lankāvatāra* says that the function of the Nisyanda Buddha is to teach the *parikalpita* (imaginary and *paratantra* (relatively existent) nature of things to those persons, who weave a net of thought-constructions around themselves

[1] *Eastern Buddhist*, II, pp 17ff.

[2] *M Vr*, Ch XXII

[3] *Lankā*, pp 28, 34, see ante

[4] Sakaki, *Mvyut* 117

[5] *Asta*, p 515 Buddhānām kāyah kāranasamutpannah pūrva-karmavipākād utpannah, etc.

being unaware of the dream-like nature of things[1] This is also the function of Śākyamuni of the Sahālokadhātu when he imparts the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitās* or the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*[2]

The *Sūtrālankāra* also does not distinguish Sambhogakāya into Svasambhoga and Parasambhoga It says that with this body Buddhas enjoy the dharmas and it is different according to the different lokadhātus, implying thereby that a Buddha of each lokadhātu has his own Sambhogakāya which is different from those of other Buddhas of other Buddhakṣetras[3]

(iii) The *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* and (iv) the *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* tell us that the Sambhogakāya is a very subtle body of Buddha It is endowed with all the mahāpuruṣa signs and is generally assumed by Buddhas for imparting the higher and metaphysical truths to the advanced bodhisattvas The *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*[4] also does not speak of the two forms of Sambhogakāya, to be found in the *Siddhi*

(v) The *Siddhi* says that there are two Sambhogakāyas called Parasambhogakāya and Svasambhogakāya The former is seen by bodhisattvas, while the latter is seen by the Buddhas of the various lokadhātus, and not by bodhisattvas As regards refulgence, illimitability and immeasurability there is no difference between these two kāyas Both of them have colour and form (varṇa-rūpa-saṃsthāna) as well as sound (śabda) On account of the knowledge of sameness (samatā) obtained by Buddhas the body is anāsrava (pure) It can appear only in a pure land like the Sukhāvatīvyūha or Gṛdhrakūṭa The difference between the Parasambhogakāya and the Svasambhogakāya are that the former has the mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇas while the latter has not, and that the citta of the former is as unreal as that of the Nirmāṇakāya, while the *citta* of the latter is real, and besides, this *citta*

[1] *Laṅkā*, p 57

[2] The function of Nirmitabuddha is to teach dāna, śīla, etc, see ante.

[3] *Sūtrā*, pp 45-6

[4] Suzuki, *Outlines etc*, p 257, in the published portion of the Sanskrit text (B T S) this passage does not occur

possesses the four jñānas, *viz*, ādarśajñāna (mirror-like knowledge),[1] samatā-jñāna (knowledge of the sameness of all things), pratyaveksanā-jñāna (knowledge of distinguishing subject, object and the varieties of things) and krtyānusthāna-jñāna (knowledge of doing all that is to be done)[2]. The rūpa of both the Sambhogakāyas is exceedingly subtle and expansive without limit, yet it is *sapratigha* (possessed of the quality of obstruction) Nevertheless the subtle bodies of countless Buddhas are interpenetrable.

The recast version of the *Pañcavimśati*[3] refers to the Sambhogakāya, and does not, like the *Kārikā*, distinguish between Dharmakāya (=Svasambhoga) and Parasambhogakāya, the reason being that in the original version of the *Pañcavimśati*, there must have been, as in the other *Prajñāpāramitās*, the conceptions of only two kāyas, and not of three or four The *Kārikā*, in fact, supports the *Siddhi* in regard to the conception of kāyas, using only somewhat different names The conception of the Svasambhogakāya shows a tendency of the Yogācāra school to posit something like the Īsvara of the Upanisads behind the phenomenal universe The Dharmakāya corresponds to the impersonal Absolute of the Vedānta, the Brahman, and the Sambhogakāya to the Īsvara when Brahman assumes name and form Every Buddha, it should however be noted, has his own Sambhogakāya but all Buddhas have one Dharmakāya The *Lankāvatāra* also gives hints to this effect It says that *abhāva* (absence of anything) is not Tathāgata, and again, as Tathāgata is described as 'Anutpāda-anirodha', it has some meaning It then denotes the Manomaya-dharmakāya[4] It cannot be seen by the non-Buddhists, Srāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and even Bodhisattvas in one of the first seven bhūmis Just as different names of one thing or one person like hasta, kara, pāni or Indra, Sakra, Purandara indicate

[1] Cf *Dīgha*, II, p 93 Dhammādāsa

[2] Explained in detail in the *Sūtrā*, pp 46ff, *Mvyut* 5

[3] *Pañca* (A S B ms), leaf 359a Cf *Śiksā*, p 159, *Bodhic*, pp 1, 4, *Mtu*, III, pp 344, 452

[4] For the definition of Manomayakāya and its three sub-divisions, see *Lankā*, p 81, Suzuki, *E B.*, iv, pp 284-5

different aspects of the same thing so also the different names of Śākyamuni Buddha in the Sahā lokadhātu, *e g*, Svāyambhuva, Nāyaka, Vrsabha, Visnu, Īśvara, Pradhāna, Kapila, Soma, Bhāskara, Rāma, Vyāsa, or Śūnyatā, Tathatā Bhūtakoti, Nirvāna, Sarvajña, etc, indicate the different aspects of Śākyamuni Buddha[1] People being subject to the conceptions of two extremes 'is' or 'is not' (dvayāntapatitayā) do not know that Buddha is like a reflection of the moon on water neither appearing nor disappearing In this passage there is a clear hint that this Manomaya-dharmakāya, existing in the Sahā lokadhātu, is the same as the Svasambhogakāya of the *Siddhi* and the Āsecanaka-ātmabhāva or Prakrtyātmabhāva of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, and it corresponds to the *Upanisadic* conception of Īśvara

DHARMAKĀYA

The three kāyas, of which we have so far spoken, belong strictly, to the realm of Samvrti, worldly and transcendental, and as such they were treated as Rūpa- or Nirmāna-kāya by the early Mahāyānists, including Nāgārjuna The only real kāya of Buddha is the Reality as conceived by the Mahāyanists, and is not different from the things or beings of the universe[2] Though an attempt to define it by the current words and expressions is bound to be not only incorrect but misleading, the Mahāyānic texts tried to give an idea of it as far as the language permitted The *Kārikā* and the *Siddhi* call it Svābhāvika or Svabhāva kāya It is, according to them, immeasurable and illimitable It fills all space It is the basis of the Sambhoga- and Nirmāna-kāyas. It is devoid of all marks (*i e* mahāpurusalaksanas) and is inexpressible (nisprapañca) It is possessed of eternal, real and unlimited gunas It has neither citta nor rūpa, and again it is not different from them There is one and only one Dharmakāya Buddhas may have their individual Sambhogakāyas but they have all one Dharmakāya[3] It can only

[1] *Lankā*, pp 102–3, cf *Daśa*, p 55

[2] In a Buddhist inscription of Battambang, a stanza in salutation of Buddha brings out this idea See *Le Muséon*, vol VII

[3] Cf. *Vis. M.*, p 508 · Nirvāna is one for all Buddhas.

be realised within oneself and not described, for that would be like the attempt of the blind man to describe the sun, which he has never seen[1]

It is often questioned whether the conception of Dharmakāya can be traced in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the works of Nāgārjuna, and whether the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the works of Nāgārjuna admit of such a reality, or rather preach pure and simple negativism? To put it in another way, was it the object of the *Prajñāpāramitās* and Nāgārjuna's works to point out only the incongruities of the world and worldly knowledge and avoid making any statement about the Reality or the truth?

The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and other *Prajñāpāramitās*, though unrelenting in their negation of every possible statement about the reality, never assert that Tathatā or Śūnyatā or Dharmakāya in its real sense is also non existing The statements like 'tathatāvikārā nirvikārā avikalpā nirvikalpā' (Suchness is immutable unchangeable, beyond percept and distinctions)[2] show rather a positive conception of the Reality than a purely negative one In regard to the Dharmakāya also the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* makes similar statements It says that he who knows that the dharmas, existing in the world or preached by the Tathāgata have no more existence than things in a dream and, does not enquire whence the Tathāgata comes and where he goes, realises the Tathāgata through Dharmatā[3] The Buddhakāya, that people speak of arises through cause and condition like the sound of a flute, it involves really no appearance or disappearance Those

[1] Masuda, *op cit* p 59 Suzuki, *Awakening of Faith*, p 62

[2] *Aṣṭa* p 307 cf the passage yā ca tathāgatatathatā yā ca sarvadharmatathatā ekaivaiṣā tathatā dvayā'dvaidhīkārā dvayatathatā na kvacit tathatā na kutaścit tathatā na kasyacit tathatā yataḥ sā na kasyacit tathatā tataḥ sā tathatā dvayā'dvaidhīkārā'dvayatathatā

(That which is Tathāgata tathatā and that which is all things-tathatā are non dual, one and the same, Tathatā is neither anywhere nor arises from anywhere, nor belongs to anything, hence as Tathatā does not belong to anybody, it is non-dual and one)

For other passages of similar import, see *M Vr*, Ch xxii

[3] *Aṣṭa*, p 514 te dharmatayā tathāgatam prajānāti Cf *M Vr*, p 448 dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyāḥ

who run after the form and voice of the Tathāgata and conceive of his appearance and disappearance are far from the Truth[1] No further statements than this can be made about the Reality, for that would be again *prapañca* When the *Astasāhasrikā* asserts that the Tathāgata does not exist, it refers to that Tathāgata as conceived by one on reading the Mahāyāna texts Even the Bodhisattvas, unless and until they reach the tenth bhūmi, cannot extricate themselves from a conception of the Tathāgatakāya, however subtle it may be (*e.g* the Svasambhogakāya) They are still under a delusion and it is this delusion that the *Prajñāpāramitās* endeavour to remove by asserting that there is no Tathāgata

Nāgārjuna by denying the existence of a so-called Tathāgata does nothing more than what the *Prajñāpāramitās* endeavour to establish His point is that, if *bhavasantati* (series of existence) be admitted then the existence of a Tathāgata should also be admitted,[2] for the Tathāgata represents the ultimate state of this *bhavasantati*, it is a state attained by a being after a long series of existence As in reality (paramārthatah) there is no bhavasantati, there is also no Tathāgata—that being who is supposed to have become Tathāgata after practising mahākarunā and other virtues, and thereby attaining omniscience If the Tathāgata had really existed, he would either be the same as five skandhas or different from them, or the skandhas would be in him or he in the skandhas, but as he is none of these nor any one of these is he, he cannot have any real existence By these and other similar arguments Nāgārjuna asserts that there is no Tathāgata By such denial he only establishes that the Tathāgata as the ultimate state of bhavasantati does not exist

Candrakīrti, in support of Nāgārjuna's arguments, quotes a passage from the *Astasāhasrikā* (p 479), in which Buddha and his dharma are compared to *māyā* or *svapna*, but at the same time he says "we do not assert the non-existence

[1] *Asta*, p 513

[2] *M Vr*, p 431 vidyata eva bhavasantatis tathāgatasadbhāvāt, *Ibid*, p 432 Na hy ekena janmanā śakyam tathāgatatvam anuprāptum

(nāstitva) of the Tathāgata in every way, for then we would be guilty of *apavāda* (denial), and yet being desirous of describing the Tathāgata by means of vyavahāra-satya (conventionally) and by taking recourse to super-impositions (samāropa) we say that he is śūnya or aśūnya, or śūnyāśūnya or naiva śūnya nāśūnya But he who endeavours to realise the true Tathāgata by having recourse to statements and denials will never know him Candrakīrti in support of this quotes the verses from the *Vajracchedikā*, to which the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* also refers, *viz*, "he who endeavoured to see me through my form and voice could not see me because

> dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyā dharmakāyā hi nāyakāh,
> dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā na sā śakyā vijānitum

[A buddha is to be seen in the sense of dharmatā (nature of dharmas), for the leaders (of men) have only Dharmakāya That dharmatā is unknowable (so also is the Tathāgata)] [1]

Nāgārjuna concludes his examination of the Tathāgatakaya by identifying Tathāgata with the world (jagat),[2] or nature itself, and asserting that the Tathāgata, whom people or even Bodhisattvas have in view, is only a *bimba* (image) of kusaladharmas and is not the real Tathatā or Tathāgata.[3] A dialectician like Nāgārjuna cannot go further than this to establish the Reality It is by denial of the existence of unreal things, including the so-called Tathāgata, that he points towards the Reality—the real Tathāgatakāya, the Dharmakāya [4]

The conception of Dharmakāya was of special interest to the Yogācārins The *Lankāvatāra*[5] in describing it says that

[1] *M Vr*, p 448 cf *Asta*, pp 513, 514 *Vajra*, p 43

[2] Tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tat svabhāvam idam jagat,
Tathāgato nihsvabhāvo nihsvabhāvam idam jagat

M Vr, pp 448–9

[3] *M Vr*, pp 448–9

[4] Prapañcayanti ye buddham prapañcātītam avyayam,
Te prapañcahatāh sarve na paśyanti Tathāgatam
See also *M Vr* p 534

[5] *Lankā*, pp 57, 60.

(Dharmatā) Buddha is without any substratum (nirālamba) and lies beyond the range of functioning organs of sense, proofs or signs and hence beyond the vision of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or the non-Mahāyānists It is to be realised only within one's own self The *Sūtrālankāra*[1] calls it Svābhāvika-dharmakāya It is one and the same kāya in all Buddhas, very subtle, unknowable and eternal The *Trimśikā*[2] explains the Dharmakāya as the transformed āsraya (substratum)—the ālayavijñāna—the transformation being effected by knowledge (jñāna) and the suppression of the two evils (dausthulyas), *viz*, kleśāvarana and jñeyāvarana The *Āloka*[3] on the *Abhisamayālankārakārikā* also explains the Dharmakāya in a similar way According to it, there are two kinds of Dharmakāya, one being the Bodhipaksika and other dharmas, which are themselves pure and productive of clear knowledge (nisprapañcajñānātmakā) and the other the transformed āsraya of the same, which is then called Svabhāvakāya. Professor Stcherbatsky[4] supplies us with nearly the same information that we find in the *Āloka* from some source, which he does not mention He says that "according to the early Yogācāras the Dharmakāya is divided into Svabhāvakāya (ño-bo-ñid-sku) and Jñānakāya (ye-ses-kyi-sku), the first is the motionless (nitya) substance of the universe, the second is anitya, *i e*, changing, living" Evidently what the Professor means by Jñānakāya is the Dharmakāya, consisting of the Bodhipaksika and other dharmas, of the *Āloka* That the Svabhāvakāya is the nityakāya, as pointed out by him, is also supported by the *Suvarnaprabhāsa* and other texts[5]

The Chinese commentators on the *Siddhi* say that Dharmakāya is the metaphysical principle of real *citta* and *rūpa* of the Tathāgata It is the real nature of things, and can be equated with Tathatā, Dharmadhātu or Tathāgatagarbha[6]

1 *Sūtrā*, p 45 2 *Trimśikā*, p 44

3 *J A*, 1913 4 *Con of N*, p 185n

5 *Suvarnaprabhāsa* (B T S), p 8, *Lankā*, p 78, *Sūtrā*, p 46

6 I have derived this information from Professor La Vallée Poussin In *Lankā* (pp 77, 78) the Tathāgatagarbha is described as nitya, dhruva, śāśvata, śiva, etc, just as the non Buddhists speak of their great soul as nitya, kartā, nirguṇa, vibhu, and avyaya.

The goal of Bodhisattvas is to realise the Dharmakāya Every being has the Dharmakāya, or the Dharmakāya comprises all beings of the world, but as they are blinded by avidyā do not realise this fact What the Bodhisattva aims at is the removal of this avidyā and the realisation of the fact that he is the same as the Dharmakāya The *Āloka* on the *Kārikā*[1] enumerates the steps through which a Bodhisattva passes, and points out that the last step of a Bodhisattva is to realise the Dharmakāya (dharmakāyābhisambodhena bhavisyati) after which it becomes easy for him to assume any one of the four kāyas In the *Lankāvatāra* we notice that Mahāmati is anxious to know how a Bodhisattva after completing the ten bhūmis can attain the Tathagatakāya or Dharmakāya and go to any one of the Buddhaksetras or heavens The *Lankāvatāra* also describes in rosy colours the prospect of attaining Dharmakāya It says that a Bodhisattva after attaining the Mahādharmamegha in the ninth bhūmi is adorned with many jewels, and sits on a lotus in a jewelled palace surrounded by other Bodhisattvas of his status He comprehends there the illusory nature of all things He is anointed (abhiseka) by Vajrapāni as a son of Buddha He then goes beyond the bhūmi of Buddhasutas by realising within himself the dharmanairātmya and confronts the Dharmakāya[2] The *Trimśikā* says that just as Vimuktikāya is the goal of the arhats, so Dharmakāya is the goal of the Bodhisattvas It shows that as the arhats by getting rid of klesāvarana obtain a purified kāya, so also a Buddha by getting rid of both klesāvarana and jñevāvarana obtains the Dharmakāya[3]

[1] *J A*, 1913 [2] *Lankā*, pp 51, 70
[3] *Trimśikā*, p 41

(c). The Doctrine of Nirvāna

SECTION I

The second fundamental point of difference between the doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, mentioned in the *Saddharma-Pundarīka*, lies in the conception of Nirvāna

HĪNAYĀNIC NIRVĀNA (I) LIBERATION FROM DUḤKHATĀ

The Hīnayānist considers himself afflicted with three kinds of misery (duhkha), viz, (a) suffering due to mental and physical causes (*duhkha-duhkhatā*), (b) that inhering in caused and conditioned existences (*samskāra-duhkhatā*) subject as they are to origin and destruction, and (c) that due to transformation of pleasurable sensations into painful ones e g (*viparināma-duhkhatā*)[1] He seeks release from these miseries incidental to life in any of the three worlds, Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa[2] (including the six ordinary forms of existence[3]) by realising the formula of the law of causation (pratītyasamutpāda) and the four āryasatyas, and the transitoriness (anityatā) and essencelessness (anātmatā) of the things of this world and the miseries to which they lead The *Pundarīka* concedes that many of the disciples of Buddha attained Arhatship or Nirvāna by perceiving the non-existence of anything corresponding to soul (ātmā) in any of the five categories of mental and physical elements (skandhas)[4] The Hīnayānists admit that their Nirvāna consists in a liberation from the three kinds of

[1] *Sad P*, p 109, *M Vr*, p 475, *Mvyut* 3, *Kosa*, vi, 3, Poussin, *Nirvāna*, p 174, Burnouf, *Lotus etc*, p 68, *Dīgha*, III, p 216, *Saṃyutta*, IV, p 259, V, p 56 In the *Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā* (pp 93–94) seven kinds of *dukkhas* are mentioned dukkha-dukkham, viparināmad, sankhārad, paticchannad, appaticchannad, pariyāyad, and nippariyāyad

[2] *Sad P*, pp. 100, 117, 132–3, *Samādhirāja* (B.T S ed.), p 13, *Sūtrā*, pp 94, 128

[3] *Sad P*, pp 135–6, for the six gatis, see *Dīgha*, III, p 264, *J P T S.*, 1884, p 152, *Annales du Musee Guimet*, V, pp 514–528, *E R E*, sv Cosmogony and Cosmology

[4] Cf *Patis M*, I, p 146.

duhkhatā, incidental to existence in the three laukikadhatus Thus, according to the Hīnayānic conception, beings obtain liberation by attaining nibbānadhātu without any residue[1] The Pāli works, canonical or post-canonical, agree on the point that this release is obtained by realising anityatā, duhkhatā and anātmatā as well as pratītyasamutpannatā of the world

What the Mahāyānists endeavour to point out is that the Hīnayānists concern themselves with the realisation of the non-existence of a permanent entity like soul (*Pudgala-nairātmya*) and not of the non-existence of anything whatsoever supposed to exist (*Dharma-nairātmya*)[2] According to the Mahayānists, this realisation attained by the Hīnayānists cannot lead them to the ultimate Reality, it carries them only some distance towards the Truth, and hence Nirvāna in the real sense of the term cannot be said to be attained by them[3] The Hīnayānists, however, consider that they reach Nirvāna when they know that they will have no more birth as they have led the life of holiness (brahmacarya) and realised the pudgala-nairātmya Some think, as the *Lankāvatāra*[4] puts it, that Nirvāna is attained by comprehending what is really soul or personality, some others think that it is attained by penetrating into the truth that things are dependent on causes But in fact, the *Lankāvatāra*[5] adds, there is no real emancipation (*moksa*) without the realisation of Dharma-nairātmya So the Hīnayānists do not actually reach moksa, they are only tossed up and down by the properties (*laksana*) of things like a log of wood by the waves

(ii) PASSAGE FROM NIMITTA TO ANIMITTA

The Hīnayānists, according to the *Sūtrālankāra*[6], have only personality as their basis (*pudgala-nimitta*) for medita-

[1] *DhP*, 26 saṅkhāradukkhatāya loko anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā muñcati

[2] *Sūtrā*, pp 154-160, *Laṅkā*, pp 68-69

[3] Cf *Bodhic*, p 442 without the realisation of *Śūnyatā*, there may be *nivṛtti* (quietude) but it is not permanent

[4] *Laṅkā*, pp 63-4 [5] *Laṅkā*, p. 135

[6] *Sūtrā*, pp 140

tion, and so they reach only Śrāvaka-bodhi or Pratyeka-bodhi and not Samyak-sambodhi, which can only be attained by making all *dharmas* (existent things and conditions) the basis (*nimitta*) for meditations[1] The Śrāvakas distinguish between a thing with signs (*nimitta*) and a thing without signs (*animitta*) and try to draw away their minds from all nimittas and apply them to the attainment of the animitta which they attain in due course The Mahāyānists think that the dual conception of things cannot lead to mokṣa They do not know of anything other than *Tathatā* (thatness of things), so to them a nimitta is equally an animitta, and consequently their knowledge, derived as it is on the basis of Tathatā alone, is free from all differentiations or dualism (*dvayagrāha vivarjitam*).[2] By the remark that the Hīnayānists distinguish between *Nimitta* and *Animitta* and consider that a person attains Animitta (=Nibbāna) by cogitating on the Animitta-dhātu and dissociating his mind from all things with signs, the *Sūtrālankāra*[3] refers in a general way to the practice of the Hīnayānists to avoid rāga, dosa, moha and such other nimittas[4] by which a being becomes entangled in worldly things There are in the Nikāyas many passages of this import, *e g*, in the *Dīgha* and *Anguttara Nikāyas*[5] it is said that a person by inattention to all signs (of allurement) develops such a mental concentration that it may be described as animitta (without sign) But the prevalent meaning of Animitta in Pāli works is Nibbāna, the goal to be reached through the meditations

[1] *Sūtrā*, pp 169–170

[2] For the exposition of *Dharma tattva* as *satatam dvayena rahitam*, see *Ibid*, pp 58 ff

[3] *Sūtrā*, p 169 Sarvanimittānām amanasikārād animittasya ca dhātor manasikārād animittam samāpadyante (as done by the Śrāvakas and not by Bodhisattvas)

[4] *Mahāniddesa*, I, p 198: Rūpanimitta, saddan, gandhan, rasan, photthabban, and dhamman

[5] *Anguttara*, III, pp 292, 397, *Dīgha*, II, 100 Yasmim samaye tathāgato sabbanimittānam amanasikārā ekaccānam vedanānam nirodho animittam cetosamādhim upasampajja viharati, *Paṭis M*, I, p 91 Nimittam bhayato sampassamāno animitte adhimuttattā pavattam ajjhupekkhitvā nirodham nibbānam animittam āvajjitvā samāpajjitvā etc, see also *Vis M*, p 672, *Mahāniddesa*, I, p. 198

(samādhis or vimokkhas) called suññata, appanihita and animitta These vimokkhas help the adept to comprehend that the things of the world are essenceless (anatta), unpleasant (dukkha) and impermanent (anicca)[1] The *Anguttara Nikāya*[2] hints that a person puts an end to his āsavas (impurities) by dwelling on these three nimittas while the *Atthasālini*[3] states that the five khandhas appear as frightful to a man as a dead body hung round his neck, if he understands the three lakkhanas (anicca, dukkha and anatta)

(iii) REMOVAL OF KLEŚĀVARANA AND NOT JÑEYĀVARANA

The *Laṅkāvatāra*[4] while explaining the position of the Hinayānists says that they believe in the reality of samsāra (worldly existence) and are frightened by its attendant miseries from which they seek release, this is only due to their ignorance of the non-existence of any difference between *samsāra* and *nirvāna* The standpoint of the Hinayānists is that the world or things around us are produced out of the five skandhas or seventy-two elements having real existence The constituted things which originate through some causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna) are in a constant state of flux and devoid of any substance[5] The mental and physical constituents undergo momentary (ksanika) changes and there is no permanent entity apart from them It is by the removal of the notion of the existence of an atman as identical with one of the skandhas or something apart from them that a person attains Nirvāna

[1] These three are called also lakkhanas (properties of worldly things). Cf *Jāt*, I, p 48 Buddhānañ ca dhammadesanā tilakkhanamutta nāma natthi tesam aniccadukkhamanattā ti

[2] *Anguttara*, III, p 319

[3] *Attha*, p 225

[4] *Lankā*, p 61

[5] *Patis M*, II, p 177 devotes a chapter to the exposition of *Suñña* The general definition offered by it is that the things of the world are devoid of attā or attaniya Then it says that the Suñña can be explained in 24 ways, *viz*, suññasuññam, sankhārasuññam, viparināmasuññam, etc, up to paramatthasuññam (=Nibbāna) The various suññas may well be compared to the 18 kinds of the Śūnyatās of the Mahāyāna scriptures

The Mahāyānists do not admit the real existence of the skandhas or elements composing a being They assert that the skandhas exist only in imagination (*vikalpa*) or are illusory conceptions (*māyā*) held by the so-called beings suffering from a defective vision due to ignorance So the Truth, according to the Mahāyānists, is *Śūnyatā* or *Dharma-nairātmya* The *Puṇḍarīka*[1] therefore says that he who knows the *dharmas* as devoid of *ātman* knows the truth It is because one does not possess this knowledge of the essencelessness of dharmas (*śūnyajñāna-vihīnatvāt*) that one is called a Śrāvaka The *Kāśyapa Parivarta* sarcastically compares the Pudgalaśūnyatā of the Śrāvakas with the hole made by a termite, and the Dharmaśūnyatā of the Bodhisattvas with the infinite space (ākāśa)[2] Of the seven reasons adduced by the *Sūtrālankāra* to show why Mahāyāna should be considered superior to Hīnayāna, one is that the knowledge of the Mahāyānists is on a higher level, for it penetrates both Pudgala-nairātmya and Dharma-nairātmya[3] The *Triṁśikā*[4] brings out very clearly the difference between Pudgala- and Dharma-nairātmya It says that the realisation of the two forms of Nairātmya is needed for the removal of the two screens (*āvaraṇa*) *viz*, that of passions (*kleśa*) and that hindering true knowledge (*jñeya*) The passions of desire, attachment, etc arise on account of a belief in a self, so when one realises the non-existence of self, his egoism is destroyed, and as a result his passions are eliminated The realisation of the non-existence of the things of this world (dharma-nairātmya) removes the screen over true knowledge. The removal of both the screens is needed for the attainment of emancipation (*mokṣa*) and omniscience (*sarvajñatva*). The passions are obstacles to the attainment of emancipation (*mokṣaprāpterāvaraṇam*), hence the removal of passions leads to mokṣa The screen of *jñeya* works as a hindrance to the functioning of knowledge (jñāna), *i e*, in the apperception of things through knowledge When it is removed knowledge penetrates unhindered into all objects of knowledge in detail

[1] *Sad P*, p 138, *Kāś P*, pp 115f.
[2] *Kāś P*, 114, *Pañca*, leaves 77, 78.
[3] *Sūtrā*, p 171 [4] *Siddhi*, p 15, cf *Sūtrā*., p 94.

(*sarvākāra*) without, however, causing attachment of any kind and this is called the attainment of omniscience or Bodhi

The Hīnayānists, however, do not admit that they shake off only the kleśāvarana and not jñeyāvarana as stated by the Mahāyānists They contend that by the removal of the screen of actions (karmāvarana), of the effects of karma (vipākāvarana) and of afflictions (kilesāvarana),[1] the Arhats attain full knowledge without any veil (anāvarana)[2] They completely eradicate from their minds the āsavas including the avijjāsava Of the three branches of their spiritual culture, *viz*, sīla, samādhi and paññā, the last, according to them, brings home to an Arhat the Truth,[3] which is the same for Arhats and Buddhas The function of Paññā consists in destroying Avijjā, the veil of ignorance, the source of worldly existences, and therefore, of all miseries (dukkha) It is Avijjā, which (i) causes experience of things which ought not to be experienced, *e g*, evils through thoughts, words and deeds, (ii) veils things which ought to be known, *e g*, the merit of observance of good conduct and so forth, (iii) acts as a hindrance to the realisation of the fact that the five khandhas are in reality an undifferentiated heap (rásatthham), and that the perceptions of the organs of sense are essenceless and that the truths are the same tathattham,[4] (iv) drives (javāpeti) beings into the various forms of existence in the Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa worlds without cessation, (v) causes one to discriminate between things which in the ultimate analysis have no real difference and clouds one's vision from the real nature of the khandhas, and (vi) blinds one to the relative nature of the

[1] The Mahāyānists perhaps made capital out of the statements very often found in the Hīnayāna works like "Arahattamaggena sabba kilesehi vimuccatīti" *Paṭis M*, II p 243

[2] *Paṭis M*, I, pp 124, 131

[3] *Ibid*, II, pp 31, 244 arhattamaggena sabbakilese samvaratthena sīlavisuddhi, avikkhepatthena cittavisuddhi, dassanatthena ditthivisuddhi

[4] *Paṭis M*, p 104 explains *tathaṭṭham* thus Cattāro dukkhassa dukkhatthā tathā avitathā anaññathā, dukkhassa pīlanattho sankhatattho santāpattho viparināmattho Evam dukkham tathatthena saccam. In this way the other truths are also explained

world, i e, its dependence on causes and conditions (paticcasamuppana)[1] By the complete removal of this Avijjā through paññā, a person becomes Arhat and reaches the state which is beyond change, beyond destruction—the state of immortality There can be no state higher than this The Hīnayānists acknowledge that the Buddhas by their extraordinary merits accumulated in the past acquire omniscience (sabbaññutañāna)[2] and many other powers unattainable by Arhats,[3] but they do not admit that the Nibbāna of Buddha is different from that of an Arhat The knowledge (ñāna) acquired by Arhats and Buddhas is *anāvarana* (without any veil) with this difference in the case of a Buddha that his knowledge is detailed and superior in some respects to that of the Arhats[4]

(iv) TRANSITION FROM LAUKIKA TO LOKOTTARA

It is stated in the *Pundarīka* that the Hīnayānists conceive of Nirvāna as passing from the worldly (*laukikadhātu*) to the transcendental sphere (*lokottaradhātu*), i e, the Hīnayānic Nirvāna is a transcendental state beyond the three dhātus free from every kind of affliction and beyond any possibility of retrogression to lower stages The *Lankāvatāra*[5] points out that ordinary knowledge (laukikajñāna) of the people of the world has reference to the existence and non-existence of things (sad asat paksābhinivista) while the transcendental knowledge (lokottarajñāna) possessed by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas has reference to the particular and generic characteristics of things (svasāmānyalaksana-patitāsayābhinivista)[6] penetrating through the notion of existence and non existence of things The distinction between laukika and lokottara as drawn in the *Pundarīka* and

[1] *Vis M*, p 526 [2] *Kvu*, xxi, 3, 1 2

[3] For a comparison of the powers (bala) of Arhats and Buddhas, see *Patis M*, II, pp 173 ff

[4] *Patis M*, I, pp 131 ff, II, pp 31, 32 The Buddhas possess 14 ñanas, of which eight are common to the Arhats and Buddhas

[5] *Lankā*, p 157

[6] *Kośa*, VI, 14c d svalaksana=le caractère propre, sāmānyalaksana=les caractères généraux

Lankāvatāra finds support in the Hīnayāna scriptures There it is stated that the puthujjanas (non-sotāpannas) labour under the notion of individual existence in the worlds while the arhats are free from such notion, as they know that all beings are made of five skandhas devoid of an underlying permanent entity and owing their origin to causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpanna), and that the common characteristics of beings are anityatā, duhkhatā and anātmatā

The *Patisambhidāmagga*, *Vibhanga* and other works speak of four dhātus, *viz*, Kāma, Rūpa, Arūpa and Apariyāpanna or Lokuttara[1] *Kāmadhātu* is the world of beings having vatthukāma (desire for existence in any of the three worlds) and kilesakāma (proneness to passion) It comprises the eleven spheres of existence from the Avīci hell to the Paranimmita heaven[2] In Kāmadhātu, the beings possess 5 khandhas, 12 āyatanas, 18 dhātus, 32 indriyas, 9 hetus, 7 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with the 3 truths and dependent on 4 āharas[3] *Rūpadhātu* is the world of beings without kāma (passion), their actions being subtle (sukhuma)[4] in contrast to those of kāmadhātu whose actions are olārika (gross) It comprises sixteen planes of existence from Brahmaloka to Akanittha heaven[5] In this dhātu, the beings possess 5 khandhas, 6 āyatanas, 9 dhātus, 14 indriyas, 8 hetus, and 4 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with 3 truths and dependent on 3 āhāras *Arūpa-*

[1] *Vis M*, p 493, *Patis M*, I, p 83

[2] *Attha*, pp 61-2, *Patis M*, I p 83 The eleven spheres are the six Devalokas, Manussaloka, Petaloka, Tiracchānayoni and Niraya

[3] *Vibh*, p 404 [4] *Vis M*, p 475

[5] These are called *Rūpabrahmalokas* By practising the first jhāna an adept develops a state of mind which is similar to that of the denizens of the first three Rūpabrahmalokas Should the adept die after perfecting himself in this jhāna, it is believed that he will be reborn in one of those three lokas, which are therefore called *Pathamajjhānabhūmi* Applying the same reason, the second three Rūpabrahmalokas are called *Dutiyajjhānabhūmi*, third three *Tatiyajjhānabhūmi*, the tenth and eleventh *Catutthajjhānabhūmi*, and the remaining five Suddhāvāsabhūmi

dhātu is the world of beings without kāma (passion) and rūpa (material constituents of a body) It contains the gods residing in the four spheres from the ākāsānañcāyatana to nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana[1] In this dhātu the beings possess 4 khandhas, 2 āyatanas, 2 dhātus, 11 indriyas, 8 hetus, one kind of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with 3 truths and dependent on 3 āhāras

These three dhātus contain all the beings of the universe from the lowest to the highest plane of existence The aim of Hīnayāna Buddhism is to reach a plane beyond the three dhatus, called the Apariyāpanna- or Lokuttara-dhātu (the unincluded or transcendental sphere. According to the *Patisambhidāmagga*[2] it contains those beings who have reached the four maggas and have obtained the four maggaphalas or the Asaṅkhata, *i e*, Nibbāna The *Vibhanga*[3] explains that the beings of Apariyāpannadhātu possess khandhas and āyatanas similar to those of Arūpadhātu with the difference that the former are conversant with two truths (nirodha and magga), possess one additional power, *viz*, anaññātaññassāmītindriya and 6 hetus[4] Evidently, the texts have in view those sentient beings of the first three dhātus, who come to possess one of the stages of sanctification including Arhathood The texts, however, do not explain how a being belonging to the Kāma- or Rūpa-dhātu and possessing one of the stages of sanctification can be without the rūpakkhandha and how one possessed of the Asankhata or Nibbāna can continue to have the khandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc,[5] which are the attributes of the members of Apariyāpanna- and Arūpa-dhātus Thus we find that the Hīnayānists seek release from the three laukikadhātus by attaining the lokottara- or apariyāpanna-dhātu, which includes the Asankhata- or Nibbāna-dhātu

[1] These four are called *Arūpabrahmalokas* The adepts, as above, by practising the Ākāsānañcāyatana and other jhanas rise to the same level as the gods of the Akāsānanta and other āyatanas

[2] *Patis M*, I, p 84

[3] *Vibh*, p 407

[4] Buddhaghosa points out that in reality one cannot speak of lokuttarāni viññāṇāni.

[5] *Vis M*, p 545

NIRVĀṆA ACCORDING TO THE EARLY MAHĀYĀNA WORKS

The Hīnayānic Nirvāna thus according to the *Pundarīka*[1] is a haven of peace and rest and is a vimukti (emancipation) so far as the kleśas[2] (afflictions) are concerned It further says that there may be people who may look upon this form of existence as Nirvāna and regard the Hīnayānists as right in their ways of thinking and practising In order to counteract such a supposition it states that there is one and only one Nirvāna, not two or three, and that one is and can be attained only by a thorough comprehension of the sameness of all things (*sarvadharma-samatāvabodhāt*)[3] The conception of *Samatā* (sameness) has been developed in the *Sūtrālankāra*, which gives five meanings of same It says that a being after comprehending *Dharmasamatā* (sameness of things) and realising the non-substantiality of things (dharmanairātmya) sees that in the series of existences whether of himself or of others, there is no difference as regards nairātmya (essencelessness) and duhkha (misery), that the desire for the removal of misery from himself as well as from others is the same, that the remedy applicable is the same for himself as well as for others, and that the knowledge attained by the bodhisattvas is the same as that attained by him[4] The *Lankāvatāra*[5] explains samatā (sameness) by saying that it is the sameness of the world (*samsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāna*), i e, samsāra bears to nirvāna the same relation as waves bear to water The *Pañcavimśati*[6] explains *samatā* by the illustration of *Ākāśa* (space) It

[1] *Sad P*, pp 129 136-7

[2] *Sūtrā*, p 119, *M Vr*, p 519 Tatra niravaśesasyāvidyārāgādikasya kleśaganasya prahanāt sopadhiśesam nirvānam isyate

[3] *Sad P*, p 133, see p 143

sarvadharmāh samāh sarve samah samasamāh sadā,
Evam jñātvā vijānati nirvānam amṛtam śivam

[4] *Sūtrā*, p 94, see p 48 samacittatā sarvasattesv ātmapara samataya

[5] *Lankā*, p 42 samsāra nirvāna samatā, *M Vr*, ch xxv na nirvānasya samsārāt kiñcid asti viśeṣanam For an exposition of Samsāra and Nirvāna as one, see Suzuki's *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp 352-6, Y Sogen's *System etc*, pp 40-1

[6] *Pañca* (A S B ms), leaves 114 ff, *Śata*, pp 1560 ff

says that Ākāśa has no direction like east or west, no past, present or future, no increase or decrease, no contamination or purification It has no origin, continuity or decay It cannot be a subject of thought It can neither be heard nor seen, it is neither known nor unknown. It has nothing to do with the Kāma, Rūpa or Arūpa dhātus, with attachment or non-attachment, with hatred or non-hatred and so forth It has no concern with the various *cittotpādas* (*i e*, the development of citta for attainment of bodhi), *bhūmis* (stages of spiritual progress), *phalas* (fruits of spiritual sanctification), or any conceptions like happiness (*sukha*), misery (*duhkha*), quietude (*śānta*), excellence (*panīta*), etc This is what is called the samatā (sameness) of Ākāśa It is in this light that the things of the world are to be seen What the *Pañcavimśati* contends for is that, from the standpoint of reality, the things seen, heard or known by us are, in fact, the outcome of our imagination What we should do is to regard these things as our fancies, because they are really the same as Tathatā, of which nothing can be predicated, just as nothing can be predicated of Ākāsa

According to the *Pundarīka*, the real Nirvāna is that state in which one sees things without any differentiation or dichotomy, and for the description of which all the expressions that can be used by man, relative as they are, are inadequate The *Lankāvatāra*[1] describes the jñāna of Bodhisattvas as the *lokottaratama jñāna* (super-transcendental knowledge), as distinguished from the *lokottarajñāna* of the Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and *laukika-jñana* of prthagjana (common persons) It consists in the realisation of all dharmas as mere reflections, having no origin and decay Hence, no question of existence and non-existence can arise in regard to this (nirābhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpadadarśanāt sad asat paksavigatam)

The Mahāyānists, however, concede the point that the Arhats can remain at peace in the state called by the Hīnayānists Arahathood or Nirvāna but, according to them,

[1] *Lankā*, p 157.

it is a lower ideal, a selfish end, devoid of love (*sneha*)[1] and charity The *Puṇḍarīka*[2] states that the arhats after attaining (Hīnayānic) Nirvāṇa do not, in fact, wish to stay there for ever, it is only a temporary rest (viśrāmo'yam na nivṛtih)[3] At this stage, they become capable of realising the nature of the Truth and the powers and privileges appertaining to a Buddha, who is indistinguishable from that Truth Then they set themselves to the performance of the duties still remaining and ultimately become Buddhas, *i e*, attain Nirvāṇa properly so called They now realise that the three dhātus, from which they have so long struggled to extricate themselves, had no existence whatsoever,[4] and were merely imaginary superimpositions (parikalpanā)[5] The three dhātus that are seen in the ten directions are only appearances like a mirage, hence they cannot have origination, destruction or transformation, bondage or freedom, light or darkness As they are non-existent like things in a dream or a mirage, any statement about them would be inappropriate Unless one realises the things of this universe in this way, he cannot obtain Nirvāṇa (sarvadharmā na prāptāh kutas tasya nirvāṇam iti)[6] One who has developed

[1] *Sūtrā*, pp 126-7 Niḥsnehānām śravaka pratyekabuddhānām sarvaduḥkhopaśame nirvāṇe pratiṣṭhitam manaḥ

[2] *Sad P*, pp 132-3, 138 140, cf *Pañca* (A S B ms), leaf 70b

[3] *Sad P*, pp 142, 188 Cf 5 kinds of Nirvāṇa in the Brahmajāla Sutta Dr E J Thomas in his *Life of Buddha*, p 200 refers to it thus, "They hold that Nirvāṇa consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or one of the four trances"

[4] *Sad P*, p 318

[5] *Sūtra*, p 94, sa traidhātukūtmasamskārān abhūtaparikalpanā mātrān paśyati

[6] Cf Das Gupta's *Indian Philosophy*, pp 425, 426, 428 referring to Gauḍapāda's definition of the Absolute The close agreement between the views of the *Sad P*, and Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍukyakārikā* will be evident from the following passages

Sad P, p 318 Dṛṣṭam hi tathāgatena traidhātukam yathābhūtam na jāyate na mriyate na cyavate nopapadyate na samsarati na parinirvāti na bhūtam nābhūtam na sattvam nāsattvam na tathā nānyathā na vitathā nāvitathā. Traidhātukam tathāgatena dṛṣṭam yathā bālā pṛthagjanā na paśyanti .

bodhicitta never thinks himself as existing either in samsāra or nirvāna Hence, an Arhat aspiring to comprehend the ultimate truth should not think of himself as having gone beyond Samsāra and established himself in Nirvāna. Thus the *Pundarīka* brings out clearly the difference between the Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic Nirvāna

EXISTENCE OF SOUL IS DENIED BUT NIRVĀNA IS NOT ANNIHILATION

Of late, many scholars have tried to elicit from the various passages of the *Nikāyas* dealing with Nirvāna the sense which Buddha had in his mind, or at least the sense with which the earliest Buddhism started Most of the earlier scholars, who did the pioneering work in the field of Buddhism, namely, Childers, Burnouf, Hardy were inclined to interpret Nirvāna as *annihilation* or to use the common Indian term *Ucchedavāda*, a dogma which was opposed to the view of the early Buddhists [1] Professor La Vallée Poussin suggests that this conclusion of the scholars was an inevitable consequence of the denial of soul by the early Buddhists [2]

The conception of soul and the denial of its existence in the early Buddhist literature constitute as complicated a problem as the interpretation of Nirvāna As the conception of one largely depends on the other, we shall state here briefly the position of the early Buddhists as to their conception of *Pudgala* (soul) The Theravādins are explicit in their statement that the five khandhas, *viz*, rūpa (material aggregates), vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), sankhārā (impressions) and viññāna (consciousness) are the ultimates,

Māndūkya, ii 31, 32 Svapnamāye yathā drste gandharvanagaram yathā, tathā viśvam idam drstam vedāntesu vicaksanaih Na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakah, na mumuksur na vai mukta ity esā paramārthatā

Māndūkya, iv 68 Yathā svapnamayo (māyāmayo or nirmitako) jīvo jāyate mriyate' pi ca, tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca

[1] Cf *Saṃyutta*, iii, p 109 Yamaka harboured the wrong view that Buddha taught that a khīṇāsavo bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā bhijjati vinassati na hoti param maranā

[2] *Nirvāna*, pp vii f.

to which the composition of the world can be reduced The mass (khandha or sangaha) of material aggregates, feeling, etc, would have remained in their original state dissociated from each other if avijjā (ignorance) had not stepped in and constituted (sankhata) out of them a being (sattā) with the sense of 'I' When and how this avijjā of the truth—that the five khandhas remain ever dissociated[1] from each other and do not form an individual—came into existence and brought endless miseries has not been told by any teacher not even by Buddha (purimā koti na paññāyati avijjāya)[2] Evidently, the five khandhas alone constitute a being and there is nothing as the sixth, which can be regarded as *Attā* or soul But still one cannot deny the fact that of the five khandhas *viññāna*[3] (perception) is the most active constituent and is mainly instrumental in the formation of a being (nāma-rūpa) It is produced from Sankhārā,[4] which again issue out of avijjā[5] According to Buddhaghosa, the belief in a self arises with the ninth link (*viz*, upādāna)[6] of the chain of causation Hence, on upādāna hinge the origin and cessation of worldly existence The belief in a self (ahankāra) is nothing but the false notion of the undisciplined men of the world[7] that one of the five khandhas is soul (attā) It corresponds

[1] Usually the Pāli texts speak of Avijjā as ignorance of the four ariyasaccas

In the *Vis M.*, (pp 198, 525) it is equated to bhavatanhā (desire for existence) and in another place (p 526) it is explained as "khandhānam rāsattham, ayatananam āyatanattham, dhātūnam suññattham, indriyānam adhipatiyattham, saccānam tathattham aviditam karotī ti pi avijjā Paramatthato avijjamānesu itthipurisādīsu javati, vijjamānesu pi khandhādīsu na javatī ti avijjā Api ca cakkhuviññānādīnam vatthārammanam paticcasamuppāda paticcasamupannā ca dhammānam chādanato pi avijjā

[2] *Vis M*, p 525

[3] Viññāna=six forms of perception through the six organs of sense, *viz*, cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jivhā, kāya and mano

[4] *Viz* puññābhisankhāro apuññābhisankhāro āneñjābhisankhāro, kāyasankhāro vacisankhāro cittasankhāro *Vibhanga*, p 135

[5] For a full explanation of Avijjā, see *Vis M*, p 526

[6] *Vis M*, p 569 Upādāna is of four kinds kāmupādānam, ditthupā°, silabbatupā, and attavādupā°

[7] *Dh. S* 1217, *Vibh.*, p 375

to the false notion of Ahaṅkāra as conceived by the teachers of the Sāmkhya and Vedānta The Buddhist conception of self (attā) is therefore as much imaginary as the notion of ahaṅkāra in the Brāhmanic systems of philosophy.

Vasubandhu's appendix to the eighth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*[1] and the first section of the *Kathāvatthu* throw a flood of light upon the early Buddhist theory of soul In fact, in the Nikāyas the existence of soul is not categorically denied in answer to direct questions on that point[2] What the early Buddhists held was that there is no such thing as soul in the sense which had come to be widely accepted previous to the advent of Buddhism, *viz*, as a persisting, unchangeable entity "In Buddhism", says Mr Shwe Zan Aung, "there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception In other words there is no conscious subject behind consciousness Subject, in Buddhism, is not the self-same permanent conscious object but merely a transitory state of consciousness"[3] This conception is identical with Bergson's conception of mind or soul, spirit or ego Mind or soul, according to Bergson, is not "some sort of permanent substantial reality on which the various states of consciousness are beaded as on a string . The states of consciousness are each of them the entire mind in one of the phases of its continuous movement .. They are not parts or fragments of the mind, members in an endless series which, for no reason, we choose to regard as a unity and call by a single name"[4] In Buddhism, the

[1] Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists* (published by the Royal Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg), La Vallée Poussin, Fr translation of the *Kośa*, ch ix

[2] *E g*, *Dīgha*, I, pp 185 ff, Stcherbatsky, *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, (p 846) shows that Buddha would have said 'tam jīvam tam sarīram' if the questioner had not meant by *Jīva* a soul "as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within" As an answer in the positive or negative about such a soul would be like the discussion about the hardness or softness of the hair of a tortoise, Buddha had to be silent on the point (avyākata)

[3] *Comp of Phil*, pp 7, 8.

[4] *Philosophies, Ancient and Modern, Bergson* by J. Solomon (Constable and Co, 1911), p 36.

conception of soul as a permanent entity is not only wrong but works as an obstacle to the comprehension of the unreality and transitoriness of things of this world When Buddhism arose, the term *ātman* had become so very common, and so much associated with the attributes ascribed to it by the teachers of the early Upaniṣads that the Buddhists had no other alternative than to deny its existence as far as possible in order to wipe out from the minds of the people all the deep-rooted ideas Besides, Buddhism started with the premises that everything whatsoever except Nirvāna is unreal,[1] so there could not be any real soul But it could not do away with the word *ātman*, for the Buddhist texts tell us that the early expositors could not help using the current expressions in propounding their doctrines They wanted to impress on the minds of the people that there is a continuity of the skandhas kept up by action (*karma*) but there is no persisting, unchangeable and indestructible entity to keep up that continuity Professor Stcherbatsky puts it thus "A personality (pudgala), in which other systems imagine the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a soul (ātman), is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (saṃskārasamūha) and a stream of thought (santana) It contains nothing permanent or substantial, it is anātma"[2] This definition of soul struck at the root of the supposition of any permanent entity and served fully the purpose of Buddhism, *viz*, to show that there is nothing in the world to which one can cling as real and permanent and so he must develop a state of mind in which he must drift to the ultimate, real state called Nirvāna, without having anything to cling to in the intermediate process

FOUR LINES OF INTERPRETATION IN THE NIKĀYAS

Scholars who took the passages in the Buddhist literature on the denial of soul too literally, without considering the

[1] The nature of unreality varies with the two forms of Buddhism, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, for a discussion of this, see *infra*

[2] *Con of N*, p 8

motive for the denial of the soul made at a particular place and in reply to the query of a particular person, believed that the early Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul and that hence the finality reached by perfect beings was complete annihilation, the absence of existence altogether. There were also some scholars, not very many among the earlier group, who inclined to the view that Nirvāna was not annihilation but an inexpressible state corresponding to the Vedāntic Brahman All these scholars, although they held one or other of the two views, complete annihilation or eternal, inexpressible existence, often admitted that Buddha was an agnostic and did not give a definite answer to any of the queries of a metaphysical character, *viz*, whether there is a soul, or what really is Nirvāna Thus, the opinions of scholars can be classified as follows —

(i) That Nirvāna is annihilation,[1]

(ii) That Nirvāna is an inconceivable and inexpressible eternal state,

(iii) That Nirvāna has been left undefined (avyākrta) by Buddha[2] To these may be added the interpretation of Buddhaghosa

(iv) That Nirvāna is eternal, pure and infinite consciousness

NIKĀYAS, A MOSAIC OF MATERIALS OF DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES

It should be observed that all those scholars, who arrived at these conclusions, cited passages from the texts of the Nikāyas in support of their findings, and that the views taken by them in most cases followed naturally from those passages In these circumstances, we have to admit that

[1] Cf Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p 351 quoting the *Vimalakīrtisūtra* "Non activity and eternal annihilation were cherished by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas"

[2] See La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāna*, pp 9, 87 ff , also *E R E*, II, p 377 and his *Way to Nirvāna*, p 134, Beal, *Catena etc*, p 172

According to Colebrooke, Nirvāna=profound calm,

" " Hardy, Burnouf, Childers, Nirvāna=extinction,

" " Max Müller, Nirvāna=rest,

" " Oldenberg, Nirvāṇa=supreme happiness

the Nikāyas as a whole do not present a coherent system of philosophy and doctrine, but the question is whether, in view of the fact that the Nikāyas took centuries to grow and attain a definite shape, we are entitled to expect from them a coherent system The Nikāyas are, in fact, a mosaic made up of materials of various times and places, wide apart from each other, hence, it would not be reasonable to expect from them a coherent interpretation of Nirvāna The ancient teachers, too, were puzzled in regard to the correct interpretation of Nirvāna, but they never attempted to discover a consistency in the passages of the Nikāyas as a whole It will be seen from the discussions preserved in the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Abhidharmakośa* that these disputants cited a set of passages in support of their contentions, and not any particular Nikāya or Sūtra To these ancient disputants each saying was independent, and carried the weight which a number of sayings would do It is, however, striking that the disputants never questioned the authenticity of the passages cited by their opponents This shows that a disputant only preferred one set of passages to another and built his theories on that set The Nikāyas evidently are only a collection of these various passages put in a uniform setting and given the garb of the sūtras Attempts, of course, are now being made to sift these sūtras and find out the various strata, but it is doubtful how far the efforts will be fruitful in the absence of new evidences It may be contended that a Pitaka is a collection of texts made by a particular school of Buddhist thought, and that consistency should be apparent or discoverable in the passages of that Pitaka The contention seems reasonable, but the facts are against it Professor Poussin has discovered in the Nikāyas many passages cited by the Sarvāstivādins in the *Kośa* in support of their contentions, while Mrs Rhys Davids and Mr Aung have identified many of the citations of the opponents of the Theravādins in the Pāli Pitaka, the collection of the Theravādins This fact indicates that the collection of Pāli sūtras was not made with any sectarian motive and that the compilers of the Pāli Tripitaka included in it all the sayings that they could

find out, excepting, very probably, some which went directly against their creeds and dogmas,[1] and for the rejection of which they took the plea of unauthenticity It is now fairly well known that each Nikāya developed by itself under the special attention of a group of reciters called *Bhānakas* who confined themselves exclusively to the preservation of that particular collection[2] Buddhaghosa, although an orthodox adherent of the Theravāda school, had to acknowledge that even these bhānakas differed among themselves regarding the use and sense of certain technical expressions[3] Thus, we see, that even the orthodox supporters of the Pāli Tripitakas believed that the Nikāyas did not agree in all their interpretations We should also bear in mind the significant remark found in the *Kośa*[4] that many sūtras were lost, that many of the sūtras underwent slight changes, and that new ideas and expositions were woven around them in such a way that the accretions conveyed a sense different from that of the kernel around which they were set[5]

NIRVĀNA, THE INCONCEIVABLE STATE, THE INFINITE CONSCIOUSNESS

On account of this admixture of materials, it is possible to make a selection of passages of the Pāli Nikāyas in such a way as to substantiate any one of the four interpretations of Nirvāna to which we have referred The passages which give the impression that Nirvāna is annihilation, if read in the light of other passages, which interpret Nirvāna as an inconceivable existence, may convey a sense different from annihilation.

[1] A hint to this effect is seen in the *Dīpavamsa*, ch. iv

[2] *Sum Vil*, p 15

[3] *Vis M*, p 95 Majjhima bhānaka Revatthera, p 275 idam tāva Dīghabhānaka Samyuttabhānakānam matam Majjhimabhāṇaka pana etc See also pp 286, 431

[4] *Kośa*, ii 55, p 278 fn sūtrāni ca bahūny antarhitāni mūlasangītibhramsāt

[5] Cf Prof Poussin's remark in his *Nirvāna*, p 9 "La vieille tradition scripturaire (Petit Véhicule), codifiée, renouvelée, amplifiée par les écoles, est mal datée, en partie tardive, point toujours claire, contradictoire sinon dans ses dogmes du moins dans ses tendences" See also p 133.

Prof Keith has, for instance, shown that the simile of the extinction of the flame, which is one of the many important similes relied on by scholars favouring the view of annihilation, has been worked out in the *Aggivacchagotta sutta* to show that it is not extinction but disappearance in the "deep, unmeasurable, difficult to fathom" state of existence[1] Buddhaghosa has drawn attention to one or two passages in the *Dīgha*[2] and *Majjhima*[3] *Nikāyas* which present us with quite a new interpretation of Nibbāna The passage runs thus

Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham
Ettha āpo ca pathavī tejo vāyo na gādhati,
Ettha dighan ca rassañ ca anum thūlam subhāsubham,
Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhati,
Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth' etam uparujjhatîti[4]

On a certain occasion a bhikkhu was advised by Buddha to put his question thus —"What is that place where (distinctions like) water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short, fine and coarse, good and bad, or name and form cease absolutely?" instead of asking "Where do the four elements earth, water, fire and air disappear absolutely?" (The answer quoted above was given to it) "It is viññāṇa (consciousness), which is signless, infinite[5], radiant on all sides

[1] Keith, *B Phil*, pp 65-6 "The comparison is indeed significant, for there is no doubt that the Indian idea of the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation, but rather that the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire"

[2] *Digha*, I, p 223 *Sum Vil* in the *I H. Q*, II, i

[3] *Majjhima*, I, p 329, *Papañcasūdani*, I, p 413

[4] Cf the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p 329) passage Viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sabbato pabham, tam pathaviya pathavittena ananubhūtam, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtam, etc The *Papañcasūdani* (I, p 413) comments on it as follows —Padadvayena (i e, *viññāṇam anidassanam*) pi nibbanam eva vuttam. *Anantan* ti tayidam uppāda vaya antarhitattā anantam nāma *Sabbato pabhan* ti sabbato pabhāsampannam Nibbanato hi añño dhammo sappabhataro vā jotimattaro vā parisuddhataro vā paṇḍaratataro vā n'atthi, etc

[5] Buddhaghosa says that it is infinite (ananta) because it has no origin, no decay, no duration (sthiti) and no change

(sabbato pabham)[1] where all the distinctions mentioned above cease, and where the (constituted) viññāna, after cessation, disappears" Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this passage says that the first viññāna is another name for Nibbāna[2] while the second viññāna is one of the five khandhas. His interpretation, it seems, is based upon a few Nikāya passages In the *Samyutta Nikāya*[3], Buddha referring to the parinibbāna of Vakkali bhikkhu said that the wicked Māra was searching for the viññāna (consciousness)[4] of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra's attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (parinibbuto) with viññāna which cannot be localised (*apatitthita*) The sense of *apatitthita-viññāna* is given elsewhere in the *Samyutta Nikāya*[5], where it is explained as consciousness which requires

[1] J d'Alwis' suggestion of 'pabham' for 'paham' has been preferred here For a note on this, see *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, II, p 283n Buddhaghosa, it seems, preferred the word "Papam" (from Sanskrit Prapā=a shed on the roadside for providing passengers with water, Aufrecht, *Abhi Ratnamālā*, p 283) to "Pabham" more for maintaining the analogy between Nibbāna and sea just mentioned before this passage He says that just as in a great sea no landing place is provided for seafarers, so also in Nibbāna there is no particular name corresponding to the 38 kammatthānas (bases for meditation), through which a monk aims at Nibbāna, i e, through whatever kammatthānas (compared here to landing-places) one may reach Nibbāna, there is nothing to distinguish it in Nibbāna See also *ante*, p 148, n 4

For Prof O Franke's notes, see his *Dīgha Nikāya* (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Leipzig, p. 166n

[2] *Sum Vil* (*I H Q*, II, i), p. 33 Tattha viññātabban ti viññāṇam, nibbānass' etam nāmam With regard to the second 'viññāṇa' Buddhaghosa says 'Tattha viññānan ti carimaka viññānam pi abhisankhāraviññānan ti" (Cf *Vis M*, p 689) He holds that the viññāna, the last consciousness of an arhat, is abhisankhāra (constituted) and that it ceases like the flame of a lamp to pass into a state of indistinguishability (apannakabhāva) Cf Keith, *B Phil*, pp 47, 48 where Prof Keith points out that Prof Franke's attempt to prove that there is much of negativism in early Buddhism favours the view that Nibbāna of early Buddhism was more idealistic than negativistic See also O Franke's notes on Nibbāna in the *Z D M G*, lxix, pp 475–481

[3] *Saṃyutta*, III, p 124, *Dhp. A*, I, p 432 appatitthitena ca viññāṇena Godhiko Kulaputto parinibbuto

[4] *i e.*, Patisandhiviññāna, see *Vbh. A*, pp 161, 192f, *Dhp A*, I, p. 432.

[5] *Saṃyutta*, II, p 65, III, pp 53–61

no support (patitthā or ārammana) for its origin' It arises only when the attachment (rāga) to rūpa (material elements of the body), and the other four khandhas is removed It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free Being free it is steady, being steady it is happy, being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse, being fearless it attains parinibbāna

In commenting on this passage Buddhaghosa further says that an arhat never has any maññanā (thought-construction)[1] in regard to the four elements or Nibbāna or anything whatsoever, which a puthujjana or a khīnāsava[2] (but not yet an arhat) has Buddhaghosa thus tries to show that Nibbāna is inexpressible, infinite and that any attempt to establish a relation between it and a being is a delusion of the mind He is also constrained to say that such a description of Nibbana had to be given as a set-off to the arguments of Brahmā,[3] hinting thereby that even such statements are not permissible as Nibbāna is inexpressible From such interpretations of the Nikāya passages as well as from his exposition of Nibbana in the *Visuddhimagga*, treated later on,[4] it will be apparent that he, far from supporting nihilism, held that Nibbāna is a transcendental, indescribable state In fact, there was hardly any school of Buddhism, which favoured the view of annihilation, and so it seems that the opinions of scholars who supported annihilation do not rest on very sure foundations Prof La Vallée Poussin has criticised in detail the views of these scholars He has given the gist of their views, showing the weak points in them along with his learned dissertation on

[1] The Nikāya passages referred to here (*Majjhima*, I, p 4) were not in harmony with Prof Stcherbatsky's theory and so they did not appeal to him See his remarks in *Con of N*, p 42n The "maññanā" of Buddhaghosa reminds us of one of the passages of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, in which they assert that all dharmas are like dreams and that Bodhisattvas 'svapnam api na manyante, svapnena na manyante, etc, see, e g, *Pañca* (A S B ms), leaves 225, 399b samsāram samsārato na vikalpayati, nirvānam nirvānato na vikalpayati and so forth

[2] For distinction between an Arhat and a Khīnāsava, see *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p 42

[3] *Papañcasūdanī*, II, p 413.

[4] See *infra*.

the interpretation of Nirvāna (Études sur l'histoire d religions, 1925) As in his work he has reviewed mos of the writings of his predecessors on Nirvāna, we need no deal with them again For the present purpose, it i sufficient to state his opinion and those of Profs Berriedal Keith and Stcherbatsky, the three latest exponents of th subject

PROF. LA VALLÉE POUSSIN ON NIRVĀṆA

Prof La Vallée Poussin starts with the statemen that it is possible to distinguish Buddhism on the one han as popular and devotional, and on the other as clerical an mystic [1] The former is meant for the laity and the latte for the monks The popular and devotional form of Buddh ism holds out the prospect of paradise to the laity It i only a means to an end, for the layman in one of his late lives is to become a monk and take to the clerical an mystic side of Buddhism and ultimately attain Nirvān Prof Poussin then proceeds to define Nirvāna He say that Nirvāna is undoubtedly the highest happiness, puttin a stop to duhkha and transmigration It implies the absenc of merit as well as of demerit It requires a purely asceti discipline to bring the desires or passions to an end [2] Th monks unlike the laity do not seek paradise, for even th life in paradise ends with the exhaustion of one's goo karma [3] They therefore seek a state which affords etern (dhruva) beatitude (sukha) [4] The very common appella tion to denote this state is *Amatapadam* (immortality), whic Prof Poussin considers to be a very old and characteristi expression used to describe Nirvāna He thinks that th notion of deliverance has been made precise in the earl

[1] *Nirvāna*, pp 1,7, 8 Cf Karma and Jñāna of Brāhmanic philo sophy, the former leads to svarga (heaven) while the latter to mok (emancipation)

[2] *Nirvāna*, p 4

[3] Cf *Chāndogya*, 8, 1, 6, Tad yatheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣīyat evam evāmutra punyajito lokah kṣīyate (just as the things produce by efforts of people are exhausted by their use, so also heavenl lives, etc, earned by sacrifices, merits, etc, are exhausted by their use

[4] *Nirvāna*, pp 48, 60

Buddhist literature It is an *abode*, supreme and definite, but yet this notion has not been coloured by any positive philosophic doctrine or by speculation upon God, soul, or being in itself[1] He, as also Dr E J Thomas[2], refers to the fact that the early Buddhists did not speculate about such Upaniṣadic doctrine as the Parabrahman which was developed by the Vedāntists long after Buddhism They knew only of the highest heaven called Brahmaloka Dr Thomas remarks in connection with the *Brahmajāla Sutta* that "among all these views there is no expressed contradiction or even recognition of the Vedāntic theory of Ātman or Brahman as the one ultimate reality"[3] Prof Poussin also points out that it is not correct to hold that Buddhism originated purely in opposition to Brāhmanic theories He says that there is nothing which permits us to affirm that Nirvāna was conceived in opposition to any Brāhmanic theory Nirvāna, Immortality, or Deliverance appears to be a rudimentary idea free from all metaphysical speculations It is connected more with myths than with metaphysics Nirvāna is an invisible abode where the saint disappears, often in the middle of a flame, or in a kind of apotheosis[4] In short, the Hīnayāna Buddhism from the time of the *Mahāvagga* to Buddhaghosa emanated, so to say, from the Yoga almost without any mixture The Immortal State, the Inexpressible is what a saint aims at, because it is the deliverance from birth and death It is, however, not possible to establish any relation, philosophical or ontological, between the Immortal and the world of beings who transmigrate Immortality is the name given to Nirvāna, in other words, perfect happiness, extinction, detachment are terms which are devoid of doctrinal complexities, and which, in fact, appear to signify merely the extinction of the fire of desire, or, to put it in another way, constitute the road to the Immortal State, or the Immortal State itself[5] It is obvious that Prof Poussin wants to contradict the long-

[1] *Nirvāna*, p 49 "La notion de la deliverance était précise l'ascète ne doute pas que la délivrance ne soit un séjour suprême et definitif"

[2] *Life of Buddha*, p 200. [3] *Ibid*

[4] *Nirvāna*, p 57 [5] *Ibid.*, pp 53–4

advocated view that Nirvāna is annihilation. He cites several passages to show that the self-originating fire in which a saint consumed himself, as also the saint himself, was not annihilated[1] While summarising his views, he gives the following different uses of the term Nirvāna

(i) The Nirvāna, the Absolute, the Uncaused which is by itself the Destruction of passion, of duhkha.

(ii) The complete possession of Nirvāna, which reduces all passions and all new existences to the quality of *anutpattika* (not being capable of reproducing), in other words, that which constitutes the saintship, the deliverance from thought (or conceptions), the *Sopadhiśesa Nirvāna* (Nirvāna with corporal residue)

(iii) The consciousness of the possession of Nirvāna, consciousness obtained in ecstasy which is beatitude, and which is the best form of Nirvāna in the world, and properly speaking, the only Nirvāna

(iv) The possession of the Samādhi of the cessation of ideas and sensations (*samjñāvedayitanirodha*), a possession obtainable by saints, perfect or imperfect, a samādhi which appears like entering into Nirvāna, and of which one becomes conscious through the body only, since the thought is then stopped

(v) The entering into Nirvāna at the last moment of thought, the end of duhkha, the entering into *Anupadhiśesa Nirvāna* (Nirvāna without any corporal residue)

(vi) The possession of Nirvāna relating to such and such a passion which carries with it the quality of not being able to reproduce itself for such passion and such future existences, an incomplete sanctity which one enjoys in ecstasy[2]

Prof Poussin has endeavoured to show that the Nirvāna of the early Buddhists is not annihilation, it is a state which may well bear comparison with the paradise of the laity but it is free from the implication of a life in paradise, *i e*, unlike the life in a paradise, it is eternal (*dhruva*), it is beatitude, but without any sensation even of

[1] *Nirvāna*, p 58.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp 83–4

bliss[1] It is beyond merit and demerit, a quiescent state which is obtainable in this life by saints when they establish themselves in the samādhi of *samjñāveditanirodha* (cessation of ideas and sensations) In this state as the thought is completely stopped, the saint feels only by his body the supreme bliss He however warns us not to identify the supreme state of bliss with the Vedāntic Parabrahman, for the Buddhists had not yet arrived at that conception His reason for holding this opinion is, chiefly, that the early Buddhists were not interested, to any appreciable extent, in metaphysical speculations, but were rather busy with myths. Hence, their conception of Nirvāna was not of a metaphysical nature but just the utmost possible extension of the conception of paradise

PROF STCHERBATSKY ON NIRVĀNA

Prof Stcherbatsky protests strongly against the view of Prof Poussin that Nirvāna is a sort of ultimate conceivable existence—a view suggested by the expression *Amatapadam*,[2] often used to describe Nirvāna, and by the descriptions of the same found in the *Milindapañha* and the *Nikāyas* Prof Stcherbatsky does not examine the various passages of the Pitakas and other works, which influenced Prof Poussin's conclusions It would appear from the *Conception of Nir-*

[1] Cf *Dhammasangani*, 1389, 1579 ff Nibbāna is not to be taken as accompanied by piti (delight), sukha (happiness), or upekkhā (equanimity) In the *I H Q*, IV, p 347, Prof Poussin says, "Nirvāna from the beginning is perfect happiness, the *summum bonum*, much better than any paradise, not a paradise (of course) without any conceivable relations with any form of existence The canonic literature states clearly that the happiness of Nirvāna, end of suffering, is blissful because it is not vedita"

[2] In this connection we may mention that Amatapadam does not always necessarily mean "heavenly state" The word 'mṛtyu' (Pāli maccu), in the lines of the *Taitt Upa* 2 1 1 Brahmavidāpnoti param, na punar mṛtyave, and *Chā Upa* 7 26 2 Tad ekam paśyati na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati, is explained by the commentators as neither heavenly existence nor eternal death but as pramāda (negligence, error) and moha (delusion) This comment is supported by the *Dhammapada* line Pamādo maccuno padam. See *P T S Dict.*, sv Maccu

vāna as well as from his earlier work the *Central Conception of Buddhism* that Prof Stcherbatsky bases his findings purely on the study of the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, and ignores the fact that the *Kośa* does not present us with the original doctrines which the Pitakas are supposed to preserve He also does not attach importance to the fact that the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins do not agree as to the nature of disintegration of constituted elements (samskrtavastus), which is clearly hinted at in the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu*[1] on the theory of the Sarvāstivādins that "all exists"[2] In his treatment of the discussion of this topic, however, he refers to the fact that the Vibhajyavādins (=Theravādins) did not always agree with the Sarvāstivādins

In view of the fact mentioned above, it is doubtful how far Prof Stcherbatsky was right in attributing to Buddha the views found in the *Kośa* that "(i) Buddha was led to a denial of every permanent principle, (ii) that the originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and (iii) that forsaking the Monism of the Upanisads and the Dualism of the Sāmkhya, he established a system of the most radical pluralism"[3] These might have been the views of the later Vaibhāsikas but were certainly not those of the early Buddhists, not to speak of Buddha himself Many passages can be, and have been, cited from the Pitakas[4] to show that Nirvāna is a reality, that it is unspeakable and possesses the sign of peacefulness, the taste of immortality, that it offers consolation, that it is unborn, uncreated, and indestructible In the face of the glowing descriptions that are to be found of the state of Nirvāna in early post canonical works,[5] it is difficult to agree with Prof Stcherbatsky that Nirvāna is nothing but

[1] *Kvu*, I 6, pp 115 f

[2] *Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp 43, 76 ff, Keith's *B Phil*, p 168, *Con of N*, pp 3, 27, for bibliography on the topic "All exists" see *Kośa*, v 24, pp 49, 50 fn

[3] *Con of N*, p 3

[4] See besides Prof Poussin's *Nirvāna*, Heiler's *Die buddhistische Versenkung*, München, pp 36–42, *P. T S Dict.* sv. Nibbāna.

[5] *e g*, *Thera-* and *Theri-gāthā*, *Milindapañha*.

eternal death and that it is an unconstituted element (asamskrta-dhātu), because it is tantamount to the absolute annihilation of the constituted elements (samskrta-dharmas) —"a kind of entity where there is no consciousness" [1] In fact, Prof Stcherbatsky's opinion makes it resemble one of the heretical doctrines condemned by Buddha, viz, Asaññi attā hoti arogo param maranā (the soul remains after death as an unconscious but healthy entity) [2] Without multiplying instances, we can refer to the last few lines of the *Kevaddha Sutta* [3] to show that there are passages in the early Buddhist works which go directly against the conclusions of Prof Stcherbatsky If Nibbāna is extreme happiness (paramasukha), a place of perfect peace [4] (santivarapadam), an object of realisation (sacchikiriyā),[5] it is safer to accept the opinion of Prof Poussin that Nirvāna is the highest conceivable paradisaical existence than to agree with Prof Stcherbatsky that Nirvāna is simply an end of the samskrta dharmas—a stone like life without a vestige of consciousness

In short, Prof Stcherbatsky makes Buddha a materialist and an annihilationist (Ucchedavādin) so severely condemned by Buddha Prof Stcherbatsky admits this anomalous position of his exposition, and endeavours to extricate himself from the anomaly by stating that Buddha's materialism and annihilationism were of a modified nature, because, as he says, the elements constituting a being were not only material, but both material and spiritual, and hence, according to him, Buddha was not an out-and-out materialist like the Cārvākas, or like Ajita Kesakambalin and Pakudha Kaccāyana, but was partially so Then, as regards Buddha being not an out-and-out annihilationist he points to the moral law, the strength and importance of which were recognised by Buddha, Buddha meant that the being, which is only a conglomeration of "evanescent elements", passes through a series of existences governed by the moral law, ultimately to be annihilated

[1] *Central Conception of Buddhism* p 53

[2] *Majjhima*, II, pp 230 f

[3] *Digha*, I p 223 for its commentary see *Sum Vil* in the *I H Q*, vol, II, i, see *ante* pp 148 ff

[4] *Majjhima*, I, p 257

[5] *Ibid*, I, pp 56, 63, 510.

or, in other words, to attain Nirvāna or eternal death Hence, according to Prof. Stcherbatsky, Uccheda or annihilation takes place not after one life but a series of lives

Nirvāṇa as viewed by Prof. Keith

Prof Keith on the basis of the Nikāya passages where there is an emphatic assertion of the existence of Nirvāna as something unfathomable, unborn, uncreated, unconstituted, and so forth,—a description echoed in the works of Nāgārjuna,—and also on the strength of the discussions in the Buddhistic literature on the existence of the Tathāgata during his life-time or after his decease, thinks that the Madhyamaka view can be traced in the Nikāyas, and that there are "positive assurances of the reality of something over and above the empirical world"[1] He says further that "the great sermon at Benares on the characteristic of that which is not self does not deny in express terms that there may exist another realm of existence which is exempt from empirical determination, and which therefore must be regarded as absolutely real"[2] Though Prof Keith thinks that the view of a section of the early disciples about the "existence of an absolute reality admits of serious support" and that passages or expressions can be traced in the Nikāyas having the colour or flavour of the Brāhmanic *Upanisads* or the *Mahābhārata*, he puts forward the proviso that on the basis of these coincidences it would not be proper to say that the Buddhist Nirvāna is "essentially the absolute parallel with the Brahman", for the Buddhists "like every new belief were largely compelled to put their wine in old bottles"[3] He also does not ignore the fact that there are ample evidences in the Nikāyas to show that "Buddha was a genuine agnostic",[4] though he himself is not much in favour of the view In short, Prof Keith is of opinion that the Nikāyas do not teach annihilation, or eternal death He finds in Nirvāna only a negative aspect of the Absolute or the Void and would not recognize it to be the

[1] Keith, *B Phil.*, p. 67

[2] *Ibid*, p 61.

[3] *Ibid*, p 68.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 63.

same as Brahman of the Upanisads or the Vedāntists Prof Poussin also would subscribe to this view if it be taken as the Mahāyānic conception of Nirvāna, for, according to him, the Hinayānic Nirvāna is something definite and real, a tangible reality Prof Stcherbatsky rises above all hesitations and asserts that the Hinayānic Nirvāna is eternal death, while the Mahāyānic Nirvāna is eternal life, and that the latter is the same as the Monism or Advaita Brahman of the Vedāntists[1] Though he may be partial to Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, he cannot be justified in ignoring or explaining away the passages of the Nikāyas which interpret Nirvāna differently from Vasubandhu The opinion of Prof Poussin that "there is a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Pāli canon",[2] and the reference of Prof Keith to passages or suttas of the Nikāyas indicative of the reasonableness of holding such an opinion, appear startling to Prof Stcherbatsky, and against them he holds without mentioning any authority or citing any passage, that "it is quite impossible to maintain that Hīnayāna is an advaita system"[3] and that it is going too far to see a "full-fledged *Prajñāpāramitā*" in the *Majjhima Nikāya*

Now that we have stated the views of the latest exponents of the Buddhist conception of Nirvāna, we shall proceed to examine some of them in the light of evidences yielded by the Pāli works

IS SAMJÑĀVEDAYITANIRODHA A FORETASTE OF NIRVĀNA ?

It is, however, striking that both Profs Stcherbatsky and Poussin have tried to form an idea of Nirvāna on the basis of the quiescent state attained by a yogin at the highest altitude of his meditation Both agree that it is this quiescence which is aimed at by all saints, including the arhats To Prof Stcherbatsky, Nirvāna was the highest form

[1] Dr F Otto Schrader in his article on *Nirvāna* in the *J P T.S* (1904–5) favours the metaphysical conception of the Absolute as the real interpretation of Nirvāna of the early Buddhists.

[2] *E R E*, sv Nirvāṇa Prof Poussin has also traced Vijñānavāda ideas in the *Aṅguttara*, see his *Nirvāna*, p. 65.

[3] *Con of N*, p 42 fn.

of quiescence imaginable and hence it is a condition where there is no vestige of consciousness—an absolute annihilation of life,[1] while to Prof. Poussin it is a condition where the mind (*citta*) does not function, but the body is pervaded by an extremely pleasant feeling, the mind, being inactive, does not enjoy the pleasure

Prof Poussin formed his impression mainly from the utterances of perfected saints in the *Udāna* and the *Thera-* and *Theri-gāthā* His conception of Hīnayānic Nirvāna appears to my mind to be the magnified form of the pleasant sensation felt by saints in the second and third trances The *Nikāyas* often speak of the pleasant sensation in the second and third trance as similar to that of a person when his body is besmeared with fine powder by an expert bath attendant, but they do not speak about the sensation felt by a saint while in Nirvāna Prof Poussin is justified in regarding the highest meditation of Samjñāvedita- (or vedayita-) nirodha as a foretaste of Nirvāna in this world, but his view that the body of the saint is pervaded by blissful sensation is unwarranted[2] The Pāli texts are quite clear about their definition of this highest meditation. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*,[3] Buddha entered into meditation before attaining parinirvāna and rose from the lowest to the highest samādhi, the *Saññāvedayitanirodha*, when Ānanda, imperfect as he was, took him to be dead (parinibbuta). This is the highest meditation to which an adept can reach[4] The condition of a person in this meditation is almost the same as that of a dead man The *Samyutta Nikāya*[5] explains the differences thus There is a complete cessation of the activities in a dead man as well as in a person in the highest samādhi,—*i e*, of the (i) physical activities (kāyasankhāro) *e g*, inhalation and exhalation, (ii)

[1] *Con of N*, p 28

[2] *Nirvāna* pp 83–4 la possession du recueillement de la cessation de l'idée et de la sensation, possession réservée aux saints complets ou incomplets, recueillement semblable à l'entrée dans le Nirvāna et dont on a conscience par le corps puisque la pensée y est interrompue

[3] *Dīgha*, II, p 156

[4] *M Vr*, p 48.

[5] *Saṃyutta*, IV, pp. 293 f cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 301.

speech activities (vacisaṅkhāro) e g, reflection and deliberation (vitakkavicāra), and (iii) mental activities (cittasankhāro), e.g, ideation and feeling (saññā ca vedanā ca)[1] The life (*āyu*) of the man engaged in meditation is not exhausted as also his internal heat (*usmā*), and his organs of sense remain in a placid condition, while in the deceased person there is no life (*āyu*) and no internal heat (*usmā*) and his sense-organs are defunct In the Saññāvedayitanirodha, a saint cannot at will rise from it Before entering into the samādhi, he fixes the time-limit after which he would revert to the ordinary state of consciousness and he does so at the fixed moment This meditation in which the mind, the body, and the power of the speech completely cease to function may be likened to the condition of deep sleep (susupti) of a man It is similar to the Upanisadic conception of "deep-sleep consciousness" in which there is no consciousness either of the objective world or of the self[2] The Pāli texts nowhere mention a blissful sensation enjoyed by the body apart from the mind The feeling of ease enjoyed by an ascetic in the highest trance is generated within the body, and not by any contact with an external material thing[3] The verses in the *Thera-* and *Therī-gatha* and the passages in the *Mahāparinibbāna sutta* describing the last trance of Buddha only express the ecstasy experienced by a perfected saint when he is in the highest trance It is really the foretaste of what he is going to experience permanently At the Arhat stage, i e, on the attainment of the Sopādisesanibbānadhatu, he is assured of the fact that the supreme bliss in the inexpressible form of existence is going to be permanently his after the dissolution of his physical body,

[1] Cf *Patañjali Yoga Sūtra*, I 2 Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ

[2] Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy*, p 269

[3] There are passages in the Nikāyas, in which it is said that "vimokkhe kāyena phassitvā viharati" (*Aṅguttara*, II, 90) The Vimokkhas do not refer to Nibbbāna but to the eight meditations (*Dīgha*, III pp 261–2) or to the three Samādhis called Animitta, Appanihita, and Suññata vimokkhas (*Vis M*, p 658) These refer only to experiences of meditating saints felt within themselves and not by coming into contact with something external

or in other words, he is going to be established in the Anupādisesa-nibbānadhātu permanently The close relation between the meditation of Saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibbāna will be apparent from the verses of the *Udāna* describing the parinibbāna of Dabba Mallaputta·

Abhedi kāyo nirodhi saññā vedanā pi 'tidahamsu sabbā,
vupasamimsu sankhārā viññānam attham agamā ti.

[The body is disintegrated, perception stops, all sensations are burnt away, the (three) activities cease and the (constituted) consciousness disappears]

The Saññāvedayitanirodha, therefore, is very similar to parinibbāna The *Majjhima Nikāya*[1] adds that a perfect saint not only attains it but also destroys his āsavas (impurities) by knowledge and thus goes beyond the clutches of Māra Hence, the Saññāvedayitanirodha of a saint is tantamount to a foretaste of Nibbāna only when it is accompanied by the other necessary conditions, *viz*, destruction of āsavas, insight into the truth and so forth

IS NIRVĀNA ETERNAL DEATH ?

Prof Stcherbatsky thinks that Nirvāna being allied to Samjñāvedayitanirodha, it may be regarded as a state without a vestige of consciousness In the account of Buddha's parinirvāna, Buddha enters into the Samjñāvedayitanirodha but he does not stay there permanently He comes down to the lowest and then rises again to attain parinirvāna in the fourth dhyāna[2] If Nirvāna had been a permanent form of Samjñāvedayitanirodha, then Buddha would have remained there and attained mahāparinirvāna

To prove his contention that Nirvāna is eternal death, Prof Stcherbatsky takes support from another statement in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* commented upon in the *Mādhyamika-Vṛtti*[3] The passage is

Pradotyasy eva nirvānam vimoksas tasya cetasah.

He attributes to the Vaibhāsikas the comment which follows this passage in the *Vṛtti* The Vaibhāsikas,[4] as

[1] *Majjhima*, I, p 160, III, p. 45
[2] *Dīgha*, II, p. 156.
[3] *M. Vṛ.*, p 525
[4] *Con. of N*, p. 191.

is supposed by him, assert in refuting the abhāva theory of the Sautrāntikas that there is something 'in which desire is extinct', and that it is not merely 'extinct desire' as the Sautrāntikas think[1] In the Sanskrit text there is no word or hint about the extinction of consciousness All that is said is about *tṛṣṇā* Prof Stcherbatsky, however, in his translation says that every desire (also consciousness) is extinct (at final Nirvāna)[2] Probably his addition "and consciousness" in the line was suggested by the line that follows, *viz*, "yasmin sati cetaso vimokso bhavati" He translates *cetaso vimoksah* as "consciousness is quite extinct." It is difficult to accept his English rendering and it is not at all clear why he should prefer "consciousness" to "mind" as the English equivalent of cetas The Pāli version of the line, "Pajjotass' eva nibbānam vimokho cetaso ahū ti",[3] was uttered by Anuruddha to describe Buddha's Nirvāna Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this passage says that *vimokkho* means the removal of all screens hindering vision, and that the extinction of the flame indicates the state of non-manifestation[4] Prof Stcherbatsky may have other reasons for such an opinion, but it is difficult to agree with him in regard to the fact that the early Buddhists generally, including the Theravādins, regarded Nirvāna as an inanimate reality In the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Dhammasangani*, Nibbāna has been qualified as *acetasika*, the English rendering of which, according to Mrs Rhys Davids, should be "not a property of the mind", or according to Prof Poussin, "where mind does not function any more"[5] Here *acetasika* does not mean inanimate substance, but it is a state where the individual *citta* (=manovijñāna)

[1] Nirvāna as Kṣayamātra is discussed in the *Vis M*, p 508, see *infra*, p 173

[2] *Con. of N*, App, p 191

[3] *Digha*, II, p 157, see Otto Franke, *Z D M G*, xlix, p 476

[4] *Sum Vil.* (Burmese ed., Rangoon, 1903), p. 168 Vimokkho ti kenaci dhammena anāvarano vimokkho, sabbaso apaññattibhāvupagamo pajjotanibbānasadiso jāto

[5] Also "Unmental, automatic" see *Points of the Controversy*, pp 57ff., 249.

or the *abhisankhāraviññāna* of Buddhaghosa[1] ceases to exist, hence Nirvāna is not eternal death

Prof Stcherbatsky in interpreting Nirvāna as an eternal state of death has attached too much importance to the influence of Sāmkhya on Buddhism[2] He almost identifies the Vaibhāsika with the Sāmkhya School excepting for the conception of Purusa in the latter[3] He says that Nirvāna is a lifeless reality corresponding to the undifferentiated matter (*Prakṛti*)[4] of Sāmkhya The position of Prof Stcherbatsky reduces itself to this that the phenomenal world issued out of Nirvāna to return to it again by the removal of Avidyā (ignorance), and that Nirvāna is the same as the five skandhas in their original undifferentiated state This is unsupported by the canonical as well as the non-canonical texts The Sarvāstivādins in enumerating the various 'elements' mention Nirvāna as an Asamskrta-dhātu existing side by side with the elements constituting a being The Theravādins also hold that the five khandhas[5] are nothing but masses of five kinds of elements, out of which a being is constituted through Avidyā Both the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravādins are emphatic in their statement that a being once constituted out of the seventy-two elements or five khandhas passes through innumerable existences, until by the removal of Avidyā, he enters into the Asamskrtadhātu or Nirvāna, which is an element existing by itself According to the Sāmkhya School of philosophy, the moksa (emancipation) of a being consists in his realisation of the fact that Purusa and Prakrti remain ever apart (viveka-khyāti) and not by a being passing from the con-

[1] See *ante* Prof Stcherbatsky himself writes elsewhere (*Central Con of B*, p. 15) that citta=mano=manoviññāna

[2] See his *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, p. 824

[3] *Con of N*, pp 27–8 [4] *Ibid*

[5] Nowhere in the Buddhist texts, any statement is made that the five khandhas were originally in an undifferentiated state All that they say is that the material elements of all beings of all times of the Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu are collectively called Rūpakkhandha, so also Vedanā, Saññā, Sankhārā, and Viññāṇa of all beings taken together are called Vedanākkhandha, Saññākkhandha, Sankhārākkhandha and Viññānakkhandha. *Vis M.*, pp 443, 452

stituted to the unconstituted state In Sāmkhya, the emancipated being is one of the innumerable Purusas while in Buddhism he is after death indistinguishable from Nirvāna The agreement between Sāmkhya and early Buddhism lies in the fact that the undifferentiated matter (Prakrti)[1] of Sāmkhya corresponds in its differentiated form to the five khandhas and not to Nirvāna as inferred by Prof Stcherbatsky If an analogue for Nirvāna be sought for in Sāmkhya we may say that it could have been found in Purusa if the innumerable Purusas were one Asamskrtadhātu

Is Nirvānadhātu a vastu?

On the basis of the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidharmakośa*, Prof La Vallée Poussin remarks that Nirvāna is a *vastu*[2] (material substance), a reality, which the body touches when in the highest trance (samjñāvedayita-nirodha), while Prof Stcherbatsky, in consonance with his interpretation of Nirvana, says that it is a "reality (dharma or vastu) in the sense of a materialistic lifeless reality" similar to the Prakrti of Sāmkhya The inclusion of Nibbāna in Asankhata-dhātus along with Ākasa and the comparison drawn between Ākāsa and Nibbana make us think that Nibbāna is a substance (vastu, dhātu) similar to Ākāsa[3] But the expression dhātu is used in Buddhist works in senses as varied as some

[1] Buddhaghosa refers to Pakati Purisa but does not compare them with Buddhist khandhas See *Vis M*, pp 518, 525

[2] See *P T S Dictionary*, p 170 sv dhātu nibbāna Drs Rhys Davids and Stede have drawn attention to the fact that dhātu in connection with Nibbāna or Amata does not convey the sense of any thing It is only a state—the state of Nibbāna, for which they coined the word "Nibbāna-dom or Nibbāna hood" On the various meanings of *Vastu*, see *Kośa*, II, p 285

[3] The conception of Ākāśa as made by the Sarvāstivādins may be similar to that of the Sāmkhyas

Dr B. N Seal thinks that "Ākāśa corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in other, to what may be called proto atom (prolyle)" See Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, p 88

The Vaiśesikas define Ākāśa as "a simple, continuous, infinite substance and is the substratum of sound" Prof Radhakrishnan, *Ind Phil*, II, pp 192-3

of the other terms, like dhamma, khandha, or samkhārā, so it is not safe to interpret the dhātu of Nibbāna-dhātu as a vastu or dravya (thing) As for the reason of the Buddhist writers for selecting Ākāsa as an object of comparison with Nibbāna, it may be said that it was done only because many aspects of Ākāsa were identical with those of Nibbāna, but it does not follow that because Ākāsa is a dhātu, Nibbāna is also a dhātu Like Ākāsa, Nibbāna is inexpressible, it is beyond empirical determination but not a material substance In the Buddhist works, the term 'Nibbāna-dhātu' has been used in such a way that one is likely to take it for a substance like Ākāsa or Samudda In the *Mahāniddesa*,[1] a large number of bhikkhus is described as attaining nibbāna without residue (anupādisesanibbāndhātu) but causing no perceptible increase or decrease in the 'Nibbānadhātu' The *Milindapañha*[2] compares Nibbāna to Ākāsa or Samudda implying thereby that it exists but its form, location, age, or measure cannot be ascertained It is like space (Ākāsa) without origin, life or death, rise or fall It is uncovered and supportless and is infinite Just as birds fly about in the Ākāsa or animals float about in the sea so also the perfect (Ariyas) move about in the Nibbāna-dhātu It is like fire without a continued objective existence Just as fire remains latent unless and until two pieces of wood are rubbed to make it patent, so Nibbāna which is without any continued objective existence is called forth into being when the necessary conditions are put together The *Kathāvatthu*[3] in connection with the discussion of 'Amatadhātu' maintains the same position It shows that the Theravādins declined to agree with the Pubbaseliyas who held that Nirvāna (Amata) is a material object

[1] *Mahāniddesa*, I, p 132, *Kvu*, p 124, *Mil*, pp 316 Atthidhammassa nibbānassa rūpam va santhānam va vayam va pamāṇam apaññāpanam Cf *Saṃyutta*, II, pp 124–6

[2] *Mil*, p 320 Yathā Maharaja ākāso na jāyati na jīyati na miyati na cavati no uppajjati duppasaho acorāharano anissito vihagagamano nirāvarano ananto evam eva kho mahārāja nibbānam na jāyati.... . .. ariyagamanam ......anantam

[3] *Kvu*, ix 2

This inference of the Pubbaseliyas was based, as pointed out in the text, on the well-known passage of the *Majjhima Nikāya* [1]

Nibbānam nibbānato sañjānāti, nibbānam nibbānato saññatvā nibbānam maññati, nibbānasmim maññati, nibbānato maññati, nibbānam me ti maññati, nibbānam abhinandati ti [He knows Nibbāna as (an object) nibbāna, having so known, he thinks of it, thinks (that he) is in it or away from it, that it is his and that it is worth praising [2]]

Buddhaghosa, in commenting upon this discussion, says that the opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is due to the drawing of a careless inference and that the passage cited above refers to earthly Nirvana [3] and not to the real Nirvāna and hence it is not conclusive Buddhaghosa's view may not be acceptable to all but it makes it quite clear that according to the Theravadins, Nirvāna, though denoted by Amata, must not be taken as a *dravya* (thing), though it may serve as an *ārammana* (basis) for meditations [4]

RÉSUMÉ EARLY BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NIRVĀṆA

The results of my examination of the expositions of Nirvāna in the Hīnayana and Mahāyāna works, and of the discussions of same by modern scholars, may be summarised thus

The texts of the early Buddhists present a threefold conception of Nirvāna, *viz*, ethical, psychical, and metaphysical

[1] *Majjhima*, I, p 4

[2] For a comment on this passage see Keith, *B Phil*, p. 49, La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāna* pp 126, 127 See *ante*

The sense of the passage is that a person who has not truly realised Nibbàna may labour under the delusion that Nibbāna is an object which he has known, and with which he stands in some relation, namely, that he has entered into it or that he is away from it, or that Nibbāna is his or that Nibbāna is an object to be praised

[3] *Kvu A*, p 116 ditthadhammanibbānam samdhāya bhāsitam tasmā asādhakam, Cf *Papañcasūdani*, p 38 Tattha Nibbānan ti "yato kho bho ayam attā pañcahi kāmagunehi samappito samangibhūto paricarati, ettāvatà kho bho avam attā paramaditthadhammanibbānam patto hoti ti", see *Digha*, I, 36

[4] *Vis M*, pp 680, 681

(i) ETHICAL The ethical conception of Nirvāna has received the largest amount of attention in the Pāli texts as well as in the writings of modern scholars The Nikāyas abound in terms and passages expressive of the ethical conception of Nirvāna so much so that Dr Stede wrote as late as 1923 that "Nibbāna is purely and solely an *ethical* state to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, contemplation, and insight It is therefore not transcendental"[1] This opinion is not supported by facts Throughout the Nikāyas, Nibbāna is described as the destruction (khaya) of attachment (rāga), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), of desire (tanhā), impressions (sankhārā), and firm grasp of wrong ideas (upādāna), of impurities (āsava) and afflictions (kilesa), and of desire for existence (bhava), birth (jāti), old age, death (jarāmarana), and thus of misery (dukkha) In describing the positive aspect of Nibbāna, the Nikāyas state that it is a condition which is very happy (accantasukha), imperishable (accuta), steady (acala, dhira), tranquil (santa) and free from fear (akutobhaya) It is the state of the highest bliss (amata) The ethical conception of Nirvāna appealed so much to the Buddhist authors that they wrote literary pieces of great poetical excellence in order to pay glowing tributes to the attainment of same

(ii) PSYCHICAL Many scholars have dealt with the psychical aspect of Nirvāna but without laying sufficient emphasis upon its significance This aspect of Nibbāna is generally brought out in those passages of the Nikāyas, which treat of the Jhānas or the path of contemplation The object of Jhānas is to bring the mind into such a state that it will be above worldly pleasure and pain It can be effected by dissociating the mind completely from all worldly matters This is achieved by means of the trances, the highest of which is the Saññāvedayitanirodha From the foregoing discussion about the highest trance, it is evident that Nibbāna is psychically Saññāvedayitanirodha provided

[1] See *P T S Dict*, sv Nibbāna The part of the Dictionary, containing the article on Nibbāna was published after the death of Dr Rhys Davids

that the adept complies with the other necessary conditions of Arhathood. In course of our exposition of the various dhātus, it has been shown that an adept in the first jhāna rises mentally to the same level as that of the denizens of the Rūpabrahmaloka, and gradually proceeding higher and higher develops a mental state corresponding to that of the beings of the Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana—the highest plane of existence in the three worlds. He acquires the five transcendental powers (abhiññā), viz., performing supernatural feats (iddhividha) such as visiting the Brahmaloka, acquiring divine ear (dibbasota) and divine vision (dibbacakkhu), knowing others' thoughts (paracittavijānana), and remembering former existences (pubbenivāsānussati). According to the Buddhist conception, an adept who is capable of rising up as high as the eighth trance (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana) is as powerful as the gods of the highest Arūpabrahmaloka. The stage of Nibbāna being still higher, he has to rise further in trance and attain the Saññāvedayitanirodha, where his mind stops functioning and hence there is no perception or sensation. He is now fit to stay in the Apariyāpannadhātu or Lokuttaradhātu. While in this trance, he has a foretaste of Nibbāna, which is going to be his permanently. He acquires the sixth abhiññā, viz., knowledge of the destruction of his impurities (āsavakhayakāranañāna)[1] and of the consequent attainment of emancipation. His mental faculties then become so very clear[2] that he understands with a moment's thought all that is happening around him. He is now possessed of full illumination, i.e., he is enlightened.

(iii) METAPHYSICAL. The metaphysical aspect of Nibbāna presents the greatest difficulties to the students of Buddhism and has been the source of many controversies. There is

[1] The usual expression is, āsavānam khayā anāsavam cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim ditthe va dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati. *Dīgha*, III, p. 281.

[2] See *Jātaka*, I, p. 106 *Vannupatha Jāt.* Obhāsamattam=supernatural illumination while striving to attain jhāna. Cf. *Dīgha*, II, p. 31. *Samyutta*, II, pp. 7, 105: cakkhum udapādi ñānam udapādi paññā u vijjā u āloko u. *Patis. M.*, II, p. 150: "Āloko udapādī ti" obhāsatthena.

no end of metaphorical terms and passages in the Nikāyas to describe Nibbāna admitting of a metaphysical interpretation. The notable passage of the *Itivuttaka*[1] 'Atthi, bhikkhave, abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam' shows that the early Buddhists conceived of Nibbāna not as annihilation but as something positive,[2] which is, however, infinite and indescribable like Ākāsa It is called a dhātu (realm) beyond the three dhātus,—the Apariyāpanna- or Lokuttara-dhātu It is a state to be realised (sacchikātabba) within one's own self (paccattam veditabbo viññūhi) It is homogeneous (ekarasa) and in it there is no individuality It is like the disappearance of flame in the fathomless state of existence in the infinite.

The few passages of the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas*, in which Nibbāna has been equated to infinite consciousness (anantaviññāna) do not, however, find support in other portions of the same works, which throw light on the conception of Nibbāna All that can be said under the circumstances is that these passages were later interpolations made at a time when the *Samyutta Nikāya* was being compiled The account of the death of Vakkali with apatitthitaviññāna and not patisandhiviññāna hints that the constituted viññāna of an Arhat passes away and mixes up indistinguishably with an ever existing infinite consciousness This seems to be an anticipation of the Vijñānavāda school of philosophy, but we cannot deny the existence of a trend of thought like this among the early Buddhists The more accurate conception of Nibbāna would certainly be that it is a state beyond the domain of word and thought and possible of realisation only within one's own self

SECTION II

The Pāli Nikāyas, as already pointed out are a mosaic composed of materials of various times and regions, hence they yield divergent opinions regarding the conception of Nibbāna But the one presented above is supported by most of the suttas of the Nikāyas and can be treated as

[1] *Itiv*, p 37 [2] *Kvu*, p 124, see also *Mil*, p 316

the earliest We shall now pass on to some of the later Buddhistic works and ascertain from them how far the early conception of Nibbāna was retained in later times and what changes, if any, were introduced

THE *Kathāvatthu* ON NIRVĀNA

Before we deal with the *Visuddhimagga*, we may well examine the few remarks scattered here and there in the *Kathāvatthu* regarding the conception of Nibbāna [1] While discussing the existence of puggala, the *Kathāvatthu* makes a remark showing that it conceives Nibbāna as a real and eternal state It says that if puggala (soul) be taken as not disintegrating with the disintegration of khandhas, this will entail sassatavāda, for the soul becomes eternally existent like Nibbāna [2] Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this says Yathā hi nibbānam na uppajjati na bhijjati evam hi puggalo [3] (just as Nibbāna does neither originate nor decay so would be the soul) Thus we see that the *Kathāvatthu*, supported by Buddhaghosa, takes Nibbāna as an eternal state without origination and decay, and does not consider a parinibbuta puggala as sassata [4] In other connections too, the *Kathāvatthu* remarks that Nibbāna is eternal and unchangeable (nibbānam dhuvam sassatam aviparināmadhammam) [5] It also says that Nibbāna unlike ñāna (knowledge) exists by itself like rūpa or cakkhu and does not require any ārammana (basis) to arise [6] Unlike sīla (morality), phassa (contact) and vedanā

[1] Though according to the orthodox tradition, it is canonical it may also be treated as non canonical as it was composed after the canon had been closed For the present purpose, we leave out of account the various aspects (guna or ākāra) of Nibbāna It has been dealt with by Prof Poussin in his *Nirvāna*, pp 158 ff

[2] *Kvu*, I i 170 (p 34) Khandhesu bhijjamānesu no ce bhijjati puggalo, puggalo sassato hoti nibbāna samasamo

[3] *Kvu A*, p 25

[4] *Kvu*, p 61

[5] *Kvu* I 6 (p 121), see also the note of the commentator in the *Points of the Controversy*, p 63 fn

[6] *Kvu*, IX 5, cf *Dh S* 1408, 1415, 1418 Rūpañ ca nibbānañ ca anārammanā.

(feeling), it is acetasika (not a property of the mind)[1] and is unconnected with mind (citta-vippayutta)[2] It is asaṅkhata (unconstituted)[3] because it possesses the 'three signs, *viz*, no origination (uppāda), no destruction (vayo) and no change (na thitānam aññathattam paññāyati)[4] The *Kathāvatthu* thus conceives Nibbāna as existing eternally without origin, decay and change, and is beyond all description

THE *Visuddhimagga* ON NIRVĀNA

In the *Visuddhimagga*,[5] Buddhaghosa retains the conception found in the *Kathāvatthu* and selects only those passages from the Nikāyas which lend support to his view In describing its gunas, he comments on a passage of the *Anguttara Nikāya* (ii 34) where Nibbāna is described as suppressing pride, removing lust, destroying ālaya (of the five kāmagunas), and arresting the cycle of existence in the three worlds While commenting on the etymology of the word Nibbāna,[6] he says that it is the going out of the 'vana' which is a synonym of tanhā and is so called because it acts as a hindrance to the four kinds of birth (yonis), five forms of existence (gatis), seven viññāna existences (*i e* the planes of existence above the Arūpa worlds) and nine sattāvāsas (abodes of sentient beings) This shows only the aspect of quietude (upasama) of Nibbāna He then takes up the well-known passage of the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iv 362, 369 ff)[7] to show that Nibbāna is truth, transcendental, difficult to be seen, without decay, eternal, indescribable immortal, happy, peaceful, wonderful, healthy, pure and is an island of refuge It appears from the selection of passages made by Buddhaghosa that he is a supporter

[1] *Kvu* IX 7, cf *Dh S* 1513 Katame dhammā acetasikā ? Cittañ ca rūpañ ca nibbānañ ca

[2] *Ibid* XIV 6, cf *Dh S* 1515 Katame dhammā cittavippayuttā ? Rūpañ ca nibbānañ ca

[3] *Dh S* 1439

[4] *Ibid*, p 60 cf *Dh S* 1416 Nibbānam na vattabbam uppannan ti pi anuppannan ti, see also 1534, 1535

[5] *Vis. M*, pp 293, 294

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Also dealt with by Prof. Poussin in his *Nirvāna*, pp 153, 154

of the view that Nibbāna is eternal and that it is a lokottara[1] state beyond the Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus

Buddhaghosa's conception of Nibbāna is well brought out also in his arguments against the Sautrāntika view of the non-existence (*abhāva*) of Nibbāna[2] He starts with the assertion that Nibbāna brings peace of mind (santi), and has the taste of imperishableness (accuti) and solace (assāsakarana), and brings one to a state of mind which is inexpressible (nippapañca), and in which differentiations disappear (animitta) He then takes up the view of his opponents, evidently the Sautrāntikas, that Nibbāna does not exist like the horn of the hare because of its non-perceptibility (anupalabbhaniyato), and meets it by saying that Nibbāna does exist and is realisable if the right path be followed—the realisation being similar to the cognizance of others' thoughts in the transcendental plane (lokuttara-citta)[3] by the power of knowing the thoughts of others (cetopariyāyañāna)[4] One is not justified in saying that a thing does not exist because it cannot be perceived by ordinary men He states further in support of his contention that if the existence of Nibbāna be denied, the practices of Sammādiṭṭhi, etc , become fruitless (vañjhābhāvo āpajjati) To this the opponent answers The practices are not really fruitless since they lead to realisation of abhāva (i e , Nibbāna as total absence of every thing)

Buddhaghosa If Nibbāna be merely abhāva, then the absence (abhāva) of past and future would also be Nibbāna, but it is surely not

Opponent The absence of the present might be Nibbāna

Buddhaghosa The absence of the present (vattamāna) is not possible, for it is self-contradictory, because it must be either past or future Besides, it would also

[1] Cf *Dh S* 1447, *Lankā*, p 157 see *ante*

[2] *Vis M*, pp 507-9

[3] See Shwe Zan Aung's *Comp of Phil*, p 12 transcendental consciousness beyond Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus

[4] It is one of the Abhiññās possessed by Arhats, see *Vis M*, p 431

be incorrect to say that the absence of the present is Nibbāna, for in the present life at a certain moment (vattamānakkhandhanissitamaggakkhane)[1] one obtains the sopādisesa-nibbānadhātu (i e, Nibbāna with corporal residue)

Opponent Would it not be equally incorrect to say that at that moment there was the non-presence of kilesas (impurities)?

Buddhaghosa To deny the non presence of kilesas would be to deny the efficacy of the Ariyamagga, and that is impossible

This reply of Buddhaghosa did not, it seems, convince his opponent who passed on to the next argument as to whether the khaya, i e, destruction of attachment (rāgakkhaya), etc should be taken as Nibbāna[2] Buddhaghosa answered in the negative, saying that in that case arhathood would also be mere extinction Besides to take Nibbāna as khaya (destruction) of something would make Nibbāna impermanent, constituted, and disconnected with sammāvāyāma, etc To this the opponent replied It would not be wrong to say that because a thing after its decay has no more origination, it has attained Nibbāna

Buddhaghosa Decay of this sort does not enter into the question, even if it be so considered, it would not support the contention of the opponent, for it is the ariyamagga which produces (lit turns into) the state of Nibbāna (bhāva), and it is the ariyamagga which destroys evil and prevents its reappearance, because it is the stage (upanissayatta) for final destruction without the possibility of further origination (anuppattinirodhasankhatassa khayassa), that of which it forms the basis (upanissaya) is destroyed by conduct

The opponent then took up the third argument inquiring why Nibbāna had not been given a description (sarūpen' eva kasmā na vuttan ti ce?)

[1] For Maggakkhana see *Paṭis*, *M*, I, pp 69f, *Vis. M*, pp 681, 682 For Phalakkhana see *Vis M*, p 680

[2] Cf *M Vr*, p, 525 Sautrāntikas say Nanu ca yo'sya nandirāgasahagatāyās tṛṣṇāyāh kṣayo virāgo nirodho nirvānam ityuktam.

Buddhaghosa Because it is exceedingly subtle, so extremely subtle, indeed, that Buddha even once thought of not preaching it at all, it can be seen by ariyacakkhu only (i e, realisable by Arhats only) Being associated with the magga, it is extraordinary (asādhārana), and its beginning being absent, it is devoid of origin

Opponent It is not without origin because it originated out of the magga

Buddhaghosa It was not originated by the magga, it can be attained only by following the magga, hence it is originless, and consequently decayless and deathless, being without origin, decay and death, it is eternal (nicca)

A fourth argument was put forward by the opponent, which is as follows

Opponent Would it not be objectionable to regard Nibbāna as eternal like the anu (atom)?

Buddhaghosa No Nibbāna has no hetu (cause) as anus have, so it cannot be compared to the anu

Opponent Is Nibbāna eternal on account of its eternal nature (i e does any quality of eternalness adhere to Nibbāna)?

Buddhaghosa That cannot be, in view of the fact that the anu, etc, are not realised (asiddh atta) by the magga

Buddhaghosa in conclusion said that for the reasons he had put forward Nibbāna is eternal and, being devoid of the nature of form, is formless (arūpa) There is only one Nibbāna, and not different Nibbānas for different Buddhas He then showed that it is called sopādisesa-nibbāna when there remains a corporal residue (upādisesa), though a complete destruction of impurities has been effected by meditation (bhāvanā) It is called nirupādisesa-nibbāna[1] on the disappearance of upādisesa, which happens on account of the absence of any kind of manifestation after the last thought

[1] For sopādisesa and nirupādisesa nibbāna, see also *M Vr*, p. 519.

of kammaphala This is due to the stopping and uprooting of samudaya (causes of origin) In short, it cannot be said that Nibbāna does not exist in view of the fact that it is attainable by means of special knowledge obtained by unflagging zeal, that its existence is indicated by the words of the omniscient Buddha, and lastly that it exists in reality (paramatthena sabhāvato) is indicated by the words Atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam akatam asankhatam (*Itiv*, p 37, *Ud*, p 80)

The *Paramatthamañjusā*,[1] in commenting upon this portion of the *Visuddhimagga*, argues in its own way for the existence of Nibbāna It starts by saying that Buddha can never utter an untruth, so when he says "atthi bhikkhave ajātam etc", it has to be admitted that the unconstituted dhātu, Nibbāna, in the highest sense, does exist It cannot be abhāva (absence of anything) because of the fact that Buddha described Nibbāna as deep, immeasurable, difficult to be understood, etc These can be said only of an existent state or object, and not of anything non-existent Anything non-existent must in every way be non-existent The following question may, however, arise as to the nature of abhāva of kilesas, to which attention is drawn by the Theravādins as an aspect of Nibbāna: Whether the abhāva of kilesas existing in beings is one or many If the *abhāva* be one, then it should be effected by one path (magga) and there is no need of many maggas (evidently referring to the four maggas sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, and arahatta), and all beings should attain Nibbāna at the same time This objection is answered thus. If the abhāva be taken as one, then it is the abhāva of kilesas which is effected by the realisation of Nibbāna It is in fact not an effect of magga, it is a thing to be envisaged The opponents may say that there is no need of maggas, as it is not necessary to give up the kilesas, and there being no question of giving up kilesas and putting an end to dukkha, what is the use of the realisation (sacchikiriyā) of kilesā-

[1] *Visuddhimagga Ṭīkā* of Ānanda (Burmese ed) edited by Saya U Pye, 1910, vol II, pp 618–620

bhāva The objection is answered thus Each magga has some definite function to perform The sotāpattimagga removes the first three saṃyojanas, the sakadāgāmimagga reduces rāga, dosa and moha to their minimum, while the anāgāmimagga eradicates them, and lastly the arahatta puts an end to all saṃyojanas Abhāva is really one, and it should not be inferred that there are many abhāvas because many kinds of kilesas are eradicated, i e., it does not follow that because there are sakkāyadiṭṭhi abhāva, rāga-abhāva and moha-abhāva, there are so many abhāvas Abhāva is really one and does not vary according to the nature of the object, of which, there is abhāva, so the abhāvas are not to be regarded as five, because the five saṃyojanas are removed It is only the common usage of the term that implies the existence of many abhāvas The state of abhāva (absence of anything) cannot but be one, so Nibbāna is not many but one The *Tīkā* concludes its argument by saying that the abhāva is effected by maggas, each magga producing its own effect, and that abhāva is not to be envisaged (na sacchikātabbo), while Nibbāna is to be envisaged, hence, the abhāva of kilesas is not identical with Nibbāna

THE *Abhidharmakośa* ON NIRVĀNA

In the *Abhidharmakośa* Vasubandhu expatiates on the Vaibhāṣika conception of Nirvāna He first asserts that Nirvāna is one of the Asaṃskṛtas (unconstituted), and as against the objection of the Sautrāntikas that it might be a result produced by the mārga, he says that the mārga leads to the attainment or possession of Visaṃyoga (disconnection) or Nirvāna and that it is self existent and not the fruit of mārga [1] In answering the question of the Sautrāntikas as to the nature of the dharma called Visaṃyoga or Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, the Vaibhāṣikas state that it is a dharma, the nature of which is real and inexpressible, only the Āryas realise it inwardly and individually It is only possible to indicate its general characters, when the Pratisaṃkhyā-niro-

[1] See *Kośa*, ii 55 Cf *Vis M*, p 508 dealt with before for a similar argument against the Sautrāntikas

dha is said to be an entity (dravya), real, good, eternal, and distinct from others, it is called the Visamyoga

The Sautrāntikas in their zeal to establish that Nirvāna is abhāva (absence of passions, etc) argue that the Asamskrtas (the unconditioned) are not real like the entities rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), etc They cite the instance of Ākāśa, which is, according to the Sarvāstivādins, an Asamskrta-dhātu, and point out that Ākāsa (space) is nothing but the absence of something tangible, or in other words, of any resisting substance Just as a man in darkness says it is ākāśa (vacuity or space) when he is not cognisant of the existence of anything tangible or resistible, so also the Ākāsa of the Sarvāstivādins should be understood Analogically they assert that the second Asamskrta-dhātu of the Sarvāstivādins, namely, the Pratisamkhyā-Nirodha, is really the destruction of anuśayas (desires) and existence already produced, and the non-origination of any further anuśayas, and as this is achieved by means of knowledge (pratisamkhyā), it is called Pratisamkhyā-nirodha The third Asamskrtadhātu, the Apratisamkhyā-nirodha, is the absence or non origination of dharmas on account of the complete absence of causes[1] independent of the force of knowledge (apratisamkhyā), *e g* , when death before its time interrupts the existence, it is said that there has been Apratisamkhyā-nirodha of dharmas which would have been born in course of this existence if the existence had continued [2]

In this connection the Sautrāntikas mention the opinion of Sthavira Srīlābha, also a Sautrāntika teacher, who interpreted the pratisamkhyā-nirodha as the future non-origin of passions due to knowledge (prajñā), and the apratisamkhyā-nirodha as the future non-origin of duhkha, *i e* , of existence due to the disappearance of passions and not directly due

[1] Yamakami Sogen prefers "condition" (pratyaya) to causes See his *Systems etc* , p 164 He explains Apratisamkhyānirodha (p 167) as the "non consciousness of dharmas or things which would have forced their way into our consciousness but for the engrossment of our attention by something else Apratisamkhyānirodha, accordingly, is a thing of daily occurrence in everybody's life "

[2] *Kośa-vyākhyā* (B Buddhica), pp 16–18

to knowledge The former, it is said, refers to sopādiśesa and the latter to anupādiśesa-nirvānadhātu[1] The Sautrāntikas did not approve of the distinction made by Srīlābha between Pratisamkhyā and Apratisamkhyā According to them, the future non-origin of duhkha implies pratisamkhyā, so, in fact, apratisamkhya-nirodha is included in the pratisamkhyā-nirodha

The Sautrāntikas considered also the opinion of another school, supposed to be the Mahāsānghikas according to the Japanese editor of the *Kośa* The Mahāsānghikas define apratismkhyā-nirodha as the posterior non existence (paścād abhāva) of dharmas already born by virtue of their spontaneous destruction In this definition, apratisamkhyā-nirodha is not eternal in view of the fact that it does not arise as long as the anuśayas do not perish

The object of the Sautrāntikas is to show through these definitions that the pratisamkhyā-nirodha implies an antecedent, *viz*, pratisamkhyā and hence it cannot be eternal (nitya), because, if the antecedent be wanting, the consequence also becomes wanting The Sarvāstivādins met this by arguing that the Sautrāntikas were not entitled to say that pratisamkhyā is anterior and the non-origin of unborn dharmas posterior The fact is, as the Sarvāstivādins thought, that the non-originated always exist by themselves, so when the pratisamkhyā is lacking, the dharmas are born, if and when pratisamkhyā arises, the dharmas are not born absolutely The efficacy (sāmarthya) of the pratisamkhyā in regard to the non-origin of dharmas is shown thus

(i) before pratisamkhyā there is no obstacle in the way of the origin of dharmas, and

(ii) after pratisamkhyā, *i e* pratisamkhyā being given, the dharmas, the origin of which has not been stopped previously (akrtotpattipratibandha), are not born

(1) Then as against the view of the Sautrāntikas that Nirvāna is simply non-production (anutpāda) of dharmas,

[1] *Cf. Vis M*, dealt with above See Prof La Vallée Poussin's article on the two Nirvānadhātus according to the Vibhāsā in *I H Q*, *vol* vi, pp. 39–45

the Sarvāstivādins cite a sūtra from the *Samyukta Āgama* (26 2) in which it is stated that the practice and culture of the five faculties, faith etc , have for their result the abandonment of duhkha, past, present, and future In fact, this abandonment (prahāna) refers to nothing else than Nirvāna and is solely of a future dharma and not of a past or present dharma The Sautrāntikas cannot accept it and interpret this passage somewhat differently, saying that the "abandonment" refers to the abandoning of passions (kleśas) relating to duhkha, past or present, and citing some other passages from the *Samyukta Āgama* in support of their contention They argue that the passions, past and present, produce in us some germs to originate future passions when these germs are killed, the passions, past and present, are abandoned It is with reference to this fact that one says that the action (karma) and the result (phala) have been destroyed Therefore by the abandonment of a future duhkha or future passion one understands that the duhkha or passion will not be born any more owing to the absence of germs

(2) The Sarvāstivādins then take up a second argument, found also in the *Visuddhimagga*,[1] which inquires why it has been stated in the *Samyukta Āgama* (31 12) that "of all dharmas, constituted or unconstituted, virāga (detachment) is the best" If a dharma be non-existing, how can a statement like the above be made? The Sautrāntikas explain this by asserting that they admit its existence, as they admit that of a sound which has no existence before it is produced and after it has died away The quotation praising "virāga" may well refer to a non-existent unconditioned thing, the absolute non-existence of everything evil

(3) The third argument of the Sarvāstivādins is that if the Pratisamkhyā-nirodha or Nirvāna be non-existent, why is it mentioned as one of the Truths The Sautrāntikas answer that truth (satya) is taken in the sense of "not-inexact" (aviparita) The Āryas realize what exists and

[1] *Vis. M.*, p. 507

what does not exist in a "not-inexact" manner, in that which is suffering (duhkha) they see only duhkha, in the non-existence of duhkha, they realize the fact of the non-existence of same Really, there is no contradiction in taking the "non-existence of duhkha" or the pratisamkhyā-nirodha as a Truth And this non-existence is the third Truth, because the Āryas see and proclaim it immediately after the second

(4) The Sarvāstivādins then have recourse to the fourth argument that if the asamskrtas be non-existent, how is it that knowledge has non-existent things as its basis (ārammana) The Sautrāntikas dismiss this objection by remarking that they find in it nothing against their theory, and say that they will explain it in connection with the discussion of the past and the future [1]

(5) The fifth argument of the Sarvāstivādins relates to the nature of the consequence found by the Sautrāntikas in the maintenance of their theory that the unconditioned really exist The Sautrāntikas point out the unreasonableness of regarding the existence of a non-existent thing as real In fact, they say that the unconditioned can neither be apprehended by the senses (pratyksa) like rūpa (form), vedanā (feeling), etc, nor can they be known by inference (anumāna) from their activities, *i e*, through the organs of sense

(6) In the sixth argument, the Sautrāntikas become the questioners and inquire how, if Nirodha be a thing in itself, a genitive construction like 'duhkhasya nirodhah' can be justified The Sautrāntikas understand by Nirodha (destruction of a thing) the "non-existence of a thing", so also by the "destruction of duhkha" they understand the "non-existence of duhkha" They do not admit the existence of any relation of cause and effect between two things existing by themselves To this the Sarvāstivadins reply, that, according to them, destruction is a thing in itself Nevertheless one can specify the relation between "destruction" and the "thing destroyed", for, according to them, nirodha

[1] For which see *Kośa*, v 25

with reference to a thing indicates "obtaining possession" (prāpti) of the "destruction" at the moment when one is dispossessed of the thing The Sautrāntikas would however inquire, what it is that determines or specifies the taking of possession of the "destruction"

(7) The seventh argument of the Sarvāstivādins is if Nirvāna be non-existence, if it be only abhāva, what is that thing which is obtained by a bhiksu in this life? The Sautrāntikas explain it by saying that a bhiksu in Nirvāna attains a stage (āśraya) in which neither passion (kleśa) nor a new existence is possible

(8) In the eighth argument the Sautrāntikas cite a text from the *Samyukta Āgama* (13 5) where Nirvāna is described as a disappearance (vyantibhāva), a decay (ksaya), a destruction (nirodha), an appeasement (vyupaśama), a detachment (virāga), a passing away (astangama) of duhkha, and as a non-reproducer (apratisamdhi) of duhkha, and infer therefrom that Nirvāna is abhāvamātra The Sarvāstivādins do not accept this interpretation, stating that the passage refers to Nirvāna as a thing in itself, in which there is no appearance (aprādurbhāva) of duhkha The Sautrāntikas do not agree with the Sarvāstivādins regarding the force of the locative case used in the passage

(9) The ninth argument put forward by the Sautrāntikas is that the simile of the flame used in the famous line, "Pajjotass' eva nibbānam vimokkho cetaso ahu" (as the nirvāna of the flame, so is also the deliverance of thought)[1], suggests only the passing away (atyaya) of the flame, and not a thing existing by itself

(10) The tenth and the last argument advanced by the Sautrāntikas is that the Abhidharma, on which the Vaibhāsikas rely most, contains the statement "What are the *avastuka* dharmas? They are the Asamskrtas" In this, the term "avastuka" signifies to the Sautrāntikas "unreal", "without true nature", but it is differently interpreted by the Vaibhāsikas According to them the term "vastu" is employed in five different senses, *viz*, (i) svabhāva vastu (a

[1] See above for a discussion of this passage

thing in itself), (ii) ālambana vastu (object of knowledge), (iii) samyojanīya (cause of attachment), (iv) hetu (cause), and (v) parigraha (act of appropriation) In the present passage, vastu has been used in the sense of hetu, here "avastuka" signifies "that which has no cause" The unconditioned, although real, being always devoid of any activity, have neither any cause which produces them nor any fruit produced by them

Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga AND *Abhidharmakosa* ANALYSED

We have now before us the expositions of Nirvāṇa as found in the *Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga* and *Abhidharmakośa* The last two also present a fairly good view of the Sautrāntika standpoint These may be analysed thus

(1) As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa is unreal, that it is merely abhāva (absence) of klesas, the mere destruction of rāga, etc all the texts mentioned above maintain that Nirvāṇa has real existence, their grounds being that

(i) it is realisable if the right path be followed (*Vm*), it is realised by the Āryas (*A* and *Vm*)[1],

(ii) the arhats realize it in this life It is known as the attainment of sopādisesa-nirvāṇa dhātu (*A* and *Vm*),

(iii) the existence of Nirvāṇa has been described by Buddha in statements like "atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam, etc" (*Vm*), or, with reference to its subtlety or depth or excellence in statements like "duddasam duranubodham, etc" (*Vm Ṭīkā*), "virāga is the best of all dharmas" (*A*) or by mentioning it as one of the Four Truths (*A.*) or the arammaṇa (basis) of knowledge (*Vm*, *K* and *A*)

(2) As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa, being only abhava, cannot be eternal, existing by itself like rūpa (form) or aṇu (atom) or that it cannot be asaṁskṛta since it is the result of magga, the texts maintain that

(i) Nirvaṇa is eternal, exists by itself like rūpa or aṇu[2]

[1] *A* = *Abhidharmakośa*, *Vm* = *Visuddhimagga*, and *K* = *Kathāvatthu*
[2] *Cf* Belvalkar, *Brahma Sūtra* (Poona), II, 2, pp 61–64

(*Vm.* and *A*), does not require any ārammana (basis) like jñāna for its origin (*Vm* and *K*), and is unconnected with citta (acetasika, cittavippayutta) (*Vm*, *K* and *A*), but it should be distinguished from rūpa and anu by the fact that it is uncaused (*Vm* and *A*) and requires the practice of magga for its realisation (*Vm*),

(ii) Nirvāna is eternal but not the parinibbuta puggala, *i e*, individuality ceases in Nirvāna (*K*), and that Nirvāna is one and not different for different Buddhas (*Vm*)[1],

(iii) Nirvāna is asamskrta as it has no origin, no decay, and no change (*Vm* and *A*),

(iv) the āryāstāngika-mārga leads only to the cessation of klesas, nirvāna is not produced by mārga, but exists by itself eternally (*Vm* and *A*)

(3) The Sautrāntikas understand the comparison of Ākāśa and Nirvāna in the sense that as ākāsa is really the absence or non-cognition of any resistible thing so Nirvāna is also the absolute absence of klesas The texts comment on it as follows —

Nirvāna is infinite, immeasurable and inexpressible like ākāsa (*Vm*, *K* and *A*), it has a positive existence, but the klesas work as an āvarana (screen) to the vision of beings, and so when the mārga removes the klesas it is visualised (*A*) The attainment of Nirvāna means the possession of the Visamyoga (disconnection) or Nirvāna (*A*)

(4) To the question why if Nirvāna exists, Buddha did not define its nature (svarūpa), the texts answer that it is very subtle (*Vm* and *A*), so much so that even Buddha at first hesitated to preach it (*Vm*)

(5) Buddhaghosa inclines towards the view that Nirvāna is inexpressible, indistinguishable, eternal and blissful In the sopādisesanirvāna, the Arhat obtains inwardly a vision of same and actually gets it when he enters into nirupādiśesa-nirvāna

(6) Vasubandhu emphasises the fact that Nirvāna is still a dhātu, a dravya (a thing in itself) but endowed with all the qualities mentioned above The atoms or ions com-

[1] Cf Dharmakāya of the Mahāyānists, see *ante*

posing a being are continually changing, and ultimately, by the force of mārga which he has been following, the individual reaches the immaculate state and becomes indistinguishable from the eternal and immaculate elements called Nirvāna-dhātu Professor Poussin, on the basis of the available descriptions of this Nirvāna-dhātu prefers to find in it a perfectly blissful and eternal life while Professor Stcherbatsky, following the strict logic of the atomic theory, concludes that the Nirvāna-dhātu is "eternal death", or the Sāmkhya's undifferentiated matter

As to the difference of opinion between Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu, it should be observed that Buddhaghosa is untrammelled by the atomic theory, the consistency of which has all along been maintained by Vasubandhu in his arguments Buddhaghosa states unequivocally that Nirvāna transcends every conceivable form of existence (beyond all sattāvāsas or viññānatthitis), and is an infinite and inconceivable state This looks very much like the metaphysical conception of the Vedantic Brahman, though not strictly so, as has been pointed out by Profs Poussin and Belvalkar[1] But it is clearly not advaya brahman, for it involves the conception of innumerable beings having separate existences of their own and only losing their identity when they are parinibbuta-puggalas

THE *Prajñāpāramitās* ON NIRVĀṆA

The conception of Nirvāna assumed a totally different form in the Mahāyānic works We have seen that the *Saddharma Pundarīka* understands by Nirvāna the realisation of the sameness of all dharmas The sameness (samatā), as explained in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the *Sūtrālankāra*, means, from the standpoint of the highest reality (paramārthatah), the non distinguishability between any two things and the impossibility of particularizing a thing The *Prajñāpāramitās* develop this idea of sameness a little further and show that

[1] *Brahma Sūtra* (Poona, 1924), II 2, p 57, "Hīnayāna has not developed any special aptitude for metaphysical theories and logical sub tleties' Cf *Sribhāsya*, ed by Durgācarana Sānkhya-Vedāntatīrtha, p 176 Nirvikāra-svaprakāśa-caitanyamaya brahma

everything perceived or known in this world is really an illusion (māyā) to the unenlightened mind So when any one speaks of Nirvāna or the attainment of Nirvāna, he imagines, because of imperfect vision, the existence of a man and his nirvāna, and thinks that the man after practising the disciplinary rules attains the ultimate state called Nirvāna[1] In reality, all these are merely his fancies (parikalpanā) One of the similes to show this unreality runs thus Suppose a magician (māyākāra) or his disciple, expert in performing magical feats, creates the five kinds of enjoyable things (pañca-kāmaguna) and shows himself as enjoying these things[2] Does he, in fact, enjoy them? So also a Bodhisattva or Buddha speaks of the so-called worldly pleasures (kāmagunas), Bodhisattva practices, skandhas, (*e g* sīla, samādhi, etc), the eightfold path, Nirvāna, or Buddha These, in fact, do not exist at all[3], they are mere names invented to denote things, the existence of which is conceived by the unenlightened, *e g*, something which has no real existence is called a sattva (being) or rūpa (form),[4] but sattva or rūpa is only a term, a mere designation That which is a designation has no origin or decay, it is used only as a symbol, its interior, or exterior, or both cannot be perceived The *Prajñāpāramitās* carry it further by stating that even the designation (nāmadheya) must not be taken as having any form of existence[5] There being no such thing as entrance (āya) and exit (vyaya) of anything whatsoever, not excluding sarvadharmatathatā or Buddha, it should not be said that there is Arhat or Buddha[6], or any kind of relation between them If Buddha creates some māyapurusas

[1] *Pañca* (A S B Ms), leaf 399b A bodhisattva does not seek Nirvāṇa because he "samsāram samsārato na vikalpayati nirvānam nirvānato na vikalpayati "

[2] *S'ata*, p 117

[3] *S'ata*, p 432 Atyantayā bodhisattvo nopalabhyate, p 613 Prakṛtiśūnyāh sarvadharmāh

[4] See *S'ata*, pp. 325ff, for sattva may be put a man, a doer, form, eye, bodhisattva, etc.

[5] *S'ata*, p 522 Nāmadheyam na sthitam na vistitam nādhisthitam. Tat kasya hetoh ? Avidyamānatvāt tasya nāmadheyasya.

[6] *S'ata*, p 552

(illusory men) and makes them pass through all the stages of sanctification and attain omniscience, no one inquires about the existence of the māyāpurusas, their practices or attainments[1] Similarly we should not trouble ourselves with the definition of either a monk or his nirvāna On ultimate analysis monk and nirvāna do not exist, they are hallucinations, and both being unreal (sūnya), the monk and nirvāna are the same in character So we should remove all misconceptions about the world and make the realisation of advayam advaidhīkāram (non-duality) of everything whatsoever as our aim[2]

NĀGĀRJUNA ON NIRVĀNA

Nagarjuna also supports this conception but his arguments are those of an expert logician and philosopher He takes into account the views of the Hīnayānists, mainly the Sarvāstivādins and shows the weak bases of their views The Hinayānists, he says, speak of two kinds of Nirvāna, sopādisesa and nirupādisesa and think that Nirvāna is the nirodha (extinction) of klesas (defiling elements) and skandhas (constituents) existing in a being They wonder how the Mahāyanists can conceive Nirvana if they think that everything is unreal (sūnya) without origin and decay What is it then, from which Nirvāna confers release Nagarjuna answers If klesas (defiling elements) and skandhas (constituents) be elements existing by themselves, how can they be destroyed?[3] The Sūnyatāvadins do not seek a Nirvāna where there is an end of klesas and skandhas Their Nirvana is

Aprahīnam asamprāptam anucchinnam aśāsvatam,
Aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvānam ucyate

(Nirvāna is that which is neither discarded nor attained, it is neither a thing destroyed nor a thing eternal, it is

[1] *S ta* | p 886ff

[2] *Ibid*, p 825 Sarvākārajñata advayā advaidhīkārā sarvadharmābhavasvabhāvatām upādāya

[3] The arguments of Nāgārjuna are found in the *Mādhyamika Vrtti*, Ch XXV translated by Professor Stcherbatsky as an Appendix to his *Con of N* In places, however, there are differences between Stcherbatsky's interpretation and the one that is given here

neither suppressed nor does it arise) Candrakīrti, in commenting upon this verse, says that it is not to be eradicated like rāga (passion) etc nor to be attained like the fruits of a saintly life (*e g* srotāpatti, sakrdāgāmi, etc) It is not eternal like aśūnya (real elements)[1] It is by its nature without origin and decay, and its laksana (characteristic) is that it does not admit of description[2] In such an indescribable thing, how can an imagination (kalpanā) of the existence of kleśas and skandhas, and their eradication through Nirvāna find a place? So long as those activities of our imagination continue to exist, there can be no Nirvāna Nirvāna is realised only when all prapañcas, i e, attempts at particularization or definition cease To the argument of the Sarvāstivādins that even admitting the non-existence of kleśas and skandhas at the stage where Nirvāna is reached, it may be that they exist in samsāra, i e, before the attainment of Nirvāna—the Mahāyānists give the forcible reply that there is not the slightest difference between Nirvāna and Samsāra So, in fact, Nirvāna requires no process of eradication Nirvāna is really the complete disappearance (ksaya) of all figments of the imagination The kleśas, skandhas, etc, the disappearance of which is generally supposed to be necessary in Nirvāna,[3] have, according to the Mādhyamikas, no real existence whatsoever Those who cannot get rid of the conception of "I-ness" or "Mine-ness" usually assume the existence of non-existent things The sufferings of those who are in a stage in which they recognize the existence and non-existence of things will never end Candrakīrti includes in the category of such sufferers the schools of Kanāda, Kapila, etc and also the Vaibhāsikas who believe in the existence of real entities, he also includes the Atheists (Nāstikas[4]) who deny their existence, the Sautrāntikas who deny the existence of

[1] Prof Stcherbatsky suggests in the footnote that Aśūnya=Nirvāna of the Hīnayānists=Pradhāna of the Sāmkhya

[2] Prof Stcherbatsky translates 'prapañca' by plurality and then sometimes even stretches this sense of the word

[3] *M Vr*, p 445

[4] Prof Stcherbatsky prefers to call the Nāstikas, Materialists

the past, the future and the citta-viprayuktas[1] but admit that of all else, and the Yogācāras who do not believe in the existence of parikalpita (imaginary) things but admit the reality of the parinispanna (the ultimate)—the pure consciousness (vijñaptimātratā)[2] Nāgārjuna says that Nirvāna does not consist in the eradication or destruction of anything It is really the avoidance of all imagination (kalpanā) of eradication, destruction, etc Just as a man imagines that he has taken poison and faints, though, in fact, the poison has not entered his stomach, so also a being in this world, not knowing really what the ego is conceives of "I-ness" and "Mine-ness," and suffers on that account Nirvana is beyond the limits of existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) A being fancies that something exists and that Nirvāna is the end of it, while, in fact, that something does not exist and therefore there can be neither its continuance nor extinction Nirvāna really consists in the avoidance of the conception that something exists[3]

According to Nāgārjuna, there are some (referring to the Vaibhāsikas, etc) who contend that Nirvāna does exist, for it works as a bar to the current of passions (kleśas), deeds (karmas), and births (janmas) like a dam arresting the course of a stream, and that a thing which is non-existent cannot be an effective barrier like a dam In reply to this it is argued (by the Sautrāntikas) that Nirvāna has been defined as the effacement (ksaya) of desires together with pleasures (nandi) and passions (rāga) So what is mere extinction cannot have any existence It is like the extinction of the flame of a lamp This argument does not convince those who conceive Nirvāna as a real object, for, according to them the extinction of desires happens in the Dharma called Nirvāna[4]

[1] *M Vr* pp 444-5 Sautrāntikamate 'tītānāgatam śūnyam anyad aśūnyam, viprayuktā vijñaptih śūnyā

[2] *M Vr* p 445 In the enumeration of schools it will be observed that the Sthaviravādins have been omitted, as also the Vedāntists

[3] Cf the *Prajñāpāramitā* view, *ante*, pp 185-6

[4] This controversy is given also in the *Kosa*, see *ante*

Nāgārjuna refutes the opinion that Nirvāna is a bhāva (real thing) on the following grounds

(i) that a really existent entity like vijñāna (consciousness) must suffer decay and death which Nirvāna cannot and therefore that which has no decay and death cannot be said to have any form of existence,

(ii) that an existent entity like vijñāna is necessarily constituted (samskrta) but Nirvāna is unconstituted (asamskrta) and hence cannot have existence,

(iii) that an existent entity requires for its origin a causal substratum (svakāranasāmagrī), but Nirvāna does not require any, for it must be without a substratum (anupādāya)

As against the opinion that Nirvāna is merely abhāva (non-existence), an opinion held by the Sautrāntikas, Nāgārjuna adduces the following reasons

(i) Nirvāna is not what is said to be the absence of defiling element (kleśa), birth (janma), etc, for, that would make transitoriness (anityatā) of kleśa, janma, etc the same as Nirvāna Transitoriness is the absence of kleśa and janma and nothing else, and so if Nirvāna be the absence of klesa and janma then it must be the same as transitoriness of klesa and janma, and in that case no exertion would be required to attain Nirvāna—which is not admitted

(ii) If Nirvāna be abhāva (non-existence), how can it be spoken of as being without any substratum and without any reference to a bhāva (existent thing)? For no question of substratum (upādāna) can arise in regard to a non-existent thing Against this may be raised the objection that the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is also said to be an abhāva (absence) without any positive counterpart Nāgārjuna meets this by saying that abhāva (non-existence) implies a change (anyathābhāva) undergone by a thing which is existent,[1] while the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is only imagination (kalpanā) without implying the existence of any object As there can be no abhāva (absence) without a positive counterpart, so Nirvāna is not abhāva.

[1] *M Vr.*, Ch. XV, 5, p. 267

Nāgārjuna now proceeds to state his conception of Nirvāna, which is neither bhāva nor abhāva He says that coming and going, birth and death, are regarded sometimes as existing relatively, either antithetically like long and short, or as cause and effect like the lamp and its light, or the seed and its sprout In both cases, they are shown to be a complex of causes and conditions Everything whatsoever must therefore have a cause and a condition, but Nirvāna, in which birth and death have ceased, is uncaused and unconditioned and hence not produced (apravrtti) Existence or non existence cannot be predicated of what is not produced, so Nirvāna is neither existence nor non-existence Those (*i e*, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sthaviras) who believe in the transmigration of constituents (samskāras) state that the group of constituents has for origin and decay a causal basis When there is no causal basis, the group is no longer produced (apravartamāna) Then it is called Nirvāna Those (*i e*, the Sāmmitīyas) who believe in the transmigration of pudgala (personality) say that permanence (nityatva) or impermanence (anityatva) cannot be predicated of personality Its coming and going happen through its corresponding upādāna (substratum) and are dependent on it When the substratum of this personality ceases to exist, then it is called Nirvāna Nāgārjuna contends that the presence (bhāva) and absence (abhāva) of the mere non-appearance (apravrttimātrakam) of constituents (samskāras) or the personality (pudgala) cannot be conceived, similarly the existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) of Nirvāna cannot be affirmed In support of his contention he quotes the saying of Buddha that desire for both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (vibhava) should be given up, and points out that Buddha did not say that desire for Nirvāna should be given up If Nirvāna has the nature of existence (bhāvarūpa) or the nature of non-existence (abhāvarūpa), then, according to Buddha, it must be given up, so existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of Nirvāna

There are again some (*i e*, the Vaibhāsikas) who contend that Nirvāna is both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) It is abhāva because in it there is absence of

passion, birth, etc It is bhāva because it exists by itself Nāgārjuna refutes this on four grounds, saying that Nirvāna cannot be both bhāva and abhāva, for, in that case,

(i) Moksa (deliverance) would be bhāva and abhāva, and this would mean that the presence of samskāras as well as their extinction represents deliverance (moksa) But the former cannot be moksa, and therefore Nirvāna is not both bhāva and abhāva

(ii) Nirvāna would be a dependent existence, for both bhāva and abhāva exist or arise through cause and condition But as it is not so dependent, it is without any substratum

(iii) Nirvāna would be caused and conditioned (samskrta), for bhāva and abhāva cannot but be uncaused and unconditioned

(iv) In Nirvāna, both bhāva and abhāva would exist together but this is impossible, for light and darkness cannot be simultaneously present at the same place Hence Nirvāna cannot be both bhāva and abhāva

Lastly, Nāgārjuna takes up the question whether Nirvāna is the negation of both bhāva and abhāva and shows that it cannot be so by two arguments

(i) If bhāva and abhāva could have been realized, the negation of them would have been conceived as Nirvāna but as what is really bhāva and abhāva is not known, it is inconsistent to describe Nirvāna by their negation

(ii) If it be imagined that Nirvāna is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva, it is impossible to ascertain the knower of such Nirvāna If it be admitted that beings in the phenomenal world cognize it, it may be asked whether they cognize it empirically by vijñāna (consciousness) or metaphysically by jñāna (knowledge) Vijñāna (empirical consciousness) needs signs (nimitta) for cognition but Nirvāna is animitta (signless) Jñāna (transcendental knowledge) has śūnyatā (essencelessness) as its basis It is originless (anutpāda) and formless (arūpa) How then with the help of this knowledge, which is indefinable, and escapes every attempt at clear expression, can it be cognized definitely that Nirvāna is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva? What cannot be

cognized or understood (lit grasped) cannot be said to have existence

Nāgārjuna then points out that the fourteen problems, which Buddha did not think worth answering (avyākrtam),[1] prove only the non-existence of things in reality and the identity of samsāra and nirvāna

If everything be non-existent some may question, why it is said that Buddha preached his dharma, and for whose benefit he preached it Nāgārjuna answers this question by saying that the Mādhyamikas define Nirvāna as the cessation (upaśama), and of not being in process (apravrtti) of prapañca (expressibility) and nimitta (signs) and as a state the nature of which is upaśānta (quiet) and siva (peaceful)[2] When Buddha is in Nirvāna (a state as described above), how can he be expected to have preached doctrines to men and gods? In the *Tathāgataguhya-sūtra* it is said that not a single word was uttered by Buddha between the attainment of bodhi and mahāparinirvāna,[3] but people, according to their individual tendencies and aims of life, conceive Buddha as giving discourses.

CONCLUSION OF THE *Prajñāpāramitās* AND *Madhyamakakārikā*

Nāgārjuna, we see, leads us through a maze of arguments to the same conclusion that the *Prajñāpāramitās* have reached by every possible negation Candrakīrti quotes a stanza from the *Prajñāpāramitā* itself in support of Nagārjuna's contention that Nirvāna or the Truth is the inexpressible absolute and is different from the Tathatā or Tathā-

[1] See, e g, *Digha*, I, pp 187 ff, *M Vr.*, p 536

[2] *M Vr*, p 538

Prapañcopaśama	=vācām apravrttih	Siva	=cittasya apravrttih
,,	=kleśānām apravrttih	,,	=janmano apravrttih
,,	=kleśaprahānena	,,	=niravaśesa-vāsanāprahānena
,,	=jñeyānupalabdhyā	,,	=jñānānupalabdhyā.

[3] *M Vr*, p 539 Avāca'naksarāh sarvaśūnyāh śāntādinirmalāh,
Ya evam jānāti dharmān kumāro buddha socyate

Cf *Laṅkā*, p 194 Uktam deśanāpāthe mayānyaiś ca buddha bodhisattvair yathaikam apyaksaram tathāgatā nodāharanti na pratyāharantī ti

gata, descriptions of which are to be found in Mahāyānic works The stanza runs thus

Tathāgato hi pratibimbabhūtah
kuśalasya dharmasya anāsravasya,
Naivātra tathatā na tathāgato 'sti
bimbam ca samdrśyati sarvaloke [1]

[Tathāgata is an image of good and pure dharma, there is (in reality) no Tathatā or Tathāgata, only images are visible in all the worlds]

In connection with the discussion on the existence and non-existence of saṃskāras, Nāgārjuna likewise points out that if Tathatā be equated with 'tathābhāvo 'vikāritvam sadaiva sthāyitā' (sameness, changelessness and ever-existence),[2] as is done by the Yogācārins, then he would also assert that that Tathatā is non-existent By all these negations Nāgārjuna only tries to show that the difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins [3] consists in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, do not enter into the question of existence and non-existence of the Reality Candrakīrti, however, apprehends that such a denial of the existence of Buddha or Tathāgata might lead people to the belief that Nāgārjuna preached pure and simple negativism, so he says, "we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) in every way of the inexpressible Tathāgata, for in that case we should be guilty of apavāda (denial)" [4] The Mādhyamikas assert that the Reality is beyond determination, i e, statements like sūnya, asūnya, both śūnya and aśūnya or not both sūnya and asūnya cannot be made about it These statements are used in the texts for the sake of prajñapti (communication) We should bear in mind that whenever Nāgārjuna negatives the existence of Tathatā or Tathāgata or any other synonym of it, he attributes to it the sense commonly accepted by the imperfect bodhisattvas

[1] *M Vr.*, pp 449, 540 [2] *Ibid*, p. 265

[3] *Ibid*, p 275 Madhyamakadarśana evāstitva nāstitva-dvaya-darśanasyāprasango na Vijñānavādidarśanādisviti vijñeyam.

[4] *M Vr*, p 443 Na ca vayam sarvathaiva nisprapañcānām tathāgatānām nāstitvam brumo yad asmākam tad apavādakrto doṣaḥ syāt

or the Yogācārins So, in fact, Nāgārjuna does not teach pure and simple negativism But it should be remembered that there were among the followers of Nāgārjuna some who interpreted Nāgārjuna's principle as absolute nihilism and we may regard Bhāvaviveka as a prominent exponent of this view But from this fact it does not follow that Nāgārjuna himself or his followers in general denied a supreme and ineffable reality, Tathatā or Śūnyatā and at least such negativism is not supported by the *Mahāprajñā-pāramitāśāstra* of Nāgārjuna The object of the *Prajñāpāramitās* as well as of the *Madhyamakakārikā* is to establish a Unity corresponding to the Vedāntic Absolute The most characteristic mark, however, of the Vedāntic Absolute is that it is of the nature of pure intelligence (cit) and bliss (ānanda) In the Unity of Nāgārjuna bliss at least is totally absent Śānta and śiva are the two terms which find place in Nāgārjuna's conception of the Reality, hence it would be assuming too much to find in his conception a full-fledged Vedāntic Brahman—an all-pervading 'I' which Buddha categorically denies [1] According to Dr Das Gupta, it approaches more the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mukti, i e, a state entirely devoid of quality of any sort, either abstract or attributive, in which "the self remains in itself in its own purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc "[2] The Mādhyamika reality or Nirvāna may well, therefore, be said to have a resemblance to the impersonal aspect of the Vedāntic Brahman but not to its other aspects [3]

[1] Cf Beal, *Catena etc*, pp 175ff (from Chinese sources), *Laṅkā*, p 78 in connection with Tathāgatagarbha, Reischauer, *Studies in Japanese Buddhism* (1925) p 63 "Nothing is more striking than the similarities between the Vedānta philosophy and the speculations of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the one is as characteristically metaphysical in its mould as the other"

[2] Das Gupta, *Ind Phil*, p. 366 quoting *Nyāyamañjari*, pp 499ff

[3] Cf Dr Barnett's remarks in his Intro to the *Path of Light*, pp 29-30 "The Vedāntic metaphysicians could find no term to predicate of Brahman, the absolute, transcendental Reality but 'nay, nay'! And it is rather in this sense that we should interpret the negations of the Mahāyāna philosophers".

The *Lankāvatāra* on Nirvāṇa

We conclude our examination of Nirvāna by ascertaining what the *Lankāvatāra*, an authoritative and early text of the Yogācārins, says about it At the outset it may be said that the Yogācārins agreed with the Mādhyamikas so far as the unreality of the things of this world and the non-duality (advaya)[1] of samsāra and nirvāna is concerned The Mādhyamikas were not prepared to establish any relation between the phenomenal world and the absolute except by remarking that from time immemorial beings have been subject to delusion, rendering them unable to realise the Truth unless and until they become Buddhas, after going through the processes prescribed in Mahāyāna works The Yogācārins differed from the Mādhyamikas in attempting to find a relation between the absolute and the individual, and in doing so they asserted that there exists only citta (citta-mātra) or vijñāna (vijñānamātra)[2] This citta or vijñāna, better known as Ālaya-vijñāna (store of consciousness, the substratum of samsāra), though originally pure, becomes polluted by delusions and dichotomizes itself into me and not-me, subject and object, the former becoming mind (manas) and the latter the external world So, according to the Yogācārins, Nirvāna consists in the ceasing of the mind to dichotomize and in realising that there exists only citta and that the phenomenal world is only a delusion of the citta The *Lankāvatāra* says that Nirvāna consists in the removal of the imagining intellect (vikalpasya manovijñānasya vyāvrttir nirvānam ity ucyate),[3] the source of seven vijñānas and that it is not any one of the following four as conceived by the heretics [4]

(i) absence of any real existence (bhāvasvabhāvābhāva),

(ii) absence of the various forms of existence (laksana-vicitra-bhāvābhāva),

(iii) realisation of the absence of the existence of one's own signs (svalaksanabhāvābhāvāvabodha), and

[1] Cf e g *Lankā*, p 76, *M Vr*, p 537

[2] For criticism of this, see *M Vr.*, pp. 274ff

[3] *Lankā*, p 126 [4] *Ibid*

(iv) destruction of the chain of continuity of the general characteristics (svasāmānyalakasana-samtati-prabandha-vyuccheda)[1]

According to the *Lankāvatāra*,[2] Nirvāna is the transformation (parāvrtti) of vijñānas, mind, etc It is devoid of the mental distinctions of existence and non-existence, and of eternal and non-eternal It is not eternal, because it has no distinct generic characteristics, and it is not non-eternal because it can be realized by saints (āryas) It resembles neither death nor destruction[3]

The *Lankāvatāra* then proceeds to elucidate its position by enumerating the different conceptions of Nirvāna current among the non-Yogācārins, and remarks in a general way that all these conceptions are defective, because they fall under either of the two extremes of 'is' and 'is not'[4] The conception of Nirvāna mentioned last among the non-Yogācāra conceptions, however, appears to be Mahāyānic It runs thus There are some who declare that Nirvāna is the removal (vyāvrtti) of citta, manas and manovijñāna by passing from one bhūmi to another till the attainment of the Tathāgatabhūmi, and practice of the samādhi of Māyā, etc, appertaining thereto by (i) realising that everything is a fancy of one's own mind, (ii) not occupying oneself with the existence and non-existence of external things, (iii) ascertaining the true nature (yathābhūta) of things, (iv) non-perceiving subject and object without being deluded by the two extremes which follow from one's own thought-constructions, (v) realising the ineffectiveness of having recourse to proofs, (vi) knowing that the truth is a matter only of self-realisation, (vii) comprehending two nairātmyas, and (viii) removing the two kinds of kleśas (intellectual and habitual) and the two screens (āvaranas klesa and jñeya) The various conceptions which non-Buddhists hold in regard to Nirvāna are their imaginations Moksa (emancipation) and moksopāya (means of emancipation), about which they

[1] *Lankā*, p 157 The Srāvakas are referred to as svasāmānya-laksanapatitāśayābhinivistāh

[2] *Ibid*, pp. 98–9

[3] *Ibid*, p 66

[4] *Ibid*, pp 182 7 for a summary see *E B.*, IV, pp 226ff

speak, do not really exist but the teachers have vikalpa (thought-construction) about them and think of the action and the actor, existence (sat) and non-existence (asat), and busy themselves in jalpa (useless talks) and prapañca (diffuse talks) Just as forms in a mirror are seen but do not exist there, so also in the mirror of vāsanā [1] foolish people see the citta as twofold (dvidhā) [2] Not knowing cittadrśya (citta-image) truly, the ignorant form vikalpas of the seen and the seer, whereas in fact there is only one citta, devoid of laksya and laksana (percipient and percept). The *Lankāvatāra* then goes into details of this exposition, asserting that Tathāgata or Buddha is beyond predications and cannot be said to be made (krtaka) or unmade (akrtaka), cause or effect, for such predication would be doubly faulty If the Tathāgata be krtaka, he would be anitya and identical with all actions, which are by nature impermanent, and if he be akrtaka, he would be non-existent,[3] and the merits so far collected by him become useless, and he becomes non-existent as a sky-flower So the Tathāgata should be regarded as beyond four-fold limitations and hence beyond proofs, and is only to be realised within one's own self When Buddha speaks about things as nirātma, he refers to phenomenal things and not to the Tathāgata A Tathāgata is neither the same nor different from the skandhas, hence he is neither nitya nor anitya Similarly he is not the same nor different from moksa In this way, if no statement can be made about the Tathāgata, and if he is beyond proofs, he turns into a word without any origin and destruction and can be equated with ākāśa, having nothing to rest upon (nirālamba) and beyond prapañca [4] Though the Tathāgata is called Anutpāda-anirodha, it must not be supposed that 'Tathāgata' means only absence (abhāva) of

[1] Vāsanā=knowledge derived from memory=present consciousness of past perceptions, or an impression remaining unconsciously in the mind from past good or evil actions and hence producing pleasure and pain (samskāra) See Monier Williams' *Dict* sv Vāsanā

[2] *Lankā.*, p 182

[3] Alabdhātmakāh=na laksanatah kalpyāh, see *Lankā*, p 19

[4] Cf *M Vr*, p. 536

something,[1] this Anutpāda-anirodha is really the name of the Manomaya-dharmakāya[2] (=Svasambhogakāya) and is not in fact the Reality, the real Tathāgata (=Dharmakāya)

POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE RE NIRVĀṆA IN HĪNAYĀNIC AND MAHĀYĀNIC WORKS

Without going into the discussion on the conception of Nirvāṇa which Buddha had in his mind, and which is to be found in the Piṭakas—a topic ably discussed in many works, the latest of which is Professor La Vallée Poussin's *Nirvāṇa*—we shall compare here the conceptions as found in the *Kathāvatthu*, *Visuddhimagga* and *Abhidharmakośa* on the one hand, and the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, and *Laṅkāvatāra* on the other

All these texts agree in regard to the following points —

(i) Nirvāṇa is inexpressible (nisprapañca), it is unconstituted, and has no origin, no decay and no change

(ii) It is to be realised only within one's own self—the pratyātmavedya of the Yogācārins and the paccattam veditabbam (viññūhi) of the Hīnayānists

(iii) It is not abhāva (absence of anything) as maintained by the Sautrāntikas

(iv) It is one and the same for all Buddhas, past, present and future.

(v) Mārga leads to Nirvāṇa

(vi) Individuality ceases in Nirvāṇa

(vii) The Hīnayānists, in agreement with the Mahāyānists, hold that Buddhas possess extraordinary powers and knowledge, far superior to the Arhats But they do not consider that the Nirvāṇa attained by Buddha is different from that attained by the Arhat[3] They thus object to the assertion of the Mahāyānists that the Nirvāṇa of the Arhats is a lower and not a perfect state

[1] *Laṅkā*, p 191 [2] See *ante*, p 122

[3] *Jāt*, I, Dīpankara Buddha is said to have attained anupādisesanibbānadhātu

(viii) Vimukti (freedom) from afflictions (kleśa) as an aspect of Nirvāna is the same for Arhats and Buddhas [1]

The points of difference regarding the conception of Nirvāna as found in the works mentioned above are —

(i) The *K*, *V* and *A* [2] mention that Nirvāna is existing, eternal (nitya), blissful (sukha) and pure (śuci) The Yogācārins subscribe to this statement when they identify Apratisthita Nirvāna with Dharmakāya [3] Strictly speaking both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins do not predicate of Nirvāna anything like eternal or non-eternal (nitya or anitya), blissful or without bliss (sukha or asukha), pure or impure (suci or aśuci), for Nirvāna to them is beyond all predication and hence cannot be called nitya, anitya and so forth

The Mahāyānists following the warning of Buddha against the two extremes of śāsvata and uccheda decline to apply the predications to everything, including Nirvāna, but the *K* and *V* state that Buddha's warning refers only to the conception of soul, and not to Nirvāna

(ii) The *K*, *V* and *A* consider that Nirvāna is a thing to be acquired (prāptam) while the *M* and *L* [4] consider it to be unobtainable (asamprāptam)

(iii) The *K* and *V* maintain that Nirvāna forms an āram mana (basis) for meditation and knowledge of monks The *M* and *L* do not distinguish between Nirvāna and the monk, knowable and the knower, object and the subject

(iv) The *K*, *V* and *A*. define Nirvāna as a lokottara (transcendental) state, and as really the highest possible state conceivable by them

The *L* and *M* recognise a state higher than lokottara (*L* calls it lokottaratama) and identify it with Nirvāna, remarking that in this state sarvajñatā (omniscience) is obtained—a state unattainable by the Hīnayānists

The Yogācārins are of opinion that the Hīnayānists attain

1 *Sūtrā*, p 36

2 *K* stands for *Kathāvatthu*, *V* for *Visuddhimagga*, and *A* for *Abhidharmakośa*

3 Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p 354

4 *M* stands for *Mādhyamika Vrtti* and *L* for *Lankāvatāra*

only Vimuktikāya or Mokṣa, while the Mahāyānists attain Dharmakāya and Sarvajñatva The Hīnayānists subscribe to this view, for, according to them, Buddha is far superior in knowledge and powers to an Arhat and is omniscient while an Arhat is not

(v) The Hīnayānists know only two forms of Nirvāna, sopādiśeṣa and nirupādiśeṣa, or pratisamkhyā and apratisamkhyā The Yogācārins add to them Prakṛtiśuddha nirvāna[1] and Apratiṣṭhita nirvāna[2]

(vi) The Mādhyamikas consider that Nirvāna is the impersonal absolute immanent in nature, and the only reality,

[1] Cf *M Vr*, p 541, atyantaparinirvṛta

[2] The Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa is the state of one who after obtaining sopādiśeṣa nibbānadhātu develops maitrī, benevolence or charity for the suffering millions and chooses not to let himself automatically pass, as he would otherwise, to anupādiśeṣanibbāna dhātu [Cf *Pañca* (A S B ms), leaf 157a Śrāvakā nirupadhiśeṣanirvānadhātau pratiṣṭhitāḥ] He is then said to be possessed of Nirvāna tinged with charity or benevolence The *Sūtrālaṅkāra* (pp 126–7) puts it very clearly The Śravakas and Pratyekabuddhas, being devoid of love, fix their minds on Nirvāna, consisting in the cessation of all misery The Bodhisattvas, however, being full of compassion, do not like to fix their minds on Nirvāna hence they are said to be in the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāna. It will be noted that the Arhats are not entitled to seek the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāna, they pass directly from sopadhiśeṣa to nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvānadhātu The Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāna can be obtained by Buddhas only, and hence it is a state superior to that of the Arhats The *Vijñaptimātratā* adds that Buddhas in the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāna rise above the idea of Samsāra and Nirvāna (cf *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, p 36), hence Śākyamuni was not really influenced by love or charity after the attainment of Nirvāna The Hīnayānists conceive him as one without love (cf *Milindapañha*, p 160 vigatam tathāgatassa pemam vigato sineho), though in fact, they repeatedly mention that he preached the Truth out of compassion for the innumerable suffering beings (lokānukampāya bahujanahitāya sukhāya) Compassion presupposes the existence of love, which may be, and in fact in the case of Buddha (but not of Bodhisattvas) was purely unselfish and, as the Mahāyānists say, devoid of kleśa For a detailed treatment of the Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāna see Masuda, *Die individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra Schule*, pp 49 f , Stcherbatsky, *Con of N* , pp 185, 245 6 , Lévi, *Mahāyāna Sūtrālankāra*, ii, pp 21, 27 , Keith, *B Phil* , pp 257–8 , *Bodhic* , p 75 , *Vijñaptimātratā*, x, pp 99 (ed of Saeki Kiokuga)

everything else being mere thought-construction It appears like the Absolute of the Vedānta, but lacks the *cit* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss) of the latter

From this it follows that there is the dharma-samatā or the sameness of all things, even of nirvāna and samsāra. These are related to each other as the sea and the waves

(vii) The Mādhyamikas hold with the Yogācārins that Nirvāna is advaya (non-dual), *i e*, in it there is no duality of subject and object, or positive and negative, and that all worldly things are mere illusions

(viii) The Mahāyānists conceive two 'screens' called kleśāvarana and jñeyāvarana[1] which operate as hindrances to the attainment of Nirvāna They hold that the Hīnayānists can get rid of only the klesāvarana, while they themselves get rid of both

CONCLUSION

The agreements and disagreements in the accounts of Nirvāna, as noticed above, point to the following conclusions

The Hīnayānic Nirvāna, *i e*, the Nirvāna as described in the literature of the Theravāda school, clearly refers to a Unity eternally existing beyond the three worlds (Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus) It is infinite, inexpressible, unborn, and undecaying It is homogeneous (ekarasa) and knows no individuality In it, all discriminations or dichotomy cease Many of the aspects of Ākāśa (space) and the ocean bear comparison with those of Nirvāna

Every being is a conglomeration of elements, which can be classified under the five heads, rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāna, hence one being is not essentially different from another, an ordinary man is not different from a perfected saint But if the nature and proportion of each of the five constituents existing in an individual be taken into account, then one being is different from another, an ordinary man is different from a perfected saint It is in this way that the Buddhist saying 'n'eva so na ca añño' (neither the same nor different) is explained

[1] For details, see *ante* Also *Laṅkā.*, pp 97, 241

The combination of elements is the outcome of Karma (past deeds) and is happening every moment (ksanika), implying that the disintegration of elements always precedes it The elements in a combined state pass as an individual, and from time immemorial he labours under the misconception of a self and of things relating to a self His vision being distorted or obscured by ignorance of the truth he cannot perceive the momentary combination and disintegration of elements On the other hand, he is subject to an inclination for them A perfect man with his vision cleared by the Buddhistic practices and culture realises the real state of things, *viz*, that an individual consists of the five elements and does not possess a permanent and unchanging entity called soul

The elements, combined under the force of karma, pass as an individual, who becomes deluded by misconceptions. He weaves a net of fancies around himself and believes he is related in some way or other to things or individuals Because of such illusions he experiences endless sufferings, or according to the Mahāyānists, thinks of himself as suffering, on account of his supposed separation from people or things near and dear to him, or through supposed disorders or derangements of his mental and physical system

It is for these deluded so-called individuals that Buddhism prescribes the eightfold path By following it an individual ultimately realises the transitoriness of things, to which he has hitherto attributed some form of existence, and finds that the elements, by which he thought himself constituted, are ultimately not constituents peculiar to him but common to all other so called beings He is then said to have attained Nirvāna, *i e*, a mental state in which he can no longer distinguish himself as an individual different from the infinite elements constituting the universe In other words, all individuality ends in it In that state of Nirvāna Gautama Buddha is not different from Śāriputra—all are one and the same

The Mahāyānic conception of Nirvāna is completely different from the Hīnayānic The fundamental point of difference is that the Mahāyānists deny the existence of elements

altogether They do not know of any other reality but the truth, the Dharmakāya or Dharmadhātu. Many of the aspects of their conception are brought out by the various terms used in Mahāyānic works For instance, when Nirvāna is equated with śūnyatā, the implication is that all things which are ordinarily supposed to exist are really non-existent just as the mirage has no substantiality whatever, *e g*, the pṛthivī-dhātu is void (śūnya) of real origination, destruction, or existence in reality [1] When it is equated with Tathatā or Dharmatā, the implication is that all things of this world are essentially of the same nature, void of any name or substratum [2] It is that which is neither existence nor non-existence [3] Sūnyatā represents the negative and Tathatā the positive aspects of the Truth When it is called bhūtakoti (true limit), it is implied that on analysis of dharmas, which are false designations, one arrives finally at the Reality, beyond which it is impossible to pass and which alone is true Some of the other expressions which are often used as synonyms of Nirvāna are,—avitathatā (not untruth), ananyatathatā (unique), aviparyāsatathatā (irreversible), paramārtha (the highest truth), tattva (the essence), acintya-dhātu (incomprehensible substance), dharmadhātu (totality of things), dharmasthiti (substratum of things), supraśānta (perfectly calm, unruffled by origination or destruction), advaya and advaidhīkāra (non-separable and non-divisible) [4]

The Mahāyānists hold that all beings other than Buddhas are under delusions, the nature of which varies according to their spiritual advancement An ordinary man is as much under a delusion that he has a son or property as the Hīnayānic saints, the Arhats, who think that they have attained Nirvāna, a state of perfect rest and happiness, and have gone beyond the three worlds The contention of the Mahāyānists is that the only reality is Nirvāna or Dharma-dhātu, everything else being a delusion of the mind The

[1] *Sikṣā*, p 246 [2] *Laṅkā*, p 226 [3] *Sikṣā*, p 263.

[4] Cf *Saṃyutta*, II, pp 25ff, "Iti kho, bhikkhave, yā tatra *tathatā avitathatā anaññatathatā* idapaccayatā, ayam vuccati, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo ti For explanation of the words in italics, see *Vis M*, p 518

moment an individual realises that he is the Reality, that Samsāra is identical with Nirvāna, he becomes perfect, *i e*, a Buddha One must eradicate from his mind the conception not only of his own individuality but also of the substantiality of anything whatsoever perceived or cognized by him When a being attains a state of mind, in which he cannot distinguish himself from any other thing of the world or from the Absolute, he is said to attain Nirvāna in the Mahāyānic sense

(d). The Doctrine of Truths

An important point of difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna pointed out by the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* is that, according to the former, a being, by comprehending the Āryasatyas including the Pratītyasamutpāda, attains Nirvāṇa, i e, he passes from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa, from a laukika to lokottara state, while, according to the latter, a being, by comprehending the fact that there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, that the world has only a relative existence (pratītyasamutpanna) and that it is unreal but appears real to a deluded mind, realises the true Nirvāṇa, which is nothing but the Śūnyatā or Tathatā, the absolute principle underlying the universe The conceptions of the Reality being so wide apart, the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists look upon everything including the Buddhistic practices from two quite different angles of vision To the Hīnayānists, the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda are real and hence belong to the domain of the highest truth (*paramattha* and not *sammuti*), while to the Mahāyānists, they are unreal and belong to the domain of convention (*saṃvṛti* or *parikalpita-paratantra*) The Mahāyānists, however, could not do away with the four truths and the formula of the chain of causation, for, they held that beings, deluded as they are, should at the beginning try to comprehend the Pudgala-śūnyatā through them In consonance with their conception of the Reality, the Mahāyānists held that Buddha had two forms of teaching, conventional and transcendental, and that whatever he said about the Āryasatyas or Pratītyasamutpāda were conventional, his real teaching being Śūnyatā or Tathatā, which could not be imparted by one to another and could be realised only within one's own self Before we enter into the discussion about his two forms of teaching, let us see what the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda are

The Āryasatyas

The Āryasatyas, as commonly known, are *dukkha* (misery), *samudaya* (origin of misery), *nirodha* (cessation of misery) and *magga* (means of the cessation of misery). The underlying teaching of these four truths is that they are to be treated as formulæ for application to everything perceived That these four truths constitute merely a formula and not a doctrine has been brought out very clearly in many Buddhist texts In the *Majjhima Nikāya*[1] while giving an exposition of what the right view (sammādiṭṭhi) is according to the Buddhists, Sāriputta takes up, for instance, āhāra (food), dukkha (misery), jarāmaraṇa (old age and death), taṇhā (desire), nāmarūpa (name and form) and avijjā (ignorance) and applies to each of them the fourfold formula, examining it in this way Take up for consideration a material or an immaterial thing Ascertain its origin. Inquire how it decays In pursuance of this method Sāriputta defines Sammādiṭṭhi through āhāra thus One who knows āhāra (food), āhārasamudaya (how food originates), āhāranirodha (how food decays) and āhāranirodhagāminipaṭipadā (the way in which the decay of food happens) possesses Sammādiṭṭhi The first truth relates to Āhāra which, in the Buddhist philosophy, is of four kinds[2] The second truth is āhārasamudaya, *i e*, āhāra comes into existence on account of taṇhā The third truth is āhāranirodha, *i e*, the ceasing of āhāra when the taṇhā is extinct The fourth truth is the way in which āhāra ceases, it happens by the practice of the eightfold path, *viz*, sammā diṭṭhi, saṅkappa, vācā, *etc* One who knows correctly these truths gets rid of hatred and attachment, rises above the belief in a self, drives out ignorance, and attains freedom from misery So, we see that in these four truths there is nothing particularly Buddhistic They are found in the Brahmanical systems of philosophy as well[3] For instance, the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali (II, 15)

[1] *Majjhima*, I, p 261 See also *Lal Vis*, pp 349, 416–7, *Mtu*, II, p 288, III, p 53

[2] *Digha*, III, pp. 228, 276, *Dhs* 71–3, *Vis M*, p 341

[3] Prof Stcherbatsky remarks, "These four topics—the four noble truths as the term has been very inadequately translated and re-

says Yathā cikitsāśāstram caturvyūham, rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaisajyam iti evam idam api śāstram catur vyūham eva tad yathā samsārah samsārahetur mokso mokso-pāya iti (Just as the science of medicine has four sections dealing with the diagnosis, cause and cure of diseases, and their remedies, so also this science of spiritual healing has four sections dealing with an examination of the nature of the things of the world, the cause of their origin, their removal, and the factors that bring about the removal) The *Abhidharmakośa* also follows up this interpretation by coalescing the four truths into two, *viz*, cause and effect, samsāra (world) and nirvāna (cessation) Duhkha and samudaya relate to samsāra, while nirodha and mārga to Nirvāna Samsāra (world) is the effect while samudaya is its cause, so also Nirvāna (cessation) is the effect while mārga is its cause [1]

This position of the Hīnayānists with regard to the Ārya-satyas is logical, for their cardinal tenet is that a being suffers by wrongly assuming the existence of a self, and thus conceiving himself as a separate entity, standing in some form of relation to every other being or thing of the world, to which again he ascribes an individuality similar to his own The chief aim of Hīnayāna teaching is to expel from one's mind all ideas of individuality, whether of himself or of any other being or thing of the world, and this can only be effected by an examination of the things of this world under the four aspects mentioned above Scrutinizing everything in this way, a being gets rid of his wrong assumption and sees things as they really are This is called sammādiṭṭhi (right view) or vijjā (true knowledge) Once this is reached he can be said to have attained freedom from misery, or Nirvāna

presented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain in reality no doctrine at all" *Con of N*, p 55

1 *Kośa*, VI 4, see also Sogen, *Sys of B Thought*, pp 69ff, *Sūtrā*, pp 137–8, it supports the interpretation of the *Kośa*, see *infra*

THE PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA

Of the four truths, the second and the third comprise th *Pratītyasamutpāda*. The chief object of this formula of causa tion is to establish that things of this world have only dependent origination and hence are impermanent and pro ductive of sufferings, and that there is nothing excep Nirvāna and Ākāśa that does not depend upon cause an condition This formula of causal law has been utilised by th Hīnayānists to show that all constituted things have a preced ing cause and condition and as such they are without an substantiality, while it has been used by the Mahāyānists t establish that the world being relatively existent is unreal lik the objects seen in a dream The formula explains the fixed unchangeable, and this-conditioned (*idappaccayatā*) nature o things, hence it is a key to the eternal truth The moment being realises in his life the truth of this formula he sees th Reality We find for this reason that the Buddhist texts iden tify the formula with Buddha and Dhamma [1] It was th solution of the problem of life and the world that appealed t Sāriputta and proved a fruitful source for Nāgārjuna's specula tions [2]

Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, hav attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of being and some of them have actually drawn parallels betwee the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāmkhya It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddha ghosa's time Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out tha *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded a similar to *pakati* (Prakrti) of the Pakativādins (Sāmkhya) because avijjā is neither uncaused (akāranam) nor is it th primary cause (mūlakāranam) of the world It owes its origi to āsavas (impurities) The reason adduced by Buddhaghos for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddh

[1] See *ante*, p. 51

[2] Nāgārjuna devoted his first chapter to the explanation of only th aspect of the law of causation

[3] See Kern, *Manual etc*, p 46f., for other refs, see Poussin, *Theori des douze causes*, p vii, fn 2.

used 'avijjā' or 'bhavatanhā' for commencing (sīsabhāvam) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (vattakathā or anamatagga)[1]. It is apparent from Buddhaghosa's remark that avijjā need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain It could as well be commenced by bhavatanhā[2] In the *Samyutta Nikāya*[3], the formula starts with *āhāra* as the first link Hence, we see that the Pratītyasamutpāda is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, *i e*, dependent origination) of things Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion That the chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution is also apparent from the last two links, *viz*, jāti and jarāmarana, as the former cannot be the cause of the latter The underlying idea is that if there be jāti, it is inevitably followed by jarāmarana The author of the formula wanted us to take up any two links and realise from them the idappaccayatā or the relative nature of worldly things We may therefore say that the twelve-linked Pratītyasamutpāda like the Āryasatyas is more a general principle than a doctrine peculiar to Buddhism, though undoubtedly, it owes its enunciation to the ancient Buddhist savants It cannot be stated how far Buddha was responsible for the selection of the links though it was perhaps to his penetrating eye that the relative existence of all worldly things became apparent for the first time

As the links of the formula have been explained by Profs

[1] *Vis. M*, p 525.

[2] *Ibid*, p 525 purimā, bhikkhave, koti na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavatanhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavatanhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavī ti Evañ c'etam, bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idapaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) *Cf Saṃyutta*, II, p 178, III, p 149

[3] *Saṃyutta*, II, pp 101–3, *Mahāniddesa*, I, pp. 25–6

La Vallée Poussin, Keith, Oldenberg and others we shall give here only a brief exposition of them [1]

The formula runs as follows [2] (1) avijjāpaccayā [3] saṅkhārā, (2) saṅkhārāpaccayā viññānam, (3) viññānap nāmarūpam [4], (4) nāmarūpap salāyatanam, (5) salāyatanap phasso, (6) phassap vedanā, (7) vedanāp tanhā, (8) tanhāp upādānam, (9) upādānap bhavo, (10) bhavap jāti, (11 & 12) jātip. jarāmaranam

The first link, avijjā, usually refers to the deluded state of mind which debars a being from taking a true view of worldly things, *e g*, mistaking impermanent things as permanent, misery as happiness, a being without a permanent self as possessed of a self and so forth [5] The second link in the chain is sankhārā (impressions or thought-constructions—cetanā) concerning merit (puñña), demerit (apuñña), and qualities that are neither merit nor demerit (āneñja)[6] This is followed by the third link viññāna [7] *i e*, perceptions through the six organs of sense. Concomitantly (sahaja) with viññāna arise the four composites (khandhas) and form a complete being (nāmarūpa) in the fœtus [8] With its growth, the nāmarūpa (body) requires the six organs of

[1] Poussin, *Theorie des douze causes*, Keith, *B Phil*, pp 99ff, Oldenberg's *Buddha* (Hoey's transl 1882), pp 223 f, Gokhale, *Pratītya-samut pādaśāstra des Ullaṅgha*, Bonn, 1930

[2] *Dīgha*, II, pp 55ff, La Vallée Poussin, *Theorie des douze causes*, pp 69 ff, *Vis M*, pp 518 ff, quoting *Samyutta*, II, pp 25–7

[3] In the *Samyutta* (II, pp 101–3) avijjā is replaced by āhāra or any such other thing that gives rise to viññāṇa.

[4] *Dīgha* (II, p 56) omits the first two links and begins its formula thus —Nāmarūpapaccayā viññānam, viññānapaccayā nāmarūpam, *i.e*, viññāna and nāma rūpa are made interdependent *Sālistambasūtra* (p. 82) says that they are sahaja (concomitant)

[5] *Sālistambasūtra*, p 79, see also *Vis M*, p 526

[6] *Sālistambasūtra*, p 82, to these three, the *Vibhaṅga* (p. 135) and *Visuddhimagga* (p 530) add three other, *viz*, kāyasankhāro, vacis and cittas The *Sālistambasūtra* explains in another place (p. 79) that rāga, dvesa and moha in regard to worldly things arising through avidyā are called samskāras

[7] *Sālistambasūtra*, p 82, *Vis M* (p 546) says that puññābhisankhāro produces twenty-one kinds of viññāna, apuññābhi° seven, and āneñjābhi° four

[8] In the *Dīgha* (II, p. 63) and *Sālistambasūtra* (p. 82) viññāṇa and

sense for doing its work, and these organs in their turn produce six forms of contact (phassa)[1] The nature of the contact produces its corresponding feeling (vedanā) and the feeling in its turn gives rise to desire (tanhā) Tanhā leads to upādāna[2] (grasping) of kāma (desire for objects of pleasure), ditthi (wrong views like sassata, asassata, etc), sīlabbata (religious practices like gosīla and govata) and attavāda (belief in a self) This upādāna, which may also be defined as a stronger tanhā, produces a keen desire in a being for future existence in any one of the three worlds, and for this he performs kamma through words, mind and body According to his *kamma* he is reborn in one of the various spheres of existence and becomes in due course old and passes away

Reasons adduced by the Mahāyānists for including the Truths and the Causal Law in their doctrines

The Mahāyānists highly appreciated the teaching conveyed by the formula of causation but were not interested in the significance of its links, as their cardinal tenet was *dharma-śūnyatā* or non-existence of everything worldly Similarly for the āryasatyas, they appreciated the method of analysis of all worldly things as suggested by the four satyas but these in their view have existence similar to the objects in a dream or a mirage Thus, if everything be non-existent, the examination of a non-existent thing is absurd, hence the Mahāyānists should by reasons justify the inclusion of the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda in their doctrines Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, Asanga and Vasubandhu therefore have shown by forcible and illuminating arguments that they were justified in including the Truths and the twelve-linked Law of Causation in their doctrines

nāmarūpa are shown as resting upon each other, *i e*, one cannot remain without the other

[1] Adhivacanasamphassa and paṭighasamphassa, *Dīgha*, II, p 62

[2] *Dīgha*, II, p 58, *Vis M.*, p 569.

NĀGĀRJUNA SUMMARISES THE POSITION OF THE HĪNAYĀNISTS

Nāgārjuna has dealt with the Truths incidentally in his examination of Pratyaya, Karmaphala, Ātman,[1] etc , and at length in his treatment of the Āryasatyas[2] He first summarises the arguments of his opponents thus If everything be non existent (śūnya), there cannot arise any question about the origin and decay of a thing,—in this case, duhkha (misery) The five constituents of beings, which come into existence through pre-existing cause and condition, are called duhkha, because they produce suffering, being subject to change and transformation That these constituents are a source of suffering is realised by the Āryas (i e , Arhats) only, and not by the common people, for the latter labour under the four misconceptions (viparyāsas)[3] of considering impure things as pure, impermanent as permanent, unhappy as happy, and egoless as having ego The common people are like the sick, to whom sweet things appear bitter A person who is not yet an arhat (anārya) does not know that the five upādānaskandhas are a source of suffering It is for this reason that the Truths (satyas) are called truths for the perfect only If everything be sūnya (non-existent), there cannot be the first Āryasatya called duhkha and consequently there can be no samudaya (origin), nirodha (destruction), or mārga (means of destruction of suffering) If the four Āryasatyas do not exist, there cannot exist true knowledge, exertion, or realisation, the four fruits of sanctification or their enjoyer, the Sangha, Dharma, or even Buddha The assertion of śūnyatā (non-existence of everything) goes against the existence of the three ratnas, in fact, of all things, good or bad

NĀGĀRJUNA'S ARGUMENTS TO MEET THE ABOVE CHARGES

Nāgārjuna pities his opponents for their inability to grasp the true sense of śūnyatā, or the object of establishing śūnya-

[1] *M Vr*, chs. I, XVII, XVIII. [2] *Ibid*, ch XXIV.

[3] *Bodhic*, p 375, *M Vr*, pp 464 and 607 referring to *Netti*, p 114 and *Index*, *Śikṣā*, p 198, *Aṅguttara*, II, p 52, *Pātañjala Yogasūtra*, II, 5, *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* (ed of Mm. Vasudev Abhayankar), p. 361, see also *infra*.

tā, and for their false imagination. The object of teaching sūnyatā, he says, is to bring about a complete cessation of all prapañca (*i e*, looking upon unity as manifold) The view held by his opponents that moksa (emancipation) is attained by the destruction of action (karma) and passion (kleśa) is incorrect It is a known fact that ordinarily persons are ignorant of the real state of things They conceive rūpa (form), etc. and allow passion, hatred and delusion to come into existence From this statement as also from the *Śūtras*, it is evident that saṅkalpa (imagination) is the source of all these, from which it follows that karma and kleśa are only products of imagination and have no real existence Their origin is due to the prapañca (thought-creation) which takes hold of the mind of a worldly being, who from the time immemorial is used to a variety of actions and things such as 'gain and loss, happiness and misery, action and the actor, known and the knower, and so forth All these worldly thought-creations cease to exist when a person realises the non-existence of the things which are commonly supposed to have real existence Just as a person does not form any idea (prapañca) about the 'beauty of a barren woman's daughter' and consequently does not weave a net of fancies (kalpanā) around her, so also a Mahāyānist is not troubled with the conception of "I" and "Mine", the roots of a belief in self (satkāyadrsti), nor is he troubled by any cause for the origin of passions. If a person realises that passions (kleśas) do not originate, he cannot have any idea of good or bad action and consequently birth, old age, disease and death Therefore the Yogins (ascetics) established in śūnyatā do not conceive any real skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc and consequently they have no prapañca, vikalpa, satkāyadrsti, kleśa, karma or mrtyu Thus the realisation of śūnyatā brings about the complete cessation of all prapañcas, and so it is said that the realisation of śūnyatā is the same as the realisation of Nirvāna [1]

[1] *M Vr.*, pp 350–1

ŚŪNYATĀ IS NEITHER NĀSTITVA NOR ABHĀVA

Having dealt with the object of the teaching of śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna proceeds to an exposition of śūnyatā by stating its essentials (lakṣaṇas), which are as follows[1] —

(i) It is *aparapratyaya*, *i e*, it cannot be imparted by one to another[2] One is to realise the Truth within himself (pratyātmavedya), and not to understand it by listening to the instruction of Āryas (the Perfect), who can speak of the Truth only through superimpositions (samāropa)

(ii) It is *śānta*, *i e*, it has the nature of cessation,[3] it is undisturbed by origination or destruction

(iii) It is *prapañcairaprapañcitam*, *i e*, it is inexpressible[4] The first prapañca is taken as a synonym of speech (vāk),[5] *i e* the sense of śūnyatā is not utterable by words

(iv) It is *nirvikalpa* or unrealisable in concepts Vikalpa is thought-construction, so śūnyatā is beyond (lit devoid of) thought-construction And, lastly,

(v) It is *anānārtha*, *i e*, devoid of different meanings

Thus he points out that śūnyatā is not to be taken in the sense of nāstitva (nihilism) or abhāva (absence of something) as wrongly supposed by the Hīnayānists He continues his exposition of śūnyatā by equating it with the pratītyasamutpāda, saying

yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatām taṃ pracakṣmahe,
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā

(We say that dependent origination is śūnyatā It is in that sense that the path is middle) All phenomenal

[1] *M Vr*, pp 372-7

[2] Prof. Stcherbatsky (*Con of N*, p 41) translates it as "uncognisable from without" but the commentary of Candrakīrti does not seem to warrant the rendering

[3] See *M Vr*, p 160 where it is shown why śāntam is taken in the sense of svabhāva-virahitam The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law, so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like the seed and the sprout Hence both of them can be described as śānta or svabhāva-virahita Prof Stcherbatsky (*op cit*) uses the word "quiescent" for śānta.

[4] Prof Stcherbatsky (*op cit*) translates it "undifferentiated in words"

[5] *M Vr*, p 373

things are relatively existent, e g , sprout and seed, vijñānas with reference to cause and condition, hence, Nāgārjuna says that things, which are only relatively existent, have in reality no origination, and the fact of this non-origination in reality is śūnyatā So it is asserted by the Teacher in the *Anavataptahradāpasankramanasūtra*[1] that whatever is said to have come into existence through cause and condition (i e relatively) is really unborn, it cannot have real origination, and whatever is subject to cause and condition is śūnya The statement made in the *Lankāvatāra* and elsewhere that all dharmas are śūnya (non-existent) refers to the non-origination of things in reality It is in this sense that the connotation of śūnyatā has come into existence Hence it is said that śūnyatā, which bears the sign of non-origination in reality, is the middle path That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish, hence is neither existent nor non-existent, and as such it is the Middle Path which keeps clear of the two extremes[2]

We may consider this topic in another way. There is nothing which originates without cause and condition and therefore there is nothing which can be called aśūnya (non-relative) It is said in the *Śataka* and elsewhere that nothing is ever produced without cause and condition, or, in other words, there is nothing eternal The ignorant only conceive of eternity, etc in regard to Ākāśa The wise know that all things are caused and conditioned, and they never fall into the delusion of either of the two extremes If it be admitted, as is done by some of the Hīnayānists,[3] that things (i e , the elements that constitute a being) are uncaused and unconditioned, then the four Āryasatyas are contradicted, for how can there be duhkha, the first truth, if things come into existence without cause and condition (apratītya) ?

[1] *M Vr*, p. 239

[2] Cf *Bodhic*, p 359

na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam,
catuskotivinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduh

[3] Referring evidently to the Sarvāstivādins

BUDDHA'S TEACHINGS WERE DELIVERED IN TWO WAYS

Nāgārjuna, thus establishing that śūnyatā is neither nāstitva nor abhāva but a word signifying the relative existence of things, says that the Hīnayānists, too much engrossed in the studies of texts alone, have misunderstood the sense of śūnyatā and do not understand that the Teacher delivered his teachings in two ways, *viz*, conventional and real, or empirical and transcendental So it is said by Nāgārjuna

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā,
lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthatah [1]

(The teachings of Buddhas are based on two kinds of truth, the truth of the world, and the truth in the highest sense)

(a) SAMVRTI

Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva points out that the words in common usage *e g*, skandha, ātman, loka, etc, being enveloped (samvrta) on all sides are called conventional The expression Samvrti has three different senses, which are as follows —

(I) Samvrti is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality, or, in other words, it is identical with ignorance (avidyā) [2] In elucidation of this, Prajñākaramati, the commentator of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, says that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent thing and thus creates an obstacle to the correct view of the reality In support of his statement he quotes from the *Śālistambasūtra* a stanza, in which it is stated that ignor-

[1] *M* I r, p 492, *Bodhic*, p 361 The two kinds of Truth have been dealt with in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Chs V, VI), see *Le Muséon*, 1907, N S, vol VIII for summary of Ch V

[2] *Bodhic*, p 352, Samvriyate āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñānam svabhāvāvaraṇād āvrta(=abhūta)prakāśanāc ca nayeti samvṛtih Avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyāh It is called samvrti because it envelopes the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion, or misconception For Paramārtha being the same as Nirvāna, see *infra*

ance (avidyā) is nothing but the non-realisation (apratipatti) of the truth, and faith in falsehood

(2) Samvrti implies a thing which depends on another for existence, i e, subject to cause and condition,[1] for a really self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay, or any kind of transformation, so whatever is caused and conditioned is sāmvrta (phenomenal)

(3) Samvrti refers to signs or words current in the world, i e, accepted by the generality of the people and based on direct perception[2] Śāntideva desires to point out that rūpa (form), śabda (sound), etc should not be supposed to be really existing on account of being directly perceived by all in the same way Their existence is substantiated by proofs which are valid from the worldly, and not from the transcendental, standpoint If all that is perceived by the senses be true, then a fool knows the truth, and there is no need of exerting for the acquisition of truth In support of his statement, he cites the illustration that the body of a woman, though impure in the highest sense, is regarded as pure by a man whose mind is swayed by attachment, hence a fact cannot be established merely by experience

It may be argued that as the expressions like dhātu, āyatana, etc occur in the scriptures, they are real, and besides had they been non-existent, the Teacher would not have referred to them as momentary, subject to decay, etc Śāntideva explains this away by saying that the Teacher used them only as artifices to lead men, having minds engrossed in thinking of object as existent, to the conception of śūnyatā, i e, things as really non-existent Whatever Buddha said about skandha, dhātu, āyatana or their transitoriness is conventional and not real, hence the existence of dhātus and āyatanas in reality is not established If it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can we account for the experience of ksanikatva (transitoriness) of

[1] *Bodhic*, p. 352 pratītyasamutpannam vasturūpam samvrtir ucyate

[2] *Ibid.*, pp 374–5 pratyaksyam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramānatah

pudgala by the yogins (ascetics) who have perfected themselves in the meditation of pudgalanairātmya (essencelessness of constituted things)? Śāntideva's answer is very simple He said that even the experiences of yogins are not above samvrti, for samvrti includes everything that falls within the scope of buddhi (intelligence), and the reality lies beyond it The experience of the yogins that a woman's body is impure contradicts the experience of an ordinary man who considers it to be pure Thus it is proved that the scriptural authority does not establish the reality of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc.

TWO KINDS OF SAMVRTI SATYAS

All that has been said above applies to loka-samvrti only, *i e*, truths valid in the world of convention, which are accepted as such by the generality of the people There is however another kind of the so-called truth, which should be distinguished as Alokasamvrti, *i e*, truths not accepted by the generality of the people The experiences of a man with diseased eyes or defective organs of sense are peculiar to the man and are not true for all Such experiences should be called Alokasamvrti (conventional truths but not general)

Śāntideva calls these two kinds of conventional truths Tathya-samvrti and Mithyā-samvrti, and distinguishes them thus [1] The Tathya-samvrti (phenomenal truth) refers to things which originate out of a cause (kiñcit pratītyajātam) and are perceived in the same way by all persons with unimpaired organs of sense, *e.g*, the colour blue, etc The Mithyā-samvrti refers to those things or statements which are accepted only by individuals and not universally, though they may have originated through cause and condition, *i.e*, they are like things perceived by a person with a defective organ of sense

(b) PARAMĀRTHASATYA

The truth of the Āryas who see things as they really are is quite different from the two so-called truths mentioned

[1] *Bodhic*, p 353

above. Nāgārjuna says that this truth, Paramārthasatya, is identical with Nirvāṇa.[1] It does not admit of any distinction as subject and object[2] It is un-originating and undecaying, and as such it is not an object to be grasped by the mind It is indeterminable by speech and unknowable by knowledge.[3] Hence the highest truth is inexpressible and can be realised only within one's own self[4] It cannot form the subject-matter of instruction, and hence it cannot be imparted by one to another Śāntideva explains the truth (tattva or paramārthasatya) as beyond the range of buddhi (intellection or perception) while that which comes within the range of buddhi is conventional (samvṛti)[5] According to him, the truth is attainable by giving up all things which act as hindrances to knowledge, *viz*, impressions (vāsanā), connection (anusandhi) and passion (kleśa) through comprehension of the real nature of things It is therefore the same as the non-existence of all dharmas and as such it may be taken as a synonym of śūnyatā (essencelessness), tathatā (thatness), bhūtakoṭi (true limit), and dharmadhātu (totality of things) All that is caused and conditioned is not really existent, because everything undergoes change with time, while in a really existent thing no change is possible, neither can the fact of coming and going be attributed to it Things that are supposed to have existence are like an illusion or an echo, because they arise through cause and condition, and disappear when the cause and condition cease So, in reality, there can be no origination through cause and condition, because real origination does not depend upon and is not subject to something else All things arise subject to some preceding causes and condi-

[1] See *ante* Samvṛti is identified with avidyā and buddhi See *Bodhic*, pp 352, 366, also Stcherbatsky, *op cit*, p 164 n

[2] Cf *Bodhic*, p 366 Paramārthasatyam sarvavyavahārasamatikrāntam nirviśesam Asamutpannam aniruddham Abhidheyābhidhānajñeyajñānavigatam.

[3] *M Vr.*, pp 364, 493.

[4] *Bodhic*, p 367 āryāṇām eva svasamvidita-svabhāvatayā pratyātmavedyam.

[5] *Bodhic*, p 354

tions, hence they are really non-existent. How, then, can an existent thing be expected to arise out of them? Can anybody ascertain whence the illusory things produced by causes come and where they go? In this connection Śāntideva comments elaborately on the famous stanza of Nāgārjuna

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpyahetutah,
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāh kvacana kecana [1]

(Nowhere and never does a really existent thing originate out of a self or non-self or both self and non-self or without any cause)

The aim of Śāntideva as also other writers on Mahāyāna is to assert that the real truth (paramārthasatya) is that things of this world have no more existence than the magic figures created by a magician As these figures and their movements are taken as real by the ordinary people while the magician himself does not concern himself about their reality, so also in this world, the viparyastas i e, those whose vision is obscured and subject to error run after, or weave their thoughts around, the various phenomenal things, while the yogin, who knows the highest reality, does not pay heed to them In short, the Paramārthasatya is nothing but the realisation of the dream-like or echo-like nature of Samvrtisatyas [2]

If Paramārthasatya be of an inexpressible nature and Samvrtisatya be non-existing like an illusion or echo as urged by Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, a Hinayānist may enquire about the necessity of preaching on the topics like skandha, dhātu,

[1] *Bodhic*, p 357, *M Vr*, p 12

[2] *Bodhic*, pp. 368, 379 The Satyasiddhi school introduced the two kinds of truth, Vyavahārasatya and Paramārthasatya into the Buddhist metaphysics In the *Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra* these two truths form the principal subject of discussion (Vaidya, *Catuhśatikā*, p 19) In the Mahāyāna literature there are other expressions bearing the same sense as Paramārtha and Samvṛti, e g, Nītārtha and Neyyārtha, see *M Vr*, p 41, V Sastri, *I H Q*, iv, 2 on Sandhyā-bhāsā, *M Vr.*, pp 41, *Sūtrā*, p 51

For Pāramārthika and Ābhiprāyikī, see *M Vr*, pp. 42 ff, *Sūtrā*, p 138, Keith, *B Phil*, p 235, *Journal Asiatique*, 1903, ii, p 360 for comments on Samvṛti and Paramārtha

āyatana, āryasatyas, pratītyasamutpāda etc , which are conventionally true and not true in the highest sense (atattva) The reply is

> vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate,
> paramārtham anāgamya nirvānam nādhigamyate [1]

(The highest truth cannot be imparted without having recourse to conventional truths, and Nirvāna cannot be attained without the realisation of the highest truth) In other words, the highest truth cannot be brought home directly to a mind, which normally does not rise above the conventional distinction of subject and object, knower and known, hence it must be imparted through conventional truths, and unless it is so imparted one cannot be expected to extricate himself from worldly limitations and arrive at Nirvāna It is for this reason that the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with sāmvrta topics like dhātu, āyatana, āryasatya and pratītyasamutpāda, they are like vessels to the seeker of water

The other reason [2] for which the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with sāmvrta topics is that the Paramārthasatya cannot be explained to another by signs or predicates, but yet it has to be explained So the only alternative is to explain it by the negation of sāmvrta matters As it is *agocara* (beyond the cognizance of buddhi—intellection), *avisaya* (beyond the scope of knowledge), *sarvaprapañcavinirmukta* (beyond the possibility of detailed descriptions), *kalpanāsamatikrānta* (beyond every possible form of imagination, *e g* , existence or non-existence, true or untrue, eternal or non-eternal, permanent or impermanent, happy or unhappy, pure or impure, and so forth) [3], the only way to explain it to the people is through common place terms and illustrations A person with diseased eyes sees a net of hair, he is corrected by another whose eyes are healthy, the latter negating the afflicted man's statement that there (really) is a net of hair. The

[1] *M Vr*, p 494, *Bodhic*, p 365, see also p 372: Upāyabhūtam vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtam paramārthasatyam (also in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, vi, 80) *Pañca* (A S B ms) leaf 56a Na ca Subhūte samskṛtavyatirekena asamskṛtam śakyam prajñāpayitum.

[2] *Bodhic*, p 363.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 366–7 These terms can be easily multiplied.

man with healthy eyes does not indicate by such a negation that he is either denying or affirming something Similarly, persons whose right vision is obstructed by ignorance conceive of the existence of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc, which are in reality non-existent phenomenal forms. Buddhas like the persons with healthy eyes know this, and they cannot help saying that there are in reality no skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, but thereby they neither deny nor affirm their existence Therefore the highest truth cannot be preached without the help of the conventional truths So it is said

> anaksarasya dharmasya śrutih kā deśanā ca kā,
> sruyate deśyate cārthah samāropād anaksarah[1]

[How can there be hearing and preaching of dharma which is un-utterable (lit cannot be articulated), it is by the superimposition of ideas on the reality which is inexpressible that the latter can be preached or heard]

If it be established that all mundane things are really non-existent, there is a probability of the Paramārtha (the highest truth) being conceived as nihilism Nāgārjuna sounds a note of warning against such a conception by saying that śūnyatā should not be identified with the extinction of a thing which existed before The question of extinction or nihilism does not arise, because the existence of something preceding is not admitted Neither should it be regarded as something existing by having recourse to superimpositions Those, who do not realise the real distinction between these two kinds of truth, fall into the error of either conceiving sūnyatā as the non-existence of samskāras (constituents of a being) or of assuming the existence of something as the basis of śūnyatā Both are wrong views, and people of limited knowledge misunderstand sūnyatā as the one or the other The distinction was, in fact, so very subtle that even Buddha hesitated to preach the truth at first[2]

[1] *Bodhic.*, p 365, *M Vr*, p 264, xv 2, *cf. Laṅkā*, p. 194.
[2] Buddhaghosa also uses this argument, see *ante*

The Hīnayānists mistake Śūnyatā as Abhāva

In concluding his argument, Nāgārjuna says that the Hīnayānists, by attributing the sense of abhāva (absence or non-existence) after assuming the existence of something to śūnyatā, fall into error and fail to understand the standpoint of the Mahāyānists The Mahāyānic conception of śūnyatā, i e, that everything is non-existent fits in correctly with all dharmas and all statements, it is when śūnyatā is seen in this light that one can perceive the reasonableness of the formulæ of Causal Law and the Four Truths, the fruits of sanctification, saṅgha, dharma, buddha, things worldly and transcendental, deeds right and wrong, a good or bad condition and other conventional matters Nāgārjuna having stated his position attacks the Hīnayānists for their inability to comprehend the correct sense of the Causal Law He says that just as a rider while riding may forget his horse and revile another for stealing it, so also the Hīnayānists, because of their distracted mind, fail to grasp the truth that śūnyatā is the true sense and the chief characteristic of the Causal Law, and attack the Mahāyānists, the Śūnyatāvādins, for misinterpreting it

The Position of the Hīnayānists with regard to the Truths and the Causal Law is untenable

Nāgārjuna now proceeds to assail the position of his opponents He says that those, who admit the reality of unconstitued things, cannot logically support the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda

It should be remembered that the Hīnayānists apply the Causal Law to constituted things only Nāgārjuna attempts to make the position of the Hīnayānists untenable by asserting that the Law should be universally applicable, and that there cannot be anything in the world which was excepted by Buddha as beyond its range He argues that if things exist by themselves, they are not subject to causes and conditions, and such being the case, there is no need to draw distinctions of external and internal, no need of causes and conditions, or the doer and the doing of an action In short, the Hīnayānic theory contradicts the origin and decay

as well as the fruits of sanctification Hence, the position of the Hīnayānists that things exist by themselves is untenable It also contradicts the words of Buddha who said on many occasions. apratītyasamutpanno dharmah kaścin na vidyate (there never exists anything which originated without cause and condition) This statement of Buddha, however, fits in with the definition of śūnyatā as given by the Mahāyānists

If all things be existent (aśūnya) and if it originates without cause and condition, there cannot be anything impermanent, and consequently no duhkha

Again, if duhkha be taken as something existing, then the truths of samudaya and nirodha (origin and decay) of misery, and mārga (the eight-fold path leading to the decay of misery) are meaningless Nāgārjuna thus pays back the Hīnayānists in their own coin

Then, with reference to the parijñāna (detailed knowledge) of the Hīnayānists Nāgārjuna shows that it is not logical to maintain that duhkha, assuming it to be an existent thing, was unknown before, and that it is known subsequently because existent things remain always in the same condition (svabhāvah samavasthitah) and never undergo any change If an existent thing be not subject to change, it cannot be maintained that duhkha which was unknowable at first was known later on From this it follows that there is no duhkha-parijñāna (knowledge of suffering) Consequently, prahāna (abandonment), sākṣātkarana (realisation), and bhāvanā (meditation) are meaningless

As it is unreasonable to claim knowledge of duhkha, which was formerly by nature unknowable, it is wrong to assume the existence of the fruit of Srotāpatti, which did not exist before but was realised later on, and so with the other fruits of sanctification The same reasoning—that which was by nature unattainable cannot be attained later on—is applied to show that there can be no one who enjoys these fruits, and consequently no Sangha If there be no Āryasatyas, there cannot be Dharma, and in the absence of Dharma and Sangha there cannot be a Buddha If it be assumed that Buddha and Bodhi exist by themselves, then

one remains without any reference to the other. If Buddhahood be taken as already existing, a person, who by nature is a non Buddha, can never attain Bodhi, however much he may practise the Bodhisattva duties, because a non-Buddha cannot be expected to change

MAHĀYĀNIC DEFINITION OF ĀRYASATYAS

Nāgārjuna's point is that if a thing exists by itself then it is absurd to speak of it as created, having a creator, and so forth Just as nobody speaks of uncovering the sky because the open sky exists by itself, so also nobody should say that a thing, existing by itself, has been made or attained In fact, the theory of pratītyasamutpanna (one existing with reference to another, *i e*, relatively) must be admitted, as otherwise even the expressions of everyday usage such as go, do, cook, read, etc , become meaningless If the world is supposed to exist by itself, the world would be unoriginating, undecaying and unchangeable as the self-existent is changeless The world, according to the Aśūnyavādins (*i e* the Realists who do not admit śūnyatā), would have no concern with the Causal Law and be beyond the possibility of diversity Had the world been so, says the *Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra*, it would not have been dealt with by Buddha, and the Teacher would have, as the *Hastikakṣyasūtra* says, gone there with all disciples

Nāgārjuna concludes by saying that he who realises Pratītyasamutpāda can rightly know the four truths and quotes a passage from the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā* dealing with the Mahāyanic view of the four truths It runs as follows,—he who realises that no dharmas have originated has known duhkha; he who realises the non-existence of all dharmas has suppressed the source (samudaya) of misery, he who realises that all dharmas are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) has comprehended the truth of nirodha (cessation), and he who realises the means by which the absence of all things is known is said to have practised the path (mārga). This has been developed thus in the *Dhyāyitamuṣṭisūtra*. Unable to comprehend the four truths properly on account of being

troubled by the four viparyāsas (misconceptions),[1] sentient beings cannot go beyond the world of transmigration They conceive of ātman (self) and ātmīya (things relating to a self) and thus have karmābhisaṃskāra (actions)[2] Not knowing that all things are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) they imagine the existence of themselves and others, and become engrossed therein to the extent of having affection, infatuation and ultimately delusion They now perform actions, physically, verbally, and mentally, and after making some superimpositions of existence on non-existing things, they think that they are subject to affection, infatuation, and delusion In order to get rid of them, they take initiation into the doctrines of Buddha, observe the precepts and hope to pass beyond the world and attain Nirvāna They imagine that some things are good, some bad, some are to be rejected, some to be realised, that duḥkha is to be known, the samudaya of duhkha to be given up, the nirodha of duḥkha to be realised, and the mārga to be practised They also imagine that all constituted things are impermanent and endeavour to pass beyond them Thus, they attain a mental state full of disgust (or contempt) for constituted things, having animitta (absence of sign or cause) as its preceding condition They think that they have thus known duḥkha, i e, the transitoriness of constituted things, become terrified by them, and shun their causes Having imagined something as source (samudaya) of duhkha, they conceive of cessation (nirodha) of duhkha and decide to follow the path (mārga) to attain it They retire to a secluded place with a mind full of disgust and attain quietude (śamatha) Their minds are no longer moved by worldly things and they think that they have done all that is to be done, they are freed from all sufferings and have become arhats But after death they find themselves reborn among the gods and in their minds exist

[1] See *ante*, p. 212

[2] *Cf Bodhic*, p. 350, Viparyāsasamjñino 'satsattvasamāropābhiniveśavaśād ātmātmīyagrahapravṛtter ayoniśomanasikāraprasūto rāgādikleśagaṇah samupajāyate Tasmāt karma, tato janma, etc

doubts about Buddha and his knowledge When they die again, they pass to hell because they doubt the existence of the Tathāgata after forming some misconceptions about all dharmas which are unoriginated The four truths are therefore to be seen in the light of the *Mañjuśrīsūtra* as pointed out above

THE *Prajñāpāramitā* ON THE ĀRYASATYAS

The new point of view from which the Āryasatyas are looked at by Nāgārjuna's school appears in the *Prajñāpāramitās* in connection with the attempt to explain the conception of śūnyatā The *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* thus defines the Āryasatyas [1]

What is *duhkhasatyāvavāda*? A Bodhisattva while practising the prajñāpāramitā should not consider himself to be attached or unattached (yukta or ayukta) to any one of the five skandhas, or to any organ of sense, or to their āyatanas or to the vijñana produced by the contact of the organs of sense with their respective objects, or to any of the four truths, twelve links of the chain of causation, eighteen kinds of śūnyatā, and so forth He should not look upon anything as rūpa, vedanā, *etc*, as connected or unconnected This is called, according to the *Prajñāpāramitā*, a sermon on the first truth, Duhkha The underlying idea is that if a Bodhisattva thinks himself as connected or unconnected with anything, which, according to the *Prajñāpāramitā*, is non-existent or has only a conventional existence, then the Bodhisattva is subject to duhkha (suffering), even if a Bodhisattva considers himself as having realised the truths or the causal law or śūnyatā, he would be subject to duhkha, though, according to the Hīnayānists, the Bodhisattva thereby attains sukha or nirvāna

What is *samudayasatyāvavāda*? A Bodhisattva while practising *prajñāpāramitā* does not consider whether rūpa or any other skandha is subject to origination or destruction (utpādadharmin or nirodhadharmin), or to contamination or purification (saṃkleśadharmin or vyāvadānadharmin). He knows

[1] *Pañca.*, pp 43 f

that rūpa does not convert (samavasarati) into vedanā, or vedanā into samjñā, and so forth, a dharma, in fact, on account of its nature being unreal (prakrti-śūnyatā), cannot be converted into another dharma. Neither that which is śūnyatā (non-existence) of rūpa is rūpa, nor does the śūnyatā of rūpa take a rūpa (form), therefore śūnyatā is neither different from, nor identical with, rūpa, and in this way the other skandhas are treated This is called the sermon on samudaya The object of this discourse is to establish that the so-called things of the world have really no existence and hence there can be no origination, transformation, or destruction, and so a Bodhisattva should remain unconcerned with the conception of samudaya of things.

What is *nirodhasatyāvavāda*? A Bodhisattva is to know that śūnyatā has no origin, decay, contamination, purification, decrease, increase, past, present, or future In it, therefore, there can be no rūpa, vedanā *etc*, no duhkha, samudaya, *etc*, not even srotāpanna, sakrdāgāmi or Buddha This is called nirodhasatyāvāvāda This statement is meant to convey that nirodha is nothing but the realisation of the real nature of śūnyatā

Arguing in this way the *Prajñāpāramitā* shows that the truth is śūnyatā, *i e*, the non-existence of the so-called things of the world, and this may be called the third truth, nirodha, while duhkha consists in thinking oneself as related in some way or other to the conventional things, and samudaya in believing that the origination of things does really happen As the mārga has no place in this interpretation of the āryasatyas, the *Prajñāpāramitā* omits it

MISCONCEPTION OF THE ARHATS

Nāgārjuna, as we have seen, establishes by quotations from the Mahāyānic texts that Hīnayānic Arhats labour under misconceptions Of the four common misconceptions (viparyāsas), they are not free from the fourth, *viz*, seeing ego in egoless things, thinking non-existent things as existent [1] But this statement of Nāgārjuna or of the Mahāyānic texts

[1] Cf. *Bodhic*, p. 350

with reference to the Hīnayānists has in view the egolessness of things generally (dharmaśūnyatā) and not merely of constituted things with which the Hīnayānists are concerned Nāgārjuna ends his discourse by asserting that the truth is that all things are like echo, mirage, or images in dreams When one realises this, he has neither love nor hatred for any being and with a mind like the sky, he does not know of any distinctions as Buddha, Dharma, or Sangha and does not have doubts regarding anything. Being without doubt and without attachment, he attains parinirvāna without upādāna

Śāntideva[1] also reasons in this way and says that a person's avidyā, the source of delusion, which comes about on account of the attribution of existence (sat) to non-existent things (asat), or ego (ātmā) to egoless things (anātmā), ceases to exist when he realises truly (paramārthatah) that things have only a dreamlike or echolike existence On the cessation of avidyā, the other links of the chain of causation[2] get no opportunity to arise and hence the person obtains Nirodha

The Mahāyānists thus relegate the four Truths and the Causal Law to the domain of matters conventional and not real, and assert that they are necessary in the doctrines of Mahāyāna inasmuch as they serve as a means for the guidance of living beings, who, as individuals in this world, cannot but have their vision distorted or screened by ignorance[3]

[1] Cf *Bodhic*, pp 350–1

[2] Śāntideva speaks of the chain of causation as consisting of three parts, *viz.*,

(i) kleśakāṇda—avidyā, tṛṣṇā and upādāna,

(ii) karmakānda—samskāra and bhava, and

(iii) duhkhakānda—all the remaining links of the chain For such divisions, see also Gokhale, *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* of Ullangha

[3] The commentator of *Bodhic* (p 362), in order to show that the four Āryasatyas are really two, says that duḥkha, samudaya, and mārga should be classified under samvṛti, and nirodha under paramārtha.

YOGĀCĀRA TREATMENT OF THE ĀRYASATYAS AND THE PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA

Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva explain the position of the Mādhyamikas with regard to the Four Truths and the Causal Law as shown above

Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and other writers on the Yogācāra system deal with this topic incidentally Asaṅga, for instance, refers to the four truths,[1] saying that the first two relate to the origin of the world or the happening of repeated births and the cause thereof, while the second two relate to the disappearance of things and the causes thereof The first two need suppression while the second two need realisation In connection with the fourteen ways of practising the smṛtyupasthānas (power of recollection) by Bodhisattvas, it is pointed out that one can enter, and also make others enter, into the four truths by means of the smṛtyupasthānas Other Yogācāra writings, viz, the *Siddhi* and the *Lankāvatāra*, do not specifically refer to the four truths but they deal with the doctrines of the Hīnayānists for the sake of comparison and contrast For instance, they speak of the Hīnayānists as those who maintain the overt sense of Buddha's teachings and not their deeper meaning,[2] being satisfied only with ascertaining the generic characteristics of things but never questioning about their essential unreality[3] They labour under the misconception (parikalpanā) of taking the three worlds as real, of postulating distinctions as subject and object, of assuming the existence of skandhas (constituents of beings), dhātu (organs

[1] *Sūtrā*, pp 137–8, 149–1

[2] *Laṅkā*, p 14 yathārutārthabhinivistā For a description of the rutārthagrāhi, see *Laṅkā*, pp 154f, 160f, 197, 227 *Laṅkā* (p 77) says, "sūtrāntah sarvasattvāśayadeśanārthavyabhicārani na sā tattvapratyavasthānakathā (the discourses are not faithful expositions of the truth because they were preached according to the mental tendencies of beings) For a remark like this, see *M Vr*, dealt with before, *Sūtrā*, p 51, alpaśrutatvam nītārthasūtrāntaśravanāt

[3] *Laṅkā*, pp 51, 71, 63 Yah skandhadhātvāyatanasvasāmānyalakṣaṇaparijñānādhigame deśyamāne romāñcitatanur bhavati Lakṣaṇaparicayajñāne cāsya buddhih praskandati na pratītyasamutpādāvinirbhāgalakṣaṇaparicaye

of sense), āyatana (spheres of the organs of sense), citta (mind), hetupratyaya (cause and condition), kriyāyoga (action), utpāda[1] (origin), sthiti (continuance), bhaṅga (dissolution), etc The *Laṅkāvatāra*,[2] speaking of Pratītyasamutpāda, says that it is by comprehending that things originate through cause and condition that one can get rid of the misconception of taking non-existent things as existent, and of assuming gradual or simultaneous origin of things. Then it explains as usual that the dependent origination happens in two ways, externally and internally, *e g* , an earthen pot, butter, sprout, etc , originate through an external cause (hetu)[3] and condition (pratyaya), while ignorance (avidyā), desire (tṛṣṇā), action (karma), etc originate through an internal cause and condition The remarks of the Yogācāra writers indicate that the four truths and the causal law of the Hīnayānists belong to the domain of imagination (parikalpanā) and not to that of reality

THE YOGĀCĀRAS HAVE THREE TRUTHS FOR TWO OF THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

It should be remembered that though the Yogācārins are sharply criticised by the Mādhyamikas[4] for their conception of the eighth consciousness called Ālaya-vijñāna (or store-consciousness), both these schools of thought agree in holding that all things (dharmas) are non-existent, and are without origin and decay,[5] and that the highest truth is unutterable (anakṣara),[6] is identical with thatness and unchangeableness, possesses the signs of anāyūha and niryūha (non-taking and non-rejection) and is beyond every possible means of determination[7]. Passages like this can be multiplied from the

[1] *Laṅkā* , pp 42, 43, 225 [2] *Ibid* , pp 82–3, 84, 140

[3] For six kinds of hetu, see *Laṅkā* , p 83

[4] *M Vṛ* , p 523

[5] *Triṃśikā*, p 41 sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvā anutpannā aniruddhā iti nirdiśyante

[6] Buddhas are silent (mauna) and never preach a word *Laṅkā* , pp 16, 17, 144, 194

[7] *Laṅkā* , p 196 Tathātvam ananyathātvam tattvam anāyūhaniryūha-lakṣaṇam sarvaprapañcopaśamam , p 73 śūnyatānutpādādvaya niḥsvabhāvalakṣaṇam.

Yogācāra works to show that their conception of the Reality, apart from Ālayavijñāna, is the same as that of the Mādhyamikas They also hold with the Mādhyamikas[1] that from time immemorial, the mind has been under the delusion of imputing existence (sat) to non-existent things (asat), and that the Hīnayānists were not able to rid their minds completely of the four viparyāsas (misconceptions)[2] inasmuch as they meditated on Pudgalanimitta (individuality as basis) only and not on sarvadharmanimitta (all things whatsoever as basis) and conceived of Nirvāna as something existent[3], full of peace and beyond misery Their conception is that the highest truth, which they usually call Parinispanna for the Paramārtha of the Mādhyamikas, is the realisation of the fact that all dharmas perceptible to our mind have no more existence than the images in a dream or the reflection of the moon in water

From time immemorial, however, our minds are so deluded that we cannot help perceiving in the images or reflection something existent, or in other words, with our common knowledge we cannot rise above parikalpanā (imaginary existence), the samvrti of the Mādhyamikas and others The Yogācāras add a rider to the parikalpanā, saying that it depends for origination on something else, and hence it is always paratantra, the pratītyasamutpanna of the Mādhyamikas and others It is not necessary that the basis of a parikalpanā need be anything existent or real, *e g*, a person may be frightened by an echo In short, Parikalpita and Paratantra relate to worldly matters only, to the anitya, anātman and duhkha of the Hīnayānists, while, parinispanna relates to the Nirvāna, the Śānta[4], *i e*, where all kleśas and vikalpas cease

Asaṅga brings out the relation of the three forms of truth thus The highest truth (paramārtha or parinispanna) is non-duality, which is shown in five ways Two of these are

[1] *M Vr*, Ch XXIV quoting Dhyāyitamustisūtra

[2] *Sūtrā*, p 169 Tatra caturviparyāsānugatam pudgalanimittam vibhāvayan yogī śrāvakabodhim pratyekabodhim vā labhate Sarvadharmanimittam vibhāvayan mahābodhim.

[3] *Laṅkā*, p 72

[4] *Sūtrā*, p 146, cf *M Vr*, Ch. XVIII

that it is non-existing under the aspect of Parikalpita and Paratantra and not non-existing under the aspect of Parinispanna It is not the same because the Parikalpita and Paratantra are not the same as Parinispanna It is not different, because the former two are not different from the latter[1] In another connection Asaṅga says that a Bodhisattva can be truly called a śūnyajña (one who knows the real nature of non-existence) when he understands it under three aspects, *viz*, first, that the non-existence means the absence of signs which are commonly attributed to an imaginary object (parikalpita), secondly, that the non-existence is the absence of any particular form of existence that one imagines it to be (paratantra), and thirdly, that which is by nature non-existent (parinispanna)[2] The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*[3] elucidates this point by saying that the nature of non-existence is of three kinds, *viz*, (i) laksana-nihsvabhāvatā (non-existence of the signs commonly attributed to a thing and hence of the thing itself, *i e*, parikalpita), (ii) utpattinihsvabhāvatā (non-existence of a thing when considered from the standpoint of its origin, *i e*, paratantra), and (iii) paramārthanihsvabhāvatā (non-existence of a thing in the highest sense, *i e*, parinispanna)

A. PARIKALPITA

Sthiramati, in commenting on the *Siddhi* says that the first category, Parikalpita, refers to the non-existence of things by its characteristics or signs A thing cannot be conceived to exist unless it is accompanied by some characteristics, the sign of form is attributed to an object, or the sign of pain, pleasure, etc is attributed to a feeling Endless things which people imagine, not excluding the dharmas attributed to a Buddha, have existence only in one's imagination, hence they are parikalpita *i e* have nothing corresponding to them in reality. The *Lankāvatara*[4] says that the parikalpita existence is inferred from signs[5] (nimitta) and explains it thus All dependently originating things are known by their nimitta (signs) and

[1] *Sūtrā*, p 22 na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā, etc
[2] *Ibid*, pp 94–5
[3] *Siddhi*, pp 39–42
[4] *Lankā*, p 67.
[5] Prof Lévi translates nimitta by "signs of connotation"

laksana (characteristics)[1] Now, things having nimitta and laksana are of two kinds Things known by nimitta only refer to things generally, internal and external, while things known by nimitta-laksana refer to the knowledge of generic characteristics of things both internal and external[2] Asanga[3] distinguishes parikalpita into three kinds · *viz*, (i) the basis (nimitta or ālambana) of one's thought-constructions, (ii) the unconscious impression (vāsanā) left by them upon one's mind, and (iii) the denominations (arthakhyāti) following the impressions are taken as real

B PARATANTRA

The second category, Paratantra, refers to the imaginary existence pointed out above regarded from the aspect of its origin, *i e*, all objects or feelings, which have existence only in imagination, and depend for origination on something else (paratantra) Things as they appear are not the same as their origin or source, so it is said that the unreality of things is perceptible when they are viewed from the standpoint of their origin Though the things, good, bad and indeterminate, or the three worlds (dhātu) or the mind and its various functions, have only imaginary existence, they arise, however, from causes and conditions, *i e* they depend for origin on others, and hence they cannot be said to exist really, because a real thing remains always the same and does not depend on cause and condition The *Lankāvatāra* puts it very briefly thus that which proceeds from a basis is dependently originated or paratantra (yadāśrayālambanāt

[1] *Lankā*, pp 224–6 five natures of existent things (i) nāma, (ii) nimitta, (iii) vikalpa, (iv) samyakjñāna, and (v) tathatā.

Nāma—samjnā, samketa Ignorant persons, deluded by various signs (laksana), become attached to things as self or mine, and thus weave a net of thought constructions around themselves

Nimitta—the reflection (ābhāsa) of eye-consciousness known as form, so also the reflections of ear consciousness, nose-c, tongue-c, body-c, mind c known as sound, smell, taste, touch and things are called nimitta.

Nimitta is more or less a sign impressed upon consciousness and laksana is definition, or features constituting a definition

[2] *Lankā*, p. 67, 150, 163

[3] *Sūtrā*, p 64

pravartate tat paratantra) Asaṅga analyses the paratantra in this way. the mark of being paratantra is the false thought-construction (abhūtaparikalpaḥ) about subject (grāhaka) and its object (grāhya)[1]

C PARINIṢPANNA

The third category, Parinispanna, refers to the Paramārtha[2] (the highest truth) or Tathatā (Thatness) Like ākāśa (space) it is homogeneous (lit. has one taste—ekarasa), pure, and changeless The Parinispanna-svabhāva (absolute reality) is called Paramārtha because it is the highest aspect in which all dependently originated things are to be looked upon. In this sense, it can be called also dharmatā (the nature of things), or in other words, it is the Absolute immanent in the phenomenal world The *Siddhi* points out that the parinispanna (the Absolute) is so called because it is absolutely changeless If it be compared with the Paratantra, it may be said to be that paratantra which is always and ever completely devoid of the differentiations as subject and object, which are nothing but the mere play of imagination, and hence absolutely non-existing Thus, it follows that the parinispanna is the same as the paratantra *minus* the parikalpita[3]

TWO TRUTHS IN HĪNAYĀNA

It is clear from the summarised discussions that the Paramārtha of the Mādhyamikas and the Parinispanna of the Yogācāras indicate the Truth as conceived by them Accepting that Truth as the only reality, they relegate everything else to the domain of unreality calling them conventional, samvrti or parikalpita, with this reservation that the conventional things appear and disappear subject to causes and

[1] *Sūtrā*, p 65
grāhaka=manas, 5 vijñānas and vikalpa,
grāhya=padābhāsa, arthābhāsa and dehābhāsa

[2] For seven different kinds of Paramārtha, see *Laṅkā*, p 39

[3] This exposition is based on the *Siddhi*, pp 39–42 Masuda has utilised the Chinese version of this treatise, for which see his *Der individualistische etc* pp 40–43 For general discussion, see La Vallée Poussin, *E R E*, *sv Philosophy* (Buddhist), L D Barnett, *Path of Light* (Wisdom of the East Series), p 102, Keith, *B Phil*, pp 235–236, Sogen, *Systems etc*, pp. 145, 146, Stcherbatsky, *Con. of N*, p 33

conditions, or in other words, they conform to the law of causation, the Pratītyasamutpāda of the Buddhists in general, and the Paratantra of the Yogācāras

The Hīnayānists utilise these expressions just as much as the Mahāyānists and they also call their Truth the only reality, *Paramattha*, everything else being conventional, *Sammuti*, their truth, in one word, being anattā, non-existence of any substantiality in the so-called things of the world, with the corollary that everything being anattā is impermanent (anicca) and unhappy (dukkha) Buddhaghosa [1] draws the distinction, saying that Buddhas use two kinds of speech, conventional and real The expressions, satta (being), puggala (person), deva (god), *etc* are conventional, while those like anicca (impermanence), dukkha (misery), anattā (essencelessness), khandha (aggregates), dhātu (organs of sense), āyatana (objects of sense), satipatthāna (practices of self-possession) and sammappadhāna (right exertion) were used in their true sense Nāgasena explains that when Buddha said "I shall lead the sangha or the sangha is dependent on me," [2] he used the expressions "I" and "me" in the conventional and not in the real sense Ledi Sadaw [3] explains sammuti sacca as those statements which are true by popular usage and are opposed to "inconsistency, and untruthfulness in speech" while paramattha-sacca are those which are established by the nature of the things and do not depend on opinion or usage. As an example he points out that when it is said "there is a soul," it is conventionally true but ultimately false,[4] for the real ultimate truth is "there is no personal entity." The latter is true in all circumstances and conditions, and does not depend for its validity on usage or popular opinion [5] The contention of the Hīnayānists is that a name is usually given to constituted things, that name is conventional, *e g*,

[1] *Kvu A*, pp 33, 34

[2] *Mil*, pp 28, 60 [3] *J P T S*, 1914, pp 129 f

[4] *Cf* Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism* "Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality"

[5] See also Prof. Poussin's article in the *J A*, 1902, p. 250, *Points of the Controversy*, pp 63 fn, 180.

when the wheels, frame, and other parts of a chariot are fitted up in a particular order, all the things taken together go by the name of a chariot. The term 'chariot' therefore depends on convention If the constituted thing, e g , the chariot is divided into various parts, it is no longer called a chariot when it is so divided From this, it follows that the things, at which one ultimately arrives after repeated analysis, are the only real entities They never undergo changes and bear the same name at all times and places and under all conditions So, according to the Hīnayānists, all the various ultimate elements, which constitute a being or thing, are real, and when reference is made to them they may be called ultimate truths or paramattha-sacca, hence the dhātus or āyatanas, satipatthānas or sammappadhānas are expressions used in the ultimate sense

The *Kośa*[1] explains the two truths in a slightly different manner It says that the things like jug and clothes, after they are destroyed, do no longer bear the same name, so also things like water and fire when examined analytically dissolve into some elements and are no longer called water or fire Hence the things, which on analysis are found to be changing, are given names by convention Such expressions, which convey ideas temporarily and not permanently, are called Saṃvṛtisatyas The Paramārthasatyas are those expressions, which convey ideas, which remain unchanged whether the things are dissolved, analysed or not, *e.g.*, rūpa, one may reduce the rūpa into atoms, or withdraw from it taste and other qualities, the idea of the real nature of rūpa persists In the same way one can speak of feeling (vedanā), therefore such expressions are Paramārthasatyas (ultimate truths)

But these ultimate truths of the Hīnayānists, we have seen, are relegated by the Mahāyānists to the domain of convention Hence, what are real according to the Hīnayānists, namely the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda, are unreal and matters of convention according to the Mahāyānists.

[1] *Kośa*, VI. 4.

CHAPTER IV

The Stages of Spiritual Progress

The difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, as we have already seen, centres round the conception of the highest truth, which, according to the Hīnayānists, is Pudgalaśūnyatā only, while, according to the Mahāyānists, it is both Pudgala- and Dharma-śūnyatā This difference is also evident in the various stages of progress chalked out by the two schools The Hīnayānists recognize four stages called Sotāpatti, Sakadāgāmi, Anāgāmi, and Arahatta, and mention specifically the attainments of an adept as he passes from one stage to another, obtaining in the last stage complete knowledge, which, according to them, is the same as that attained by Buddhas[1] The Mahāyānists likewise recognize ten (according to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* twelve) stages of progress, through which a Bodhisattva passes in order to have complete emancipation and become a Buddha

As the Mahāyānists hold that an insight into dharmaśūnyatā is the only means of attainment of the highest knowledge, and that an insight into pudgalaśūnyatā equips an adept for proceeding higher up and realising dharmaśūnyatā, they divide their stages of progress into two sections The first, comprising the first six bhūmis, leads an adept to the realisation of Pudgalaśūnyatā, while the second, comprising the last four bhūmis, gives him the real knowledge, Dharmasūnyatā or Dharmasamatā Thus, the first satisfies the aspiration of the Hīnayānists and hence corresponds to their four stages, while the second lies beyond their reach, as they do not admit Dharmasamatā.

Though this is essentially the relative position of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists with regard to the stages of spiritual progress, one must, however, add to it the various other features, which are so often repeated by the

[1] See *ante*, p 83

Mahāyānists about their chief aim being not so much to attain happiness and emancipation for their own selves as to enable the suffering millions of the world to attain happiness and escape from the misery of the world, even at the cost of the adepts' lives and religious merits. So while detailing the attainments necessary for each bhūmi, the texts point out the progress made by a Bodhisattva in regard to the Āśaya, Upadesa, Prayoga, Upastambha and Kāla,[1] as also the Ākāra, Linga and Nimitta.[2] If these additional features of the Mahāyānic account of the first six bhūmis be left out, one may reasonably say that the description of the six bhūmis is simply a Sanskritised form of the Pāli passages, which deal with the stages of sanctification. Hence, the real addition of the Mahāyānists is the last four bhūmis, viz., Dūrangamā, Acalā, Sādhumati, and Dharmameghā.

THE LITERATURE ON THE TOPIC

Regarding the literature on the subject, we may state that in Pāli there are no works dealing exclusively with the stages of sanctification. The accounts are found scattered in almost all the Pāli canonical works as well as in the few available Sanskrit works of the Sarvāstivādins. Buddhaghosa follows the scheme of spiritual progress in his *Visuddhimagga*. He divides it into three sections, of which the first deals with Sīla (moral precepts), the full observance of which results in the attainment of the first two stages, sotāpatti and sakadāgāmi, the second deals with Citta or Samādhi, which results in the attainment of the third stage Anāgāmi, and the third treats of Paññā (knowledge), perfection in which leads the adept to the final stage, Arahatta or complete emancipation.[3] Vasubandhu has dealt with the 'stages' in various places in his *Abhidharmakośa*,[4] supporting mostly, as we shall see later on, the accounts in the Pāli works.

In the Mahāyāna literature, there are a few treatises

[1] For the explanation of the terms, see *supra*, Ch. II, pp. 76 ff.
[2] *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 2.
[3] *Vis. M.*, p. 6.
[4] *Kośa*, VI. 34 ff.

dwelling exclusively on the stages of progress while there are many which deal with them incidentally. Of the works treating mainly of the Bhūmis, the most important and at the same time comprehensive is the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*,[1] one of the nine recognised scriptural texts of the Nepalese Buddhists. The next in importance are the *Bodhisattva bhūmi*[2] and the *Madhyamakāvatāra*,[3] both following the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* with minor variations. For works containing an incidental treatment of the Bhūmis, we may refer to the *Lankāvatāra*, *Sūtrālankāra* and other similar works. The *Prajñāpāramitās* (*Śatasāhasrikā* and *Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā*) devote a chapter exclusively to the treatment of the Bhūmis, though they do not omit to state that from the standpoint of the highest truth, they are devoid of any reality and are mere matters of convention.[4] The *Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā* again has a peculiar feature of its own. While speaking of the various practices followed by the Bodhisattvas in connection with their progress in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, it indicates many of the attainments by using expressions which are current among the Hīnayānists, e.g., Kulaṅkula, Ekavīcika, Sotāpanna.[5] The *Śatasāhasrikā*[6] also gives us a list of ten Hīnayānic bhūmis, which are not in use in the Pāli texts. They are Suklavipaśyanā (or vidarśanā) bhūmi,

[1] Edited by Dr. J. Rahder, 1926.

[2] A portion of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* [Cambridge ms.—Vihāra Patala] has been published by Dr. Rahder as an Appendix to his *Daśa*. Dr. Rahder has very recently published an article '*La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique*' in the *Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise*, Tome II, no. 1—Tokyo 1929. In it he has presented us with some new materials from the Chinese sources.

[3] The Tibetan version of this work has been edited by Prof. Poussin in the Bibl. Bud. Series, and a French translation of the first six chapters of the same has also been published by him in *Le Muséon* vols. VIII, XI, and XII. A reconstruction of its Sanskrit text is now being published in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1929, 1930, Madras.

[4] *Śata.*, ch. X.; *Pañca.*, Paris ms. fol. 122–8.

[5] This is the peculiar feature of the *Pañca.*, the Sanskrit original of which is available at present. It is a recast of the original *Pañca* of which the Sanskrit original is lost. See *Appendix* and my Intro. to *Pañca* for details.

[6] *Śata.*, pp. 1476, 1520=*Mvyut.* 50=Das's *Tib. Dict.*, p. 475.

Gotrabhūmi, Astamakabhūmi, Darśanabhūmi, Tanubhūmi, Vītarāgabhūmi, Krtāvībhūmi, Pratyekabuddhabhūmi, Bodhisattvabhūmi and Buddhabhūmi The names clearly indicate the stages which they are intended to signify The first two refer to the pre-sotāpanna stages, the third and the fourth to the sotāpattimagga and sotāpanna stages, i e, so long as the adept is in the darśanamārga, the fifth to sakadāgāmi, in which stage rāga, dvesa and moha reach their minimum (tanutva), the sixth to the anāgāmi stage when the above three are completely eradicated, the seventh to the arahatta stage, when the adept completes all that is to be done, for which reason an Arahat is often called krtakrtya (having done what is to be done) The eighth, ninth and tenth are self-explanatory and need no comment It should be noted that the treatment of the Bhūmis in the *Prajñāpāramitās* is much simpler than that of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and very likely it represents a stage in the evolution of the Bhūmi conception, standing midway between the *Mahāvastu*[1] and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* The account of Bhūmis in the *Mahāvastu* appears to be the earliest The names used are not the standard ones From the name used in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, it seems that the writers on Bhūmis considered it a piece of literary skill to devise names indicative of the qualities attained by a Bodhisattva in a particular stage[2] The description of

[1] The names in the *Mtu* are (i) Durārohā, (ii) Baddhamānā, (iii) Puspamanditā, (iv) Rucirā, (v) Cittavistarā, (vi) Rūpavatī, (vii) Durjayā, (viii) Janmanideśa, (ix) Yauvarājya and (x) Abhiseka.

[2] Dr Rahder says in his paper on *La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique* that the Chinese *Avatamsaka sūtra* devotes a large section to the discussion of the career of a bodhisattva He says that it speaks of 52 stages (or degrees), *viz*, "10 especes de Foi + 10 Résidences (adhimukti) + 10 Conduites (ācāra) + 10 Déflexions + 10 Terres (Bhūmi) + Eveil égal + Eveil merveilleux " These, it seems from their details, are only a form of classification of the bodhisattvas according to their qualities and do not indicate the gradual stages of spiritual progress It is in the fifth item that we find mention of the Bhūmis (stages of progress) They are as given by Dr Rahder in French, (i) Joyeuse, (ii) Immaculée, (iii) Clarifiante, (iv) Radieuse, (v) Dure à-gagner, (vi) Droit-en-face, (vii) Va-loin, (viii) Immobile, (ix) Bon Esprit, (x) Nuage d'Essence. These are exactly the same bhūmis as mentioned in the *Daśa* and other works

the bhūmis in the *Mahāvastu* is very scanty and does not contain the details which are important and even essential from the Mahāyānic standpoint On the other hand, it mentions some disciplinary (vinaya) rules which a Bodhisattva is expected to observe, and the non-observance of which not only impeded his progress but brought about his fall to the next lower stage In the accounts of the first three bhūmis, some traces of the description contained in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* are found, but in the next seven, and specially in the last four, there is hardly anything more than a mere mention of the names of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who attained them It is apparent that the conception of bhūmis was very hazy to the author of the *Mahāvastu*, who tried to supply the gaps by recounting some legendary lives of Bodhisattvas and fictitious names of Buddhas

For our present purpose of comparison between the Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic stages, we shall follow the account of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, indicating at places its agreements and disagreements with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and referring in the footnotes to the accounts of the *Mahāvastu* and the *Prajñāpāramitās*, while for the Hīnayānic stages, we shall depend mainly on the Pāli works, supplementing them where necessary by the information supplied by the *Kośa*

Pre-Bhūmi stages

PRE-BODHISATTVA OR PRE-SOTĀPANNA STAGE,
(i e PṚTHAGJANAHOOD TO ĀRYAHOOD)

The most difficult task of an adept both in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna is the fulfilment of the conditions laid down for passing from the state of a pṛthagjana (ordinary man of the world) to that of an Ārya (a man capable of attaining the highest knowledge) The Mahāyānists demand that one must develop Bodhicitta before he can be entitled to commence the practices of bhūmis,[1] while the Hīnayānists hold that one must understand the Four Truths and

[1] *Bodhic*, pp 86 f

have faith in the teachings of Buddha, or in other words, he must complete the fifteen ksanas of the Darśanamārga to be able to drift himself along the stream (sota) of sanctification—the eightfold path [1]

About the pre-Bodhisattva stage we come across very often in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and other Mahāyāna works a general remark that a being who has performed meritorious acts (avaropitakusalamūla), served many previous Buddhas (pūrvajinakrtādhikāra), and has had many kalyānamitras (spiritual guides) is destined to attain Bodhi [2] In a slightly different manner the *Sūtrālankāra* [3] says that a being who has developed Adhimukti [4] (aspiration) through innumerable æons, filled himself with merits as the sea is by water, gone through the preliminary purification by the observance of the Bodhisattva discipline, becomes wise by learning śāstras, and makes his mind soft and pliable,[5] is entitled to exert himself in bhāvanā (*i e* repeated darśana) and benefit by the teachings of Buddha

ADHIMUKTICARYĀBHŪMI

It is in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that we find mention of a pre-Bodhisattva stage called the Adhimukticaryābhūmi The *Madhyamakāvatāra*,[6] quoting the *Ratnamegha-sūtra*, says that the bhūmi of the Bhavisyad (future) Bodhisattva is placed just before the first bhūmi and consists essentially of excessive (adhimātra-adhimātra) practices of the adhimukti (aspiration) He is a future Bodhisattva because he has not

[1] *Samyutta*, V, 347. soto soto ti ha Sāriputta vuccati, katamo nu kho Sāriputta soto ti ? Ayam eva hi bhante ariyo atthangiko maggo soto seyyathīdam sammādiṭṭhi pe sammāsamādhī ti

[2] *Pañca* (A S.B ms), leaves 204b, 223b, 232a Cf *Mtu*, I, p 57

[3] *Sūtrā*, xiv 1-3, p 90 The *Sūtrā* is mainly a treatise on the Bodhisattvacaryā Its treatment is general and comprehensive As we are here concerned mainly with the Bhūmis, we shall pass over the minor details

[4] For a note on Adhimukti, see Lévi, *Translation* of the *Sūtrā.*, p. 13 fn

[5] For kalpacitta read kalyacitta, see Lévi, *Transl* of the *Sūtrā*, p 16 n

[6] *Le Muséon*, VIII, p. 262

yet developed Bodhicitta He is therefore said to be in the Adhimukticaryābhūmi, i e, he has been aspiring to become a Buddha by following the doctrines of Mahāyāna After hearing a religious discourse, or praises and accounts of the powers of a Buddha, he has only passing thoughts that he would become a Buddha, but unless and until this thought stays permanently in his mind, he cannot be said to possess Bodhicitta and become an Ārya, a Bodhisattva [1]

The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is more explicit with regard to the pre-bodhisattva stage, the technical name given by it is Prakṛticaryā [2] It divides this stage into two, Gotravihāra [3] and Adhimukticaryāvihāra [4] These two preparatory stages cannot be strictly called bhūmis The *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and other treatises dealing with bhūmis do not therefore mention them in their list of bhūmis They deal with or refer to the qualities needed in the pre-bodhisattva stage but do not reckon them as additional bhūmis as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* does

The Gotravihāra is thus described in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* A person who is gotrastha, i e, belongs by nature to a noble class of beings, is endowed with the qualities, high aims, and good dharmas of a Bodhisattva They are apparent

[1] Cf *E R E*, II, p 745

[2] This is mentioned also in the *Mtu* as the first of the four caryās

[3] Vihāra-bhūmi The corresponding Hīnayāna term is Gotrabhū, which is reckoned as a pre sotāpanna stage See *Aṅguttara*, IV, p 373 The first two bhūmis, Śuklavipaśyanā and Gotra, mentioned in the *Śata* (see *ante*, p 240), also correspond to this

[4] It is the same as the Adhimukticaryābhūmi of the *M Ava* The *Laṅkā* (p 65) speaks of the preparatory stage as Parikarmabhūmi See *E R E*, II, p 744 for Parikarma and Upacāra bhūmis In the *Śata* (ch x), Parikarma refers to the duties to be performed by a bodhisattva in a bhūmi

The *Mtu* (I, 46 f) calls the corresponding bhūmis Prakṛticaryā and Praṇidhānacaryā The former refers to the worldly virtues of being respectful to parents, śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas, performance of the ten kuśalakarmapathas, worship of Buddhas, *etc* The latter (praṇidhānacaryā) refers to the aspiration felt by a bodhisattva to become Buddha and to achieve the same at any cost The *Mtu* gives also the legends about the present Buddha as to when and in what circumstances, he made the resolution (praṇidhāna)

in his natural demeanour He sets himself to perform good deeds naturally, and does not require persuasion, he does the same with a certain amount of wisdom and feeling of charity He possesses the seeds of Buddhadharmas and is incapable of committing evil deeds, not to speak of the deadly (ānantarya) sins [1] The gotravihāra forms the root-cause (hetumātra) of the other eleven vihāras It only makes it possible for one to exert himself for the attainment of the other bhūmis but does not carry him further

The Adhimukticaryāvihāra is the name given to the first attempts made by a Bodhisattva to develop Bodhicitta, the noble aspiration In this bhūmi the Bodhisattva actually starts on his march to the Tathāgatavihāra, while in the Gotravihāra he gives only an indication of same [2] When he completes the duties of the adhimukticaryā, he can be said to have done the work preliminary to the first bhūmi, the Pramuditā In the Adhimukticaryāvihāra, a bodhisattva practises bhāvanās in a limited degree, and is incapable of retaining what is acquired He makes only an attempt for nirnimitta-bhāvanā (*i e*, meditation of the Absolute devoid of all signs) [3] He is possessed of pratisamkhyānabala (power of discriminating knowledge) and applies himself to the duties of a bodhisattva with pratisamkhyāna-prajñā and not by natural tanmayatā (absorption) He cannot yet have the Bodhisattva-bhāvanās, which make one steadfast and non-receding He is not above the five fears, viz, of livelihood, dispraise, death, evil destiny (durgati) and censure by the assembly [4] With pratisamkhyā he exerts himself for the good of beings and not out of natural love and compassion Sometimes, he explains things wrongly and sometimes he interests himself in improper spheres or in the material requisites of life. He may have reverential faith (śraddhā) but no innate knowledge of truth He possesses only limited

[1] For ānantarya sins, see *Kośa*, IV 96, *Vibhaṅga*, p 378

[2] These two vihāras have a parallel in the two kinds of Bodhicitta, mentioned in the *Bodhic*, viz, Bodhipranidhi and Bodhiprasthāna The *Bodhic* puts these two after the development of Bodhicitta, see *infra*, p 247

[3] *B Bh*, p. 3 [4] Cf *Aṅguttara*, IV, p. 364

śrutamayī and cintāmayī prajñā (knowledge derived from hearing and reflection),[1] which again sometimes gets bewildered He follows the bodhisattva-path with great difficulty and sluggish knowledge (dhandha-abhijñā) and does not develop a very strong desire for bodhi Now and then he forgets the right means in which beings should be trained and even the Buddhavacana. Occasionally he imparts teaching incautiously and fails to produce the desired result At times he takes away his mind from bodhi and loses energy for the observance of Bodhisattva-samvaras (disciplines) or for rendering service to beings Sometimes he also seeks his own happiness, though after reflection he seeks the happiness of others as well Not unoften he notices his own failings but lacks sufficient energy to correct them He likes instruction in the Bodhisattva-dharmas but sometimes he gets frightened by the magnitude of the task He is not endowed with all the bodhipakṣika-dharmas These are the chief indications by which it can be ascertained whether or not a person is in the Adhimukticaryābhūmi

The idea underlying the preparatory stage is that there are beings who possess to their credit such kuśalamūlas that they are destined to become Buddhas These beings are called gotrasthas[2] Just as a king's sons are different from those of a commoner by their inherent nature, demeanour, and aspiration, so also those beings who possess the germs of Buddhahood are known by their inherent superior qualities

The *Daśabhūmikasūtra*[3] furnishes us with the details of the pre-bodhisattva stage which are on many points different from the account of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* Some of these details are as follows They develop bodhicitta after having accumulated enough merits, followed the prescribed practices, worshipped many Buddhas, possessed pure and sublime intention and aspiration, and held compassion always in the

[1] See *Netti*, pp 8, 60, *Kośa*, VI 5c Cf Rahder, *La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique*, p 5

[2] See *Sūtrā*, p 11 for gotrāgratva. The *B Bh* devotes about six leaves to the details of the gotra, see Camb Ms, leaves 1–6 For gotra, see also *ante*, pp 84 ff

[3] *Daśa*, p 11

front of his mind They are desirous of attaining the Buddha knowledge, the ten powers, the four great Vaiśāradyas, realising the sameness of all dharmas (things), rescuing all beings from misery, acquiring every form of knowledge, and purifying all Buddha-ksetras

These accounts depict the wavering mind of a person who is endeavouring to develop Bodhicitta. It is by the actual development of Bodhicitta[1] that a person gets rid of his prthagjanahood and becomes an Ārya or the Elect to proceed along the stream of sanctification[2] Bodhicitta, in short, means the vow or aspiration of a being to become a Buddha and obtain all the qualities and powers of a Buddha The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* divides it into two parts, Bodhipranidhicitta and Bodhiprasthānacitta The former is simply an aspiration to become a Buddha for saving worldly beings from misery without seriously thinking of the duties of making the highest gifts, and such other virtues The latter refers to the resolution to observe the Bodhisattva-samvaras (disciplines) and to strive for the acquisition of merits The former is compared to a traveller who is thinking of going to another country, while the latter to one who has actually set out on his journey in order to reach the destination[3] As soon as one develops bodhicitta, he is entitled to perform the duties connected with the first Bhūmi[4]

HĪNAYĀNIC TREATMENT OF THE PRE SOTĀPANNA STAGE

We have in the Hīnayānic works also an elaborate description of the qualities necessary for a person to pass from the puthujjana stage to the Ariya Like the general state-

[1] The topic of Bodhicitta is of all-absorbing interest in most of the Mahāyāna works The *Bodhic* devotes to it its first three chapters, and its commentary quotes many sūtras throwing light on the same

[2] See *E R E*, II, p 744, *M Ava* in the *Le Museon*, VIII, p 11 yena cittotpādena sahotpannena bodhisattvo 'tikrānto bhavati pṛthagjanabhūmim avakrānto bhavati bodhisattva niyāmam, etc

[3] *Bodhic*, pp 23–5

[4] According to the *Mtu.* (I, 78) a bodhisattva in the first bhūmi is still a pṛthagjana but he is prāptaphala and daksineya

ments in the *Prajñāpāramitās* about the previous kuśalamūlas of the bodhisattvas, we have also in the Pāli texts references to the previous merits (upanissaya) of a person seeking ordination or spiritual progress It is often said in connection with the conversions made by Buddha that he delivered discourses after ascertaining the kusalamūlas (merit-roots or previous merits) of persons whose conversion he had in view The usual passage is "satthā paccusakāle lokam volokento imassa kulaputtassa upanissayam addasa"[1] [the teacher at dawn looked round the world and saw the previous merits (lit bases) of the man] This implies that the real benefits of discourses cannot be derived by every body It is only those, whose previous actions have raised them to a certain height, that derive benefits from the discourses There are many instances in the Pāli works showing that a person had to have to his credit sufficient merits entitling him to become a sotāpanna after hearing only one discourse, there are also cases of persons becoming sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, arahat or paccekabuddha by virtue of their stores of previous merits The implication in such cases is that the persons in their previous lives had died after attaining the stage of sanctification, or its corresponding qualities, just preceding the one obtained by them in this life The Hīnayānists hold that a prthagjana must have some kuśalamūlas before he can expect to be an ārya, *i e*, a srotāpanna[2]

A puthujjana is defined in the *Majjhima Nikāya* as one who labours under the delusion of "I-ness" and "Mine-ness" and thinks that he has rūpa, vedanā, etc Not knowing the

[1] *Jāt*, VI, p 70, *Petavatthu Cy*, p 38 For references, see Childers' *Pāli Dictionary*, sv upanissaya, also *P T S Dictionary*

[2] These kuśalamūlas are called moksabhāgiyas in the *Kośa* They must be acquired in an existence prior to the attempt to acquire the nirvedhabhāgiyas (Pāli nibbedhabhāgiya dhammas) See *Kośa*, IV, 125 fn , VI, 24 fn , *Dīgha*, III, p 251 for Cha nibbedhabhāgiya saññā, or *Samyutta*, V, p 345 for Cha vijjābhāgiya saññā, which are enumerated as follows anicca saññā, anicce dukkhasaññā, dukkhe anattasaññā, pahānasaññā, virāgasaññā, nirodhasaññā See *infra*, pp 253–4

true law, he develops attachment to things which he should avoid, and thereby produces and increases the āsavas (inflowing impurities) of kāma (desire), bhava (desire for existence) and avijjā (ignorance) [1] The *Puggala Paññatti* [2] simply says that a puthujjana is one who has neither got rid of the three samyojanas nor applied himself to get rid of them The *Patisambhidāmagga* [3] tells us that the puthujjanas, who are striving to be ariyas, try to be indifferent to the sankhārās by looking upon them as anicca, dukkha and anattā but this indifference of theirs does not stay permanently in their minds and sometimes even appears distasteful to them

The stage next to Puthujjana is Gotrabhū, corresponding in some respects to the Gotravihāra of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* [4] The Gotrabhū represents the last state of a puthujjana, for a person becomes gotrabhū when he is just fit to commence the works which make a person an ariya The *Patisambhidāmagga* [5] takes gotrabhū not only as a stage prior to sotāpanna but also as indicating a class of persons who are on the way to arhathood and may be in possession of one of the eight maggas and phalas. Likewise the *Abhidhammatthasangaha* [6] places the Gotrabhū stage after Patipadā-ñānadassana-visuddhi (the purity of insight with regard to the path)[7] and Vutthānagāminivipassanā-ñānam (discernment leading to uplift) and makes the Gotrabhū an ariya, *i e* a sotāpattimaggattha In the two works mentioned last, Gotrabhū denotes those persons, who are on the path and are entitled to become Arhats, and hence persons in any

[1] *Majjhima*, I, pp 7, 239 It will be observed that the fourth āsava is not mentioned here An arahat in contrast to puthujjana is called a khīnāsava See also *Patis M*, pp. 117–8

[2] *Pug P*, p 12 See *Comp of Phil*, pp 49–50 for the four classes of Puthujjanas

[3] *Patis M*, I, pp 63, 64, 94

[4] See *ante*, pp 244–5

[5] *Patis M*, I, pp 66–8

[6] *Comp of Phil*, pp 67–71, 129, 215 (treated in detail by Mrs Rhys Davids in the Introduction)

[7] Buddhaghosa also supports this. See *Vis M*, p 672 Ito (Patipadāñāṇadassanavisuddhi) param gotrabhūñānam hoti

one of the three stages, sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, and anāgāmi.[1] The *Anguttara Nikāya*[2] and the *Puggala Paññatti*,[3] however, do not consider the Gotrabhū an ariya and hence they distinguish Gotrabhū as a stage preceding the Sotāpattimagga

Those who are between Gotrabhū and Sotāpanna (*i e* sotāpattiphalapatipanna) are divided into two classes, called Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī[4] They still practise the Darsanamārga According to the *Kośa* the former are of mild (mrdu) and the latter of sharp (tīksna) faculties The Śraddhānusārīs are those who follow the dharma through faith in their spiritual guide, or in other words, they take to the practice of smrtyupasthāna, etc , and work for the realisation of the Truth by being incited by others (parapratyayena), while the Dharmānusārīs are those who set themselves to practise the Bodhipaksika dharmas through the study of the scriptures (dvādaśānga)[5] The *Puggala Paññatti* simply says that, of the persons who are working for the realisation of sotāpattiphala, those who have saddhindriyam (faculty of faith) in a great measure (adhimattam) are called Saddhānusārī, while those who have paññindriyam (faculty of paññā) in a great measure are called Dhammānusārī The persons of the former class, when established in the sotāpattiphala, are called Saddhāvimutta and those of the latter class are called Ditthippatta The only difference between these two classes is this that the former destroys some of his āsavas but not as much as the latter[6] For progressing along the path to Nibbāna, there are (i) two dhuras (courses)—saddhā (faith) and paññā (knowledge), (ii) two abhinivesas (adherences)—samatha (quietude)[7] and

[1] *Comp of Phil* , p 68

[2] *Anguttara,* IV, p 378

[3] *Pug P* , p 14 Attha ariyapuggalā ariyā, avasesā puggalā anariyā Cf *Infra*, p 255

[4] *Pug P* , p 15, *Kośa,* VI, 29, 63, *Digha,* III, p 105, *Samyutta,* V, pp 200, 205, *Vis M* , p 659

[5] *Kosa,* VI, 29 Prof Poussin has kindly drawn my attention to the fact that the Dvādaśānga is mentioned only in the *Vyākhyā* in explanation of the term 'Dharma' of the *Kośa*

[6] *Pug P* , 15 paññāya c'assa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā honti na ca kho yathā ditthippattassa See also *Kośa,* VI, 63

[7] *Cf* Geiger, *Saṃyutta Transl* , II, p 172 See also *DhP* , *A* , I, p 7

vipassanā (introspection), and (iii) two sīsas (heads)—ubhatobhāgavimutta (one who is free in both ways) and paññāvimutta (free by reason of paññā)[1] The followers of Paññādhura and Samathābhinivesa are called Dhammānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Kāyasakkhi[2] in the next six, and Ubhatobhāgavimutta in the arhat stage, the followers of Paññādhura but Vipassanābhinivesa are called Dhammānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Ditthippatta[3] in the next six, and Paññāvimutta[4] in the arhat stage The followers of Saddhādhura and Samathābhinivesa[5] are called Saddhānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Kāyasakkhī in the next six, and Ubhatobhāgavimutta[6] in the arhat stage, the followers of Saddhādhura but Vipassanābhinivesa are called Saddhānusārī in the sotapāttimagga stage, Saddhāvimutta[7] in the next six, and Paññāvimutta in the arhat stage[8]

Those who are either Saddhānusārī or Dhammānusārī reach the second stage[9] of the ariyamagga called sotāpattiphala, also called sattakkhattuparama (*i e*, they are to have seven more births) Mention is made of specific qualities, which an adept must possess in order to become a sotāpanna In the *Samyutta Nikāya*,[10] Sāriputta asks Ānanda, "How many are the dhammas which one must give up as well as one must acquire for being a sotāpanno avinipātadhammo

granthadhura (way of study) and vipassanādhura (way of contemplation)

1 *Pug P Cy*, p 194 *Dīgha*, II, p 71

2 Kāyasakkhi is defined in the *Anguttara* (IV, pp 451–2) as implying those who realise within their own body (kāyena phassitvā) the eight jhānas (or vimokkhas) and also destroys āsavas by paññā

3 Ditthippatta is described in the *Pug P*, (p 15) as referring to those who know truly the four truths, and put an end to āsavas by comprehending the dharma of the Tathāgata by paññā

4 See *infra*

5 *Pug P Cy* reads samādhi for samatha. 6 See *infra*

7 Saddhāvimutta (*Pug P*, p 15) are similar to Ditthipatta, only the paññā of the former is not as much as that of the latter

8 *Pug P Cy*, pp 194–5 See also *Kośa*, VI, 63, 64

9 The first stage being sotāpattimagga comprised the two classes called Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī

10 There is a chapter called Sotāpatti samyutta in the *Saṃyutta*, V, pp 264, 362–3, 388=*Dīgha*, III, p 227

niyato sambodhiparāyano (a sotāpanna gone beyond the possibility of retrogression and destined to attain the highest knowledge)" The reply of Ānanda was that one must have firm faith (pasāda) in Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha[1] and must be endowed with all the sīlas liked and praised by the wise They are called the Sotāpattiyaṅgas[2] One who has the four Sotāpattiyaṅgas is considered free of five sins, *viz*, killing, stealing, misconduct, lying, and drinking[3] The *Samyutta Nikāya* also tells us that when an ariyasāvaka knows the taste, the dangers and the way out of the indriyas, *viz*, sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and upekkhā, he is a sotāpanna[4] In a discourse in connection with the illness of Anāthapiṇḍika, it is said that the puthujjana was expected also to comply as far as possible with the eight conditions of the atthaṅgikamagga *plus* the sammāñāna and sammāvimutti,[5] besides the four sotāppattiyangas The sotāpattiyangas, in fact, are merely preliminaries, though essential, to the actual commencement of practices for attaining the sotāppatti stage The duties entailed upon a candidate just after the sotāpattiyangas are a further increase in pīti (pleasure), pāmojja (joy), passaddhi (calmness), samādhi (concentration), and the practice of the cha vijjā- (or nibbedha-) bhāgiya dhammas (six dharmas leading to knowledge), *viz*, the

[1] There is a formula for announcing the faith, see *Dīgha*, III, p 227 The faith is called Saddhindriya, *Saṃyutta*, V, p 196 *Patis M*, p 161 Ye keci mayi aveccapasannā sabbe te sotāpannā See *Kośa*, VI, 73b, 34, p 205 fn La pureté de la conduite (prayoga) règles de moralité (śīlāni) chères aux Āryas, pureté des sentiments (āśaya) avetyaprasāda

[2] The other four sotāpattiyangas, very rarely found, are (i) sappurisasamsevā, (ii) saddhammasavanam, (iii) yoniso manasikāro, and (iv) dhammānudhammapatipatti, *Samyutta*, V, pp 345, 411, *Dīgha*, III, p 227, *Paṭis M*, II, p 17 shows the connection between these and the indriyas

[3] *Samyutta*, II, pp 68–71

[4] *Ibid*, V, p 207, *Patis M*, I, pp 115–6 It says "Anaññātaññassāmītindriyam ekam thānam gacchati, sotāpattimaggam and then tells of the position of the indriyas It adds that in the sotāpattimaggakkhaṇa, except the things already existing, all thoughts that arise are pure, transcendental, and lead to Nibbāna

[5] *Saṃyutta*, V, pp 381–4

realisation (anupassanā) of (i) transitoriness (anicca) of constituted things, (ii) unhappiness (dukkha) due to transitoriness, (iii) essencelessness (anatta) of things, (iv) giving up (pahāna), (v) virāga (detachment), and (vi) nirodha (cessation).[1] The *Nikāyas* do not go into details about the attempts of a candidate in the sotāpanna stage to comprehend the anicca, anattā and dukkha or the four āryasatyas In the *Dīgha Nikāya* there is only a bare mention of the four ñānas *viz*, dukkhe ñānam, nirodhe ñānam, samudaye ñānam, and magge ñānam.[2] An exposition of these has been given in the *Patisambhidāmagga*,[3] which says that when one has "understanding, search, research, discernment, discrimination, etc of each of the four truths, he is said to have comprehended the four truths" This topic has received special treatment in the *Kośa*,[4] which may be briefly stated. There are two mārgas, darśana and bhāvanā,[5] the latter commencing at the last stage of darśanamārga The darśanamārga has sixteen ksanas or moments of comprehension of the truths,[6] which are as follows —

[1] *Samyutta*, V, p 345, *Dīgha*, III, p 251, *Kośa*, Intro to chs V and VI, p iv, as Prof Poussin shows, puts the order of progress in the pre sotāpanna stage as follows —

(i) Acquisition of the Moksabhāgiya-kuśalamūlas,

(ii) Acquisition of the Ariyavamsas (*Kośa*, VI, 7c–d, 8a–b, *Aṅguttara*, II, p 27, *Dīgha*, III, p 224—rules relating to the requisites of a monk),

(iii) Aśubhabhāvanā, Ānāpānasmṛti,

(iv) Practice of Smṛtyupasthānas,

(v) Acquisition of the Nirvedhabhāgiyadharmas,

(vi) Satyābhisamaya (15 kṣaṇas)—darśanamārga

There are many details which should be mentioned in an exposition of the path of spiritual progress, but as we are concerned here mainly with the comparison of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna stages, the details have been passed over.

[2] *Dīgha*, III, p 227

[3] *Patis M*, I, p 119 See for translation of this stock passage, Mrs Rhys Davids' *Buddhist Psychology*, p 18

[4] Prof Poussin has given a summary of it in the Intro to his transl of the *Kośa*, chs V and VI, *M. Vr*, p 479, n 4.

[5] Bhāvanāmārga is seeing the Truths again and again See *Kośa* Intro to chs. V and VI, p. vi.

[6] See *Kośa*, VI, 261, VII, 4

1) Duhkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti 5) Samudaye do. 9) Nirodhe do 13) Mārge do	(faith producing the knowledge that things of the Kāmadhātu are full of duhkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also the mārga to the origin and cessation of things)
2) Duhkhe dharmajñāna 6) Samudaye do. 10) Nirodhe do. 14) Mārge do	(actual realisation of the fact that things of the Kāmadhātu are full of duhkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also the mārga leading to their origin and cessation)
3) Duhkhe anvayajñāna-kṣānti 7) Samudaye do 11) Nirodhe do 15) Mārge do	(faith producing the knowledge that things of the Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus are full of duhkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also a mārga leading to their origin and cessation)
4) Duhkhe anvayajñāna 8) Samudaye do 12) Nirodhe do 16) Mārge do	(actual realisation of the fact that things of the Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus are full of duhkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also a mārga leading to their origin and cessation)[1]

The *Kathāvatthu* shows the stages of gradual progress of a srotāpattiphalapratipannaka while he is in the darśana-mārga thus

[1] The order of the kṣaṇas is to be made out from the number prefixed to each of the sixteen kṣaṇas For a list, see *Mvyut* 56, and for detailed exposition, see *Kośa*, VII, 8, p 13n

By Dukkhadassana, he gives up partially and not completely sakkāyadiṭṭhi, vicikicchā and sīlabbataparāmāsa and the kilesas involved in them	He is not yet quite Sotāpanna or Satta-khattuparama or Ko-lamkola or Ekabīji
By Samudayadassana, he gives up sakkāyadiṭṭhi completely, and the other two partially, and so also the kilesas	Do
By Nirodhadassana, he gives up vicikicchā completely and sīlabbataparāmāsa partially, and so also the kilesas	Do
By Maggadassana, he gives up sīlabbataparāmāsa completely and the kilesas partially	He is now a Sotāpanna[1]

The *Kośa* tells us that a candidate while progressing along these ksanas is called Śraddhānusārī, Dharmānusārī or Srotāpattiphalapratipannaka up to the fifteenth ksana It is in the sixteenth moment that he is considered established (sthita) in the sotāpattiphala and he may now be said to have obtained the catuhsatyābhisamaya This attainment, or in other words, the completion of the Darśanamārga frees him from the avastuka kleśas, *viz*, satkāyadrsti, etc, and makes him an Ārya, *i e*, a person entitled to let himself flow along the stream of sanctification—the eightfold path He is no more to be called Śraddhānusārī or Dharmānusārī He is now a Srotāpanna[2]

The pre-Ārya stage, in fact, decides the path which a candidate is to follow If one aspires only to moksa or nirvāna and accumulates kuśalamūlas of not a very high excellence as the Hīnayānists do, he is a Śrāvaka and if he aspires to Buddhahood in order to become the rescuer of the world, *i e*, develops Bodhicitta and accumulates kuśala-

[1] *Kvu*, I, p 164 leaves this point doubtful, but all the passages mentioned there support the inference drawn above

[2] *Kośa*, VI, 25fn, 53c d, *Paṭis M*, I, p 69 adds that the adept gives up all micchādiṭṭhi, micchāsankappa, etc, and takes sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsankappa, etc.

mūlas which only an exceedingly rare person can, he is a Bodhisattva

I PRAMUDITĀ

An adept as soon as he brings his mind up to the pitch described above[1] goes beyond the pṛthagjanabhūmi (plane of an ordinary being) and becomes definitely a bodhisattva. He can now be regarded as a member of the Tathāgata family,[2] becomes irreproachable (anavadya) by any taint relating to birth (sarvajātivādena), ceases from worldly existences, proceeds on in the transcendental existences, becomes established in the bodhisattvadharmatā and well established in the rank of a bodhisattva, comprehends sameness, and is destined to be included in the family of Tathāgatas of all times (past, present and future) and ultimately attains Sambodhi Such bodhisattvas while in this bhūmi have prāmodya (joy), prasāda (faith), prīti (pleasure), utplāvanā (elation), udagrī (exaltation), uśī (fragrance), utsāha (energy), and become asamrambha (devoid of pride), avihimsā (devoid of malice) and akrodha (devoid of anger) The Jinaputras become joyous on remembering the Buddhas, their dharmas, the Bodhisattva practices, the pāramitā purifications etc[3] They are pleased also because they know that they are out of worldly matters, nearing the Buddhabhūmi, the Jñānabhūmi, and cut off from births in hell or any lower form of existence They are the refuge of all beings, and are always within the close view of the Tathāgatas They are devoid of all sorts of fear[4] because they have no love for self or for things. They do not expect any service from others, on the other hand, they are prepared to render service to all beings As they have no conception of self, they canot have any fear of death, as they know that when they are dead, they will always be with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas

[1] *Kośa*, VI 31a b He is now either a kāyasākṣī or dṛṣṭiprāpta or śraddhāvimukta, see *ante*, pp 250, 251.

[2] See *infra*.

[3] Cf *B Bh*, p 7, 'Abhisamayālankārāloka' in the *Kośa*, VI 26, p 181 fn

[4] Cf. *Ibid*, p 7.

Then the Bodhisattvas having sublime aspiration and mahākaruṇā as their forethought engage themselves in the attainment of further merits On account of their having in a greater degree śraddhā, prasāda, adhimukti, avakalpanā, kṛpākaruṇā, mahāmaitrī and having a firm mind endowed with hrī, apatrāpya, kṣānti, sauratya, and admiration for the doctrines, and being helped by spiritual guides (kalyāṇamitras) they become well-established in the first bhūmi They now take the following mahāpraṇidhānas (resolutions)[1]—

(i) to perform the worship of Buddhas in every possible manner and as completely as possible,

(ii) to preserve and protect the doctrines of Tathāgatas;

(iii) to watch the Buddhotpādas of all the worlds and to accompany the Bodhisattvas in their last existence from their descent from the Tusita heaven up to their mahāparinirvāṇa,

(iv) to practise all the bhūmis along with the pāramitās,

(v) to ripen all beings and help them in attaining omniscience,

(vi) to purify all Buddhakṣetras by paying them visits,

(vii) to comprehend the endless distinctions that exist in the things of all lokadhātus,

(viii) to persuade all bodhisattvas to develop the one aspiration and collect merits therefor, and to realise the one and the same basis of all bodhisattvas, to attend upon all Buddhas, to see Buddhotpādas whenever wished for, to pass through the various forms of existence with his own body, to be accomplished in the doctrines of Mahāyāna and to propagate Mahāyāna,

(ix) to perform the duties of a bodhisattva, to do righteous acts by body, speech, and mind, to realise the Buddhadharma all at once, to remove afflictions by faith, to obtain a body like that of the Mahābhaiṣajyarāja or be like the wish-fulfilling gem and to obtain speech which will never be fruitless, and

(x) to attain Sambodhi in all lokadhātus, to take without

[1] See *Śikṣā*, pp 291-5 = *Daśa*, p 14 = *B Bh*, p 8, *Sūtrā* (Fr. Transl), p 36n, Suzuki, *Outlines etc*, pp 308-310, *E R E*, sv Bodhisattva (based on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*) and is not the same as *Daśa*, *Dharmasaṅgraha*, cxii Praṇidhānam trividham.

moving a hairbreadth from the right path his birth as an ordinary human being, to retire from the world, perform miracles, attain bodhi under the bodhi-tree, preach the dhammacakra and attain ultimately the mahāparinirvāna [1]

While in the Pramuditā bhūmi, the Bodhisattvas take innumerable pranidhānas, of which the ten mentioned are the chief They now pity the countless beings, who are led by wrong views and blinded by ignorance, desire and so forth, repeatedly born in the three worlds and, according to the chain of causation, increase their stores of misery They try to establish themselves in Nirvāna, the extreme happiness (atyantasukha) [2]

While in the first bhūmi they develop compassion and love and apply themselves to mahātyāga (i e giving up everything) of ordinary wealth, sons, wives, etc They seek again and again the worldly and transcendental things and thus become versed in all śāstras and are consequently able to judge what is good and what is evil for beings They become lokajña [3] By constant worship and observance of śāsana (doctrines), they possess the ten qualities needed for the purification of the ten bhūmis,[4] *viz* , faith (śraddhā), compassion (karunā), love (maitri), sacrifice (tyāga), patience to withstand distress (khedasahisnutā), knowledge of scriptures (śāstrajñatā), knowledge of the world (lokajñata), modesty, bashfulness, steadiness and the ability of performing the worship of the Tathāgatas [5] They now see many Buddhas and worship them with all the necessary requisites, show respect to their Sanghas and transfer the merit thus acquired to the attainment of Sambodhi [6]

[1] *Cf* *Mtu* , I, pp 47 ff

[2] *Daśa* , p 18, *B Bh* , p 9 [3] *Cf* *B Bh* , p 9

[4] *Mtu* , I p 78 has tyaga, karuna, aparikheda, amana, sarvaśāstrādhyayitā, vikrama, lokānujña, and dhrti *Śata* (p 1454) has adhyāśaya, sarvasattvasamacittatā, tyāga, kalyānamitrasevanā, dharmaparyesti, abhiksanamaiskramya buddhakāyasprhā, dharmavivarana, mānastambhanirghatana, satyavacana For an explanation of these terms, see *Śata* , pp 1458–1460 It will be observed that all the attainments mentioned in the *Mtu.* and *Śata* appear in the account of the *Daśa* *Cf* *B Bh* p 9 daśa vihāraparisodhaka dharmā

[5] *Daśa* , p 19 *B Bh* p 9 *Mtu* , I, p 78 mentions these eight qualities in connection with the first bhūmi

[6] *Cf* *B Bh* , pp 9–10.

They gain the power to ripen beings through gifts (dāna) and affable words (priyavadya) and adhimukti (strong desire) Over and above these, they gain the other two samgrahavastus[1] (elements of popularity) but not yet the insight into the unlimited knowledge Of the ten pāramitās,[2] their dānapāramitā is of an extraordinary nature. A bodhisattva who has attained the first bhūmi is entitled to become a king of Jambudvīpa and be a righteous ruler with mind always turned towards Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, and the bodhisattva practices and omniscience Wishing to become a leader of men, he renounces the world, takes ordination[3] and in a moment enters into a hundred samādhis, sees a hundred Buddhas, traverses over a hundred lokadhātus and performs other extraordinary things.

CORRESPONDENCE OF BHŪMIS WITH MAGGAS AND PHALAS

The Hīnayāna system does not offer any parallel to the first bhūmi of the Mahāyānists, for it has no concern with Bodhicitta, Pranidhānas, Maitrī, Karunā, and the ten qualities needed by a bodhisattva for fortifying himself to march along the ten bhūmis It is from the second bhūmi that the Hīnayāna system offers a parallel to the Mahāyānic stages of progress The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[4] and the *Madhyamakāvatāra*[5] notice this fact in their treatment of the bhūmis.

In the Hīnayāna system a very common way of speaking about the various stages of progress is that an adept by complying with the rules of Adhisīla[6] (entire moral precepts) becomes a Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmi, by complying with the rules of

[1] *Mvyut* 35 dānam priyavāditā arthacaryā samānārthatā, see also *Lal Vis*, p 38, *Daśa*, p 22, *B Bh*, p 10

[2] *Mvyut* 34 gives a list of ten This is common in Pāli works

[3] *Cf Sata*, p. 1459 Tathāgata-śāsane pravrajati See *infra*, p 270

[4] See Rahder's edition in the App. to *Daśa*, p 1

[5] *M Ava*, ch I (*Le Muséon*, VIII)

[6] The Atthangika Magga is arranged thus

Sīla = Sammāvācā, °kammanta, and °ājiva

Citta or Samādhi = Sammāsankappa, °vāyāma, °sati, °samādhi

Paññā = Sammādiṭṭhi See, *e.g*, *Vis M*, pp 4, 510, *Dīgha*, III, p 219

Adhicitta, an Anāgāmi, and by those of Adhipaññā, an Arhat So we can name the Hinayāna stages also as (1) Puthujjana but Gotrabhū, (2) Adhisīla, (3) Adhicitta, and (4) Adhipaññā [1] If we now compare with these the Mahāyānic bhūmis as named in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* the relation of the Hinayānic to Mahāyānic bhūmis becomes apparent They are as follows (1) Gotra-Vihāra, (2) Adhimukticaryā-Vihāra, (3) Pramuditā-Vihāra, (4) Adhisīla-Vihāra,[2] (5) Adhicitta-Vihāra, (6), (7) and (8) Adhiprajñā-Vihāra, (9) Sābhisamskāra-sābhoga-nirnimitta-Vihāra, (10) Anābhoga-nirnimitta-Vihāra, (11) Pratisamvid-Vihāra, and (12) Parama-Vihāra Of these twelve Vihāras, we have already dealt with the first two, the preparatory Bhūmis,[3] which are, as a rule, not included in the usual list of bhūmis, and correspond to the Hinayānic Puthujjana or pre-Sotāpanna stage Hence, if they be left out, we have the usual ten bhūmis Evidently the five bhūmis (4–8 of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and 2–6 of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*) correspond to the four Hinayānic stages The higher knowledge and attainments which the Bodhisattvas claim and which, according to the Mahāyānists are beyond the capacity of the Hinayānists, are to be attained in the last four bhūmis

II VIMALĀ OR ADHISĪLA

A Bodhisattva who has well practised the first bhūmi and seeks the second develops ten cittāśayas, *viz*, rju (plain), mrdu (soft), karmanya (pliable), dama (submissive), sama (tranquil), kalyana (beneficial), asamsrsta (unclogged), anapeksa (indifferent), udara (noble) and māhātmya (magnanimous) [4]

[1] Three samanakaraniyas in the *Anguttara*, I, p 229

[2] *B Bh*, p 12 tells us that the Adhisīla V is the same as Vimalā bhūmi of the *Daśa*.

[3] See *ante*, pp 243 ff

[4] *B Bh*, p 11 mentions ten samvagāśayas but does not enumerate them The *Mtu*, I, pp 85–9 mentions twenty adhyāśayas and amplifies each of them by a stanza This is followed by an enumeration of the evil consequences that follow their non observance, making the Bodhisattva go downwards It is in connection with the third bhūmi (*Mtu*, I, p 101) that the *Mtu* tells us daśa karmapathān kuśalān sevanti puruso ttama.

When these āśayas are developed he is established in the second bhūmi, Vimalā He then quite naturally refrains from prāṇātipāta (taking life), adattādāna (stealing), kāmamithyācāra (misconduct), anṛtavacana (telling lies), piśunavacana (malignant speech), paruṣavacana (harsh speech), sambhinnapralāpa (frivolous talks) and becomes anabhidyā (non-avaricious), avyāpannacitta (devoid of malevolence), and comes to possess samyagdṛṣṭi (right view)[1] He then thinks that all beings suffer on account of not avoiding the said ten akuśalakarmapathas He therefore must persuade them to follow the right conduct, and with that object in view, he must himself first observe them[2]

He ponders over the fact that persons are graded according to their kuśalakarmapathas (good deeds performed) and other practices, by virtue of which they become men, gods, etc, and also Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas He also ponders over the fact that by committing evil deeds (akuśalakarmapathas) beings are born in hell, the animal world or the Yama world, or as human beings with a short life and many diseases So he decides that he will observe the ten kuśalakarmapathas and persuade others to do so[3] He therefore becomes loving and compassionate towards all beings and takes upon himself the duty of being a teacher and a guide, bringing them from the wrong to the right view He observes that beings suffer on account of anger, avarice, desire, hatred, delusion, mental darkness, lack of energy and so forth, that they are tossed up and

[1] *Daśa*, pp 23–5, on p 26 the sufferings that follow each of the misdeeds are mentioned

[2] *B Bh*, pp 11–12 refers briefly to the acquisition of kuśalakarmapathas and remarks that just as gold is purified by heating and other processes, so a Bodhisattva is purified by the practice of these karmapathas The *Mtu*, however, makes no reference to the kuśalakarmapathas in the second bhūmi *M Ava* (ch II) enumerates the kuśalakarmapathas in all their details, and also dilates on the purity acquired by the bodhisattva in this bhūmi, which is for this reason named Vimalā

[3] *Śata*, p 1455 refers to śīlas, but its account agrees to a great extent with that of *Daśa* *Śata*. enumerates eight duties, śīlapariśuddhi, kṛtajñatā, etc For comments on them, see *Śata*, pp 1460–1 The *Mtu*. gives us very little information in regard to this bhūmi

down by the waves of desire, love of existence, ignorance, that they are tied up by love and hatred, likes and dislikes, and labour under the misconception of 'I-ness' and 'Mine-ness', etc Out of compassion he resolves to rescue those beings and lead them to a suitable haven of peace

While in this bhūmi he can see many Buddhas, worship them and transfer the merit thus acquired to the attainment of Bodhi He receives the kuśalakarmapathas from these Buddhas and fulfils them in many kalpas He gets rid of mātsarya (covetousness) and carries out fully the precept of liberality Of the four samgrahavastus, he increases priya-vadya (affability) in a great measure, and of the ten pāramitās he improves the śilapāramitā in a great degree but not so the other pāramitās

Should a bodhisattva after the attainment of the second bhūmi desire material prosperity, he can become a righteous cakravartin with seven ratnas and so forth.[1]

This account of the second bhūmi leaves us little doubt as to its similarity to the Adhisīla practices of the Hīnayānists, without, of course, taking into account the adhyāsayas developed by the Bodhisattvas In the *Visuddhimagga* it is stated that the sīla practices lead to the purification of all impurities relating to conduct,[2] and serve as the basis for the attainment of sotāpanna and sakadāgāmi stages In the first chapter of the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa dilates on the various sīlas to be observed by the householders, lay-devotees, monks and nuns, supplementing it by the second chapter on the thirteen dhutangas, which he considers necessary for the ascetics (yogī) to bring their sīlas to perfection[3] The *Nikāyas* usually mean by the sīlas the commonly known ten sīlas and the 250 pātimokkha rules[4] By the complete performance of sīlas and a little of samādhi and paññā,[5] an

[1] *Cf* *B* *Bh*, p 12 The *Mtu* adds in every bhūmi the qualities which make a bodhisattva retrogress from a higher to a lower bhūmi but passes over the other details

[2] *Vis* *M* sīlena ca duccarita sankilesavisodhanam pakāsitam hoti

[3] *Ibid* p 59 [4] See, *e g*, *Anguttara*, I, pp 229, 235.

[5] It will be observed that an adept commences practising all the three, sīla, samādhi, and paññā, but he fulfils only one in one stage

adept becomes a sotāpanna and a sakadāgāmi. We know that a sotāpanna is free from the three samyojanas and the two anusayas, *viz*, ditthi and vicikicchā [1] By bringing the three hindrances, rāga (attachment), dosa [2] (hatred), and moha (delusion) to their minimum (tanutta), and by getting rid of anusayas, kāmarāga and patigha and by practising a little more of samādhi, and paññā, he becomes a sakadāgāmi In the *Patisambhidāmagga*,[3] it is stated that an adept in sotāpattiphala, sakadāgāmimagga, etc, obtains aññindriya (the faculty of perfect knowledge), and the dhammas that were already existing in him become unmanifest (avyākata), and the new thoughts that arise in his mind are pure, transcendental and conducive to Nibbāna [4] A sotāpanna also gets rid of ditthāsava completely and the other three āsavas so far as they lead to hell, while a sakadāgāmi of olārika (gross) kāmāsava, and partially of bhavāsava and avijjāsava [5] In addition to the attainments required in the sotāpattimagga, the adept must also think of the transitoriness and essencelessness of the five upādāna khandhas [6]

There are two sub-stages between sotāpatti (or sattakkhattuparama) and sakadāgāmi They are called kolamkola (kulankula) and ekabījī (ekavīcika) [7] Any one who has got rid of the three samyojanas, completed the sīlas and practised a little (mattaso) of samādhi and paññā is usually called sotāpanna He is also called sattakkhattuparama [8] because he will be re-born seven times more among men and the gods before he can attain Nibbāna He will never fall back into hell and is destined to attain Nibbāna after getting rid of

1 *Patis M*, II, p 96
2 *Ibid*, I, pp 72–3, II, p 96
3 *Ibid*, II, p 96
4 *Ibid*, I, p 116
5 *Ibid*, I, p 24
6 *Samyutta*, III, p 168

7 *Anguttara*, I, p 233, IV, pp 380–1, *Samyutta*, V, p 205, *Pug. P*, p 16, *Netti*, p 189, *Vis M*, p 709, *Patis M*, I, p 161, *Kośa*, VI, 34 For the two stages prior to sotāpanna, *viz*, Dhammānusārī and Saddhānusārī, see *ante*, pp 250 ff

8 There are disagreements among the schools as to the number of existences, some interpret seven existences among men and seven among the gods, and some even more, though the texts cited by each clearly show that seven existences in all were meant See, for details, *Kośa*, VI, 34, pp 200–2

two more avarabhāgīya (orambhāgiya = lower) fetters, *viz*, kāmacchanda and vyāpāda, and five ūrdhvabhāgīya (uddhambhāgiya = higher) samyojanas (fetters), *viz.*, rūparāga, arūparāga, auddhatya, māna and moha

A srotāpanna becomes a kulankula by getting rid of the third and fourth categories of passions of the Kāmadhātu and by the acquisition of purer indriyas as opposed to the passions He will be reborn twice or thrice either among the gods when he is called Devakulaṅkula or among men when he is called Manusyakulankula [1] The *Nikāyas* did not draw any clear difference between sotāpanna and kolamkola The *Visuddhimagga* distinguishes them by saying that the Kolamkolas have vipassanā and indriyas of the medium order,[2] while the sotāpannas have those of mild (mrdu) order

The next stage Ekabīji (Ekavīcika) is put in the Pāli texts after Kolamkola and before Sakadāgāmi, but in the *Kośa* it is put after Sakadāgāmi [3] The superiority of Ekabījis as shown in the Pāli texts is that they develop samādhi and paññā still more but cannot complete them [4] The *Visuddhimagga* adds that they have sharp faculties (tikkhindriya) In consequence of this, they are reborn once more among men (mānusakam bhavam) for attaining Nibbāna Quite similar is the description of a Sakadāgāmi, only in this case, it is not mentioned whether the one more rebirth will be among the gods or among men, the texts simply say "imam lokam āgantva", *i e*, they will be reborn in the Kāmadhatu, which includes both men and the gods In any case, the Sakadāgāmis reduce rāga, dosa, and moha to their minimum (tanutta)

The *Kośa* tells us that a Sakrdāgāmi destroys passions (klesas) up to the sixth category Having been born among the gods, he will be reborn once more among men In him rāga, dvesa, and moha are brought to the minimum, and there remain only the three lower categories of passion, *viz*, mrdvadhimātra, mrdumadhya and mrdumrdu The

[1] *Kośa*, II, 34
[2] *Vis M*, p 709 following *Kośa*
[3] *Kośa*, VI 35, 36
[4] 'Na paripūrakārī' is used instead of 'mattasokārī'

Ekavīcikas are distinguished from them by the fact that they destroy seven or eight categories of passions and acquire the faculties opposed to these passions.[1]

The divisions of srotāpannas into three classes are mentioned also in the *Lankāvatāra*. It says that the srotāpannas are of ordinary (hīna), medium (madhya), and excellent (viśista) classes.[2] The hīna class will undergo seven more rebirths, the madhya (i.e. kulaṅkula) three or five and the viśista (i.e. ekavīcika[3]) only one. The samyojanas, viz., satkāyadrsti, vicikitsā and śīlavrataparāmarśa are mild, medium or sharp according to the class of srotāpannas. A srotāpanna by getting rid of the three samyojanas does not have rāga, dvesa and moha.[4] While speaking of the sakrdāgāmi, the *Lankāvatāra* simply mentions that they require one more birth to put an end to duhkha.[5] The stage next to sakrdāgami is anāgāmi corresponding to the third bhūmi of the Mahāyānists.

III. Prabhākarī or Adhicittavihāra

A Bodhisattva who has completed the second bhūmi and seeks the third should develop the following ten cittāśayas:[6] suddha (pure), sthira (firm), nirvid (disgustful), avirāga (non-detached), avinivrta (non-returning), drdha (strong), uttapta (energetic), atrpta (never satisfied), udāra (noble) and māhātmya (magnanimous).

While in the third bhūmi the bodhisattva realises that the constituted things are impermanent, full of sufferings,

1 *Kośa*, VI. 36 says on the etymology of the word thus: vīci = interval, separation, i.e., they are separated from Nirvāna by one more birth. Quite different, however, is the etymology given in the Pāli texts, where bīja = seed.

2 *Laṅkā.*, p. 117.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 117–9 explains Satkāyadṛsti as of two kinds, sahaja (natural) and parikalpita (imaginary), and then interprets Vicikitsā and Śīlavrataparāmarśa as a Yogācāra text would do.

4 *Laṅkā.*, p. 119, on this point *Laṅkā* differs from all Hīnayāna texts, which say that Sakṛdāgāmis bring rāga, dvesa and moha to the minimum.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

6 Cf. *B. Bh.*, p. 12, *Mtu.*, I, pp. 89–90 mentions 28 qualities which send back a Bodhisattva from the 3rd to the 2nd bhūmi.

have momentary origin and decay, are without beginning and end, and are subject to the causal law. He understands the misery and despair as issuing from attachment to samskāras, and so he applies his mind to the attainment of Tathāgatajñāna,[1] which he finds as unthinkable, immeasurable and above all misery and despair, and where there is neither fear nor trouble, and by attaining which one can save beings He then develops ten more cittāśayas

Realising this state of things, the bodhisattva again resolves to rescue beings and strive for them He then thinks over the means by which he can rescue them and finds that it is possible only by anāvaranavimoksajñāna (the unscreened knowledge of emancipation) He observes that it is attainable only by hearing and practising the dharma So he turns his mind to perfecting himself in the dharma and resolves to sacrifice all earthly wealth and enjoyment, and undergo all sorts of suffering [2] He now sees that mere purification in speech and action would not be sufficient and that he must observe the dharmas and anudharmas [3] With that end in view, he practises the dhyānas, the four brahmavihāras, *viz*, maitrī, karunā, muditā, and upeksā, and acquires the abhijñās, *viz*, rddhividha (power of performing miracles), divyasrota (supernatural power of hearing), paracittajñāna (power of reading the thoughts of others), pūrvanivāsānusmarana (power of remembering former births), and divyacaksu (supernatural power of vision [4])

He sees many Buddhas, hears their discourses, and follows their directions He comprehends that all dharmas are non-transmigrating, non-decaying and are only subject to cause and condition The fetters of Kāma, Rūpa, Bhava

[1] Cf *B Bh*, pp 12-3

[2] Cf *Mtu*, I, pp 91-5 for ekā gāthā subhāsita a Bodhisattva is prepared to sacrifice everything, even his own life This is followed by an enumeration of the evils for which a Bodhisattva may retrogress

[3] Cf *B Bh*, p 13, *Mtu*, I, pp 91 2, *M Ava* (*Le Museon*, VIII, pp 301 ff)

[4] *Sata* p 1455 mentions only five dharmas in connection with the third bhūmi Except the first there is very little agreement among the three works *Mtu* *Sata*, and *Daśa*

and Avidyā become weak, those due to wrong views (micchādiṭṭhi) having been already destroyed. He gets rid of rāga, dvesa and moha, and the following āśayas are purified kṣāntisauratya (forbearance with gentleness), akhilyamādhurya (sweetness without hindrance), akopya (non-anger), akṣubhita (non-agitation), alubhita (non-covetousness) anunnāmāvanāma (non-elation and non-depression), sarvakṛtapratikṛtānām niṣkānkṣā (non-desire for remuneration for works done), aśāthyamāyāvitā (non-deceit) and agahanatā (non-mysteriousness) Of the four saṃgrahavastus, he increases arthacaryā in a great measure, and of the ten pāramitās he improves kṣāntipāramitā, but not the rest

In this description of the third bhūmi it will be noticed that the bodhisattvas apart from the extraordinary qualities peculiar to them commence practising the eight dhyānas (jhānas), the four brahmavihāras, and the six abhijñās Their fetters relating to Kāma, Rūpa, Bhava, and Avidyā become weak, and those due to dṛṣṭi are destroyed Their rāga, dvesa, and moha are completely destroyed

In the Hīnayāna system also, an adept after completing the sīlas attempts to rise higher and higher in the training of mind through samādhi [1] The *Visuddhimagga* [2] treats in detail the practices that are classed under samādhi They are the four jhānas with the help of forty kammaṭṭhānas (bases of meditation), ten anussatis (objects of remembrance), four brahmavihāras, the four āruppa (higher) jhānas, two bhāvanās, ten iddhis, and six abhiññās, all of which, it will be observed, are included in the third bhūmi. The *Visuddhimagga* also tells us that an adept after completing the citta practices becomes an Anāgāmi, *i e.*, he will not be reborn any more in the Kāmadhātu [3] He gets rid of the five orambhāgiyas (lower), *viz* , sakkāyadiṭṭhi, vicikicchā, sīlabbataparāmāsa, kāmacchanda and vyāpāda,[4] completely destroys rāga, dosa and moha, and removes wholly

[1] *Vis M* , p 84 [2] *Ibid* , ch II

[3] *Pug P Cy* , p 198 , oram vuccati kāmadhātu.

[4] The first three are destroyed by the Sotāpattis and Sakadāgāmis, so in this stage only the last two are destroyed See *ante*, pp 264, 265

kāmāsava, and partially bhavāsava and avijjāsava.[1] He comes into existence as an upapātika (self-born[2]) and attains Nibbāna

The Anāgāmis are divided into five sub-classes[3] called

(1) Antarāparinibbāyi, i e, those who practise the path to destroy the five higher (uddhambhāgiya) samyojanas just after coming into being and before reaching the middle of their lives[4]

(2) Upahacca (=Upapadya of *Kośa*)-parinibbāyi, i e., those who practise the path to destroy the five higher samyojanas after the middle and a little before the end of their lives[5]

(3) Asankhāraparinibbāyi, i e, those who attain parinibbāna by putting an end to kilesas with a little trouble and without great effort (appadukkhena adhimattam payogam akatvā).[6] The *Kośa* explains it as those who attain Nirvāna without effort because they are not energetic[7] The *Anguttara Nikāya* gives us a different interpretation It says that those who complete the fourth Jhāna, develop the five balas and five indriyas, and attain parinibbāna in this life are called Asankhāraparinibbāyi[8]

(4) Sasankhāraparinibbāyi, i e, those who attain parinibbāna by putting an end to kilesas with great trouble and great effort (dukkhena kasirena adhimattam payogam katvā)[9] The *Kośa* explains it as those who attain Nirvāna without relaxing the exercises because they are energetic The *Anguttara Nikāya* explains it as those who look upon the body as evil (asubha), food as loathsome and all constituted things

[1] *Path M*, p 118

[2] In the Suddhavāsalokas (*Pug P Cy*, p 198)

[3] *Vis M*, p 710 The *Kośa* adds five more to this list See fn *infra* *Pug P Cy*, p 200 calculates 48 clasess of Anāgāmis out of these five

[4] *Pug P*, p 16 *Kośa*, VI 37 explains it differently

[5] *Pug P Cy*, p 199 āyukkhayassa asanne thatvā It may be remarked in this connection that the length of lives in these existences is counted by thousands of kalpas *Kośa*, VI, p 211 explains it as those who attain sopādiśeṣanirvāna dhātu immediately after birth

[6] *Pug P Cy*, p 199

[7] *Kośa* VI, p 211

[8] *Anguttara*, II, p 156

[9] *Pug P Cy*, p 199, see *Vis M*, p 453 sasankhāra-pubbapayoga

as disgusting They cogitate on the transitoriness of things and death, and make their minds steady They develop greatly the five balas and five indriyas.[1]

(5) Uddhamsota Akanitthagāmi, i e, those Anāgāmis who do not attain parinibbāna while they are in the Aviha heaven but rise higher and higher until they reach the Akanittha heaven where they attain Nibbāna[2]

Thus we see that the Hīnayānic Anāgāmi stage is parallel to the Mahāyānic third bhūmi

The practices of the fourth, fifth and sixth bhūmis correspond to the Adhipaññā practices of the Hīnayānists In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, three bhūmis are put under Adhiprajñāvihāra, the reason being that the Bodhisattva acquires Prajñā by three different means (tribhir mukhaih), *viz*, bodhipaksika dharmas, the four truths, and the causal law So it subdivides this Vihāra into three.

(i) Bodhipaksyapratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the Bodhipaksika dharmas),

(ii) Satyapratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the Truths), and

(iii) Pratītyasamutpādapratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the law of causation)

[1] *Aṅguttara*, II, p 156 *Cf* *Kośa*, VI, p. 212 fn The Anāgāmis (1) and (4) are of sharp faculties, (2) and (3) of mild faculties (3) and (4) practise the dhyānas while (1) and (2) are described without any mention of dhyānas About the precedence of (3) to (4), see *Kośa*, VI, p 212

[2] See *Kośa*, VI 37, p 213 for two kinds of Ūrdhvasrotas (i) Akanisthagā and (ii) Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatanagā

The Akanisthagā are divided again into three sub-classes

(*a*) Pluta (one who soars high), on account of dhyānas practised by him, he is born in the Brahmakāyika heaven and lastly he is born in the Akanistha heaven where he attains Nirvāna,

(*b*) Ardhapluta (one who soars only half-way), on account of dhyānas practised by him, he is born in the Brahmakāyika heaven, from which he passes to Suddhāvāsa and thence to Akanistha to attain Nirvāṇa there, and

(*c*) Sarvacyuta, before entering into Akanistha heaven, he passes across all the heavens except Mahābrahma An Anāgāmi cannot have two existences in one heaven because he always rises higher and higher.

IV ARCISMATĪ OR BODHIPAKSYAPRATISAMYUKTĀ-DHIPRAJÑĀVIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva passes from the third to the fourth bhūmi after acquiring the ten dharmālokas[1], i e, after obtaining insight into sattvadhātu (world of sentient beings), lokadhātu (various worlds), dharmadhātu (universe), ākāśadhātu (space), vijñānadhātu (world of consciousness), kāmadhātu (world of desires), rūpadhātu (world of forms), ārūpyadhātu (world of formlessness), udārādhyāśayādhimuktidhatu (spheres of noble intention and aspiration) and māhātmyādhyāśayādhimuktidhātu (spheres of magnanimous intention and aspiration)

He becomes an accomplished member of the Tathāgata family by acquiring the following ripeners of knowledge,—unbending aspiration, implicit faith in the three ratnas, clear perception of the origin and decay of samskāras, of the non-origination of things in reality, of the incoming and outgoing of the world, of samsāra (worldly existences) and nirvāna (cessation), and of the actions of beings of the various spheres

He practises the four smrtyupasthānas (earnest thoughts) and exerts to acquire further merits and preserve the merits already acquired and not to commit evil actions any more He practises the rddhipādas, the five indriyas[2] and balas, the seven bojjhangas and the eight mārgas[3]

In this bhūmi he gets rid of satkāyadrsti and its relevant factors and performs actions leading only to sambodhi

As he acquires the various qualities of this bhūmi, his mind becomes softer, aspiration stronger, compassion for the sentient beings greater, and consequently he becomes more and more energetic[4] His doubts are removed and his cittāśaya becomes immeasurable

He now takes ordination[5] His kuśalamūlas become of the purest kind Of the four samgrahavastus he develops samānarthata (feeling of equality) and practises the vīryapāramitā of the ten pāramitās

[1] Cf B Bh, pp 14–5

[2] I e, Sraddhā, Virya, Smrti, Samādhi and Prajñā

[3] Cf B Bh, p 15

[4] Cf B Bh, pp 15, 16

[5] See ante, 1st bhūmi, p 259

V SUDURJAYĀ OR SATYAPRATISAMYUKTĀDHIPRAJÑĀVIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva passes from the fourth to the fifth bhūmi by developing the cittāsayaviśuddhisamatā[1] (uniformity and purity of intention) relating to the following ten matters doctrines of the past, present and future Buddhas, moral precepts, mental discipline, removal of wrong views and doubts knowledge of the right and wrong path, practice of the Bodhipaksika dharmas, and the duty of elevating beings morally

In this bhūmi, on account of the repeated practice of the various Bodhipaksika dharmas, the possession of a still more purified intention,[2] the comprehension of tathātva (thatness) of all dharmas, and the further increase of his aspiration compassion, love, etc , he understands the four Āryasatyas[3] He becomes proficient in understanding the

(a) Conventional truth (samvrti) on account of catering to the wishes of other beings,

(b) Transcendental truth (paramārtha) on account of following only one path,

(c) Truth of signs (laksana) by realising the generic and particular characteristics of things (svasāmānyalaksana),

(d) Truth of analysis (vibhāga) by knowing the various divisions of dharmas,

(e) Truth of overcoming (nistīrana) on account of knowing the real condition of skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc ,

[1] The fourth bhūmi in the *Mtu.* is not very clearly described. It mentions some evils which retard the progress of a Bodhisattva and speaks about the avaivartika qualities attained or to be attained See *Śata* , pp 1455, 1462-3, which gives a slightly different list

[2] Cf *B Bh*, p 16 The *Mtu* (p 110) says that the citta of a bodhisattva when passing from the fourth to the fifth bhūmi realises "ādīptam sarvabhavam rāgadvesamohebhyah" But this is mentioned in the *Daśa* in connection with the 3rd bhūmi (see *ante*, p 267) The account of the *Śata* is also different and speaks only of some disciplinary rules It says that in this bhūmi a bodhisattva avoid gṛhisamstava, bhiksuṇī-samstava, kulamātsarya, samganikāsthāna ātmotkarsaṇa, vyāpāda, parapamsana, daśākuśalakarmapathā, māna stambha, viparyāsa, rāga, dvesa and moha (*Śata* , pp. 1456, 1463-5).

[3] *B Bh*, p 16

(f) Truth of things (vastu) by subjecting his body and mind to afflictions,

(g) Truth of origin (prabhava) on account of births,

(h) Truth of decay and non-origin (ksayānutpāda) on account of the complete suppression of all sufferings,

(i) Truth of the knowledge of the path (mārgajñānāvatāra), and

(j) Truth of the origin of Tathāgata knowledge (tathāgatajñānasamudaya) on account of attaining knowledge in all its details and for following the bodhisattvabhūmis

Having known the truths he realises that all the constituted things are essenceless, false He pities the ignorant beings who undergo repeated births and the consequent sufferings for not knowing the truth and wishes that all his merits be transferred to them for their happiness, training, and ultimate emancipation

In this bhūmi he becomes smrtimān, i e, does not get bewildered, matimān for having clear knowledge, gatimān for knowing the sense in which a sūtra is uttered, hrīmān for preserving himself as well as others, dhrtimān for practising the disciplinary rules, and buddhimān for being proficient in ascertaining what is proper and improper and such other things[1] His desire and energy for acquiring further merits and rendering service to beings become greater and greater He pleases the beings by means of all the four samgrahavastus, by showing his rūpakāya, by giving discourses on the doctrines, on the Bodhisattva practices, on the greatness of Tathāgatas, on the evils of the world, on the virtue of acquiring Buddhajñāna, and by performing miracles For establishing the Buddha dharma he also acquires the secular sciences, viz, mathematics, medicine, poetry, drama, metallurgy, astronomy, etc[2]

He sees the Buddhas and hears the dharma from them He renounces the world, becomes a dharmabhānaka Of the ten pāramitās, he likes dhyānapāramitā

[1] Cf B Bh, p 17 [2] Ibid

VI ABHIMUKHĪ OR PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDAPRATISAṂYUKTĀDHIPRAJÑĀVIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva, on the completion of the mārgas, passes to the sixth bhūmi and realises the ten kinds of sameness,[1] *viz*, the sameness of all dharmas on account of their being (i) animitta (baseless), (ii) alaksana (signless), (iii) anutpāda (originless), (iv) ajāta (unborn), (v) vivikta (detached), (vi) ādiviśuddha (pure in the very beginning), (vii) nisprapañca (inexpressible), (viii) anāyūha-niryūha (non-taken and non-rejected), (ix) māyāsvapnapratibhāsapratiśrutkopama (similar to dream, illusion, or echo), and (x) bhāvābhāvādvaya (identity of existence and non-existence)

Looking upon all things in this manner, the bodhisattva through his deep faith reaches the sixth bhūmi but does not yet attain the anutpattikadharmaksānti (faith in the non-origination of things by nature) As mahākarunā predominates in his mind, he pities the beings who, on account of their ignorance, think of the things of the world as originating, decaying and possessing a soul (ātman) Not knowing the truth, they walk along the wrong path, are moved by merits and demerits, and thus have some abhisamskāras (thought-constructions) The thought-seed (citta bījam) thus produced by the abhisamskāras becomes contaminated (sāsrava), being full of upādāna (attachment to existence) and productive of birth, old age, death and rebirth Then by the thought-creation of karma-ksetra (fields of action), ignorance and desire, a net of views is woven, from which come name and form (nāma-rūpa), from them arise in succession the five organs of sense, contact, feeling (vedanā), abhinandana (enjoyment) combined with trsnā (desire), attachment (upādāna), desire for existence (bhava), and five skandhas distributed into five classes of beings (gatipañcaka) These beings fade into old age, despair, etc The bodhisattva comprehends that there is really no doer of these, which, being by nature uncreated by any power (anābhoga, śāntilaksana), dis-

[1] Cf *B Bh*, p 18 The *Mtu* (I, p 120) does not speak of anything particular in this bhūmi It simply says that a bodhisattva by associating with the meditating ascetics (yogācāras) and by developing śamatha and vipaśyanā passes from the 5th to the 6th bhūmi

appear and there is no destroyer of them The bodhisattva further realises that the non-comprehension of the highest Truth is avidyā (ignorance) and avidyā is the source of samskāras, which produce the first citta-vijñāna with its concomitant (sahaja) the four upādāna-skandhas, from which arise name and form and gradually the mass of sufferings The tree of suffering grows without any doer, or feeler (kārakavedakarahita) So he realises that these three worlds are all mere thought-constructions (cittamātram yad idam traidhātukam) [1]

Through his comprehension of the law of causation from the ten different standpoints and on account of his being convinced of the fact that there is no doer or feeler, and no creator (asvāmika), and that all things are subject to cause and condition, and devoid of any essence, detached from everything else, and essentially non-existing, the bodhisattva realises the śūnyatā-vimoksamukha (release of essencelessness) [2] Then by comprehending that the bhavāngas (the links in the chain of causation) are by nature extinct (svabhāva-nirodha), he does not notice any dharmanimitta (basis of dharmas) and thus he attains animitta-vimoksamukha (release of baselessness) Lastly, on account of his understanding the śūnyatā and animittatā of all bhavāngas, he does not really seek any vimoksa, though he keeps up the appearance of doing so out of compassion for the innumerable beings, hence he obtains apranihita-vimoksamukha (release of desirelessness) Keeping mahākarunā before him, he completes the bodhyangas which are still incomplete, and being convinced of the fact that the samskāras proceed from the assemblage of, or connection with, materials that are by nature non-originating and non-decaying, he turns his mind to asaṅgajñāna (knowledge free from attachment) called Prajñāpāramitāvihāra [3] and develops it greatly He now practises all the śūnyatā, animitta and apranihita samādhis and develops ten āśayas for rising higher and higher in the spiritual attainments and goes beyond every possible chance of fall to Srāvaka or Pratyeka-

[1] The Pratītyasamutpāda is explained here from ten different stand points, see *Daśa*, pp 48–51 See *ante*, pp 210–1

[2] Cf *B Bh*, p. 18. [3] Cf *B Bh*, p 19.

buddha stages Of the ten pāramitās he greatly develops the prajñāpāramitā.[1]

A bodhisattva by passing through these bhūmis attains all the qualities of an arhat besides those which are indispensable to a bodhisattva He is now an arhat because, as the *Laṅkāvatāra* says, he is now free from the thought-constructions (vikalpa) of dhyāna (meditation), dheya (objects of meditation), samādhi (concentration), vimoksa (release), bala (powers) abhijñā (higher knowledge), kleśa (afflictions) and duhkha (misery) [2]

We have seen that, according to the Hīnayānists, an adept on completion of the paññā practices becomes an arhat Buddhaghosa devotes the last twenty chapters of the *Visuddhimagga* to the elucidation of the various matters which comprise the Paññābhūmi. In this bhūmi[3] the adept is expected to examine analytically the five skandhas (constituents of the body), the twelve āyatanas (fields of the organs of sense), twenty kinds of indriyas (faculties), four truths, and the twelve-linked chain of causation These are only the preliminary practices of the Paññābhūmi These help the adepts to complete the bhāvanāmārga. We have seen[4] that the bhāvanāmārga commences in the sixteenth moment, *i e*, the last moment of the darśana-mārga when the adept becomes srotāpanna So the adepts while progressing along the stages of sanctification complete the sīla- and citta-visuddhis and partially the visuddhi relating to paññā These visuddhis, as classified in the *Visuddhimagga*[5] and the *Abhidhammatthasangaha*[6] are "(i) ditthivisuddhi (purity of views), kaṅkhāvitarana-visuddhi (purity by which all the sixteen classes of doubts with reference to the past, present and future are transcended), maggāmaggañānadassanavisuddhi (purity consisting in the dis-

[1] *Śata*, p 1456 says that a Bodhisattva in this bhūmi completes the six pāramitās and avoids the following six thoughts śrāvakacittam, pratyekabuddhacittam, paritarsaṇacittam, anabalīnacittam, durmanaskacittam and viksepacittam

[2] *Laṅkā*, p 120

[3] *Vis M.*, p. 443.

[4] See *ante*, pp 253 ff

[5] *Vis M*, pp 443, 587ff.

[6] Mrs Rhys Davids has lucidly explained these visuddhis in her Intro to the *Compendium*, her English rendering has been adopted here, for further details, see *Comp of Phil*, pp. 65ff.

tinguishing of the actual path from that which is not the path), patipadāñāṇadassanavisuddhi (purity of insight during the progress of the practice of discernment), and ñāṇadassanavisuddhi[1] (purity-insight or path-insight)[2] In the arhat stage, the adept gets rid of the five remaining samyojanas (uddhambhāgiyas), all kilesas (afflictions), āsavas (impurities) and comprehends finally the real sense of the four truths, i e., he obtains perfect knowledge and his mind is completely freed. He will have no more rebirth and will attain Nibbāna This is also borne out by the description of the arhats that we find in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and other Mahāyāna texts It generally runs thus An arhat is ksīnāsrava (devoid of the four āsravas), niskleśa (free from afflictions), vaśībhūta (with a well-controlled self), suvimuktacitta (with the mind completely freed), suvimuktaprajña (with knowledge cleared up), ājāneya (well-bred), krtakrtya (doer of all that is to be done), apahrtabhāra (relieved of the burden of five skandhas), anuprāptasvakārtha (successful in achieving the object of life) and pariksīnabhavasamyojana (free from the fetters of rebirth).

Corresponding to the two classes of sotāpannas called Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī, the arhats are also divided into two classes Ubhatobhāgavimutta and Paññāvimutta[3] The former comprises those who realise the eight vimokkhas (releases)[4] and destroys their āsavas (impurities) by paññā (knowledge) while the latter comprises those who do not realise the eight vimokkhas but destroy their āsavas by paññā[5]

All the arhats, it seems, did not possess the patisambhidās, which a bodhisattva acquires among others in the ninth

[1] *Vis M*, p 672 sotāpattimaggo sakadāgāmimaggo anāgāmimaggo arahattamaggo ti imesu pana catusu maggesu ñāṇam ñāṇadassanavisuddhi nāma

[2] Buddhaghosa calls these five visuddhis 'sarīra' while the sīla- and citta visuddhis 'mūla' See *Vis M*, p 443

[3] See *ante*, p 251

[4] *Digha*, II, pp 70–1 (up to saññāvedayitanirodha)

[5] *Ibid*, II, p 71, *Pug P*, p 14, *Aṅguttara*, IV, p 453, *Kośa*, VI 63 The *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp 452–3, however, says that the Paññāvimutta attains the eight vimokkhas, and omits the words "kāyena phassitvā" which are mentioned in connection with the Kāyasakkhins and Ubhato bhāgavimuttas

bhūmi It is often found that an arhat who possessed paṭisambhidā also was specially described as sahapaṭisambhidā arahattam pāpuni (i.e., attained arahathood with paṭisambhidā) [1]

With the sixth bhūmi, our comparison of the Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic stages ends The accounts of the remaining four bhūmis have nothing to do with the Hīnayānic practices, and besides, the attainments for which a bodhisattva performs the tasks of these bhūmis were unknown to the Hīnayānists From the seventh bhūmi really commence the attempts of the bodhisattva to realise the dharmaśūnyatā, the nirnimittatā of things cognised by us, and the four bhūmis only indicate the gradual development of this knowledge of bodhisattvas until the Tathāgatabhūmi, in which he becomes a perfect Tathāgata and one with all the other Tathāgatas The Hīnayānists, of course, accord a very high position to Buddha with the extraordinary powers and attributes, some of which are found mentioned in connection with the last four bhūmis.

VII DŪRANGAMĀ OR SĀBHISAMSKĀRA-SĀBHOGA-NIRNIMITTA-VIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva after completing the bodhisattvamārga enters into the seventh bhūmi He now commences practising a different and superior path aided by the ten kinds of knowledge of expedients (upāyaprajñājñāna) [2]. The ten kinds are as follows He

i (*a*) possesses a mind well-trained by the meditations of śūnyatā, animitta and apranihita, (*b*) appears as if acquiring a collection of great merits and knowledge,

ii (*a*) comprehends the essencelessness (nairātmya-niḥsattva)

[1] *Mil*, p 18, *DhP A*, II, pp 58, 78, 93, *Aṅguttara*, II, p 160 Sāriputta attained it within a fortnight after his ordination, *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp 3-6 pabinnatthādiñānānam piṭakattayadhārinam arhantānam, p 54 chalabhiññe tepiṭake pabhinnapaṭisambhide, etc.

[2] *B Bh.*, p 19 It should be noted that there are two sections in each of the ten kinds of knowledge or activities of the bodhisattva, the first section being indicated as (*a*) representing his actual, and the second as (*b*) the expedients (upāyakauśalya) adopted by him for the sake of ordinary human beings.

of all dharmas, (*b*) does not give up the four apramānavihāras, *viz*, karunā, maitrī, muditā and upeksā;

iii (*a*) collects the best of all merits, (*b*) does not cling to any dharma,

iv (*a*) remains detached from the three dhātus, (*b*) shows also his doings in the three dhātus,

v (*a*) frees himself absolutely from all afflictions (kleśas), (*b*) performs actions needed for eradicating rāga, dvesa etc of beings,

vi (*a*) realises the non-duality (advaya) of all things which are like mirage, echo, etc, (*b*) shows also his various actions, discriminations, and immeasurable aspirations,

vii develops a mind well aware of the sameness of all Buddhaksetras,

viii (*a*) merges himself in the dharmakāya of all Buddhas, (*b*) shows also his rūpa kāya with its major and minor laksanas[1],

ix acquires the voice of the Tathāgata, and

x (*a*) comprehends the time distinguished as past, present and future as one moment (ekaksanatryadhvānubodham), (*b*) shows also for the sake of the world his existence in the various kalpas.

For even a moment he does not remain dissociated from mārga-abhinirhāra (activities relating to the path), and jñānābhirhāra (activities relating to jñāna) He completes all the ten pāramitās[2] and the four samgrahavastus, four adhisthānas and thirty seven bodhipaksika dharmas.[3] He is now endowed with kāyakarma and vākkarma, pure according to the aspiration of the bodhisattva, the ten kuśala-karmapathas practised by Samyaksambuddhas and performs spontaneously the functions connected with the worldly arts and crafts (silpasthānakarmasthāna) which were mastered

1 *Lankā*, p 192, tells us that the bodhisattvas in this bhūmi cannot see the manomayadharmakāya of the Tathāgata

2 *Dasa*, pp 56-7 It will be observed that the pāramitās are counted here as ten, i e, adding to the usual six (7) Upāyakauśalya, (8) Pranidhāna, (9) Bala and (10) Jñāna See *ante*, p 12

3 *Dasa*, pp 57-8 gives briefly a comparative statement of the previous six *bhūmis* and the seventh bhūmi *All the attainments acquired hitherto up to the seventh bhūmi are completed spontaneously* (anābhogena) by the bodhisattvas in the later bhūmis

by him in the fifth bhūmi,[1] and is now the teacher of beings of the three thousand worlds[2] and has no equal in āśaya (aspiration) and exertion (prayoga) excepting, of course, those bodhisattvas who are in the higher bhūmis He has now in front of his mind all dhyānas, samādhis, samāpattis, abhijñās and vimoksas, which will be completed in the following bhūmis He now practises many samādhis and goes beyond the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha bhūmi and approaches the Prajñājñānavicāranabhūmi[3]

He attained nirodha in the sixth bhūmi, and in the seventh, he entered into and arose out of it but it should not be thought that he is subject to nirodha because he is above the delusion (vitarkadosa) of the Śrāvakas, *viz*, that nirodha is samskrtātyanta vyupaśama (the ultimate cessation of the constituted things)[4] It is one of the excellences of bodhisattvas that they rise up to, and remain in, the bhūtakoti-vihāra (*i e*, ultimate possible state of sentient existence)[5] but are never subject to nirodha

Armed with great powers, meditation, and knowledge of expedients, he manifests himself in the world, shows his aspiration for Nirvāna, and surrounds himself with a large number of followers, but he remains mentally detached from everything According to his pranidhāna he appears in the tridhātu to rescue beings from misery, but he is not contaminated by the worldly impurities Though he has the Buddhajñāna he shows himself as belonging to the class of Srāvakas or Pratyekabuddhas, or even as subject to the snares of Māra and the influences of heretical teachers, going even so far as to sever himself from the Buddhadharma, take to worldly rites, or the enjoyments of the worlds and heavens

[1] See *ante*, p 272 [2] Cf *B Bh*, p 20

[3] *Daśa*, p 60 accounts for the reasons of Bodhisattva's repeating the performances of the first or other bhūmis Cf *B Bh*, p 20

[4] In fact this shows the line of demarcation between the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas

[5] Cf Bhavāgra or Bhavāgraparama=Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana *Kośa*, VI, 37 fn Cf also *Dīgha*, II, p 156 When Buddha was attaining parinibbāna it was said that he "nevasaññānāsaññāyatana samāpattiyā vutthahitvā saññā-vedayita-nirodham samāpajji" Then he comes down from there and attains parinibbāna in the fourth jhāna.

He sees many Buddhas, hears from them the law, and acts according to their directions His faith in the abstruse dharma (gambhīradharmaksānti) is purified He greatly develops the upāyakauśalya-pāramitā [1]

VIII ACALĀ OR ANĀBHOGA-NIRNIMITTA-VIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva after completing the seven bhūmis and purifying the mārga by means of knowledge and expedients, collecting merits, forming the great resolutions (mahāpranidhānas), establishing himself in the four adhisthānas (*viz*, satya, tyāga, upaśama and prajñā), and so forth, he comprehends that all things are without origin, growth, sign, decay change and are by nature non-existent, and that their beginning, middle and end are all the same, in short, he comprehends the tathatā (thatness) of all things [2] He goes beyond the thought-constructions due to citta and manovijñāna and knows that all dharmas are same like ākāśa and thus he establishes himself in the anutpattikadharmaksānti (the faith that things have no origination) [3] As soon as he acquires ksānti he is established in the eighth bhūmi (Acalā [4]) and is above all enjoyments He is possessed of dharmas which are spontaneous (anābhoga), and hence, has no anxiety for matters relating to kāya, vāk and citta, is free from all thought-constructions produced by the movements of thought and is established in the vipāka-dharmas (completion) He does not, in fact, practise the rules of conduct (samudācāras) of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas

[1] The *Mtu* (I, p 127) says nothing in particular about this bhūmi except that a bodhisattva practises self control for doing good to beings

The *Sata* (p 1457) speaks of forty dharmas relating to the non existence of soul and other worldly things, and the realisation of śūnyatā and allied matters Hence, it gives the gist of the practices mentioned in the *Daśa*

[2] Cf *B Bh*, p 21 The *Mtu* (I, p 136) simply tells us that the Bodhisattva develops mahākarunāsamprayuktam cittam for going from the seventh to the eighth bhūmi and completes the account of the eighth bhūmi by mere enumeration of some legendary names

[3] Cf *B Bh*, p 22, see also pp 49, 273

[4] Cf *Lankā*, pp 221-2, 226

He is now asked by the Buddhas to exert for acquiring the ten balas and four vaiśāradyas which he up till now has not acquired, and also to take into consideration the ruffled, afflicted, deluded state of mind of the ignorant people. He is then reminded of one of his previous resolutions that dharmatā (i e dharmas being without origin, decay and continuity) is not for Tathāgatas only but that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas should also be made to realise it He is then asked by Buddhas to exert for possessing like them immeasurable body, knowledge, worlds, refulgence, purity of voice and limbs, dharmālokas, ksetras, sattvas and the variety of dharmas of the ten corners of the universe The possession of 'immeasurables' is of great value, far surpassing all the merits and knowledge acquired in the previous seven bhūmis, because the merits and knowledge acquired hitherto were by means of exertion (sābhoga-karmanā) while in the present bhūmi the merits and knowledge are acquired spontaneously

On account of his acquiring spontaneously the upāyakauśalyajñāna (knowledge of expedients) and as the result of his efforts to acquire omniscience, he comes to know how and when a world comes into being, continues to exist, and then disappears, and which karma is responsible for it. He understands the smallness, greatness, i e, every minute detail of the four elements, of the various classes of sentient beings, and their fields of action Such detailed knowledge is needed by a bodhisattva, because he must appear among those sentient beings just as one of them in order to make them feel that he is same as them and that it is possible for every sentient being to become a Buddha [1]

He develops ten vasitās [2] (control) over āyu (span of life cetas (mind), pariskāra (requisities), karma (action), upapatti (origin, i e, birth), adhimukti (aspiration), pranidhāna (resolution), rddhi (miracles), dharma (doctrines) and jñāna (knowledge)

The bodhisattva at this stage can be said to possess

[1] *Daśa*, pp 67-70 refers to the minute details of this knowledge, which is called Sarvākārajñatā The details are passed over here See also *Kārikā* (Bibl Buddhica), Ch I

[2] Cf *B Bh*, p 22

inconceivable, incomparable, immeasurable knowledge, and his actions are always faultless He now possesses the praṇidhānas, adhiṣṭhānas, pāramitās, mahāmaitrī, mahākaruṇā, dhāraṇī, pratibhāna, etc, in short, all dharmas which make a Buddha Hence, this bhūmi is called Acalā and there is no possibility of his going back from this bhūmi (avivartyabhūmi) He is now a member of the Buddha family, and may be said to possess the Buddha gotra He is henceforth constantly attended by all the gods and Vajrapāṇi [1]

IX SĀDHUMATĪ OR PRATISAMVIDVIHĀRA

A Bodhisattva after acquiring and developing the apramāṇa jñānas, dhāraṇīs, samādhis, abhijñās, minute knowledge of the lokadhātus, balas, and the vaiśāradyas of the Tathāgata mentioned in the previous bhūmi, enters into the ninth bhūmi [2] At this stage, he knows truly whether the dharmas are good, bad or indifferent, pure or impure, worldly or transcendental, conceivable or inconceivable, definite (niyata) or indefinite (aniyata), constituted or unconstituted He knows the duties of the Srāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, the Bodhisattvas, and the Tathāgatabhūmi By the intelligence thus derived, he knows correctly the habits or the nature of thoughts of beings, their afflictions (kleśa), actions (karma), faculties (indriya), aspiration (adhimukti), elements (dhātu), desire and intention (āśayānuśaya), birth according to desires (vāsanānusandhi) and the rāśis (i e, gotras) He knows the multifarious nature (nānātva) of thoughts (citta), afflictions, karma, etc

The bodhisattva in this bhūmi is in a position to have a very minute knowledge of the aims and qualities of every being and so he is now capable of deciding the way in which a being is to be guided to the goal He therefore modifies his teachings according to his judgment

He also takes the form of a dharmabhāṇaka [3] (preacher of

[1] *Sūtra*, p 1458 gives the attainments of this bhūmi They are similar to those described in the *Daśa* Cf *Laṅkā*, p 192

[2] *Mtu*, I, p 141 mentions only some legendary names in this bhūmi and speaks of nothing else Cf *B. Bh*, p 23

[3] Cf *B Bh*, p 23, see also *ante*, p 272

dharmas) in order to preserve the doctrines of the Teache On account of his immeasurable knowledge, he preache the dharma in various ways, adopting the four pratisamvid (branches of logical analysis)[1] By the practices of thi pratisamvids and working as a dharma-preacher, he become a receptacle of dharma utterances Possessed of dhāranī and pratibhānas he preaches the dharma to beings of a lokadhātus and does the same in an infinite number of ways.

Even in this bhūmi he continues his own spiritual practice and never gets out of the sight of Buddhas He greatl develops the bala-pāramitā If he wishes, he can no become a Mahābrahmā[2]

X Dharmameghā or Parama-Vihāra

A Bodhisattva on completion of the duties of the nint bhūmi passes to the tenth[3] Now he masters countles samādhis, and as the result, a lotus of infinite splendour an size appears and he is found to be seated on it with a equally resplendent body and established in the samādhi o omniscience (sarvajñajñānaviśeṣābhiṣeka)[4] surrounded b countless bodhisattvas who are yet in any one of the nin bhūmis and all looking at him The rays of light issue fort from his body and make all beings happy[5] While he is thu seated on the lotus, rays come forth from the Tathāgatas and consecrate him as a Samyaksambuddha possessed of omniscience, and hence this bhūmi is called Abhiṣekabhūmi.

[1] *Viz*, Dharma (nature or condition), Artha (analysis), Nirukti (etymo logical analysis) and Pratibhāna (context) It is difficult to find suitable expressions for the Pratisamvids An idea, however, can be formed from the illustrative passages given in the *Daśa*, pp 77–8

[2] See *Sata*, p 1458 It speaks of quite different matters, some o which appear in the *Mtu*, I, p 142, in connection with the tenth bhūmi

[3] The *Mtu*, I, p 142, has nothing corresponding to the account of the *Daśa* It mentions something connected with the Bodhisattva's descent from the Tuṣita heaven and birth in the world of mortal beings

[4] Cf *B Bh*, 24

[5] The wonders of raśmi are described here as well as in the *Prajñā-pāramitās* and other Mahāyāna works

He now knows thoroughly how the world and its dharmas appear and disappear, the innumerable functions of a Buddha, the countless bodhisattva-vimoksamukhas, samādhis, dhāranīs, etc He is now possessed of such smrti-kauśalya (expedients of memory) that he can hold all dharmas showered on him (dharmameghā) by infinite Buddhas [1] He can perform any kind of miracle In this bhūmi he greatly develops the jñāna-pāramitā [2]

It is after the tenth bhūmi that a bodhisattva becomes a Tathāgata, and so the *Lankāvatāra* calls this stage Tathāgatabhūmi [3] The *Śatasāhasrikā* [4] also remarks that a bodhisattva in the tenth bhūmi can be called a Tathāgata

In the Hīnayāna literature one does not expect any account corresponding to that of the last four bhūmis. The conception of Buddha among the Hīnayānists is more or less hazy and that is due to the fact that the introduction of the Bodhisattva conception in their literature was only an after-thought, suggested undoubtedly by the Mahāyānic speculations They carefully avoided all metaphysical conceptions introduced by the Mahāyānists in connection with the Bodhisattva and Buddha conceptions, though they could not offer a similar treatment to the devotion inspiring stories of the lives of the bodhisattvas The Hīnayānists, consistent with their doctrinal principles, incorporated in their literature a life of Buddha preceded by a short account of the Bodhisattva lives under the headings, *Dūrenidāna* and *Avidūrenidāna* [5] These two *Nidānas* are nothing but the gist of stories current among the Mahāyānists, and possess trace, though very slight, of borrowings Apart from the expressions like Buddhabīja[6] and Abhinirhāra,[7] the passage in which Sumedha brāhmana says, "I have no need of nibbāna by destroying the kilesas, like Dīpankara Dasa-

[1] Cf, *B Bh*, p 24

[2] *Sata*, p 1472 says that the bodhisattva in this bhūmi obtains, besides the pāramitas, Tathāgatabalas, four vaiśaradyas and four pratisamvids, eighteen āveṇikadharmas, sarvākārajñatā, sarvavāsanākleśānusandhiprahāna and sarvabuddhadharmaparipūraṇa

[3] *Lankā*, p 227 [4] *Sata*, p 1458 [5] *Jāt*, I, p. 2.

[6] *Ibid*, I, p 16 [7] *Ibid*, I, p 14

bala, I shall attain the highest sambodhi and by means of the boat of dharma, I shall lead the men across the sea of transmigration and attain parinibbāna, "[1] shows clearly Mahāyānic, or at least, semi-Mahāyānic traces But the Hīnayānists rejected not only the metaphysical speculations but also the stereotyped list of pāramis of the Mahāyānists. The *Jātaka* as well as the *Mahābodhivamsa*[2] states that the Buddhakāraka dharma is only ten pāramis, *viz*, dāna, sīla, nekkhamma, paññā, viriya, khanti, sacca, adhitthāna, mettā and upekkhā This is a list of their own making and does not agree with the Mahāyānic list[3]

Of the extraordinary spiritual powers attained by a Buddha, the Hīnayānists say very little We have in the *Nikāyas* the remark that Buddhas (including Paccekabuddhas) attain perfect knowledge by themselves, and by following the dharma unheard before[4] A Samyaksambuddha preaches the dhamma and becomes the founder of a religion, and the leader of men and the gods He is sabbaññu (omniscient)[5] and his knowledge in any matter whatsoever does not require any āvajjanā (reflection), he possesses ten balas, and four vesārajjas In the *Kathāvatthu*[6] there is a discussion on this topic, *viz*, whether the powers of a Tathāgata are the same as those of a Sāvaka—a point raised by the Andhakas on the basis of the *Anuruddha-samyutta*[7] Among the powers of Buddhas referred to, there is nothing very special except the few mentioned above, and the Theravādins were driven to an uncomfortable position by the question of the Andhakas In their literature the Hīnayanists tried to prove that a Buddha is a rare being and superior to the men and the gods, but they mention also that there is hardly any distinction between an Arhat and a Buddha except that the latter is a founder and teacher of a religion[8]

1 *Jāt* I, p 14. 2 *Ibid*, p. 25, *Mahābodhivamsa*, p 9

3 See *ante*, pp 12, 278 4 *Anguttara*, III, p 9, *Pug*, *P*, p 14

5 *Majjhima*, I, p 482 sabbaññū sabbadassāvī aparisesam ñānadassanam patijānāti.

6 *Kvu*, III, 1 2 7 *Samyutta*, V, p 304.

8 For a comparison of the Śrāvakas Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see ch II, pp 80–4 *Dial. of Buddha*, II, 1-3, III 6

TABULAR STATEMENT SHOWING THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HĪNAYĀNIC AND MAHĀYĀNIC BHŪMIS

Hīnayānic Stages	*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, *Śatasāhasrikā* and other Mahāyāna works	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*	*Śatasāhasrikā* (p 1473) = *Mvyut* 50 (śrāvakabhūmis) = *Tib Dict* (p 475) of S C Das	*Mahāvastu*
Pre sotāpanna or Puthujjana (up to completion of the 15 kṣaṇas of the darśanamārga, see pp 254–5)	No name but there is a description of the practices, see pp 246–7	A. Prakṛticaryā sub divided into	I Suklavipaśyanā bhūmi but see Rahder, *Daśa*, pp xi, xvii	A Prakṛticaryā (see p 244, n 4)
Gotrabhū (Acc to *Aṅguttara* and *Pug P* it precedes Sotāpattimagga but acc to other works adepts in one of the maggas and phalas are Gotrabhū)	..	(a) Gotravihāra and	II Gotrabhūmi	
....	Adhimukticaryābhūmi (in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*) See pp 243–4	(b) Adhimukticaryāvihāra or Śuddhāśaya bhūmi	....	B. Praṇidhānacaryā (see p. 244, n 4).
Sotāpattimagga — (i) Saddhānusārī (ii) Dhammānusārī (see pp 250, 255)	I Pramuditā	III Pramuditā ...	III Aṣṭamaka bhūmi [*Tib Dict* * makes it the seventh bhūmi (?)].	I Durārohā (see p 247, n 4)

I Sotāpanna (or Sattakkhattuparama) — (i) Saddhāvimutta (ii) Diṭṭhippatta (see pp 250–1) (a) Kolaṁkola (i) Devakolaṁkola (ii) Manussakolaṁkola (b) Ekavīcika or Ekabījī *Kosa* puts this after Sakadāgāmi (see pp 263–5)	II Vimala	B Caryāpratipattibhūmi comprising IV Adhiśīlavihāra	IV Darśanabhūmi	C Anulomacaryā comprising II Baddhamānā
II Sakadāgāmi — (i) Saddhāvimutta (ii) Diṭṭhippatta (see pp 250–1)	•	••	V Tanubhūmi..	
III Anāgāmi — (i) Saddhāvimutta (ii) Diṭṭhippatta (see pp 250–1) (a) Antarāparinibbāyi (b) Upahaccaparinibbāyi (c) Asankhāraparinibbāyi (d) Sasankhāraparinibbāyi (e) Uddhaṁsoto Akaniṭṭhagāmi The last mentioned is again subdivided into (1) Akaniṣṭhagā (i) Pluta	III Prabhākari	V. Adhicittavihāra	VI Vītarāgabhūmi	III. Puṣpamaṇḍitā

Hīnayānic stages	*Daśabhūmikasūtra, Śatasāhasrikā* and other Mahāyāna works	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*	*Śatasāhasrikā* (p 1473) = *Mvyut* 50 (śrāvakabhūmis) = *Tib Dict* (p 475) of S C Das	*Mahāvastu*
(ii) Ardhapluta (iii) Sarvacyuta (2) Naivasamjñānāsamjñā yatanupagā (see pp 268–9) IV Arahatta :— (i) Ubhatobhāgavimutta (ii) Paññāvimutta (see p 276)	IV Arcismatī V Sudurjayā VI Abhimukhī (see p 275)	VI Bodhipaksya-prati samyuktādhiprajñā vihāra VII Satyapratisam yuktādhiprajñāvihāra VIII Pratītyasamut-pādapratisamyukt ādhiprajñāvihara (see pp 269 ff)	VII Kṛtāvībhūmi [The *Mvyut* and *Tib Dict* stop here]	IV Rucirā V Cittavistarā VI Rūpavatī
Pratyekabuddha			VIII Pratyeka-buddhabhūmi	•
•			IX Bodhisattva bhūmi	VII Durjayā D Anivartanacaryā comprising VIII Janmanidesa

..	VII Dūrangamā	IX Sābhisamskāra-sābhoga nirnimitta vihāra		•
	VIII Acalā or Avaivartika	X. Anābhoga nirnimittavihāra (or Niyatā)		
....	IX Sādhumatī	XI Pratisamvidvihāra (or Niyatacaryā)		IX Yauvarājya
Samyaksambuddha	X Dharmameghā (or Abhiseka-bhūmi)	XII Parama vihāra (or Nisthāgamana) or Tathāgata bhūmi	X Buddhabhūmi	X Abhiseka *N B*—The powers and qualities attained in the various bhūmis according to the *Mahāvastu* do not tally with those mentioned in other works The differences are pointed out in the footnotes

CHAPTER V

The Vinaya of the Mahāyānists

(How far it is an Adaptation of the Hinayāna Vinaya)

In the extensive literature of the Mahāyānists in Chinese and Tibetan translations, we find some sūtras, which can be classified under Vinaya, as has been done by Nanjio in his *Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka*[1], but in any case there remains the fact that the Mahāyānists lacked a well-codified Vinaya corresponding to that of the Hinayānists I-tsing, who was chiefly interested in the Vinaya remarks that the Mahāyānists had no Vinaya of their own and that theirs was the same as that of the Hinayānists[2] But at the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that the Mahāyānists had a large number of sūtras, which served the purpose of the Vinaya Nanjio refers to some of them while the *Siksāsamuccaya* and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* furnish us with many such names Some of these sūtras are

(1) *Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa*[3], a treatise apparently dealing with the duties of a bodhisattva, and probably a work on the lines of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*

(2) *Bodhisattva-prātimoksa-sūtra*[4], containing many rules of

[1] Nanjio, *Catalogue*, col 239f

[2] *I Tsing*, Takakusu's trans, pp xix, xxii.

[3] Nanjio mentions two works under this name but the literal translations of the Chinese titles are (i) *Bodhisattva-kuśala śila Sūtra*, and (ii) *Bodhisattva Nimimdhara Sūtra* (Nanjio gives "bhadra" for "kusala" and "bhūmidhara" for "nimimdhara")

[4] In the Cambridge University Library there is a Ms entitled *Bodhisattva Prātimoksa Sūtra* procured by Bendall from Nepal Through the kind intervention of Dr E J Thomas I have been able to secure a rotograph copy of the same It is a small work covering ten leaves The title of the Ms suggests that it should correspond to the Chinese texts Nos 1500, 1501 of the Taisho edition of the Tripitaka (Nanjio, Nos 1096, 1098) but on collation I find that there is absolutely no agreement It, however, agrees very closely with the Chinese text No 1499 (of the Taisho ed vol 24—Nanjio, 1097) The Sanskrit restoration from the Chinese title 菩薩戒羯磨

the *Prātimokṣa* type mixed up with admonitions characteristic of the Mahāyāna texts, it contains, e g, rules regarding the duties of a disciple towards his Ācārya, Upādhyāya, Sahadharmika, etc, as also sermons on dāna, kṣānti, self-preservation, the duties of gṛhi-bodhisattvas and so forth

(3) *Bhikṣu Vinaya,* which contains among other things some regulations governing the conduct of a monk, e g, rules regarding the collection of alms, medicines [1], etc

(4) *Ākāśagarbha-sūtra,* dealing with āpattis and mūlāpattis along with the ceremonies connected with the worship of Ākāsagarbha bodhisattva for absolution from sins [2]

(5) *Upāli paripṛcchā,* wherein Upāli is generally the interlocutor and like the previous sūtra, it also deals with āpattis and anāpattis [3], pāpadeśanā (confession), etc

(6) *Ugradattaparipṛcchā* [4], in which Ugradatta gṛhapati (householder) is the interlocutor It contains mostly the rules to be followed by gṛhi-bodhisattvas, and refers incidentally to the life of monks in the forest and so forth.

(7) *Ratnamegha sūtra* [5], dealing with the duties of a forest recluse, collection of alms, medicines and so forth.

(8) *Ratnarāśi sūtra* [6], which contains among other things the duties and functions of a Vaiyāvṛtya monk (i e, a bhikṣu who wishes to undertake the duty of a secretary to the sangha), the rules to be observed when the monks go on their rounds for alms, etc

There are many other works of a like nature from which

文 is *Bodhisattva śilakarma paddhati* (Nanjio renders it as "A composition or treatise on the Bodhisattva's śīlakarma") So the *Bodhisattva Prātimokṣa Sūtra,* from which passages have been cited in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* is not the one, of which we have found the Sanskrit Ms but is very probably the original of the Chinese translations, Nos 1500, 1501, entitled 菩薩戒本

1 See, e g, *Bodhic*, p 141, *Śikṣā.*, p 135

2 *Śikṣā*, pp 59ff, See Nanjio, 67, 68.

3 *Bodhic*, p 139 Upāli paripṛcchāyām āpattyanāpattivibhāgaḥ. See Nanjio, 1109 It is placed under the heading Hīnayāna Vinaya.

4 Nanjio, 23 (19) under Ratnakūta Class, see also Nos 33, 34.

5 Nanjio, 151, 152

6 Nanjio, 23(44) places it in the Ratnakūta class.

quotations are to be found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and a list of which has been compiled by Bendall in his edition of the text. That the Mahāyānists looked for the rules of conduct in these sūtras is evidenced by the remark in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* that "uktāni ca sūtrāntesu bodhisattva-śikṣāpadāni" (the duties of the bodhisattvas are mentioned in the Sūtrāntas[1]) In the *Ratnameghasūtra* it is stated likewise that bodhisattvas should know that they cannot attain bodhi by merely observing the Prātimoksa rules and that they are to perform the duties prescribed by the Tathāgata in the Sūtrāntas[2] So also in the *Caturdharmakasūtra* it is said that the bodhisattva duties are to be found in the Sūtrāntas if they are frequently examined How a bodhisattva is to conduct himself, and what śikṣāpadas are to be observed are all described in the Sūtrāntas[3] Thus we clearly see that the Mahāyānists depended upon the rules scattered in the Mahāyāna texts and did not possess a code of the Vinaya rules

From the remarks quoted above it is evident that the Mahāyānists adopted the *Prātimokṣa* rules of the Hīnayānists, though they pointed out their inadequacy for the attainment of Bodhi The references in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* to 5 or 10 śikṣāpadas, to 250 śikṣāpadas for bhikṣus, or to 500 śikṣāpadas for bhiksunīs distinctly show that they were using some sort of a code, which was similar to, or had much in common with, the Hīnayānic *Prātimokṣa*[4] The name of one of their texts, *viz*, the *Bodhisattva Prātimoksa sūtra* may lead one to think that it is an adaptation of the Hīnayānic *Prātimoksa sūtra*, but from the few quotations that we have in the *Śikṣāsamu-*

[1] *Śikṣā*, pp 17, 41, *Bodhic*, pp 91, 159

[2] *Śikṣā*, p 17, *Bodhic*, p 92 "kim tarhi yānīmāni tathāgatena teṣu teṣu sūtrānteṣu bodhisattvasamudācārā bodhisattva-śikṣāpadāni prajñaptāni teṣu tesu mayā śikṣitavyam iti"

[3] *Śikṣā*, p 41 sūtrāṇām ca sadekṣaṇād bodhisattvaśikṣāpadāni hi prāyaḥ sūtreṣv eva dṛśyante, teṣu teṣu sūtrānteṣu bodhisattva samudācārā bodhisattvaśikṣāpadāni prajñaptāni ti vacanāt"

[4] *Śikṣā*, pp 174–5 (*Bhaiṣajyaguru vaiḍūryaprabharājasūtra*) About the number of the *Prātimoksa* rules in the *Vinayas* of various schools, see E Waldschmidt, *Bruchstucke des Bhikṣunī prātimoksa*, pp 2, 3

ccaya it may be said that it is not a code of monastic rules like the *Prātimokṣa sūtra* but a mixture of monastic rules with those about the general conduct of the bodhisattvas both lay and ordained[1] The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* further hints that it is a compilation made from the *Ratnarāśi* and other sūtras[2]

The Mahāyānists, however, give only a secondary place to the observance of the Prātimokṣa rules They say that a bodhisattva would be guilty of mūlāpatti (grave offence) if he says to anybody "What will you do by following the *Prātimokṣa-Vinaya*? Develop your mind for samyaksambodhi, read the Mahāyāna texts If there be any evil already done by you in word, thought, or body it will be purified by your reading the texts[3]" But again it is also enjoined that a bodhisattva should not wholly depend upon the *Prātimokṣa-Vinaya*, for if a bodhisattva observes the Prātimokṣa rules for many kalpas, *living on roots and fruits of trees but with the* mind attached to śrāvakayāna, he is guilty of a grave offence[4] Besides these remarks, one can also perceive from the customs of the Dhyāna school about the ordination of monks, how the *prātimokṣa* is relegated to a secondary position. De Groot tells us that the Dhyāna school recognised the 250 Prātimokṣa rules as the code of their clergy[5] The monks are first ordained according to the Prātimokṣa rules, and after two or three days, they pass through a second ordination according to the *Brahmajāla sūtra*, the accredited Vinaya of the later Mahāyānists, in order to attain to the dignity of a bodhisattva Thus we see that the Mahāyānists could not or did not do away with the Prātimokṣa rules.

The only Mahāyānic works accessible to us that can be called a code of disciplinary rules are the Chinese *Brahmajāla sūtra* and the two works of Śāntideva, *viz*, *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* Śāntideva is a well-known figure in the Buddhist world of the seventh century, and these two works of his are collections of excerpts from a large number of Mahāyāna sūtras, gathered with a view to present a picture of

[1] See *e g* *Śikṣā*, pp 37, 55, 144, 188.
[2] *Śikṣā*, p. 55 [3] *Ibid*, p 61 [4] *Ibid*, p 66
[5] De Groot, *Le code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, p. 8

the duties and functions of a bodhisattva[1] As regards the *Brahmajāla sūtra*, De Groot informs us that though it had existed from the first century A D., "it was not thought much of before 730 A D"[2] This book was translated by Kumārajīva and formed part of the great work *Bodhisattva-hṛdaya-bhūmi*[3] The fact that Śāntideva had no occasion to refer to this work shows that it was not very popular in his times, or probably, it was not known to him as the other works on Bodhisattva duties were Like other Mahāyānic sūtras on disciplinary rules, it also attempted to combine the ideal life of a bodhisattva, who might be a monk or a layman with that of a monk as a member of the sangha As the preliminary practices of a bodhisattva, it speaks of the twenty cittāsayas ("sentiers du debut"[4]) so many of which are found in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*[5], and it says that a bodhisattva must develop these before he can seriously think of attaining bodhi These cittāsayas are followed by the mention of ten other qualities, called Vajras, which make the bodhisattva firm in his zeal and path After acquiring these thirty qualities, the bodhisattva is to progress along the ten bhūmis

The *Prātimoksa* rules are enumerated in detail after these forty acquirements The first part of the *Prātimoksa* rules deals with the ten serious offences, making a bodhisattva guilty of Pārājikā. The first four of them are identical with the four Pārājikā offences of the *Pātimokkha sutta* in Pāli They are abrahmacarya (misconduct), adattādāna (stealing), vadha (killing), and uttaramanusyadharmālāpa (laying claim to powers and knowledge not usually possessed by human beings) The additional six are —

(1) trading in intoxicating drinks or inducing others to do the same,

(2) divulging the offences committed, or the way in which they were committed by a grhī, bhiksu-bodhisattva, monk, or nun,

[1] Bendall's *Intro to Sikṣā.*, p v

[2] De Groot, *op cit.*, p 12

[3] Nanjio, *Catalogue*, No 1087

[4] De Groot, *op cit*, p 20.

[5] See *ante*, ch iv

(3) vaunting one's own qualities and disparaging others[1],

(4) giving nothing to the destitute, and even injuring them;

(5) not forgiving a person who has injured the bodhisattva but asked for pardon, and

(10) speaking ill of the Triratna

The second part deals with forty-eight other rules, which are considered secondary[2] Most of them are found in the *Pātimokkha sutta* or the *Śiksāsamuccaya* They deal with rules regulating eating and drinking, confessing, treatment to be accorded to friends, teachers, etc, means of livelihood, forming pranidhānas, and so forth[3]. The *Sūtra* under consideration is like many other Mahāyāna sūtras an attempt to synthesise the life and ideal of a bodhisattva with those of a Hīnayānic bhiksu It is also a compilation like the *Śiksāsamuccaya* but it has confined itself more to the actual rules than the *Śiksāsamuccaya* does

The chief reasons for the inability of the Mahāyānists to depend solely on the Hīnayāna code are the following —

(1) The Mahāyānists kept in view the conduct not only of a bhiksu- (or pravrajita-) bodhisattva but also that of a grhī-bodhisattva

(2) The development of bodhicitta and the completion of the Pāramitās played the chief rôle in the practices of a bodhisattva

(3) Too much stress was laid upon Karunā and Maitrī, which, in many cases, received approbation at the expense of the most fundamental rules of conduct[4]

GRHI-BODHISATTVAS

The early Hīnayānists, as we have pointed out elsewhere[5], gave very little attention to the spiritual needs of the laity. They adhered to the principle that the duties that should be performed by a person for the attainment of Nibbāna

[1] Cf *Śiksā*, p 98 ātmānam utkarṣayema param vā paṃsayema

[2] De Groot, *op cit*, p 40

[3] *Ibid*, pp 33ff for details

[4] See, *e g*, *Śiksā*, p. 167

[5] See *supra*, ch I, p 3

cannot be adequately done by one living a family life and not retiring from the world[1]. The discourses suitable for the householders were, according to them, the dānakatham, sīlakatham, saggakatham, kāmānam ādīnavam okāram saṃkilesam, and nekkhamme ānisamsam[2] (discourses on gifts, moral precepts, heaven, dangers and evil consequences of desires, and the good fruits of retirement) It is only when the mind of the householders has been suitably prepared by the discourses on the last two topics that the Ariya-saccas are explained to them The questions may be asked, *viz.*, how could there be lay-adherents like Anāthapiṇḍika, Bimbisāra, Visākhā, who had a prominent place in the then Buddhist society, and how is it that there are a few discourses in the *Nikāyas* on the duties of a householder, on an ideal wife, and so forth[3]? Without questioning the antiquity of some of these discourses, we may assert that they contain very little except some general advice for the spiritual uplift of a person The monks used to approach the householders more with a view to persuade them to leave the household life and become recluses than to continue to be householders and perform duties conducive to Nibbāna. Later on, of course, one finds the laity formally taking the vow of five sīlas, or temporarily eight sīlas[4], but still they are not expected to derive the full benefits of the religion without going through ordination Anāthapiṇḍika in spite of all his gifts and virtues was only a sotāpanna at the time of his death[5] This state of things, of course, could not continue long, and among the Hīnayānists, there arose a new movement, which could be called semi-Mahāyānic, for

[1] Sambādho gharavāso rajāpatho, etc See *Majjhima*, I, p. 179, *Aṅguttara*, II, p 208

[2] *Early History, etc*, pp 36 f

[3] *Ibid*, pp 115ff, N Law, *Studies*, etc, pp 95 ff

[4] At present this is common at Chittagong, and in Burma and Ceylon Wieger in his *Bouddhisme Chinois* (I, pp 147, 148) also refers to the ceremony performed by a layman by confessing his past sins, accepting the faith and the five precepts, and temporarily the eight precepts

[5] *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 387.

creating an important place for the laity in the Buddhist system by the introduction of the practice of the Pāramitās[1]

The Mahāyānists developed these Pāramitā practices a good deal and tried to persuade both householders and monks to fulfil them In the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* we get glimpses of the duties of a Bodhisattva apart from the completion of Pāramitās Some of these passages may be summarized as follows —

(1) Gifts result in the destruction of trsnā (desire), removal of fear, anxiety, and so forth, therefore householders should make gifts as much as possible

If a householder feels an excessive affection for his son but for none others, he must correct himself by reflecting that Bodhi is attained by one (i) who is samacitta (even-minded), (ii) who is exerting himself rightly (samyak-prayukta) to attain bodhi, and (iii) who does not make distinctions (anānātvacārin) He is to regard his son as an enemy (lit not friend), as he being the object of excessive affection, is the cause of detracting his father's mind from the doctrines of Buddha He is to correct himself by thinking that "he himself comes from one place and his son from another, that all beings are his sons, and he is the son of all beings." Thus a grhī bodhisattva must not regard anything as his own[2]

This is followed by an interesting passage showing how a grhī bodhisattva is to absolve himself from his sins when he fails to give away the thing asked for At first he must reflect within himself that the thing, whether he gives it up or not, must one day leave him If he can dispose of it, he will be happy at the time of his death. But even if after this reflection, he fails to give away the article, he is to confess his weakness thus. "I am of weak mind, my kuśalamūlas are not ripe, I am only a beginner (ādikarmika) in Mahāyāna, my mind as far as the gifts are concerned is not yet under control, I am still attached to upādānas and to "I-ness" and "Mine-ness," excuse me, O good man, do

[1] See *ante*, pp 11 ff

[2] *Śikṣā*, pp 18-19 (Ugradattapariprcchā)

not be sorry, I shall develop my power of self-denial, so that I may fulfil your desire" He should also see that neither he has aprasāda (displeasure) against the seeker of the gift nor the seeker against him But in any case, such miserliness is condemned by Buddhas[1]

There are many admonitions with regard to the nature of gifts to be made by laymen and as to the time when and the place where they are most efficacious[2]

(2) A gṛhī bodhisattva is to give up anunaya (supplication) and pratigha (repugnance), and remain unattached to eight lokadharmas[3] He should not be elated by the gain of a wife, son, wealth and property, or depressed by misfortunes, for he is always to think that all constituted things are illusory and have the sign of appearance and disappearance (vithapana-pratyupasthāna=rnam-par bsgrub-pa ñe-bar-gnas-paḥi mtshan ñid)[4] It is only a matter of practice, and the bodhisattvas can avoid both elation and despondency by making the mind invincible[5] against passions

(3) A gṛhī bodhisattva seeks enjoyable things "rightly and not wrongly, he has right living and not wrong living"[6]

(4) The four evils from which a layman should refrain are

(a) to cause hindrance to persons desirous of renunciation, of seeking ordination, or of following the mārga to Nirvāṇa,

(b) not to believe in the fruits of actions and stand in the way of ordination of one's own sons, wife or relatives out of affection or love of wealth,

(c) rejection of the saddharma, and

(d) hatred (pratigha) towards sramanas and brāhmanas

[1] *Sikṣā*, p 20 (Ugradattaparipṛcchā)

[2] *Ibid*, pp 87, 144, 147-8

[3] *Mvyut* 125 Lābha Alābha, Yaśa, Ayaśa, Nindā, Praśamsā, Sukha and Duḥkha See *Dh S* 61

[4] The English rendering is conjectural

[5] *Sikṣā*, p 180 Cf *Gandavyūha* na cābhyāsasya duskaram nāma kiñcid asti

[6] *Sikṣā*, p 267, *Transl*, p. 245

(5) Gṛhīs should refrain from
(a) drinking spirits, etc.,
(b) visiting places of vulgar amusements,
(c) bad temper, fickleness, wavering, garrulousness, etc, and should always be self-possessed[1].

(6) A gṛhī must refrain from adultery and be satisfied with his wife Even when living with her, he should always reflect that she is a source of evil, full of impurities and so forth He should also bear in mind that she is a companion for passion and dalliance and not for the next world, a companion at food and drink and not for the fruits of karma, and that she is a hindrance to śīla, dhyāna, prajñā, etc[2]

(7) A gṛhī should be discreet about the enjoyment or giving away of wealth He should also take into consideration whether the giving away or abstention from same would stand in the way of attaining bodhi by himself or his sons, wife, or employees[3]

(8) For the benefit of others, the gṛhī bodhisattva should renounce his own profit[4]

(9) Bodhisattvas derive great merit and even develop bodhicitta by worshipping or honouring stūpas[5]

(10) A kulaputra or kuladuhitṛ practises the eight śīlas for one year or three years with a view to be re-born in the Sukhāvatī-vyūha[6]

(11) Gṛhīs should practise the daśakuśalakarmapathas[7]

(12) Gṛhastha-ādikarmika-bodhisattvas should study the Buddhist scriptures

The *Ugradattaparipṛcchā*, from which the above information is mostly collected, is apparently a book of conduct for use by the lay bodhisattvas[8]. The question—"katham āśayasampannasyāpy *ugradattaparipṛcchāyām* gṛham anujñātam" (how is it that in the *Ugradattaparipṛcchā* those who have aspiration for buddhahood are also allowed to continue the family life?) —makes it clear that laymen, unlike the early Hīnayānists,

[1] *Śikṣā*, p 120 = *Bodhic*, p 123
[2] *Ibid*, p 78 (Ugradattaparipṛcchā)
[3] *Ibid*, p 144
[4] *Ibid*, p 145
[5] *Ibid*, pp 93, 94
[6] *Ibid*, p 175
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 87
[8] *Ibid*, p 62

had a place in the disciplinary code of the Mahāyānists, though, of course, preference was given to the life of a recluse in the forest rather than to that of a dweller in the town[1] With the Hīnayānists they also hold that 'na jātu kāmān pratisevamānah putresu dāresu janitvā trsnām grham ca sevitvā jugupsanīyam anuttarām prāpayati so'grabodhim' (Never will he obtain the supreme wisdom by living the detested life of a family man, by enjoying the pleasure of the world, and by hankering after wife and sons)[2]. On the contrary, they extol life in a forest in extravagant terms[3]

Royal Laity

These are a few of the rules of conduct laid down for the lay bodhisattvas and noticed incidentally in the *Śiksāsamuccaya* There are also many rules for developing bodhicitta or practising the pāramitās applicable to both Grhī and Pravrajita-bodhisattvas, to which we shall refer later on It should be noted that the Mahāyānists were careful to consult the whims and conveniences of kings and princes by providing some special rules for them[4]. In the *Rājāvavādakasūtra*, e g , it is stated that kings have many important duties to perform, and so they cannot practise the pāramitās fully Therefore, when walking, sitting, lying, eating or drinking they should develop desire for sambodhi, cultivate faith in the possibility of its attainment and form resolutions accordingly They should concentrate their minds upon qualities of all buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas and srāvakas, and transfer the merits thus acquired to the benefit of all beings and thereby help them in the attainment of omniscience In this way, a king can discharge the duties of his kingdom as well as he can acquire merits for attaining bodhi and bodhicitta[5]

[1] *Bodhic* , p 123 Ugrapariprcchāyām grhinam bodhisattvam adhikrtyoktam = *Śiksā* , p 120

[2] *Śiksā* , p 193 Tad evam Ugradattapariprcchāvidhinā grhadosān bhāvayitva śrutavatā cittam śodhayitum aranyam āśrayanīyam iti

[3] *Śiksā* , p 193, *Bodhic.*, p 285 On the virtues of forest life, see *Śiksā* , ch xi

[4] In the Pali *Vinaya* also, one notices that kings' wishes and conveniences were consulted in the framing of rules

[5] *Śiksā* , pp 9–10 = *Bodhic* , pp 26

In the *Ākāśagarbhasūtra* are mentioned the five great offences (mūlāpatti) that may be committed by a king himself or through his officers, and for which he can be condemned to hell. They are —

(*a*) stealing property belonging to a sangha or a stūpa,

(*b*) reviling the dharma of any one of the three yānas,

(c) disrobing a monk, who has shaved his head and taken yellow robes according to the Buddhist law, no matter whether or not he be observant of the precepts, and make him a family man and then punish him,

(*d*) committing deliberately any one of the five deadly sins,

(*e*) disbelieving the causes of actions (ahetuvādi) and the existence of the next world, and

(*f*) practising the ten akuśalakarmapathas and persuading others to do the same [1]

In the *Ratnakūṭasūtra* is shown how a monk is to receive a king or his officer if he is visited by either in the forest He should offer him a seat, and should the king take his seat, he should also sit, otherwise not If the king be fickle-minded (cañcalendriya) he is only to be complimented by being told that he is fortunate in having many śramanas and brāhmanas in his kingdom, and in being free from the infliction of thieves and rebels If the king be high-principled and serious, then the dharma should be preached to him in various ways suited to his temperament [2]

DEVELOPMENT OF BODHICITTA

The Mahāyānists think very highly of the virtue of developing Bodhicitta which throws into the shade all disciplines An idea about their conception of the efficacy of possessing bodhicitta can be formed from the following stanza —

krtvāpi pāpāni sudārunāni
yadāśrayād uttarati ksanena,
śūrāśrayeneva mahābhayāni
nāsrīyate tat katham ajñasattvaih.

[After committing atrocious crimes, one can absolve himself from them in one moment by developing (lit taking refuge in)

[1] *Śikṣā.*, pp. 59–60 = *Bodhic*, pp. 159, 160 [2] *Ibid*, p 197

bodhicitta, just as some persons can escape punishments by being protected by powerful persons It is only the ignorant who do not take to such an excellent refuge, the bodhicitta [1]] The Mahāyāna texts are replete with references to the excellences of the bodhicitta, a topic with which the early Hīnayānists had no concern By bodhicitta the Mahāyānists mean the forming of a resolution to attain bodhi and save every being of the world from misery by leading him to Nirvāna or Bodhi.

Though originally the development of bodhicitta was regarded as a matter of long practice and the outcome of qualities that one could possess rarely, it became later a matter of ceremony, and the persons seeking bodhicitta went through some formalities, an idea of which is given in the works of Śāntideva The formalities are —

(i) Vandanā and Pūjana (worshipping) of Buddhas and Caityas [2],
(ii) Śaranagamana (taking refuge) and Pāpadeśanā (confession) [3],
(iii) Punyānumodanā (expressions of sincere approval of others' good deeds) [4],
(iv) Buddhādhyesanā or Yācanā (entreating Buddhas to be the guides of all beings, ignorant as they are [5], and
(v) Bodhiparināmana (offering up one's merits for bodhi) [6].

I Vandanā or Pūjana is effected by mentally dedicating all things of the world including his own self [7] to Buddhas with their disciples, and the promise of repenting for past sins and

[1] *Bodhic*, pp 20

[2] According to the *Śikṣā*, p 290, Vandanā is included in Pāpadeśanā (Vandanā pāpadeśanāyām antar bhavati)

[3] *Śikṣā*, p 290 says that in the *Akṣayamatisūtra*, ātmaparapāpadeśanā is included in punyasambhāra

[4] *Bodhic*, pp 74–6, *Śikṣā*, pp 291, 313, see *Asta*, pp 135, 142, 149 for anumodanā and parināmanā

[5] *Śikṣā*, p 290 yācanam adhyesaṇāyām ekārthatvāt, also p 315

[6] These formalities are collectively called Triskandha. See *Śikṣā*, p 290 and also pp 13, 291 ff., *Bodhic*, pp 73, 152, 154

[7] *Bodhic.*, p 48 · dadāmi cātmānam aham jinebhyah, sarvena sarvam tad ātmajebhyah.

refraining from committing any further evil deeds. The Pūjā[1] (worship) is to be performed by bathing the Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas, *viz.* Samantabhadra, Ajita, Mañjughosa, etc., in a magnificent bathroom (snānagrha) with scents, unguents, flowers, incense, etc, accompanied by music. This is to be followed by the offering of robes, bowls, food and other requisites Having thus finished the Snānapūjā, Mālyapūjā and so forth[2], one is to perform the Dīpapūjā (illumination) Then commences the Dharmapūjā, which consists in decorating or making offerings to the caityas and images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas This is followed by Stutipūjā[3] (chanting hymns in praise of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas) and Pranāmapūjā (uttering the formulæ of salutation) addressed to Buddha Dharma, Sangha and Tathāgatastūpa[4] The *Śiksāsamuccaya* devotes three chapters[5] to the description of the results obtained by worshipping a stūpa[6], or repairing a dilapidated stūpa, by drawing a picture or making an image of Buddha, by praising a Buddha and persuading others to do the same[7], but it gives first place to the three great pūjās, *viz*, (i) development of bodhicitta, (ii) practising the religion, and (iii) having a compassionate heart towards all beings

The mental pūjās were all converted into rituals, and ended in the ceremonious worship of the images and caityas of various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas The underlying object of these Pūjās is, of course, to develop *Śraddhā* (reverential faith) in one's mind for Buddha, his Dharma and his followers Be it Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, Śraddhā is at the basis of all practices[8]. In the *Nikāyas*, one of the stock passages is that a disciple

[1] *Śiksā*, p 290 does not detail the Pūjā and dismisses it simply by saying 'tatra vandanā sarvabuddhān namasyāmīti'

[2] Cf *Śiksā*, p 290

[3] For an instance of stuti, see *Śiksā*, pp 318ff

[4] *Bodhic*, pp 44–57 [5] *Śiksā*, chs xvii, xviii, xix

[6] It may be observed in this connection that the *Bodhic* attaches more importance to reverence shown to Bodhisattvas than to the worship of Caityas, the argument put forward being that Caityas depend for their origin on Buddhas, who issue from Bodhisattvas For a discussion of the topic that Buddhas issue from Bodhisattvas, see *M Ava* (*Le Museon*, Vol VIII)

[7] *Śiksa*, pp 309, 311, 313 [8] *Bodhic*, p 87, *Śiksā*, p 2

must have firm faith (aveccapasādena samannāgto bhavati) in Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha[1] Perfection in the practice of Śraddhendriya is laid down in the Hīnayāna works, as one of the conditions which a candidate for Arhathood must fulfil The *Śiksāsamuccaya* quotes sūtra after sūtra to establish the necessity of 'śraddhādīnām sadābhyāsah' (i e. faith, etc , should be constantly practised)[2] From the *Aksayamatisūtra* it cites the definition of Śraddhendriya which runs as follows One can be said to have Sraddhendriya if he believes that (*a*) there is a right view (samyagdrsti) for men of the world, (*b*) one enjoys the fruits of his actions, (*c*) there is merit in performing the duties of a bodhisattva, (*d*) things in reality are devoid of any essence (śūnya) and therefore are non-existent The first two of these debar him from committing any evils for the sake of livelihood, the third from developing a desire for any practice other than Mahāyānic, and the fourth from following any doctrine other than Mahāyānic[3] Śraddhā comprises the three anusmrtis (i e constantly thinking of the excellent qualities) of Buddha[4], Dharma[5] and Saṅgha[6], the Hīnayānists adding to these the three others, *viz* , cāga (gifts), sīla (precepts) and deva (gods)[7] In short, faith (Śraddhā and Prasāda) in Buddha, Dharma and Sangha is the first essential to be fulfilled by a person aspiring for Buddhahood or Arhathood

II After acquiring firm faith, an adept is to take refuge (Śaranagamana) by uttering the formulæ of Triśarana[8] and confessing (Pāpadesanā) his past sins The Pāpadeśanā consists in the candidate's formal confession of all his sins, bodily, mental or verbal, actually committed or approved by him in his previous lives and in the present one, through ignorance or delusion, and in repentance of same, being convinced of the fact that akusalakarmas lead a being to hell[9] He is frightened

[1] For passages in the *Nikāyas* emphasising *Śraddhā*, see, e g , *Aṅguttara*, I, p 207, III, p 153, *Majjhima*, I, p 320, *Theragāthā*, 507, 1253–4

[2] *Śikṣā*, p 316 [3] *Ibid*, p 316 [4] *Ibid*, pp 318 ff

[5] *Ibid*, pp 322 ff [6] *Ibid*, pp 324 ff [7] *Digha*, III, p 250

[8] *Bodhic*, pp 58, 65, p 66 adds the taking of refuge in Bodhisattvas

[9] *Ibid*, pp 59, 72, cf *Svayambhūpurāna*, p 116 For the formulæ of Śaraṇagamana and Pāpadeśanā, see *Śikṣā*., pp 169, 170

by the prospect of hellish sufferings, and in despair, takes refuge in the three Ratnas and the Bodhisattvas, viz, Samantabhadra, Mañjughosa, Avalokita, Ākāśagarbha, Ksitigarbha and Vajrapāni [1] He absolves himself from his sins by this Saranagamana [2] and Confession

III Punyānumodanā follows Pāpadeśanā. It consists in the expression of sincere joy by words, mind, or body [3] on seeing beings who after suffering hellish pains enjoy happiness through their good actions, or on seeing people developing citta for Śrāvakabodhi or Pratyekabodhi, or on seeing the great beings, the self-finders of the path,[4] continuing to be bodhisattvas or becoming Buddhas and exerting themselves for the welfare of beings [5]

IV, V After Punyānumodanā, the adept is to perform Adhyesanā [6] or Yācanā, i e, to entreat Buddhas not to attain parinirvāna but to be the light (of knowledge = dharmapradīpa) to the innumerable beings, who cannot distinguish between the right and the wrong ways on account of their ignorance [7] This is followed by Parināmanā, when he offers all his merits for the good of all beings and for obtaining the powers and privileges of a Buddha and thus be able to satisfy all beings by meeting the individual needs of each one, no matter whether the need be worldly happiness or salvation.[8]

BODHISATTVA-CARYĀ

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* then points out that a patient cannot derive the full benefit of a medicine, however good it may be, if he does not follow the directions of the physician So also an adept cannot attain bodhi by simply developing

[1] *Bodhic*, pp 66, 67 [2] *Ibid*, p 67

[3] *E g*, Romaharsa, aśrupāta, gātrakampana *Ibid*, p 74

[4] Tāyinām=svādhigatamārgadeśakānām, or Tāyah = samtānārthah Āsamsāram apratisthitanirvānatayāvasthāyinām *Ibid*

[5] *Bodhic.*, pp 76, *Siksā*, p 315

[6] For Adhyesanāmantra, see *Siksā*, p 65.

[7] This Adhyesanā or Yācanā is to be found in many Mahāyāna works, see, *e.g*, *Lal Vis*, Ch xiii Samcodanāparivartah, *Siksā*, p. 292

[8] *Bodhic*, pp. 77, 78, *Sikṣā.*, pp. 296, 315, 348, 356

bodhicitta and not practising the Bodhisattvasamvaras or Śikṣās as laid down by the Teacher [1] It however asks the readers to consult the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* for details [2] and gives briefly the definition of *Āpatti* It says that a bodhisattva would be guilty of an offence (āpatti) if for relieving beings from pain, present or future, and for producing joys and comforts for them for the present or the future, he does not strive sincerely by his body, word, or thought, to procure the things needed, remedy the obstacles, suffer pain or loss to avert the pain and loss to others, and utilise the opportune moment It will be anāpatti (non-offence) if a bodhisattva's efforts be fruitless in matters beyond his power The āpatti, of which he may be guilty for not properly exerting in a matter really beyond his power, can be remedied by confession [3]

PĀRAMITĀS

The most essential and primary caryā of a bodhisattva is the completion of the six pāramitās The Mahāyāna texts enter into the minutest details about the duties of a Bodhisattva for completing each pāramitā in the right way [4] We shall quote here only one passage from the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* to illustrate what the Mahāyāna texts mean by perfection in a pāramitā —

(i) Yah kāyasyotsargah kāyaparityāgah kāyānapekṣā iyam asya *dāna*pāramitā (It is bodhisattva's perfection in gift when he offers, gives up, or remains indifferent to his body),

(ii) Yat kāye chidyamāne sarvasattvān maitryā spharati vedanābhis ca na samhriyate iyam asya *śīla*pāramitā (It is his perfection in precepts when he irradiates love towards all beings, and does not contract himself in pain even when his body is dismembered),

(iii) Yat kaye chidyamāne ya evāsya kāyam chindati teṣām eva pramokṣārtham kṣamate na ca cittena kṣanyate

[1] *Bodhic.*, pp 91ff, also p 87 [2] See *infra*, p. 320

[3] *Bodhic.*, pp 93, 94=*Śikṣā.*, p 15 (Bodhisattvaśikṣāśarīram) The āpattis and anāpattis are dealt with in the *Upāliparipṛcchā*. See *Bodhic.*, pp 139, 153

[4] There are many directions for the pariśuddhi of pāramitās.

ksāntibalam copadarśayatīyam asya *ksānti*pāramitā (It is his perfection in forbearance when his mind does not feel anguish and shows forbearance to persons dismembering his body, and pardons them in order that they may attain emancipation),

(iv) Yena vīryena tam sarvajñatāchandam notsrjati, cittabalādhīnām ca pratigrhnāti, samsāram eva cānubadhnāti, kuśalamūlārambham eva cārabhate, iyam asya *vīrya*pāramitā [It is his perfection in strength that he does not give up his aspiration to attain omniscience and holds fast to it by force of thought, that he follows the course of the world (without attaining Nirvāna which he could) and continues collecting merits],

(v) Yat kāye vikīryamāne tat sarvajñatācittotpādaratnam kartum na sammuhyati bodhim evāpeksate śāntapraśāntam eva pratyaveksate iyam asya *dhyāna*pāramitā (It is his perfection in meditation that when his body is cut in pieces he does not feel any doubt about the jewel of omniscience and aspires to bodhi calmly and sedately),

(vi) Yat kāye chidyamāne kāyasya trnakāsthakudyavat pratibhāsopamatām pratyaveksate māyādharmatām ca kāyasyāvatarati, bhūtānityatām bhūtaduhkhatām ca bhūtānātmatām ca bhūtaśāntatām ca kāyasyopanidhyāyati, iyam asya *prajñā*pāramitā (It is his perfection in wisdom that when his body is dismembered he regards it as grass, wood, or wall, or as an image or illusion, and thinks of its real transitoriness, unhappiness, essencelessness and unruffledness)[1].

It is difficult to say how far these ideas were put into practice, but at any rate, it is apparent from the *avadānas* that they cherished these ideas fervently In regard to the practice of the pāramitās, no distinction was made between a layman and a monk except in matters of ordinary gifts[2]

KARUṆĀ AND MAITRĪ

An important difference between the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists in regard to the disciplinary rules consists in the

¹ *Śiksā*, p 187, *Transl*, p 182

² See *e g*, *Śiksā*, p 144 a monk's dāna should be ekā catuspadikā gāthā=*Bodhic*, pp 143, 144

great stress laid by the latter upon Karunā (compassion) and Maitrī (love). It should not be supposed that the Hīnayānists were totally without them, but they did not emphasise them as much as the Mahāyānists did These are included in the brahmavihāras, and the Hīnayānic monks are enjoined to practise them among various forms of meditation [1] In the *Nikāyas* we often come across the following passage in connection with the Brahmavihāras so mettāsahagatena cetasā ekam disam pharitvā viharati Tathā dutiyam *etc* sabbāvantam lokam mettāsahagatena cetasā vipulena mahaggatena appamānena averena avyāpajjhena pharitvā viharati [2] (a bhikkhu dwells with his mind full of love towards all beings of all quarters, the love-filled mind being large, profound, immeasurable and free from enmity and hatred) The *Visuddhimagga* dilates on this passage and explains by quotations from the *Vibhanga* and the *Patisambhidāmagga* that a person is said to practise the mettā-brahmavihāra when he can love all beings of the world as he loves a particular person (*e g* , his son) The bhikkhus are expected to develop the feelings of amity (mettā), compassion (karunā), joy (muditā) and indifference (upekkhā) towards all beings and wish for their happiness The Hīnayānists deem it sufficient if the bhikkhus can develop that state of mind, though remaining physically inactive and dwelling in a monastery or forest But the Mahāyānists look upon karunā and maitrī in quite a different light The *Śiksāsamuccaya* brings out its importance as a producer of Buddha by the simile of the growth of the fœtus in the womb It says that bodhicitta is the kalala (embryo) krpā or karunā the arbuda (the 2nd pre-natal stage), maitrī the pesī (the 3rd pre-natal stage), āśaya the ghana (the 4th pre-natal stage) These, developed by bodhi-anga, form the Buddha-garbha (mature Buddha-womb [3]) In short, the Mahāyānists insist that mahākarunā should be the keynote of all

[1] These are included in the 40 kammatthānas, see *Vis M* , p 110 In the *Prajñāpāramitās* also, these four brahmavihāras are treated as forms of meditation.

[2] *Dīgha*, III, pp. 223–4, *Sum Vil* , pp 115ff , *Vis M* , p 111, see Mrs Rhys Davids' paper "*Divine States of Consciousness*".

[3] *Śiksā* , p 103

bodhisattva practices[1] Śāntideva points out in the first kārikā of his work

> yadā mama paresām ca bhayam duhkham ca na priyam,
> tadātmanah ko viśeso yat tam raksāmi netaram

(When fear and pain are disliked by myself as well as others, why should I distinguish myself from others that I should seek protection for myself and not for others.) It is mahākarunā, *i e.*, consideration for others' good that pervades the whole conception of bodhisattva practices[2]. This has, we must admit, relaxed to a large extent the rigidity of disciplinary rules, a thing which would never be allowed by the Hīnayānists Maitrī is, in fact, a corollary to Karunā; it means that a bodhisattva must love all beings as he would love his own son[3] Though the two expressions are very often mentioned together, it is mahākarunā that greatly appealed to the minds of the Mahāyānists At any rate, we cannot but appreciate this ideal of the Mahāyānists, if we take into consideration their philosophy of Samatā (equality), for the proper exercises of mahākarunā and mahāmaitrī can really be effective in making the average mind develop gradually the thought of samatā (equality or sameness)

MAHĀYĀNISTS OBSERVE ŚIKSĀ-SAMVARAS

Notwithstanding their idealistic philosophy the Mahāyānists did not underestimate the value of the rules of conduct as formulated by the Hīnayānists It was regarded as a mūlāpatti (grave offence) if a bodhisattva dissuaded a person from the observance of the Prātimoksa rules and asked him to read Mahāyāna sūtras[4], and by mistake if one believed that purity could be attained by reading the Mahāyāna texts without observing the rules of discipline[5] But again it is sometimes said that the aspiration for Tathatā or

1 *Śiksā*, p 117 yat kiñcid Bhagavan bodhisattvānām kāyakarma yat kiñcit vākkarma yat kiñcit manaskarma tat sarvam sattvāveksitam pravartate mahākarunādhipateyam

2 *Śiksā*, p 286 Mahākaruṇayā bhagavan bodhisattvānām sarvabuddhadharmāh karatalagatā bhavanti.

3 *Śiksā*, p 19. 4 *Bodhic*, pp. 147-8=*Śiksā*, p 61.

5 *Bodhic*, pp. 146, 147

Śūnyatā or Sarvajñatā absolves one from all sins[1], and hence the observance of samudācāras is not essential The significance of such a statement is that a person, who is striving to realise Śūnyatā or Tathatā, endeavours to raise his mind to the height where he cannot find any distinction between positive and negative, between offence and non-offence, vinaya (rules) and avinaya (absence of rules), saṅkleśa (impurities) and vyavadāna (purification) He endeavours to go beyond the realm of vikalpa or samvrti, under which fall the disciplinary rules, whence it appears to him that there is no such thing as samudācāra (rules of conduct), and he can therefore be regarded as free from karmāvarana (obstacles due to action[2]) But this aspiration for śūnyatā[3] cannot be had without going through a certain amount of samudācāra for it is often said that they who say that bodhi can be attained by one means (ekanayena) and that means is śūnyatā are foolish Thus we see that the Mahāyānists felt the need of samudācāra or śiksāsamvara as much as the Hinayānists, and for this, they drew upon the stock of disciplinary rules of the Hīnayānists as also upon the common heritage of the Indian religious orders

We have seen that as far as the development of bodhicitta and the practice of the pāramitās, and maitrī and karunā, are concerned, no distinction is made between a grhī bodhisattva and a pravrajita bodhisattva except in regard to a few directions that are necessary for grhī bodhisattvas for performing the duties of a bodhisattva compatible with family life Though the Mahāyānists approved of the family life of a bodhisattva, they do not, in fact, believe that it is possible for a grhī bodhisattva to attain bodhi by continuing to be a householder The life of Gautama

[1] *Śiksā*, pp 165, 171–2, 178

[2] *Śiksā*, p 172, for details of Karmāvaraṇa, see *Śiksā*, pp 90, 98, 99 Cf *Patañjali yogasūtra*, iv 31

[3] *Śiksā*, p 97 Buddha after saying that he had practised the pāramitās for countless years said, "tat te mohapurusā evam vaksyanti ekanayenaiva bodhir yaduta śūnyatānayene ti", p 117 "kā punar iyam sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā? yeyam bodhisattvacaryāyā aparityāgenā bhyāsyamānā abhyastā vā sarvabhāvaśūnyatā", see also p 272

Buddha, always the ideal of the Mahāyānists in regard to the career of a bodhisattva, shows that at the end, a bodhisattva must retire from the household life in order to attain bodhi In the description of bhūmis, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* also points out that a bodhisattva in the fifth or sixth bhūmi seeks ordination and retires from the world Evidently, they recognise that the bodhisattvas should, at a certain time, lead the life of a monk and abide by the rules of *Vinaya*

MAHĀYĀNIC ORDINATION

The *Kriyāsangrahapañjikā*[1], though a later work, furnishes us with an account of the procedure of ordination that prevailed among the Mahāyānists It follows the procedure of the Hīnayānists so closely that it seems that the ceremony of ordination remained almost the same among both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists It runs as follows —

The Pravrajyā and Upasampadā are to be effected by an Ācārya and Upādhyāya. If any body seeks pravrajyā, he should be first asked about the restrictions (antarāyikān dharmān)[2] and then he is to take triśarana, five śikṣāpadas, and the upāsakasamvaras (the disciplines that a layman can undertake, viz, the 8 sīlas) by uttering thrice the usual Hīnayāna formulæ Then for ordination he formally entreats the Ācārya and Upādhyāya who consent to ordain him His head is shaved and he is told that he is now different from a grhī, and is asked whether he is willing to continue to be so On his answering in the affirmative, he is bathed in the waters of the four oceans[3] and clad in yellow robes, and is asked to utter thrice that he, so-and-so, gives up for his whole life the dress of a householder and adopts that of a monk

He is now given a new name according to the *nikāya* (school) and with this name he again takes triśarana and the ten śikṣāpadas He holds a bowl and a robe (pātra-cīvara) and then entreats the Sangha to permit him to seek so-and-so

[1] *A S B* ms., leaf 160a, see H P Śāstrī's *Cata of Sans Mss*, vol 1, pp 123–6

[2] I e some diseases, permission of parents, etc. See Pāli *Kammavācaṃ*

[3] Evidently a Tāntric addition

as Ācārya and so-and-so as Upādhyāya, and promises to make proper use of the bowl and the robe by uttering mantras. The wordings of the *Pañjikā* are slightly different from those of the *Kammavācam* but the form and order of procedure are the same

DISCIPLINARY RULES COMPILED FROM THE *Śikṣāsamuccaya*·

As the object of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is a general treatment of the duties of a Bodhisattva, it does not present us with a systematic disciplinary code for the monks, but in some places it gives a few rules, which must have been taken from a code followed by the Mahāyānists It says that the duties of a bodhisattva towards others or his duties on the occasion of hearing or preaching the dharma or performing the worship of the Tathāgatas[1] are prescribed in the *Bodhisattva-prātimokṣa*

(A) KALYĀNAMITRA

(i) Bodhisattvas should have kalyānamitras (spiritual advisers) In the Mahāyāna texts, the kalyānamitra plays an important rôle In the *Prajñāpāramitās* it signifies any person, layman, or monk, who teaches the bodhisattvas that things are transitory, and non-existent in the highest sense, advises them to perform the kusalamūlas (good deeds), and tries to create in them an interest for Sarvajñatā (omniscience) through Mahāyāna, avoiding Hīnayāna Those who advised the bodhisattvas to study the Angas (scriptures) and to practise the various dhyānas, apramānas, ārūpya-samāpattis and so forth, or in other words, the practices of the Hīnayānists, and dissuaded them from practising the pāramitās and studying the *sūtrāntas*, should be regarded as pāpamitras (evil friends[2]). It is enjoined upon a bodhisattva never to forsake a kalyānamitra even at the cost of his life, because the duties to be followed by him are all explained in the *sūtrāntas* which can be learnt only from a kalyānamitra[3] A kalyānamitra, according to the *Bodhicaryā*-

[1] *Śikṣā*, p 55.
[2] *Śata*, pp 937-1041, 1186, 1190, *Pañca* (ASB Ms), leaf 216a.
[3] *Śikṣā*, p 41

vatāra[1], is one who is well versed in the bodhisattvasamvara (discipline) and thoroughly knows the Mahāyāna. One should reverently attend upon him for the sake of detailed knowledge (parijñāna)[2] A kalyānamitra protects a bodhisattva from falling into evil courses (durgati), doing improper deeds, frequenting pleasure resorts and so forth He also brings him out of the worldly life[3] The bodhisattvas in their turn should approach the kalyānamitra with a firm and tranquil mind, ready to obey him and carry out his wishes, however difficult they may be, just as a dutiful son would do to his father and a patient to his physician, taking his instructions as medicines, and the consequent attainments as the cure of diseases[4]. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* also quotes many texts about the duties of a kalyānamitra and his disciple[5]. According to it, a person, who teaches even a gāthā of four pādas, is a kalyānamitra[6], hence a dharmabhānaka is a kalyānamitra Thus we see that a kalyānamitra is a very wide term and includes both Ācārya and Upādhyāya Though we do not come across the actual rules observed by the kalyānamitra and his antevāsika (disciple) as we get in the *Vinaya* of the Hīnayānists, we may infer from the above description of the duties of a kalyānamitra and his disciple that the texts have in view the Hīnayānic rules of conduct The term is also found in use in the later Pāli texts In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa uses it in the sense of both Ācariya and Upajjhāya, and even calls Buddha a sabbākārasampanno kalyānamitta, (a perfect friend or spiritual adviser[7]) He also points out that kalyānamitta is a kammatthanadāyaka (prescriber of the basis of meditation), which is really the function of an Ācariya[8]

[1] *Bodhic*, p. 157 [2] *Bodhic*, p 157

[3] *Ibid*, p 157, *Sikṣā*, p 35 niskāsayitāraḥ samsārapurāt This is similar to the function of an Ācarya

[4] *Bodhic*, p 158 [5] See e g *Sikṣā*, pp 34–6 [6] *Ibid*, p 37

[7] *Vis M*, pp. 121, 98, also pp 89, 98, 99 Kalyāṇamitta is used in a general sense in the *Mangalasutta* and the *Saṃyutta*, I, p 88

[8] For the duties of the Ācarya and the Upajjhāya, see *Cv*, VIII, 12–14

(B) VAIYĀVṚTYA-BHIKṢU

(ii) The functions of a Vaiyāvṛtya bhikṣu (i e, a monk who has taken upon himself the responsibility of serving the Sangha) correspond to those of the Senāsanapaññāpaka (arranger of seats, beds, etc) and Bhattudesaka (distributor of food) of the *Suttavibhanga*[1]. The account of the functions of the Senāsanapaññāpaka and Bhattudesaka is confined to matters relating to the distribution of seats, beds and articles of food to the monks The quotation in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* touches on many topics and is interesting from the view-point of the functions of the secretary of a religious organization It says that the primary aim of a Vaiyāvṛtya bhikṣu should be to win the approval of the Sangha He should do every act, however small it may be, with the consent of the Saṅgha He must see to the needs of monks, who are āraṇyakas (leading a forest life), piṇḍacārikas[2] (living on alms under some restrictions), yogācārins (meditating)[3], bāhuśrutyas (seekers of wide learning), dharmakathikas (preachers of the law) or are suffering from illness He should keep separate the money or business relating to the saṅgha of a particular locality and that of the sanghas of the four regions (cāturdiśa) of all times[4] He must apply the gifts made specially for a stūpa to the use of the stūpa and not to any other purpose He must not lose his temper or give improper directions He must render account of the gifts received by him from faithful devotees

[1] *Vinaya*, II, pp 74–5, III, pp 158ff , *Suttavibhaṅga*, VIII Dabba after attaining arhathood wishes "kin nu kho aham saṃghassa veyyāvaccam kareyyan ti—yam nunāham saṃghassa senāsanañ ca paññāpeyyam bhattāni ca uddiseyyan ti"

[2] *Cullavagga*, VIII 5, p 215 piṇḍacārikā bhikkhū

[3] These three refer to those monks who are observing one of the dhutaṅga precepts In the *Vinaya Piṭaka* also, there are rules regarding the service to be rendered to, or by, a monk who is an āraññaka See *Vinaya Piṭaka*, Indexes, II, p 343, V, p 244, sv Āraññaka

Cf *Vinaya*, II, pp 75, 176, Dabba Mallaputta arranged seats and beds according as the monks were bahussutas, dhammakathikas, etc

[4] Cf Āgatānāgata-cātuddisasangha in *Cullavagga*, VI 1 4, 9 1. In the inscriptions also, gifts are found to be made to a particular sangha or the sanghas of the four regions, see *ante*, p 14

at proper time and place [1] This account is followed by a list of the punishments that will be meted out to him in his future births for the breach, or improper discharge, of his duties

(C) DRESS

(iii) A monk ordained in the name of Buddha is to put on yellow robes and shave his head and chin However immoral or sinful he may be, he is immune from injury, punishment, or reproach from unordained persons including a king, because in some ways at least he renders good to the world of the gods and men [2]

The coloured garments, shaven head and the alms bowl are calculated to destroy his pride [3] In order to be free from pride, he remembers that he is like a young candāla, living on alms, receiving what is cast away by others, and that he is to respect his teacher, please his fellow monks by proper conduct, and so forth [4]

(iv) A bhiksu needs dress for decency as also to protect his body from gnats and such other insects, but he cannot have more than three pieces [5] If anybody asks from him the bowl or a robe and if he has not got any to spare, he cannot part with those he has, for they are necessary for him for leading the life of a brahmacārin [6] The yellow robe of a monk is the sign of a śramana and an object of worship to the gods, men, and demons These are to be worn by monks free from all worldly ties, and as aids to the performance of duties leading to salvation[7].

(D) FOOD

(v) For self-preservation, a bodhisattva needs dress and food [8] He should collect food just as much as he needs

[1] *Sikṣā*, pp 55-6

[2] *Ibid*, p 68 The yellow robe should be regarded as a moksadhvaja (banner of freedom), see also p 115

[3] *Ibid*, p 150 [4] *Ibid*, pp 150-1 [5] *Bodhic*, p 141

[6] *Ibid*, p 142 avisarjanīyam hi tricīvaram uktam tathāgatena Cf *Vinaya, Mv*, VIII 13 3, *Nissaggiya Pāc.*, 1 ff

[7] *Sikṣā*, p 136

[8] *Ibid*, p 127 These two are called Satatabhaiṣajya, and medicines are called glānapratyayabhaisajya, Cf *Bodhic*, p 140.

While going on rounds, he should avoid unseemly places[1] Of the food he collects, he should put aside one portion for his brother monks, two for the poor and the afflicted and keep the fourth for himself This portion he takes without attachment, greediness, and setting his mind to it[2]. He takes it simply with a view to support and maintain his body so that he may not be emaciated

While going on his round, he must not attend to pleasant or unpleasant things With senses well controlled, seeing not more than a yoke's length in front, he should proceed from one house to another in regular succession[3], without being elated if he gets alms, or down-hearted if he is refused He should visit only ten houses and not more, if even then he fails to get alms, he should not be sorry. On the other hand, he should think that people are busy with their own affairs and it is so much to the good that they merely notice him, even if they do not give him alms He should have maitrī and karuṇā for all persons he comes across, and wish them good fortune After collecting alms, he should offer a portion to the poor if he can find any, if not, he should set apart a share for the poor as yet unseen Then he is to sit crosslegged according to the practice of ascetics, and take his food, wishing that by the food taken by him the 80,000 worms of the body may live and be happy If he has only very small food, he should think that it will keep his body and mind light and that he would be better fit for exertion[4] If he receives an abundant dole, he must be moderate in his food and leave the excess upon a rock for birds and beasts.

He must not enjoy the taste of food and so forth He is to be pure in mind and body, but not in his food, for he should be conscious of the fact that food turns ultimately into filth. He must not mind the kind of food, *i e*, whether it is good or bad, or the persons who give it to him, *i e*, whether the giver is man or woman, boy or girl He should give no

[1] *Śikṣā*, p 116 [2] Cf *Mtu*, I, p 139

[3] Cf Sapadānam (*i e* patipātiyā) piṇḍāya carati

[4] *Śikṣā*, pp 128ff, *Bodhic*, pp 140ff

thought to the fact of being treated with respect or otherwise, served slowly or quickly. In this way, he should avoid all possible evil thoughts (akuśala-manasikāra)

As a craving for food leads one to hell, a bhikṣu must not have desire for flavour (rasatṛṣṇā) of food and must eat it bearing in mind that he takes food to support his body in order to follow the right path

Should rain prevent him from going on his rounds, he should remain without food for two or three days, remembering all the while that there are creatures in Yamaloka and other evil places who do not get food for years, and so he must not have weakness in body and mind but must patiently endure hunger and thirst

If any family offers him food, pure according to the Mahāyānic restrictions, he is to take his seat and deliver a discourse on religion, and if the food be not pure he is to rise from his seat and depart A piṇḍacārika bhikṣu must not make comments on the food received, or indulge in any sort of useless talk He must be always indifferent to what he gets.

A bhikṣu may accept an invitation at a woman's place if thereby he can benefit himself or anybody else[1]

When begging or eating food, a monk should remember the giver, the worms in the body, and the dharma, which causes the good of all beings[2]

These are the various restrictions, which a monk should observe for his satatabhaiṣajya[3] But in any case, he cannot eat fish or flesh prohibited in the *Laṅkavatāra sūtra*[4] and other sūtras The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* quotes many sūtras[5] where fish and meat-eating are condemned, and refers to the three restrictions (trikoṭipariśuddha) observed by the Hīnayānists[6].

1 Contrast *Pāc* 44–46
2 *Śikṣā*, p 138
3 *Ibid*, pp 127–131
4 See *Laṅkā*, pp 244ff
5 *Śikṣā*, pp 131ff
6 On this topic, see Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, I, pp 55f *Vinaya*, I, p 238 tikoṭiparisuddham macchamamsam adiṭṭham asutam aparisaṅkitan ti, *Vinaya*, II, p 197 Devadatta's demand that macchamamsam na khādeyya, *Śikṣā*, p 135n tad uddiśya hatam svahatam

(vi) In the *Bhikṣuvinaya*, medicines are prescribed for the sick for a yāma (three hours), for a week, or for one's whole life[1] The Mahāyānic *Vinaya* ordains the use of ghee or oil, juice of roots, or fruits as medicaments for the preservation of the body, which is necessary for the salvation of all beings[2]

(E) VĀCIKA

(vii) A bodhisattva should reside in a place suitable for him He should speak in season, be cognisant of time and place, so that people may not find any occasion to be displeased with his conduct

(viii) He should speak gently and not volubly He should not frequent the societies of laymen, but should be fond of solitude He should maintain a cheerful countenance[3]

(ix) He should not talk aloud[4]

(x) He should not indulge in "despondent, disconnected, frivolous or dramatic talk"[5] In short, he should not do anything that might displease others, and every action of his should be tempered by mahākaruṇā and the desire of doing good to all beings[6]

(F) KĀYIKA

(xi) On land or water meant for use, he should not answer the calls of nature[7]

(xii) He should not use a toothpick, nor drop phlegm before teachers, as a mark of respect

(xiii) He should not at the time of eating fill his mouth, make a noise, or open his mouth wide[8]

hanyamānam dṛṣṭam, De Groot, *op cit*, p 42 See also Prof La Vallée Poussin's remarks in the *Foreword*

[1] *Bodhic*, p 141

[2] *Śikṣā*, p 135, cf *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, VI ff, for diseases and medicines

[3] *Bodhic*, p 132, *Sad P*, p 265

[4] Cf *Sekhiya*, 13 [5] *Śikṣā*, p 126

[6] *Ibid*, p 127 saṅkṣepatas tu paraprasādarakṣā. Cf. *Bodhic*, p. 149, *Śikṣā*, p 117

[7] *Śikṣā*, p 125, *Transl*, p 124, *Bodhic*, p 148, Cf. Bhikkhupātimokkha, *Sekhiya*, 73, 74, *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga*, *Pāc* 8, 9.

[8] Cf *Sekhiya*, 39, 50, 51

(xiv) He should not be unrestrained in hand and foot[1], "sit with dangling legs[2]", and rub hands.

(G) DHUTAVĀDINS

(xv) If an abhyavakāśika monk (living in an unsheltered place) falls ill, he should reside in a monastery without having any attachment to the monastery or making it his home, and wishing good to the giver of the monastery

(xvi) An āranyaka monk (*i e*, living in a forest) in choosing his place of residence should pay heed to the facts (*a*) that it is not very far from or near to a place wherefrom alms are to be collected, (*b*) that pure water is easily available for drinking, (*c*) that there are trees with leaves, flowers, fruits as also caves, cliffs and quiet places, and (*d*) that there are no wild animals in the locality[3]

(xvii) Should an āranyaka bhiksu desire to hear the dharma or see his ācārya or upādhyāya or consult physicians about some illness or have śayanāsana in a village, he should come and go only in the evening[4]

(H) ATONEMENT

(xviii) A bhiksu should atone for his sins in four ways

(*a*) Vidūsana-samudācāra = repentance and self-reproach by mentally entreating the various Buddhas to forgive him for the sins committed by him[5] It includes confession resorted to by Buddhist monks generally,

(*b*) Pratipaksa-samudācāra = performing some good deeds, which counteract the evils committed by him,

(*c*) Pratyāpattibala = adopting the duty to observe

[1] *Śiksā*, p 116 [2] Cf. *Sekhiya*, 15, 16

[3] *Śiksā*, pp 196–7 This is followed by an account of the mental state that an āranyaka bhiksu should possess

[4] *Ibid.*, p 200. It is to be noted that the rules relating to the begging of alms, use of medicines, etc were the few special rules observed by the followers of the dhutanga precepts particularly Āraṇyakas, Piṇḍapātikas Śmāśānikas, Paścādbhaktikas and Abhyavakāśikas See *Śiksā*, pp 131, 135, 137, *Pañca.* (ASB. ms), leaf 218b, 284 for dhutangas See also De Groot, *op cit.*, pp 69f for some other rules

[5] For formulæ, see *Bodhic.*, p 154.

samvaras (disciplinary checks) and not committing evils any more, and

(d) Āśrayabala = taking refuge in Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha and developing bodhicitta

(I) ĀPATTIS

In the *Upālipariprcchā*, the light and serious offences (āpatti) are distinguished in detail The āpattis may be broadly divided into two classes:

(i) Those committed through hatred (dvesasahagata) They are considered serious in view of the fact that they indicate a bodhisattva having a mind full of aversion (parityāga) towards beings A bodhisattva is to confess his sins falling under this head before a chapter of ten monks.

(ii) Those committed through attachment (rāga). These are not serious, and even sometimes may be regarded as anāpattis (non-offence) in view of the fact that they indicate the bodhisattva's favourable attitude towards other beings A bodhisattva is to confess offences falling under this head before a chapter of five monks

The *Śiksāsamuccaya* mentions a few other āpattis, *viz*, stryāpatti, dārikāpatti, hastāpatti, stūpāpatti and saṅghāpatti (*i e*, offences relating to women, girls, *hasta*, stūpa and saṅgha), but it does not give details about the nature of their commission and confession [1]

Except for a little Mahāyāna colouring here and there, the above rules of discipline are apparently derived from those of the Hīnayānists

(J) ĀPATTIS PECULIAR TO MAHĀYĀNA

To form an idea of the nature of the disciplinary rules made specially by the Mahāyānists, we shall mention here some of the offences, which are considered serious (mūlāpatti) by them A bodhisattva should not

(i) preach the deeper teachings of Mahāyāna to a person not competent to grasp them and thus frighten him away from the higher teachings and resort to śrāvakayāna,

[1] *Śikṣā.*, pp 160, 164, 168, 169, *Bodhic*, pp 153-4. See *ante*, p. 306

(ii) discourage persons from practising the pāramitās and ask them to take to śrāvakayāna;

(iii) dissuade persons from observance of *Prātimokṣa* rules and advise them to read only the Mahāyāna texts,

(iv) disparage Śrāvakayāna and advise persons to give it up, or praise Mahāyāna and ask people to take to it in order to attain bodhi;

(v) show disrespect to Srāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna;

(vi) read, teach or preach Mahāyāna for the sake of gain and honour, speak ill of others or show some supernatural powers with a view to lessen the gain of others and increase his own,

(vii) be proud of one's own learning of Mahāyāna texts and imparting the same to others; or boast of his learning or his compassion to his hearers;

(viii) be proud of the gifts received from one's admirers,

(ix) be instrumental in punishing bhikṣus and compelling them to commit offences against the sangha;

(x) give out false doctrines and thereby taint the morals of the bhikṣus and thus discredit them in the eye of the householders[1],

(xi) reproach a grhī- or pravrajita-bodhisattva for any āpatti,

(xii) show disrespect to a bodhisattva,

(xiii) show displeasure at a bodhisattva's enjoying the five pleasures of the senses,

(xiv) cause mental or physical pain to a bodhisattva,

(xv) address an unkind word to a bodhisattva,

(xvi) fail to honour a bodhisattva thrice in the day and thrice at night,

(xvii) fail to give away kingship, wealth or body for the completion of the resolution formed by him,

(xviii) hesitate to dwell with a person as low as a caṇḍāla,

(xix) praise oneself and disparage others,

(xx) stop at a place to avoid quarrels, etc,

[1] *Sikṣā*, pp 60 ff, *Bodhic*, pp 160 ff It is also pointed out (*Sikṣā*, p 64, *Bodhic.*, p 163) that a bodhisattva can absolve himself from all these sins by simply worshipping Ākāśagarbha Bodhisattva

(xxi) profess himself as an observer of dhutaṅgas or śīlas, or as one vastly learned,

(xxii) give out his good points and conceal the bad[1];

(xxiii) fail to examine his own self,

(xxiv) wish the company of persons with little learning,

(xxv) be fond of assemblies,

(xxvi) fail to reside in solitary places and practise self-control,

(xxvii) hanker after gain and honour, frivolous talk, sleep, slumber and so forth, and

(xxviii) fail to serve or praise the Tathāgatas.

These rules are more like pious advice than a code of discipline meant for the bodhisattvas They lack a system and have in view only the ideal life, which a Bodhisattva should lead

[1] For these and such other rules, see *Śikṣā*, pp 98, 104, 105, 148, 309, 274

APPENDIX

A Note on the Prajñāpāramitā

It need not be pointed out how great is the importance of the *Prajñāpāramitās* in the history of the Buddhist literature and how much the history of the origin and development of Mahāyānism depends on them From the large number of works on *Prajñāpāramitās* existing in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan, a list of which is to be found in Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka* and Walleser's *Die Vollkommenheit der Erkenntnis*, it is apparent that at a certain stage of Buddhism the *Prajñāpāramitās* were considered by the Buddhists the most holy and the most valuable of all works Nāgārjuna considered it worth while to undertake the task of writing a commentary on one of them while Asanga and many others devoted much time and energy to comprehend the philosophy embedded in them

THE EARLIEST *Prajñāpāramitā*

The dates of Chinese translations of the various *Prajñāpāramitās* help us very little in ascertaining which of them is the oldest, nor is the theory, which is so often launched by scholars, that the more concise a book the earlier it is, of much consequence in regard to this class of literature The earliest Chinese translation, we are told, was made of the *Daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* by Lokaraksā about 148 A D [1] Curiously enough this particular version of the *Prajñāpāramitā* was not known to the Sanskritists The *Mahāvyutpatti* [2] mentions six of them without referring to it while

[1] Nanjio's restoration of the name *Daśasāhasrikā*, it seems, was made from the Tibetan name *Śes-rab kyi pha-rol tu phyin-pa-khri-pa* (10,000), for, there is nothing in the Chinese title to indicate that it is *Daśa* and not *Aṣṭa* or any other *Prajñāpāramitā* Again, Nanjio points out that this *Daśa* was the same as *Aṣṭa*

[2] *Mvyut* 65 mentions *Śatasāhasrikā*, *Pañcaviṃśatisā°*, *Aṣṭasā°*, *Pañcaśatikā*, *Triśatikā* and *Saptaśatikā*.

Bendall, R L Mitra, and H P Śāstri catalogued many manuscripts on Prajñāpāramitā but did not come across any of the *Daśasāhasrikā* Besides these facts it should also be noted that Śāntideva or the author of the *Lankāvatāra* had occasions to refer to the *Śata* and the *Asta* but never to the *Daśa*[1] The only explanation that can be offered for this silence of the Sanskritists is that either this *Prajñāpāramitā* is of non-Indian origin or is only a version of the well-known *Asta* Profs Nanjio[2], Walleser and a few other scholars prefer the latter view on account of the fact that the Chinese version of the *Daśa* follows more or less that of the *Asta* But then again the question arises, why in the Chinese collection there should be versions of the *Asta* too? A very close study of the various Chinese versions may yield some definite results but the names of chapters as given in the Chinese versions help us very little, specially in view of the fact that the titles of chapters were mostly invented by the Chinese translators and were not translations of the titles of the Sanskrit originals[3]

If we are to rely on the Tibetan traditions, we should regard the *Asta* as the oldest, for it was the first *Prajñāpāramitā* preached by Maitreya[4] Adding to this the opinion of Profs. Nanjio and Walleser about the identity of the *Daśa* and the *Asta*, it would not be wide of the mark to hold that the *Asta* was the oldest The Nepalese tradition, however, makes it to be the latest abridgment made from the original *Prajñāpāramitā*, which extended over a hundred and twenty-five thousand ślokas,[5] the earliest abridgment being the *Śata* followed by the *Pañcavimśati* and the *Asta*

We might have made a better approach to the truth if we had known the text upon which Nāgārjuna commented and

[1] Henceforth *Sata*, *Daśa*, and *Asta* will be used for referring to the *Satasāhasrikā*, *Daśasāhasrikā* and *Astasāhasrikā*

[2] Nanjio, *Catalogue*, p 3(d)

[3] *E g* in the Sanskrit original of the *Satasāhasrikā* the chapters are indicated by numbers only without any name but the Chinese version gives the names of chapters Evidently the names were chosen so as to indicate the subject matter of the chapter

[4] *Tāra*, p 58.

[5] Mitra, Intro to the *Asta*, p iv

produced his famous *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* Rosenberg informs us that the text used by Nāgārjuna was the *Pañcavimśati*., but he does not indicate his source of information.[1] A view current in Japan at the present moment is that Nāgārjuna's Śāstra was written upon the *Prajñāpāramitā* called 大明度經 (Ta-ming-tu-ching)[2] According to Nanjio's information this is a version of the *Asta* or *Daśa*, at least the fact that the *Ta-ming-tu-ching* contains also thirty chapters like some of the versions of the *Asta* and *Daśa* points towards the probability of its being a translation of a version of the *Asta* but on comparison we see that this text does not literally follow the present Sanskrit text Besides, the number of chapters in the Sanskrit original is thirty-two while that in the Chinese is thirty and so if it be a translation of the *Asta* it must be of another version of the same

INTERNAL EVIDENCES (I) CONCEPTION OF TRIKĀYA

There are also internal evidences which throw light on the antiquity of the *Asta* and its priority to the *Śata* and the *Pañcavimśati* They are mainly the conceptions of Sambhogakāya and the ten bhūmis

It has been shown before[3] that the Yogācārins were responsible for the Trikāya conception and that Nāgārjuna in his *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* spoke only of two kāyas, *viz*, rūpa and dharma kāyas, and not sambhogakāya The Sambhogakāya is expressly mentioned in the recast version[4] of the *Pañcavimśati* but the nature of its description shows

[1] Rosenberg, *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, p 273 Rosenberg's statement is not based on any authority This tradition is also recorded by Przyluski (see *I H Q*, vol V, p 2)

[2] Forming no 135 of the Taisho edition, vol VII, pp 475ff It was translated by Chi Chien of the Wu dynasty (222-280) The Japanese view was communicated to me by Prof E Tomomatsu

[3] See *ante*, Ch III (b), pp 96, 97, 114

[4] The extant Sanskrit Mss of the *Pañcavimśati* do not represent the original *Pañcavimśati*, from which the Chinese and Tibetan (bkah hgyur) translations were made For detailed reasons see my *Intro* to the *Pañcavimśati*.

that its Sambhogakāya (=embodiment of Bodhipaksika and other pure dharmas) corresponded to the Dharmakāya of the early Mahāyānists, and Svasambhogakāya of the later Yogācārins Now the question arises, when did this conception of Sambhogakāya come into vogue? The first definite conception of it appears in the *Lankāvatāra* where the name given to it is not Sambhogakāya but Nisyanda- or Dharmatānisyanda Buddha[1] The *Lankāvatāra* is not a very early treatise and is undoubtedly later than the *Śatasāhasrikā*, to which it refers by name[2] In the *Śata*, the term Nisyandakāya or Sambhogakāya does not appear but there is the graphic description of Śākyamuni's Sambhogakāya, which is called there Prakrtyātmabhāva or Āsecanakakāya[3] This description of the Āsecanakakāya serves as a prelude (nidāna) to the discourse on the *Prajñāpāramitā* The *Pañcavimśati* follows the *Śata* almost word by word in this description, and therefore needs no separate comment. The *Gandavyūha* surpassed the *Prajñāpāramitās* in its description of the Buddhakāya, and it seems that imagination could not be let loose further than what the compiler of the *Gandavyūha* has done The description of the Āsecanakakāya appears in the *Saddharmapundarīka* as well but it is more guarded and less imaginative It is striking that this description of the refulgent body of Buddha, throwing its rays of light all over the universe and making every being happy, is absent in the *Asta* The *Asta* starts directly with the topic of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, which has been taken up by the *Śata* in its second and fourth chapters[4] The silence of the *Asta* about the refulgent kāya of Buddha is clearly indicative of its being earlier than the *Śata*, *Pañcavimśati*, *Gandavyūha*, etc, and was the production of a time when the Sambhogakāya or Āsecanakakāya had not yet been conceived of

[1] See *ante*, Ch III (b), p 120
[2] *Lankā*, p 8
[3] See *ante*, Ch III (b), pp 118–9
[4] E g *Śata*, p 504=*Asta*, p 7
" p 324= " p 4.

(II) Conception of Daśabhūmi

Another internal evidence, proving the greater antiquity of *Asta* is its conception of Bhūmis We have seen that in the evolution of the Bhūmi conception, the *Mahāvastu* represents the earliest stage, the *Śata* and the *Pañcavimśati* the middle, and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and other works the latest[1] The *Asta* does not refer to the Bhūmis at all Objection may be taken to such negative evidences, but if the *Asta* and the *Śata* be compared, it will be found that the evidence, though negative, is strong enough to prove our contention. The account of the Bhūmis occurs in the tenth chapter of the *Sata* , in which the topic has been introduced by the line Katham bodhisattvo mahāyāna-samprasthito bhavati (how a bodhisattva is regarded as having started on the great way ?)[2] This is preceded by an elaborate answer to the question, "What is Mahāyāna ?"[3], giving opportunity to the *Śata* to dilate on all the practices, which a bodhisattva is expected to accomplish The chapter that follows the account of the Bhūmis deals with the metaphysical interpretation of Mahāyāna, which is identified there with the highest truth, the Śūnyatā, and compared to Ākāśa[4] The *Asta* answers the question as to who is Mahāyāna-samprasthita by one word pāramitābhiḥ samprasthitah (started by practice of the pāramitās) This is preceded by a brief answer to the question "What is Mahāyāna ?" and followed by the remarks about the metaphysical aspect of Mahāyāna without any reference to the Bhūmis It may be contended that the *Asta* for the sake of abridgment omitted many topics and the account of the Bhūmis was one of them An objection like this cannot be answered except by a further negative evidence It is a common practice with the *Prajñāpāramitās* to enumerate all the various practices and even stages of sanctification of a Srāvaka, Pratyekabuddha or Bodhisattva and show that they are non-existing or that Bodhisattvas remain dissociated from them or that they are only dreams but taken as real by the dreaming masses None of the *Prajñāpāra-*

[1] See *supra*, Ch. IV

[2] *Śata*., p 1454=*Asta*., p 23

[3] *Śata* , p 1405=*Asta*., p. 23

[4] *Śata* , p 1530=*Asta* , p 24.

mitās mention these Mahāyānic bhūmis though they speak of the Hīnayānic stages of sanctification[1] in such enumerations This strengthens our position that the conception of Bhūmis was not known to the early Mahāyānists and that they were invented later on and incorporated in the larger *Prajñāpāramitās*, leaving untouched the older enumeration of Śrāvakabhūmis[2]

By such internal evidences it can be definitely stated that the *Asta* preceded the *Sata* and the *Pañcavimsati*. as well as the *Lankāvatāra*, *Saddharmapundarīka*, *Gandavyūha* and *Daśabhūmikasūtra* By means of these tests of the conceptions of Sambhogakāya and Bhūmi, we may thus arrange the texts chronologically,—

(1) *Asta* and *Daśa*,

(2) *Saddharmapundarīka*, *Sata*, and *Pañcavimśati*. (recast version),

(3) *Gandavyūha* and *Lankāvatāra*, and

(4) *Daśabhūmikasūtra*

The earliest Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* was made by Dharmaraksa in the third century A C proving the existence of the Sūtra itself in the second century Two centuries may well be allowed for the evolution of these conceptions of the Sambhogakaya and the Bhūmis, and the expansions of the *Prajñāpāramitās* We may therefore hold that the *Asta* or the *Daśa* was in existence towards the end of the first century B C

Relation among the various *Prajñāpāramitās*

It is generally believed,—there is also a tradition to this effect,—that there has been a gradual abridgment of the original *Prajñāpāramitā* and this has given rise to the various treatises called the *Śatasāhasrikā*, *Pañcavimśatisā*°, *Astādaśasā*°, *Daśasā*°, *Astasā*°, *Saptaśatikā*, *Ardhaśatikā*, ending with *Ekāksarī* Strictly speaking all these *Prajñāpāramitās* excepting the first three or four are not really abridgments of the larger ones but are independent works devised and written by different compilers at different times The main

[1] See *ante*, Ch IV, p 241

[2] See *Sata.*, p 1473

theme of all the works is, of course, the same, *viz.*, the establishment of the new Śūnyatā philosophy, and the assertion that the Truth can be realised through the practice of the prajñāpāramitā only There are many extraneous matters, which have been discussed incidentally in the larger *Prajñāpāramitās* and passed over in the smaller ones, *e g*, the sense of the 18 śūnyatās, 118 samādhis, the various caksus, the bodhipaksikadharmas It seems to me that the larger *Prajñāpāramitās* are not merely unnecessary expansions of the smaller ones, and that it is perhaps an exaggeration to say that the *Vajracchedikā* is an abridgment of the *Śata*, or the *Ekākṣarī* gives all that a *Prajñāpāramitā* can give

And then as against the tradition that the smaller *Prajñāpāramitās* are abridgments of the larger ones, a view is current among modern oriental scholars that the truth lies in the opposite direction Dr Tucci is an advocate of this view In his introduction to the *Saptaśatikā*, he says "Save rare exceptions, bigger compilations do nothing but expand in an emphasizing way those fundamental concepts, which constitute the kernel of *Prajñāpāramitā* Those fundamental concepts are to be found more succinctly and without excessive repetitions in shorter manuals The *Saptasatikā* goes immediately into the core of the subject-matter and without so many repetitions expounds in one dialogue the theme, the interlocutors being Buddha, Mañjusrī and Śāradvatīputra"[1] Prof Tucci overlooks the fact that the *Saptaśatikā* touches the fringe of a wide range of topics discussed in the other *Prajñāpāramitās* and cannot be taken as giving the gist of a large *Prajñāpāramitā* To carry to the extreme his line of thought we may say in one word that Sūnyatā is the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitās* and it contains the gist of the whole literature The view which Tucci endorses is really the outcome of the critical study of the brahmanic literature It has been found that in some cases the brahmanical works were originally short and

[1] *Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Memorie della R Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei), 1923, vol xvii, fasc iii.

simple, and in course of time they became voluminous by glosses or philosophical interpretations The Buddhist literature stands on quite a different footing, and what may be true for the brahmanic literature is not necessarily true for the buddhist In the latter case we find that the language of the older texts is simpler although they are more verbose and full of repetitions, while the later texts are concise, less verbose, and have fewer repetitions. Again, the voluminousness of the earlier *Prajñāpāramitās* was due to repetitions and not to glosses and philosophical interpretations Hence the relation between the smaller and the larger *Prajñāpāramitās* should be ascertained by an independent enquiry and not by any general theory It can only be possible when we have the *Prajñāpāramitās* in handy editions So, for the present, we must confine ourselves to a comparison of the *Asta*, 12 (out of the 72) chapters of the *Sata* and the recast version of the *Pañcavimśati*, which is in the course of publication [1] The relation between the *Asta* and the *Śata* can be hardly called that of abridgment or expansion as it can be said between the *Sata* and the *Pañcavimśati* The *Asta* does not contain a word about the glorious Buddhakāya and other matters of the Nidāna It starts directly with the question as to the propriety of Subhūti in teaching Mahāyana, a topic taken up in the second chapter of the *Śata* [2] In the first chapter, the *Asta* discusses when a bodhisattva is to be regarded as mahasannahasannaddhah (well armoured), which is treated in the seventh chapter of the *Sata* [3] Then the question "What is Mahāyāna?" is answered at the very beginning of the *Asta* while it is taken up in the eleventh chapter of the *Sata* [4] Instances of agreement, sometimes verbal, like those mentioned above can be multiplied to show that the *Asta* and the *Śata* deal with identical topics, but the arrangement and the emphasis

[1] There is another *Prajñāpāramitā* published first by Prof Leumann (Schriften der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Strassburg, 1912) and then by Messrs H Izumi and S Toganov (Kyoto, 1917) called *Prajñāpāramitā nayaśatapañcāśatika*

[2] *Asta*, p 4 = *Sata*, ch II

[3] „ p 23 = „ p 1405.

[4] *Asta.*, p. 24 = *Śata*, p 1530

laid on a particular topic are quite different Besides this, the *Śata* introduced new topics like bhūmis and expositions of the various śūnyatās, samādhis, etc,[1] which were only enumerated or referred to in the *Asta* So it may be said that the *Śata* utilised the *Asta* and not *vice versa* Again, some of the *Prajñāpāramitās* were evidently abridged from the *Śata* The *Pañcavimśati* is clearly an abridgment of the *Śata* effected by an omission of set enumerations and repetitions by the use of words, such as yāvad, peyyālam or by sometimes mentioning only the positives in full without the negatives In short, the *Pañcavimśati* tried to preserve the original with the utmost accuracy

Very recently a fragment of a *Prajñāpāramitā* manuscript (48 leaves) found in Central Asia has been published in the *Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India* (No 32) The editor, Mr Bidyabinod, believes on the evidence of the Upright Gupta characters used in it, that the fragments belong to a date earlier than 580 A C He has also shown that the subject-matter and phraseology of the fragment resemble those of the *Sata* and that the portion contains a slightly shorter version of chapters vii–xi of the latter The fragment contains the sections on the interpretation of the Pāramitās, Sūnyatās, Samādhis and the Bodhipaksika dharmas and closely follows the corresponding passages of the *Pañcavimśati*, having slight difference like dharmebhyah for dharmaih, or bāhya for bahirddhāh The fragment might be regarded as a copy of the original *Pañcavimśati* but the portions found in it are so very common that it is difficult to say definitely that it is a copy of the *Pañcavimśati* and not of the *Astādaśa* or any other work It can, however, be said that it is not a copy of the *Śata*, for in some places the abridgments have been made on the lines of the *Pañcavimśati* In Ceylon also some inscriptions have been discovered recently, containing fragments of the *Prajñāpāramitā*[2] They correspond to the nidāna-section of the *Śata*, and the *Pañcavimśati*, the agreements though quite close

[1] See, *e g* *Sata*, Ch VIII ff.
[2] *Ceylon Journal of Science*, II

cannot be called literal So it seems they are taken from a recension of either the *Pañcaviṁśati* or the *Aṣṭādaśa*

The comparison of the *Śata*, *Pañcaviṁśati* and *Aṣṭa* confirms our contention that the generalisations regarding abridgment and expansion of the *Prajñāpāramitās* are not possible and that each book must be judged by its contents If we consider the *Saptaśatikā*, which is supposed to be older than the expanded ones, we notice that the interlocutors are Mañjuśrī and Śāriputra, and not Subhūti and Śāriputra, the most common figures of the very early Mahāyāna treatises There is a class of literature like the *Gandavyūha*, in which Mañjuśrī plays the chief rôle, and so it may be that this *Prajñāpāramitā* was the production of a class of devotees who held Mañjuśrī in great veneration The mention of the Nirālamba-bhaginī, *i e*, concretisation of an abstract idea, hints rather at its posteriority than priority to the larger *Prajñāpāramitās*

Nature of the Repetitions

We shall now proceed to form an idea of the nature of the repetitions resorted to in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and the reasons therefor In these days, when so much attention is given to the conservation of time and energy, one is apt to get weary of repetitions, and particularly of the mechanical repetitions, which are so often found in the *Prajñāpāramitās* Writers on philosophical subjects very naturally ring the changes on the theme that they desire to establish, but so long as they do it skilfully, and without tiring their readers there can be little objection to their enthusiasm One notices these repetitions in the most modern of philosophical works of the west and the east, as well as in the masterly Buddhist works of Nagārjuna and Asanga. For the fulfilment of its object a new philosophical work is necessarily burdened with the unpleasant and arduous task of first wiping out from the minds of its readers several old ideas, some of them deep-rooted, in order to implant new ideas in their places Again, to deepen the impression it has to revert to its topic over again in different ways and lead its readers unconsciously to the new

point of view The early Buddhist literature, specially the *Prajñāpāramitās*, sadly lacked the knowledge of artful repetitions and consequently it is tiresome. Compared with the great philosophical works produced in India before or about the time of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, the *Prajñāpāramitās* are conspicuously lacking in philosophical precision and phraseology, deficiencies which it tried to remedy by repetitions. For instance, when it endeavours to establish the thesis that everything is śūnya (non-existent), a doubt may be left in the mind of the reader whether the Tathāgata or the Asamskrtadhātus like the Ākāśa or Nirvāna are excluded or included, so the *Prajñāpāramitās* have punctiliously mentioned that each of them whether Tathāgata, Nirvāna or Ākāśa, even the various Śūnyatās, are śūnya in the sense that Caksu or Caksuvijñāna is śūnya A modern reader can certainly complain of this defect in view of the immense literature that he has to wade through within a short space of time but the writers of the *Prajñāpāramitās* had at their disposal ample time and patience to read and write works like these

The *Prajñāpāramitās* also like all other philosophical works had to eradicate many of the old deep-rooted ideas They directed their attention mainly to their predecessors, the Hīnayānists. The Hīnayānists, as is well known, had already enjoyed a long lease of life and developed a fair amount of literature on their doctrines, the classification of dharmas, psychological analyses, etc The *Prajñāpāramitās* took the most popular of these doctrines and disciplines, and tried to show that from the new point of view, which the *Prajñāpāramitās* set out to inculcate, they were all to be treated as mere names having no existence whatsoever To give an illustration They preach that a bodhisattva while practising the prajñāpāramitā does not consider him self attached or unattached to any (mentioning each and every one) of the 5 skandhas, 6 indriyas, 6 āyatanas, 6 vijñānas, 4 mahābhūtas, 12 links of the pratītyasamutpāda, 6 pāramitās, 18 śūnyatās, 37 bodhipaksikadharmas, apramānas, samādhis, samāpattis, āvenikadharmas, balas, vaisāradyas, phalas, tathatā, ātman, sukha, nirvāna, and so forth.

They repeated the same list over again to maintain that each of them was not bodhisattva or that each of them was not different from bodhisattva. In short, the *Prajñāpāramitās* in order to establish Śūnyatā have shown that there is nothing in the world of our knowledge which has any real existence Everything that we are conscious of has only dreamy existence, and that all the 84,000 dharmaskandhas supposed to have been preached by Buddha are only expedients (upāyakauśalya) adopted by him for the benefit of ignorant and deluded beings, and consequently a bodhisattva while practising the prajñāpāramitā should treat them as mere apparitions devoid of reality

FUNCTION OF PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

The function of the prajñāpāramitā is to make a bodhisattva bear in mind that the pāramitās, samādhis, samāpattis, phalas or bodhipakṣikadharmas, which he has been practising, are only aids and expedients invented by Buddhas to help beings to the realisation of the ideal Unlike the other pāramitās, the prajñāpāramitā is not to be practised It is really a state of mind to be acquired by the help of the six pāramitās and the various Buddhistic practices A bodhisattva may perfect himself in the dānapāramitā, but as there is every possibility of his forming a conception of the dānapāramitā as having a sort of existence (svabhāva), it may become for him an object of grasping (grāhya) He may also have a conception of the giver and the receiver and the thing given It is to counteract all these conceptions, which are really misconceptions, that the prajñāpāramitā steps in and makes the bodhisattva try to develop a state of mind in which the dānapāramitā would appear to him as devoid of signs (alakṣana), without any independent existence of its own, and at the same time eliminate from his mind any conception regarding the giver, the receiver or the thing given In short, the function of the prajñāpāramitā is to convince a bodhisattva that the dānapāramitā or whatever it may be is really formless, baseless and is indistinguishable from śūnyatā It serves as a guard to the bodhisattva, who has risen much above the average and

acquired various meritorious qualities, but still may cling to some idea or concept which in itself may be highly pure and meritorious, but being an attachment must be got rid of. It is for this reason that the prajñāpāramitā has been extolled over all other pāramitās or virtues, and has been designated as the chief (nāyikā, pūrvaṅgamā) of all pāramitās[1] The *Astasāhasrikā*[2] compares the prajñāpāramitā to the earth, on which all the other pāramitās rest, grow and produce the fruit of sarvajñatā (omniscience), and hence it is the producer of the Sarvajñas, the Tathāgatas.

[1] *Aṣṭa.*, pp 80, 81. [2] *Ibid*

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

A =Atthakathā
Aṅguttara=Anguttara Nikāya (P T S)
Asta =Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (A S B)
As Res =Asiatic Researches
Attha =Atthasālinī
Ava Ś =Avadāna Śataka (Bibliotheca Buddhica)
B Bh =Bodhisattva Bhūmi (edited by J Rahder as an Appendix to the Daśabhūmikasūtra)
B.E F E O =Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient
Bodhic =Bodhicaryāvatāra (A S B)
B Phil =Buddhist Philosophy by A B Keith
B T.S =Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta
Buddhismus etc =Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Litteratur by B Wassilief
Cal Rev =Calcutta Review
Catena etc =A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures by S Beal
Comp of Phil =Compendium of Philosophy (translation of the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha—P T S)
Catalogue=A Catalogue of the Chinese translations of the Buddhist Tripitaka bv B Nanjio
Con of N =Conception of Nirvāna by Th Stcherbatsky
Corpus=Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum by Hultzsch (1925)
Cv =Cullavagga of the Vinaya Pitaka
Cy =Commentary
Daśa =Dasabhūmikasūtra ed by J Rahder
Dh P =Dhammapada
Dh S =Dhammasangani (P T S)
Divyā =Divyāvadāna (Cowell's ed)
Der individualistische etc =Der individualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra-schule by J Masuda
Dīgha=Dīgha Nikāya (P T S)
Early History etc =Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and Buddhist Schools by N. Dutt
E B =Eastern Buddhist (Japan)

Ep Ind =Epigraphia Indica
E R E =Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics
Geschichte, etc =Geschichte der indischen Litteratur (vol II) by M Winternitz
Handbook etc =Eitel's Handbook of Chinese Buddhism
I H Q =Indian Historical Quarterly (Calcutta)
Intro =Burnouf's Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien
Ind Ant (or I A)=Indian Antiquary
Ind Phil =Indian Philosophy
Itiv =Itivuttaka (P T S)
J A =Journal Asiatique
J A S B =Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
J P T S =Journal of the Pāli Text Society
J R A S =Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
Jāt =Jātaka (Fausböll's edition)
Kārikā=Abhisamayālankārakārikā (Bibl Buddhica)
Kāś P =Kāśyapa Parivarta ed by Holstein
Kośa=Abhidharmakosa (Fr Transl by L de la Vallée Poussin)
Kosavyākhyā=Abhidharmakosavyākhyā, pt i (Bibl Buddhica)
Kvu =Kathāvatthu (P T S)
Lankā =Lankāvatāra Sūtra ed by B Nanjio
Lal Vis =Lalita Vistara (Lefmann's edition)
List=Luder's List of Brahmi Inscriptions (Ep Ind , vol x)
Lotus etc =La Lotus de la Bonne Loi, Burnouf's Fr Transl of the Saddharma Pundarika, 1925
M Ava =Madhyamakāvatāra (Fr Transl in Le Muséon)
Majjhima=Majjhima Nikāya (P T S)
Manual etc =Manual of Indian Buddhism by H Kern
Manuscript Remains etc =Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan by A F Rudolf Hoernle
Mil =Milindapañha (Trenckner's edition)
Masuda See Origin etc
Mtu =Mahāvastu (Senart's ed)
Mv =Mahāvagga of the Vinaya Pitaka
M Vr =Madhyamaka Vrtti (Bibl Buddhica)

Mvyut =Mahāvyutpatti (Bibl. Buddhica)
Nep. B. Lit =Nepalese Buddhist Literature by R. L. Mitra
Netti =Nettippakarana (P T S.)
Origin etc =Masuda's Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools (Asia Major, II)
Pañca or Pañcavimśati=Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (A S B or Cambridge ms)
Patis M =Patisambhidāmagga (P T S)
Pug P or P.P =Puggala Paññatti (P T S.)
Pundarīka See Sad P
Sad. P =Saddharma Pundarīka (Bibl Buddhica)
Sad San =Saddhamma Sangaha (J P T S , 1890)
Samyutta=Samyutta Nikāya (P T S)
Śata =Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (A S B.)
Siddhi =Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi ed by Sylvain Levi
Śiksā =Śiksāsamuccaya (Bibl Buddhica)
Studies etc =Studies in Indian History and Culture by N N Law
Sum Vil =Sumangala Vilāsinī (Supplement to I H Q) ed by N Dutt
Sūtrā =Sūtrālankāra ed by Sylvain Lévi
Systems etc =Systems of Buddhistic Thought by Yamakami Sogen (Calcutta University)
Tāra =Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien by A Schiefner, 1869
Trimśikā See Siddhi
Ud =Udāna (P T S)
Vibh =Vibhanga (P T S)
Vis M =Visuddhimagga (P T S)
Z D M G =Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft

LIST OF PĀLI AND SANSKRIT WORDS *

Aggasāvaka, the foremost disciple, 75
Agrabodhi, the highest knowledge, 93, 113
Anga, division of the Buddhist scriptures
Advaya, non-duality
Advaidhīkāra, inseparability, indivisibility
Adhicitta, higher mental practices
Adhipaññā, higher practices for insight into the Truth
Adhimukti, aspiration, 85, 243
Adhiśīla, higher practices relating to control of body
Adhisthāna (*adhitthana*), resolution, 12, 280
Anātman (*anattan*), the doctrine that every being is constituted of vanishing elements and hence is without any permanent substance as soul
Anābhoga, not requiring power or exertion, i e , spontaneous, self-created (Tib lhun-grub), 273, 280
Anitya (*anicca*), the doctrine that things of the world are transitory, impermanent
Animitta, signless and baseless, 94, 131f, 172, 191, 273
Animitta-vimoksa-mukha, mental dissociation from the things of the world by meditating that they are baseless and signless, 274
Anupādāya, without attachment
Anusaya dormant passions, desires, 30, 177, 263
Anusmṛti, constant remembrance, 304
Apratisthita (*apatitthita*), footingless
Apranihita (*appanihita*) *-vimoksa-mukha*, mental dissociation from the things of the world through meditation devoid of all desires, 94, 274, 132
Apramāna, immeasurable, it usually refers to the four *brahma-vihāras* (q v), or to powers and attainments of Buddhas
Abhijñā (*abhiññā*), the six supernormal powers attained by arhats, 168, 266

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* Words appearing in the Index or only once in the text with their English rendering have been omitted here

Abhinirhāra, resolution to achieve something, 284
Abhiniveśa, adherence to a dogma, 250, occupied with
Abhisamaya, comprehension, full knowledge
Ariyapuggala, persons on the way to salvation
Avyākṛta (*avyākata*), indeterminable, unmanifest
Aśūnya, real, non-relative
Aśaikṣa (*asekha*), arhats who have nothing more to learn
Aṣṭāṅgikamārga (*aṭṭhaṅgikamagga*), the eightfold path, i e, the eight kinds of practices prescribed for the attainment of emancipation
Asaṃsāra, transcendental
Asaṃskṛta, unconstituted

Ādikarmika, beginner
Āpatti, breaches of the monastic laws, hence, any offence
Āyatana, spheres, sources or planes of the origin of senses (Tib skye-mched)
Āryasatya, the fourfold truth, or the fourfold method of analysis followed by the Buddhists for examining worldly things
Ālambana (*ārammana*), basis support
Ālaya-vijñāna, the store-consciousness, the substratum of saṃsāra
Āveṇika-dharma, it refers to the eighteen qualities which a bodhisattva acquires without any flaw (cf Tib chos-ma-hdres-pa)
Āśaya, mental disposition, intention
Āśraya, substratum, support
Āsrava (*Āsava*), (four) impurities

Indriya, organs of sense, faculty, power

Upāya, expedient, means
Upanissaya, previous merits, 173, 248
Upādāna, substratum of future births due to attachment to four wrong ideas

Ṛddhi (*iddhi*), supernatural powers

Karma, action
Kalpanā, imagination, thought-construction, net of fancies
Kuśalamūla, merits acquired through good actions

Kleśa (*kilesa*), impurities, passions, afflictions, defiling elements
Ksīnāsrava, arhats who are free from impurities

Gotra, a category of beings having a certain degree of religious aspiration, 55, 84f

Caryā, practice, conduct
Citta = *manas* = *manovijñāna*, mind, thought
Caitta, mental functions

Chanda, intention, strong

Jhāna (*dhyāna*), trances

Tathatā, thatness, *i e*, the Mahāyānic principle that things in reality remain the same and is without origin and destruction

Duhkha (*dukkha*), the doctrine that existence in any of the various worlds, or attachment to the things of the world is associated with pain, misery and so forth

Drsti (*ditthi*), view *samyak*, right, and *mithyā*, wrong
Dvesa (*dosa*), hatred

Dharma (dhamma), truth, doctrine, existent things and conditions, nature of things, qualities acquired by an adept, discourses
Dharmatā = *Tathatā* (q v)
Dhātu, elements, worlds, *viz*, kāma, rūpa, and arūpa, sometimes also apariyāpanna or lokottara, also relics
Dhāranī, the twelve qualities which firmly uphold a bodhisattva (Tib gzuns, Chi 絶持 = chueh-ch' ih), 282

Nāman, sign, name, 234n
Nāmarūpa, usually translated as "name and form", *nāma* denotes four of the five khandhas, *viz*, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāna, while *rūpa* denotes only the material aggregates of a body (rūpakkhandha)
Nimitta, sign, basis, 131, 232, 234n
Nirnimitta, signless, baseless
Nirodha, cessation, the third truth that duhkha can be ended
Nisprapañca, inexpressible
Nairātmya, non-existence of soul (*ātman*), want of substance in both *Pudgala* (individual) and *Dharma* (things of the world)

Pakatisāvaka, a common disciple

Paramārtha, the highest truth

Paryavasthānas, pervading passions, 27n, 30

Pāramitā, the six or ten virtues which a bodhisattva must completely acquire before he can become a Buddha

Pudgala (*Puggala*), soul, individual

Prajñapti, description, communication

Prajñā, knowledge, intellectual exercises for obtaining insight into the truth

Pratigha (*Patigha*), repugnance

Pratītyasamutpāda, the theory that all things originate out of some causes and conditions It is usually translated as "Law of Causation", "Causal Law", and recently as "Theory of relative existence"

Pratibhāna, readiness in speech, self-confidence in speech

Pratisamkhyā, knowledge

Pratisamvid (*patisambhidā*), understanding (Tib so-so-yan-dag-par-rig-pa), analysis, (for detailed treatment see *Points of the Controversy*, pp 377–382) It is of four kinds artha, dharma, nirukti and pratibhāna, 277, 283

Prapañca, describing a thing which is indescribable, hence a mere thought-construction, looking upon unity as manifold, 125, 187, 192, 197f, 213f

Phala, Hīnayānic fruits or stages of sanctification

Bala, powers, qualities

Buddhaksetra, it refers to the belief that every Buddha presides over a world of beings, 67n, 89, 121

Bodhicitta, the resolution made by an adept to become a Buddha, it is of two kinds, (i) Bodhipranidhi and (ii) Bodhiprasthāna, 247

Bodhipaksika (*bodhipakkhika* or *bodhipakkhiya*) *dharma*, the 37 qualities which an adept is to attain for full enlightenment, 4, 33, 91, 107, 246, 270

Brahmavihāra, meditation induced by altruistic concepts, 267, 308

Bhāva, existence

Bhāvanā, dwelling on something constantly i e, repeated *darśana*

Bhūtakoṭi, limit or end of existence (Tib yod-pa-ñid-kyi-mthah, also yan-dag-pa-ñid-kyi-mthah—*dharmadhātu*)

Bhūmi, stages of sanctification

Mārga, (i) the eightfold path, see *aṣṭāṅgikamārga*, (ii) the four of the eight Hīnayānic stages of sanctification

Moha, delusion

Yāna, vehicle, or path which leads an adept to liberation

Rāga, passion, attachment

Rūpa, material aggregates of a body, form

Lakṣana, percept, properties, characteristics

Lokadhātu, a sphere, a unit of the universe

Vāsanā, unconscious impression left by past actions, 197n, 234

Vaśitā, control acquired by a Bodhisattva over his mind, requisite length of life, action, birth, aspiration, doctrines, resolution, miraculous powers, and knowledge, 117, 281

Vikalpa, thought-construction

Vimokṣa, liberation, release, it usually refers to the three meditations induced by *śūnyatā*, *animitta* and *apraṇihita*, (q v) 160, 274

Vimukti, emancipation, liberation, deliverance

Vaiśāradya (*vesārajja*), four acquisitions which make Buddhas fearless, 75, 85, 108, 247, 281

Vicikitsā (*vicikicchā*), perplexity, doubt about the efficacy of following the Buddhist dharma

Vihāra (*bhūmi*), stages of sanctification

Vipassanā, deep vision, insight (Tib lhag-thoṅ)

Vyāpāda, hatred, ill-will

Śamatha, quietude, an absolute inexcitability of mind (Tib shi-gnas)

Śarana, taking refuge in the three ratnas, Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha

Śāśvatavāda, eternalism, 87, 170

Śikṣāpada, set of precepts, 311

Śīlavrataparāmarśa, taint due to belief in the efficacy of rites and ceremonial observances

Śūnya, devoid of attributes, non-existent

Śūnyatā, the Absolute which is devoid of all attributes

Sraddhā, reverential faith

Śrāvaka (*sāvaka*), usually it means disciples, the Mahāyānists, however, refer by this term to the Hīnayānists because the latter are initiated into the Truth by hearing discourses from Buddhas and their disciples

Satkāyadṛṣṭi (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), belief in the existence of one's own individuality

Samatā, the sameness of things of the world in reality, *i e*, things are without origination and destruction, not to speak of their distinctions

Samādhi, concentration

Samāpatti, the eight trances, *i e*, including the four jhānas

Samudaya, origin, it usually refers to the origin of misery or sufferings of the world, 49, 82, 227

Samudācāra, conduct, set of precepts, 310

Samgrahavastu, elements of popularity

Samvara, discipline

Samvṛti, conventional truth, as distinguished from *Paramārtha* (q v)

Samyojana, (ten) fetters, tieing a being to the world

Samsāra, world, existence, 46, 82, 94

Skandha (*khandha*), (i) the five constituents of a being, *rūpa* (material aggregates), *vedanā* (feeling), *samjñā* (perception) *samskāra* (impressions) and *vijñāna* (consciousness), 117, 136, 142, 163, 201–202

(ii) five groups of acquirements, *viz*, *śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti* and *vimuktijñānadarśana*, 104, 108

Samskṛta, constituted

Smṛtyupasthāna (*satipaṭṭhāna*), intent contemplation and mindfulness, 108, 230, 236

Svabhāva, existence, reality

Sāmānya, general

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